Auto pollution and congestion in an urban model: An analysis of alternative strategies

Congestion and pollution externalities associated with automobile driving are examined for their effect on urban structure. A monocentric urban model which incorporates household preferences for both an unpolluted environment and for leisure time is presented, and used to evaluate alternative pricing and emissions policies on automobile use and their effects on city structure. Optimal tax gradients for driving are derived, and compared with second best cases of per mile taxes and no taxes. As externalities gradients become more nonlinear, the welfare gains from employing optimal taxes rather than a per mile tax are increased. The appropriate choices of an emission standard, highway capacity, and highway pricing policy must be made simultaneously and depend on household preferences.     

Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence: evidence from the US

Concurrent taxation is a feature of many federal systems. As a result, the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other. A way to check the empirical relevance of this hypothesis is to test for the existence of interdependencies in the tax setting behaviour of various layers of government. Following this approach, this paper estimates the reaction of US state personal income and general sales taxes to federal tax rates, taking into account the special features of the US tax system. We find that when the federal government increases taxes, there is a significant positive response of state taxes.     

Optimal dynamic tax evasion

We study optimal dynamic tax evasion in the framework proposed by Lin and Yang (2001) and Dzhumashev and Gahramanov (2011) with some modifications: a more flexible utility function, a more realistic audit process, and a penalty function which can be defined both on evaded income and evaded taxes. In the former case the elasticity between tax rate and tax evasion is positive, unless the subsistence consumption level is higher than a given threshold. In the latter case the relationship is usually negative , but the value of elasticity depends on the form of absolute risk aversion. In particular we show that for increasing relative risk aversion, for a tax rate higher than 50%, the elasticity may even become positive. US data are consistent with IRRA preferences.     

Theoretical analysis and empirical measurements of the effects of the Philadelphia income tax

This study develops policy-oriented measures of optimal local taxes and their maxima which take into account the existence of macro multipliers, other taxes, and discounting. It also presents an estimate of the effects of the Philadelphia income tax on employment tax and revenues. An upper bound for the optimal tax rate is suggested. The current tax rate is found to perhaps be above both the optimal and the revenue maximizing (or monopoly) point.     

Union wage setting and progressive income taxation with heterogeneous labor: theory and evidence from the German income tax reforms 1986–1990

This paper analyzes the effects of tax shifting in a model with union wage setting and progressive income taxation. The setup allows for different skill levels of the workforce and accounts for the union's distributional objective of income equality. The theoretical predictions of the model are empirically tested with a panel of German micro-data covering the period of the income tax reforms 1986–1990. It is shown that average taxes raise wages, whereas increasing the progressivity of the tax system reduces wages. The effect of progressivity on high-skilled labor tends to be less significant and smaller. Stronger preferences for equality compress the (pre-tax) wage distribution.     

Tax avoidance and business location in a state border model

Previous studies have struggled to demonstrate that higher taxes deter business activity. We revisit this issue by estimating the effect of changes over time in cross-border differences in state tax conditions on the tendency for new establishments to favor one side of a state border over the other. Identification is enhanced by taking account of previously overlooked reciprocal agreements that require workers to pay income tax to their state of residence as opposed to their state of employment. When reciprocal agreements are in force, higher personal income tax rates lure companies from across the border, while corporate income tax and sales tax rates have the opposite effect. Where reciprocal agreements are not in place, the results are largely reversed. These patterns are amplified in heavily developed locations, and differ in anticipated ways by industry and corporate/non-corporate status of the establishment. Overall, results strengthen the view that state-level tax policies do affect the location decisions of entrepreneurs and new business activity, but not in a way that lends itself to a one-size-fits-all summary.     

EDITORIAL: TAX REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION

Major tax reform to simplify the UK tax system is possible. Merging income taxes, social security taxes and corporation tax into only a single flat-rate of tax on all incomes would be a radical start. Avoiding taxes on income and expenditure which are 'too high' requires major reductions in government spending, mainly on the welfare state. Given the political will, over a period of years we really can hugely improve the UK tax system.     

Reforming or Transforming the Federal Tax System: (A Review Essay)

A bstract . Several proposals to reform the federal income tax system are under active consideration. Professor Richard W. Lindholm has proposed instead that we abolish the individual and corporate income taxes and the estate and gift taxes. To replace the lost revenue he proposes a flat 15 per cent value added tax and a flat 2 per cent net wealth tax. He posits five goals for successful tax reform and discusses his proposed system in terms of them. He finds his system would be simpler and less disruptive of markets than even a simplified income tax structure.     

HOW SHOULD CAPITAL BE TAXED?

This survey discusses how capital should be taxed in advanced economies. We review the theoretical optimal tax literature, survey empirical studies on the distribution of capital and the distortionary costs of capital taxation, and analyze the desirability of specific taxes on capital income, wealth, property, inheritances, and corporate profits. Our overall conclusion is that capital taxation plays an important role in an optimal tax system, but only certain ways of taxing capital are able to strike a balance between optimality and administrative feasibility.     

Progressive Taxes and the Labour Market: Is the Trade–off Between Equality and Efficiency Inevitable?

Does an income tax harm economic efficiency more the more progressive it is? Public economics provides a strong case for a definite ‘yes’. But at least three forces may pull in the other direction. First, low–wage workers may on average have more elastic labour supply schedules than high–wage workers, in which case progressive taxes contribute to a more efficient allocation of the total tax burden. Second, in non–competitive labour markets, progressive taxes may encourage wage moderation, and hence reduce the equilibrium level of unemployment. And third, if wage setters have egalitarian objectives, progressive taxes may reduce the need for redistribution in pre–tax wages, and hence increase the demand for low–skilled workers. This paper surveys the theoretical, as well as the empirical literature about labour supply, taxes and wage setting. We conclude that in a second best world, the trade–off between equality and efficiency is not always inevitable.     

Optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfer in a dynamic model with multiple levels of government

In this paper, we study the optimal choices of the federal income tax, federal transfers, and local taxes in a dynamic model of capital accumulation and with explicit game structures among multiple private agents, multiple local governments, and the federal government. In general, the optimal local property tax is zero if the local property tax is constrained to be nonnegative, whereas the optimal local consumption tax is always positive. When the local consumption tax is chosen optimally, the federal income tax can be either positive or negative. For most reasonable parameter values, our numerical calculations have shown that with a positive local consumption tax there exists a reverse transfer from local governments to the federal government.     

The distributional implications of tax and transfer programs in US

The distributional consequences of changes in tax laws and transfer programs in the United States are studied. Using detailed household income data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1981–91, income inequality is measured for both pretax/transfer and post-tax/transfer definitions of household income. A new statistical methodology for assessing the impact of changes in taxes and transfers on the size distribution of income is utilized. Confidence intervals are constructed for various measures of inequality, and hypothesis tests are conducted to determine whether observed changes in the distribution of income due to taxes and transfers are statistically significant. Using decomposable measures of inequality, the implications of type of tax table used are investigated.     

关于教职工个人所得税税收筹划浅析

个人所得税是我国重要的税种之一,认真履行代扣代缴个人所得税是单位财务部门的重要工作内容。2019年1月1日实施新的个人所得税以来,个人所得税代缴工作暴露出不少问题,如漏缴、不足额代缴等问题突出。因此,如何构建合理的个人所得税税收筹划,降低职工的税收负担成为构建高质量财务管理工作的当务之急。     

How should heavy-duty trucks be taxed?

This paper develops and implements an analytical framework for estimating optimal taxes on the fuel use and mileage of heavy-duty trucks in the United States, accounting for external costs from congestion, accidents, pavement damage, noise, energy security, and local and global pollution. The analysis allows for endogenous fuel economy, increased auto travel in response to reduced truck congestion, and distinguishes driving by truck type and region. We estimate the optimal (second-best) diesel fuel tax at $1.12 per gallon and implementing it increases welfare by $1.34 billion per annum. Optimizing over both fuel and mileage taxes, and differentiating mileage taxes by vehicle type and region, yields progressively higher welfare gains. The most efficient tax structure involves a diesel fuel tax of 69 cents per gallon and charges on trucks that vary between 7 and 33 cents per mile; implementing this tax structure yields estimated welfare gains of $2.06 billion.     

国外环境税问题研究进展

对国外学者关于环境税收问题研究的新成果进行综述。诠释最优环境税定义及探寻不同条件假设下最优环境税率的确定,从一般均衡的视角考察环境质量对劳动供给决策的影响,探讨税收相互作用的效应和分析学者重点研究的双重红利及其存在条件。最后根据发达国家环境税政策运行的经验,分析将环境税作为环境管制措施引入发展中国家的可行性。     

State and Local Electric Utility Taxes:

ABSTRACT Competitive forces emerging nationally across the electric utility sector as a result of actual and anticipated deregulatory activity have forced the industry, various governmental units, and the general public to consider a number of important issues. One major concern is the extent to which state and local taxes imposed on the major investor-owned firms, traditionally embedded in regulated rates, will affect their competitive position relative to challenges from nonregulated competitors offering intrastate or interstate electricity sales. The most likely trend is tax revenue reduction accompanied by some efforts at revenue neutrality, as investor-owned firms lose their monopoly status in a more market-oriented environment and compete with smaller finns with relatively lower cost structures. The trend will also include customer-based taxation shifting the burden from the providers of electricity to the customers, with the providers remaining as tax collectors.     

Tax Policy Coordination, Vertical Externalities, and Optimal Taxation in a System of Hierarchical Governments

Tax policies of two levels of government (state and federal) with overlapping tax bases are considered. This overlap leads to “vertical” fiscal externalities are considered when several different commodities are in the tax base and the tax bases of the two levels of government may not be identical. When the governments share a tax base, the mix of combined taxes is optimal. With different tax bases, combined taxes are no longer optimal as federal tax rates are adjusted to reflect state public service levels. When grants are available, a welfare-maximizing mix of taxes and public services is obtained.     

浅谈个人所得税的筹划技巧

个人所得税的征收在现在社会备受关注,本文以我国现行的个人所得税法规为依据,从个人所得税筹划的思路出发,介绍了两个经典的个人所得税筹划案例,希望通过本文可以让读者在履行自身应尽纳税义务的同时,又能用合理合法的筹划手段来维护自身权益。     

Sources of Public Revenue that Make Nations Richer

Among sources of public revenue that make nations richer, the most beneficial are charges for harms, such as pollution and congestion, and charges for the private benefits from public services. Increases in the money supply sufficient to keep price changes in line with expectations are also beneficial. Taxes on concentrations of wealth are beneficial if wealth inequality is considered harmful. Properly administered taxes on land do no harm and are beneficial when markets are imperfect. Among taxes that cause harm, the combination of a tax on labour income and a tax on inheritances is probably the least damaging.     

Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint

Pairwise majority voting over alternative nonlinear income tax schedules is considered when there is a continuum of individuals who differ in their labor productivities, which is private information, but share the same quasilinear-in-consumption preferences for labor and consumption. Voting is restricted to those schedules that are selfishly optimal for some individual. The analysis extends that of Brett and Weymark (2016) by adding a minimum-utility constraint to their incentive-compatibility and government budget constraints. It also extends the analysis of Röell (2012) and Bohn and Stuart (2013) by providing a complete characterization of the selfishly optimal tax schedules. It is shown that individuals have single-peaked preferences over the set of selfishly optimal tax schedules, and so the schedule proposed by the median skill type is a Condorcet winner.