Political institutions and telecommunications

It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries' political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and discuss venues for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development.     

Free entry into telecommunications?

The two leading principles of pricing for public enterprises are outlined: Value based and cost based pricing. It is shown that optimal pricing à la Ramsey-Boiteux is closely related to value based pricing which itself is connected with Lindahl pricing of public goods. Cost based pricing is related to the pricing in competitive markets. Opening up of telecommunication to competition implies a change from value based (public good) pricing to cost based (pritate good) pricing. It is shown why specific developments in telecommunication technology make a switch to cost based pricing and a competitive environment appropriate. At the end a proposal is developed for a gradual change towards competition which would meet less political resistance.     

Competition and investment in telecommunications

This study examines the relationship between competition and investment by Incumbert Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) in US telecommunications markets. A panel data model and a dynamic panel data model that have not been used in previous studies are applied in this analysis. Results of the panel data model suggest that investment by ILECs is positively related to the market share of Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs), and negatively to the absolute number of CLECs. However, once the persistence in ILECs’ investment behaviour is controlled for using the dynamic model, our measures of the existing competition from CLECs, at best, have a weak effect on ILECs’ investment. Therefore, while strengthening competition in the telecom sector may be key to restoring telecom investment, it is uncertain that competition spurred by the mandatory sharing policy in this sector stimulates ILECs’ incentives to invest in new infrastructure.     

Rational Abstention and the Congressional Vote Choice

Research on voting, particularly on legislative behavior, tends to focus on the choices of those casting ballots. Yet, intuitively, abstentions and vote choice should be jointly determined. As such, the relevance of participation depends upon both the extent to which it can be explained by the costs and the benefits of voting and on the nature of the interactions between participation and preferences. To this end, we provide a framework for explaining roll call behavior that simultaneously considers legislators' decisions about whether and how to vote. Application to roll call voting in the 104th Congress finds that abstention and voting choices are integrated; our approach generates sensible and substantively important results which yield important insights into legislative behavior and public policy.     

Policy issues in the development of telecommunications

The paper examines the specific features of the telecommunications system which determine its character, and the regulatory issues which arise out of a situation of potential conflict between the telecommunications network operators (PITs) and the providers and consumers of value added services transacted on the network. It looks at the policy options available to reconcile such conflicts, and at how EC policies are shaping the future of the European telecommunications ststem. It concludes that current development in telematics are aimed mainly at business users, and that safeguards for the private custormer will be necessary in order to ensure the provision of a socially equitable service.     

Policy issues in the development of telecommunications

The paper examines the specific features of the telecommunications system which determine its character, and the regulatory issues which arise out of a situation of potential conflict between the telecommunications network operators (PITs) and the providers and consumers of value added services transacted on the network. It looks at the policy options available to reconcile such conflicts, and at how EC policies are shaping the future of the European telecommunications ststem. It concludes that current development in telematics are aimed mainly at business users, and that safeguards for the private custormer will be necessary in order to ensure the provision of a socially equitable service.     

Salience as an emergent property

We offer an evolutionary model of the emergence of concepts of salience through similarity-based learning. When an individual faces a new decision problem, she chooses an action that she perceives as similar to actions that, when chosen in similar previous problems, led to favourable outcomes. If some similarities are more reliably perceived than others, this process will favour the emergence of conventions that are defined in terms of reliably perceived similarities. We discuss experimental evidence of learning in recurrent play of similar but not identical pure coordination games.     

Simulating some impacts of telecommunications/transportation substitution

A number of authors have written about the potential for telecommuting—the substitution of computer and telecommunications technology for the journey to work—to occur in the coming decades. Although some research points out serious problems with telecommuting if the alternative is to work at home, significant benefits will accrue to employees if the substitution is trips to neighborhood workcenters (NWCs) versus trips to the central business district (CBD). This paper provides an assessment of the factors influencing the decision to undertake a substitution using NWCs as the major alternative. The impacts of these decisions on one urban area are simulated with respect to cost and time savings for commuters, reductions in gasoline consumption, and reductions in air pollution. The implications of these findings for future research in this area are discussed.     

The economics of deregulation of local exchange telecommunications

This paper has two objectives. The first is to reappraise the potential competitiveness of local exchange telecommunications markets, in light of recent arguments in favor of deregulation. The second objective is to discuss regulatory reform strategies. We conclude that local telecommunications markets retain the essential characteristics of a natural monopoly, but that many of the regulatory reforms are nevertheless desirable.     

地方人大监督权的三种研究范式

本文比较了理解人大监督权的三种范式，经典理论范式、法律文本范式以及治理范式，并重点分析了治理范式下实现人大监督权的相关因素。在理论确立、法律明确的情况下，要使监督权有效地运转起来，不能依然抱怨理论的抽象或法律规定的不具体，那只能使监督权永远停留在字面上，必须重视对制度空间的利用以及监督权行使过程中涉及的诸要素的分析。     

An assessment of telecommunications reform in developing countries

This paper analyzes the impact of policy reform in basic telecommunications on sectoral performance using a new panel data set for 86 developing countries across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean over the period 1985 to 1999. We address three questions. First, what impact do specific policy changes—relating to ownership and competition—have on sectoral performance? Second, how is the impact of change in any one policy affected by the implementation of the other, and by the overall regulatory framework? Third, does the sequence in which reforms are implemented affect performance? We find that both privatization and competition lead to significant improvements in performance. But a comprehensive reform program, involving both policies and the support of an independent regulator, produced the largest gains: an 8 percent higher level of mainlines and a 21 percent higher level of labor productivity compared to years of partial and no reform. Interestingly, the sequence of reform matters: mainline penetration is lower if competition is introduced after privatization, rather than at the same time.     

Asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets

In liberalized telecommunications markets, the incumbent typically enjoys several advantages over any entrant. Regulation in such asymmetric markets stimulates competition in the short and the long term if retail prices are low and the entrant's profits are high so that entry is encouraged. I show that asymmetric access price regulation with a cost-based access price for the incumbent and an access markup for the entrant is more successful than cost-based access price regulation applied to incumbent and entrant. This is a robust prediction with respect to the pricing strategies considered. Such asymmetric access price regulation is in accordance with European legislation.     

Capacity-based versus time-based access charges in telecommunications

The Spanish telecommunications regulator recently introduced a capacity-based access system. Under this regulation, entrants pay a flat charge for the interconnection circuits leased to the incumbent operator and are able to freely use these circuits to provide telecommunications services. This paper determines the optimal capacity-based access charge in the presence of time varying demand and capacity constraints and compares this regulation with the traditional time of use access system. The analysis shows that either type of regulation allows the incumbent to recover its fixed costs and can promote the same pattern of entry. Finally, the optimal capacity-based access charge when the entrant has market power is derived.      

Complexity of economic structures and emergent properties

This concept revolves around differences of embeddedness of organizations in the macro patterns of routines (economic policy regimes), which in turn may differentially provide them–and the system as a whole–with ‘procedural rationality’ in dealing with identified problems in their relevant complex environment. Regularities of interdependence are specified between different regime patterns and the variety of coordination routines between and inside micro organizations. Corresponding regularities are also observed for internal governance routines of organizations, which in turn determine the behavioral adaptation by self-organization that may be rationally in a local perspective, but–contingent on the organization’s embeddedness in the coordination structure–not necessarily so in a comprehensive one.

Estimation of household preferences for long distance telecommunications carrier

The competitive environment in long-distance telecommunications markets changed considerably with the divestiture of AT&T in 1982. A variety of providers appeared, offering myriad services. In this environment, customer selection of preferred long-distance carrier became more complicated and more important.In this paper, we analyze and quantify the determinants of this choice. To our knowledge, this focus is distinct. By contrast, the literature to date has analyzed the behavioral determinants of calling volume (local and long-distance) and the selection of local service options.In our analysis, we allow the alternative carriers to differ in terms of tariffs, reputation, quality, access, and specialized customer services. We quantify the interactive effects of these carrier attributes and customer demographics upon the selection of carrier. Price and income elasticities are estimated. A distinguishing feature of our analysis is that it examines behavioral differences among households in equal-access and unequal-access areas. We find that households assured of the convenience of 1 + dialling for their chosen carrier in equal-access areas display more rational and sophisticated decision making. On the other hand, households in unequal-access areas display greater status quo effects in their decision making.     

Multinational firms, international trade and international telecommunications

The study analyses the determinants of international telephone, telex, telegram and leased lines communication between the United States and 46 countries. It focusses on the role of multinational firms, international trading firms and new information technologies within the framework of the theory of transaction costs.Results of the econometric estimates suggest that: (a) technological conditions of telecommunication infrastructure, i.e., international diffusion lags of new information technologies, play an important role in the explanation of international telephone and telex telecommunication flows but not in the demand for telegraph and leased lines, (b) multinational firms use international telecommunication to reduce the coordination costs and are strong customers of leased lines and telephones, but less so of telex and telegrams, (c) international trading firms exhibit less clear preferences in the use of the different media to reduce transaction costs.