Bangladesh's trade and economic relations with the socialist countries

After her independence in 1971, the economic relations between Bangladesh and the European socialist countries developed to a greater extent than before. But the socialist countries still remain relatively small trading partners of Bangladesh. Their share in the total aid received by the heavily aid-dependent Bangladesh has also not been very great. It is not possible to arrive at any precise estimate of the terms of trade and aid between Bangladesh and the socialist countries, but some rudimentary measurements show that they are unlikely to have been very different from those between Bangladesh and the rest of the world.     

Egypt's economic relations with the socialist countries

The economic relations between Egypt and the socialist countries (1948-73) are discussed and appraised in the context of the political, economic and historical factors which brought them about and maintained them. It is argued that, because of special circumstances, Egypt had little choice but to develop close economic ties with the Soviet bloc. Bilateral trade has known disadvantages; the USSR, however, links trade with generous credit-an attractive feature for LDCs suffering from chronic balance-of-payments deficits. Other advantages and costs of bilateral trade are also discussed. The paper includes comments on Soviet development assistance. A main theme is that Egypt, considering the restrictions imposed on her options by the polarization of the Arab-Israeli conflict, fared well in the relationship. Export and import prices in bilateral agreements seem to have corresponded to world prices, often with a premium in Egypt's favour. Egypt also benefited from a large inflow of resources and from a significant contribution to domestic capital formation.     

Special gains from trade with socialist countries: The case of Tanzania

Trade does not necessarily benefit all trading partners and heavy dependence on trade is a precarious matter. Trade with socialist countries could confer special advantages on Third World trading partners thus making a net benefit more likely. However this requires conditions in which trade ceases to be ‘mere exchange of commodities’ and becomes an element of planned economic integration. Given a non-planned Third World country like Tanzania and given recent approaches to international trade by most socialist countries, it is not surprising that Tanzania is shown to have derived no particular benefits from its trade with the socialist countries. The trade was merely an exchange of commodities, with the possible exception of the trade with China.     

Japan's ‘Aid’ to developing countries

Although Japan has now emerged as one of the major donors, next only to the USA, Japanese aid activities have been criticized as being ‘neo-colonial’. Much of the criticism results from the fact that in the total flow of financial resources, the share of the official development assistance and the ‘grant’ element in it is rather small. A much greater proportion of the total flow is directed towards export promotion for Japanese goods and securing the sources of raw materials abroad. The geographical distribution of Japanese assistance gives further grounds for allegations of ‘neo-colonialism’. Around 60 per cent of the total financial flow is directed towards Asia, a little less than half of which is concentrated in South-east Asia. It is almost certain that the total flow in absolute terms will continue to increase; in view of the energy crisis and the likely balance of payments difficulties, it is doubtful whether the current high levels in terms of percentage of GNP will be maintained. If there is to be a cutback it is almost certain that ‘aid’ will suffer more than foreign investments. In terms of proportion of GNP, official development assistance has not reached the target set by the International Development Strategy for the UN Second Development Decade. It is not expected to do so in the foreseeable future.     

Long-term development credits and socialist trade

Zusammenfassung Langfristige Entwicklungskredite und sozialistischer Au\enhandel. —Die chronischen Ungleichgewichte auf dem Comecon-Markt haben unter anderem zu betr?chtlichen langfristigen Kreditstrómen für genau bezeichnete Zwecke (long-term credits for well-defined purposes, abgek. CWDP) unter den Comecon-Mitgliedern geführt. Sozialistische Kommentare haben diese Transaktionen als nützlich für alle beteiligten Partner erkl?rt, ohne die Bedingungen für die Wirksamkeit und Nützlichkeit dieser Abmachungen n?her zu untersuchen. Darüber hinaus mu\ die sozialistische Interpretation dieser Kredite als langfristige L?sung der Ungleichgewichte als au\erordentlich kurzsichtig bezeichnet werden; CWDP-Kredite lassen die okonomischen Ursachen dieser schwierigen Entwicklungsprobleme unberührt. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die wichtigsten Ursachen der Ungleichgewichte und die besonderen Umst?nde der Kreditabkommen (Abschnitt I). Eine der seltenen kritischen überprüfungen durch M. Tardos stellte die heilsamen Wirkungen dieser Kredite in Frage, aber die Analyse zog aufkl?rende Schlu\folgerungen aus unzureichend und ungenau dargestellten Bedingungen. Abschnitt II enth?lt eine verbesserte und erweiterte Darstellung des Problems von Tardos. Der au\erordentlich niedrige Zinssatz für Kredite zwischen Comecon-L?ndern (Intra-CMEA-Kredite) liefert auf den ersten Blick den Beweis für eine Benachteiligung der Kreditgeber. Abschnitt III prüft die wichtigsten relevanten Grundzüge der Intra-CMEA-Kredittransaktionen und führt zu einer vorsichtigeren Bewertung der Kosten und Vorteile. Im Abschnitt IV werden schlie\lich das Problem der Ausdehnung gebundener Kredite im allgemeinen und die Frage der Vor- und Nachteile für die direkt am Comecon beteiligten L?nder ebenso wie für die Drittl?nder im besonderen erortert. Im Anhang werden die wichtigsten bekannt gewordenen Kredite und, soweit als m?glich, auch Einzelheiten über die Bedingungen der Abmachungen zusammengestellt.

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Résumé Crédits de développement à long terme et commerce extérieur socialiste. — Les déséquilibres chroniques dans le marché CAEM ont amené, entre autres, des flots remarquables de crédits à long terme pour fins bien définis (longterm credits for well-defined purposes = CWDP) entre membres du marché CAEM. Les commentaires socialistes ont considéré ces transactions avantageuses pour tous les interéssés, mais sans avoir examiné bien profondément leurs conditions d’efficacité et d’utilité. D’ailleurs, l’interprétation socialiste de ces crédits comme solution durable des déséquilibres manque, évidemment, de discernement. Les crédits CWDP ne remédient pas aux causes économiques de ces problèmes de développement bien compliqués. L’article que voici met au jour les causes les plus importantes des déséquilibres et les circonstances spéciales des accords de crédit (section I). Il est vrai qu’une étude critique rare de M. Tardos a mis en question les effets avantageux de ces crédits, mais son analyse appliqua un raisonnement clair à des conditions insuffisamment et inexactement exprimées. Section II présente une correction et une extension des problèmes de Tardos. Le taux d’intérêt extrémement bas pour les crédits entre membres du CAEM est une preuveprima facie de ce qu’il y a désavantage aux créditeurs. Section III examine les traits les plus importants des accords intra-CAEM de crédit, ce qui permet une évaluation mieux considérée des co?ts et des bénéfices. Section IV, enfin, examine la question générale des crédits fixés et s’occupe du problème des co?ts et bénéfices pour les pays qui ont part aux crédits CWDP, aussi bien que pour des tiers. Dans un appendice, une liste des crédits les plus importants qu’on conna?t est donnée avec des détails — si disponibles — des conditions des accords.

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Resumen Créditos de desarrollo a largo plazo y comercio exterior de los países socialistas. — Los desequilibrios crónicos en el mercado del COMECON han dado lugar a importantes corrientes de créditos a largo plazo para usos exactamente definidos (long-term credits for well-defined purposes = CWDP) entre los países miembros. Los comentaristas socialistas subrayan las ventajas que estas transacciones tienen para todos los países, pero no analizan los condicionantes de la eficacia y utilidad de las mismas. Además, esperar de estos créditos una solución duradera de los desequilibrios es mostrar poca perspicacia; pues los créditos CWDP no afectan a las causas económicas de estos difíciles problemas de desarrollo. El presente artículo comienza por estudiar las principales causas de los desequilibrios y las circunstancias especiales bajo las que se llegó a estos acuerdos crediticios. Es cierto que uno de los pocos análisis críticos existentes, de M. Tardos, puso en duda los efectos útiles de estos créditos, pero las conclusiones se basaban en condiciones insuficientes e inexactas. Por ello, la segunda parte del artículo contiene una presentación revisada y ampliada del problema de Tardos. El tipo de interés extraordinariamente bajo para créditos entre países miembros del COMECON demuestra que estas transacciones perjudican a los países donantes. En la tercera parte se analizan las características más importantes de dichas transacciones y se intenta una evaluación de costes y beneficios. Finalmente, en la cuarta parte, el autor discute el problema de la ampliación de creditos sujetos a un uso determinado en general, así como la cuestión de las ventajas y desventajas para los países miembros del COMECON y terceros países en particular. El anexo contiene los principales créditos conocidos y, donde es posible, los pormenores de los acuerdos correspondientes.

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Riassunto Crediti per lo sviluppo a lungo termine e commercio estero socialista. — I cronici squilibri sul mercato del Comecon hanno condotto tra i soci del Comecon, tra l’altro, a considerevoli correnti di credito a lungo termine per scopi ben definiti (long-term credits for well-defined purposes, abbrev. CWDP). Commenti socialisti hanno dichiarato utili queste transazioni per i soci partecipanti senza esaminare più da vicino le condizioni per l’efficacia e l’utilità di questi accordi. Inoltre l’interpretazione socialista di questi crediti come soluzione a lungo termine degli squilibri deve essere definita straordinariamente miope; CWDP-crediti lasciano intatte le cause economiche di questi difficili problemi di sviluppo. Il presente contributo esamina le cause più importanti degli squilibri e le condizioni particolari degli accordi di credito (capitolo I). Una delle rare verifiche critiche condotta da M. Tardos pose in dubbio gli effetti benefici di questi crediti, ma l’analisi tirò illuminanti conseguenze da condizioni insufficienti e non esattamente rappresentate. I1 capitolo II contiene un’esposizione ampliata e migliorata del problema di Tardos. Il tasso d’interesse per crediti straordinariamente basso tra i Paesi del Comecon (Intra-CMEA-crediti) fornisce a prima vista la prova di uno svantaggio per il sovventore. I1 capitolo III esamina le più importanti e rilevanti caratteristiche delle Intra-CMEA-transazioni di credito e conduce ad una più cauta valutazione dei costi e vantaggi. Nel capitolo IV infine sono discussi il problema dei crediti vincolati in generale e la questione degli svantaggi e vantaggi per i Paesi direttamente partecipanti al Comecon altrettanto come per i Paesi terzi. In appendice sono raccolti i crediti più importanti divenuti noti e, per quanto possibile, anche particolari sulle condizioni degli accordi.

     

Safeguards and voluntary export restraints under the World Trade Organization: The case of Japan's vegetable trade

Though the WTO agreement of safeguards prohibits VERs, WTO members can still use VERs without formal intergovernmental agreements. Our theoretical analysis shows that the fear of invoking a safeguard measure by an importing country on a good can induce a disruptive exporter of the good to enforce such a VER under certain conditions (for example, if the number of exporting country is not large). Our empirical analysis, using Japan's first safeguard actions as a case study, suggests that if producers of an exporting country capture an export market and if there is a large drop in their export price, the producers seeing a growing threat of safeguards will enforce such VERs. Our results highlight the need for amendments to the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.     

Pakistan and the socialist countries: Trade and aid

The economic relations between Pakistan and the socialist countries are examined against their political background. The sharp deterioration in Pakistan's political relations with the socialist countries in the 1950s was accompanied by a contraction in trade, which had almost been a one-way flow until the early 1960s, consisting of Pakistan's exports. The political rapprochement with the socialist countries following the 1962 Sino-Indian clash coincided with a tremendous spurt in trade, largely under the aegis of barter trade agreements. Trade turnover increased fivefold in the sixties and Pakistan became a recipient of socialist aid. An examination of the structure of trade reveals that Pakistan's exports to the socialist countries diversified considerably less than total exports, but that the terms of trade were more favourable. The quantity, kinds, and sources of socialist aid are also examined.     

Some aspects of China's agricultural development experience: Implications for developing countries in Asia

China's rather ‘unorthodox’ rural development strategies have attracted growing interest from developing countries in search of more effective development alternatives. The Chinese experiment is characterized by: (1) heavy emphasis on the institutional precondition for agricultural development; (2) rejection of urban-biased policies for more balanced strategies comprising many distinctly pro-agrarian measures; and (3) an integrated approach, centred primarily on the communes, which closely links production to distribution, rural capital formation, rural industrialization, and a wide range of non-farm activities. The Chinese experience should be instructive to many developing countries, even though its direct transfer-ability to different political and social contexts is often called into question.     

Changes in the socialist countries: Contents and prospects

Abstract

This paper examines volatility transmission and conditional correlations behaviour between the US and the Asian stock markets considering the effect of the Global Financial crisis. One Asian mature market and 10 emerging markets are included in the sample. To carry out the analysis, we use a multivariate asymmetric GARCH model. Results show that there exists volatility transmission between the US and the Asian markets. Moreover, it is found that, after the crisis, volatility transmission patterns have barely changed. Finally, results suggest that the lower the country‘s level of development, the lower the correlation with the USA.