Profitability and supply price in the US domestic oil industry: implications for the political economy of oil in the twenty-first century

In May 2001, the US Government's National Energy Policy DevelopmentGroup proposed to increase investment in domestic oil resourcesand to diversify further the sourcing of US oil imports by increasingproduction in new petroleum provinces. The paper argues thatboth strands of this policy are dependent upon a third, unstated,objective—to ensure that OPEC retains sufficient marketpower to prevent the sort of collapse in world oil prices thatoccurred in 1998–99. The consequences of that collapse,when the real price of US oil fell to its lowest level in 53years, are explored. Finally, it is argued that the outcomeof the crisis was a rapprochement between OPEC and the US. Itis suggested that the consensus between the US and OPEC as tothe desired range within which the world oil price should moveis likely to survive any temporary political disturbances.     

Optimization agricultural production under financial risk of water constraint in the Jordan Valley

Using high-frequency data the co-movements among crude oil prices are analysed in order to address the question of regionalization of the world crude oil market. Time-series econometrics in the form of error-correction modelling is applied for daily crude oil price data covering the time period 1988 to 2004 and in this framework topics like weak and strong exogeneity among three major oil prices – represented by Brent, OPEC and Texas (WTI) – are addressed. The empirical results are that causality is most likely bi-directional among these crude oil prices – and hence rejecting a regionalization hypothesis of the global oil market – and also an influence from the OPEC oil price towards Bent and WTI, which are usually claimed to have a benchmark role.     

Fundamentals and Oil Price Behaviour: New Evidence from Co‐integration Tests with Structural Breaks and Granger Causality Tests

As the world economy has undergone various changes and shocks, the oil market went through significant fluctuations during the period 1994–2015. This study focuses on discussing the possible factors that determine crude oil prices, which include world economic growth, market power of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), non‐OPEC supply and the value of dollar, taking into account the structural changes that influence the study period, which is quarterly data for the period of 1994.Q1–2015.Q3. For time series stationarity tests, Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Perron (1997) unit root test with structural break is used. To test the existence of a long relationship in the presence of structural changes, the Gregory and Hansen (1996a, 1996b) method of co‐integration is used. For long‐run coefficient, we proceed to estimate fully modified least squares. The result shows a significant influence of non‐OPEC supply, the dollar appreciation and world gross domestic product growth, but OPEC did not have a significant effect on the price of oil, which is indicated by the structural break for OPEC capacity utilisation at 2002.Q1, that indicates the starting point of the loss of OPEC power. Establishing the presence of co‐integration, we apply the evaluation of Granger causality for co‐integrated data, using vector error‐correction model.     

The market power of OPEC 1973–2001

We apply a multi-equation dynamic econometric model on monthly data to test if the behaviour of OPEC as a whole or different sub-groups of the cartel is consistent with the characteristics of dominant producers on the world crude oil market in the period 1973–2001. Our results indicate that the producers outside OPEC can be described as competitive producers, taking the oil price as given and maximizing profits. The OPEC members do not fit the behaviour of price-taking producers. Our findings of low residual demand price elasticities for OPEC underpin the potential market power of the producer group, and are in line with the results in some recent energy studies. On the other hand, our findings indicate that neither OPEC nor different sub-groups of the cartel can be characterized as a dominant producer in the period 1973–1994. However, we find that the characteristics of a dominant producer to some extent fit OPEC-Core as from 1994. Thus, although OPEC clearly has affected the market price, the producer group has not behaved as a pure profit-maximizing dominant producer.     

The prospects for OPEC five years after 1973/74

This paper surveys more than a dozen models of OPEC and world energy markets that have appeared since 1976. Included are simulation models, optimization models, and analyses of energy balances. Attention is focused on the outlook for OPEC prices and the demand for OPEC oil exports over the next fifteen years. Virtually all analyses agree that substantial changes from current market conditions are unlikely over the next few years. Beyond 1985, however, some project a severe tightening in world oil markets, while others project no such change from current conditions.     

The simple macroeconomics of an oil-dependent economy

This paper constructs and analyzes a simple macrodynamic model of a small economy that is completely dependent upon OPEC for oil imports. The impact and dynamic behavior of wages, prices, output and exchange rates is analyzed under several alternative scenarios. Initially, it is assumed that oil is denominated in dollars and the consequences of an increase in oil prices are investigated under a system of free floating. In later sections, the effects of this disturbance are re-examined under various kinds of ‘managed float’ systems.     

TERRORISM AND THE RETURNS TO OIL

The effect of terrorism on global oil prices has been largely explained through demand-side effects. We estimate an empirical model to re-examine the effect of terrorism on the price of global oil stocks across oil market regimes that reflect different supply constraints. We believe that terrorism will have larger impacts when global capacity is tight (i.e. when global demand is close to global supply). This means that any shock to capacity (say by conflict) should have the largest impact on profits before the first OPEC shock in the early 1970s. Since then, conflict shocks would not allow firms to exploit production in the same way, thus reducing the available profits that could be garnered by such production manipulation. If capacity constraints are binding when a conflict occurs, then we predict that a positive stock price reaction can be expected for oil firms from such a shock. We exploit a new panel dataset to investigate the relationship between oil profitability and conflict, using conflict data from the top 20 oil producing and exporting countries in the world. We show that in the later part of our sample, 1974–2005, as cartel behavior of OPEC member countries has diminished and as conflict has become more regular and thus the information surrounding it noisier, oil stock prices do not increase in response to conflict. However, in earlier capacity constrained eras, we find that oil stocks can in fact increase in response to conflict. In some cases, the impact of conflict may cause the return of oil stocks to increase by as much as 10 percentage points.     

Fuel Efficiency Improvements: Feedback Mechanisms and Distributional Effects in the Oil Market

We study the interactions between fuel efficiency improvements in the transport sector and the oil market, where the efficiency improvements are policy-induced in certain regions of the world. We are especially interested in feedback mechanisms of fuel efficiency such as the rebound effect, carbon leakage and the “green paradox”, but also the distributional effects for oil producers. An intertemporal numerical model of the international oil market is introduced, where OPEC-Core producers have market power. We find that the rebound effect has a noticeable effect on the transport sector, with the magnitude depending on the oil demand elasticity. In the benchmark simulations, we calculate that almost half of the energy savings may be lost to a direct rebound effect and an additional 10% to oil price adjustments. In addition, there is substantial intersectoral leakage to other sectors through lower oil prices in the regions that introduce the policy. There is a small green paradox effect in the sense that oil consumption increases initially when the fuel efficiency measures are gradually implemented. Finally, international carbon leakage will be significant if policies are not implemented in all regions; we estimate leakage rates of 35% or higher when only major consuming regions implement fuel economy policies. Non-OPEC producers will to a larger degree than OPEC producers cut back on its oil supply as a response to fuel efficiency policies due to high production costs.     

能源冲击对中国宏观经济的影响

能源是影响中国经济波动的一个重要因素,在目前中国所实行的宏观经济政策目标下,中国能源总体价格上升10%,当年的通货膨胀率上升大约0.29%,最终导致的总体价格水平上升0.35%,而产出缺口在当年为0.34%,最终造成的产出损失累计为0.41%;国际石油价格上升100%将导致中国物价出现温和上升以及产出出现小幅下降,但二者均不会超过1%。     

OIL PRICE VOLATILITY AND U.S. MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

This study uses a model with explicit energy sector linkages to estimate the macroeconomic impacts of the 1986 collapse in energy prices. The model combines features of neoclassical macroeconomics to estimate final demand spending and of general equilibrium analysis to estimate substitution possibilities. The model allows price and wage rigidities yet permits interfuel and input substitutions. The simulation results suggest three conclusions. First, the most significant macroeconomic impact of the 1986 oil price reduction is the sharp drop in inflation. Second, output and employment gains are relatively small due to the sharp drop in energy sector output. Finally, the estimated gain in real output due to lower energy prices is close to the output loss resulting from the trade deficit increase during 1986. This may be one reason why no substantial increase in economic growth occurred following the 1986 collapse in energy prices.     

OPEC and the monopoly price of world oil

The paper presents a dynamic model of the behavior of OPEC viewed as a monopolist sharing the oil market with a competitive sector. The main conclusion is that the recent increase in the price of oil was a once and for all phenomenon due to the formation of the cartel and that prices should remain approximately constant during the next twenty years.     

基于可计算一般均衡模型的能源价格变动对新疆经济的影响

基于通用可计算一般均衡(CGE)平台,探讨了能源价格变动对新疆地区宏观经济的影响。模拟结果显示:(1)煤炭价格和天然气价格分别上涨10%以后,新疆地区的GDP、各部门的产出和居民消费变动不大,说明提高煤炭和天然气价格不会对新疆经济造成大的波动,未来新疆地区能源价格改革应从煤炭和天然气入手。(2)油价上涨10%后,新疆地区部门产出和居民消费变化较大,因此未来新疆地区在提高油价时应考虑社会稳定,避免产生大的经济波动。值得注意的是提高油价后,城乡收入差距缩小。总体来说提高油价所产生的影响是积极的。     

OPEC as a political and economical entity

This paper assumes that the decision makers of OPEC (or at least of its core members) are interested in both profits and political payoffs (support, popularity, being a hero of the Arab or Islamic street, etc.). The oil weapon, i.e. a reduction of output is the most powerful instrument to obtain political payoffs from harming the West, which can be also profitable in the short run due to the high prices implied by sluggish demand for OPEC oil. The analysis shows that this political objective reduces longrun supply and includes the possibility that it is optimal to ‘kill the goose that lays the golden eggs’ if initial demand is below a threshold (and multiple steady states exist).     

The Sleeping Giant Awakes: Projecting Global Implications of China's Energy Consumption

China's rapid economic growth has generated a surge in energy demand that is reallocating global fuel balances. We employ a global energy computable general‐equilibrium model to analyze alternative scenarios for economic growth, Chinese currency appreciation, and oil price shocks, with a special focus on China energy markets. Imports from the Middle East, Central Asia, Russia, and Sub‐Saharan Africa are found to comprise a growing share of China's energy. Imports to China grow from 12% of world energy imports in 2010 to 17% by 2050 when over 80% of China's oil demand will be imported.     

Beyond Kyoto: backstop technologies and endogenous prices on CO2 permits and fossil fuels

This paper analyses the markets for fossil fuels given that the limits the Kyoto Protocol sets on CO₂ emissions from Annex B countries extend beyond 2008–2012. A forward-looking model with endogenous prices for fossil fuels is applied under different assumptions concerning the technological progress for a carbon-free backstop technology. Both the time-profile of the international permit price needed for the Kyoto Forever targets as well as the implications through reduced demand and lower producer prices for fossil fuels are calculated. The permit price has to rise at least up to 2030 in order to fulfil the emission targets. From then on the necessary permit price shows different future developments, dependent on when the backstop technology starts to replace oil. Since changes in the availability of the backstop technology shift the time-profile of the permit price, the loss of petroleum wealth for oil and gas producers varies between the scenarios, but is never more than 20%. Findings indicate that the reduction in gas revenues in OECD-Europe after the introduction of the targets amounts to a yearly loss of 0.01–0.02% of their total GNP for half a century. The reduction in oil revenues for OPEC is comparable to an annual loss of 2.9–5.4% of their GNP over a period of sixty years.     

An endogenous growth model with embodied energy-saving technical change

In this paper, we extend the Romer [Journal of Political Economy 98 (Part 2) (1990) S271] model in two ways. First we include energy consumption of intermediates. Second, intermediates become heterogeneous due to endogenous energy-saving technical change. We show that the resulting model can still generate steady state growth, but the growth rate depends negatively on the growth of real energy prices. The reason is that real energy price rises will lower the profitability of using new intermediate goods, and hence, the profitability of doing research, and therefore have a negative impact on growth. We also show that the introduction of an energy tax that is recycled in the form of an R&D subsidy may increase growth. We conclude that in order to have energy efficiency growth and output growth under rising real energy prices, a combination of R&D and energy policy is called for.     

The validity of uncovered interest parity: Evidence from african members and non-member of the organisation of petroleum exporting countries (OPEC)

This paper re-examines uncovered interest parity (UIP) puzzle using Africa where there is dearth of studies. It extends the previous literature in the following ways. It captures the heterogeneity (oil and non-oil sources of shocks) in the region by considering both African members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries- OPEC (Algeria, Nigeria and Angola) and non-member (South Africa) to ensure generalisation of findings. It also explores asymmetric exchange rate responses to diverse monetary policy stances from a new dimension by explicitly measuring asymmetries and capturing long- and short-run dynamics using the new non-linear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) and asymmetric component AC-GARCH models along with other recent methods for results' robustness. Results from alternative methods show that UIP fails to hold in the African members and non-member of OPEC which is attributable to capital mobility restrictions and currency risk. However, asymmetric and permanent/transitory exchange rate response to monetary policy stances was noticed with little evidence of risk premium dynamics and role of price level instability in UIP validity.     

Energy price shocks and milk price adjustments

Much previous research on energy price transmission sheds light on the relationship between oil prices and aggregate commodity prices, such as for agricultural products, or food price indexes. This letter uses data from 12 U.S. cities between 2001 and 2011 to examine how energy prices are transmitted to fluid milk products at the retail level. Results indicate the existence of an asymmetric energy pass-through (a rise is transmitted faster than a fall in prices) and that private label milk products are more insulated from energy price shocks and adjust at similar rate with national manufacturer brands.     

US oil consumption,oil prices,and the macroeconomy

Since the oil price shock of 1973–74, researchers have waged an intense debate regarding the connection between the U.S. energy sector and national income. Studies examining the relationship between oil prices, oil consumption, and real output have produced remarkably mixed results. In particular, the two most widely cited investigations by Darby and Hamilton come to dramatically different conclusions concerning the effect of oil shocks on economic activity. To date, however, studies of this issue have been either correlation based and thus void of causality inferences, have used overly restrictive bivariate causality techniques, or covered periods that exclude major oil price disruptions. This paper analyzes a quarterly multivariate VAR model to investigate the existence and direction of causality between oil prices, oil consumption, real output, and several other key macroeconomic policy variables. Among the key findings is that oil price shocks are not a major cause of U.S. business cycles. Moreover, our findings also suggest that both oil prices and real output cause significant changes in oil consumption without feedback. These results support the contention that a systematic U.S. conservation policy would not significantly impair real economic activity.     

Oil Prices, Terms of Trade Shocks, and Macroeconomic Fluctuations in Saudi Arabia

The article investigates the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in Saudi Arabia using structural vector autoregression methods and pays particular attention to oil prices and changes in terms of trade. Using a macroeconomic model tailored to the Saudi Arabian economy, the authors identify terms of trade, supply, balance of payments, aggregate demand, and monetary shocks. The results show that the Saudi Arabian price level, real exchange rate, and to a lesser extent output is vulnerable to terms of trade shocks. Moreover, Saudi Arabian terms of trade are driven by output, trade balance, and aggregate demand shocks. To stabilize output and the real exchange rate, Saudi Arabia ought to continue diversifying its production base and aim for a stable nominal oil price. (JEL E32 , Q43 , C22 )