财政分权、空间外溢与区域经济增长

分税制改革以后,税收体系被划分为中央与地方两大部分,正式建立起以分税制为中心的财政分权体制。各地区的财政分权程度不仅对本地经济增长有直接影响,还对其他地区的经济增长有间接影响,即存在空间溢出效应。利用我国2005年至2018年31个省（市、自治区）的面板数据,运用空间面板模型,估计和检验财政分权对经济增长的空间效应。研究结果表明：各地区的财政分权不仅促进本地经济增长,还对其他地区的经济增长有显著正向溢出效应。     

中国地方政府公共卫生支出行为实证分析

公共卫生支出属于财政支出的重要组成部分。合理界定公共卫生支出占财政支出的比重是公共财政体制的重要内容。文章对2004-2010年间全国31省、市、自治区面板数据进行实证分析研究了影响地方财政公共卫生支出的因素及效应。研究表明:人口规模、经济发展水平、城市化程度和与财政公共卫生支出之间存在一定的相关性。财政分权对公共卫生支出具有很小的负面影响,政府规模的膨胀程度、人口结构与财政公共卫生支出并没有必然的因果关系。     

财政自主与公共支出效率:自地方政府实践维度观察

公共支出效率主要受相对财政自主——地方政府自有收入在支出中的比例——的正面影响。这表明了分权确立独立主体的激励型好处,但更受绝对财政自主——地方政府自有收入——的负面影响,意味着我国分权缺乏相应的控制和问责机制,所谓的财政自主还没有达到规范意义上的要求。因此,我国地方分权应坚持,但配套的公共财政包括公共预算制度更应尽快建立和健全。     

政府支出与经济波动——基于省级面板数据的实证分析

政府支出能否起到稳定经济增长的作用是一个值得研究的重要问题。使用1987-2013年30个省市自治区的面板数据,文章考察了政府支出对我国经济波动的影响。在考虑政府支出规模的内生性后,2SLS估计结果发现政府支出对经济波动的影响具有两面性。一方面政府支出规模主要发挥了财政自动稳定器作用,因而减少了经济波动;另一方面,政府支出变动对总量产出冲击较大,从而增加了经济波动。进一步控制了贸易开放、通货膨胀、货币政策冲击、金融发展和产业结构等因素,估计结果表现出较好的稳健性。研究结论意味着,在保持经济稳定增长方面,需要权衡政府支出规模与政府支出变动对经济波动的影响。     

财政分权体制下地方政府的自利性行为研究

财政分权体制是我国经济转轨和社会转型的出发点和重要保障。新中国成立60多年来,我国的财政体制先后经历了由统收统支的财政体制到财政包干制再到分税制的演化过程,文章系统地阐述了在财政分权体制背景下地方政府的自利性行为的内涵及特征,并分析了其具体影响的表现形式。通过研究得出克服政府自利性的三大路径的结论：一是构建约束政府自利性的制度安排,二是合理界定政府职能,三是加强政府官员行政伦理素质的改造。     

财政分权，省级官员特征与地方政府债务规模——基于2010-2014年省级政府数据的实证分析

政府债务规模和风险是一级政府关注的重点问题。从财政分权和省级官员特征两个维度,本文考察了地方政府债务规模的影响因素,并在此基础上进一步研究财政分权程度和省级官员特征对地方政府债务规模的交互影响作用。通过2010-2014年30个省级政府的实证数据进行混合OLS回归,研究发现财政分权程度越高,地方政府债务规模越小。省级官员的年龄过大或过小都会使地方政府债务规模的减小,同时具有企业工作背景的省长和省委书记也会抑制地方政府债务规模的扩张,并且财政分权和省级官员特征对地方政府债务规模的影响是相互促进的。据此提出建议,合理控制地方政府债务膨胀。     

论政府间税收竞争的理论基础

如何认识、评价和规范我国地方政府间税收竞争行为的基本内涵是政府间税收竞争合法与非法的理论前提,能为政府间税收竞争的有序发展提供制度保障。文章探讨政府间税收竞争的理论根源,分析我国政府间税收竞争的法理基础,有利于规范政府间税收竞争行为,促进经济平稳快速发展。     

财政分权、地方政府行为与劳动者报酬份额

中国经济高速增长伴随劳动份额快速下降,为什么会产生这种现象引起广泛的关注,文章从财政分权的视角进行了研究。在财政分权的激励和约束之下,地方政府为实现经济增长和晋升的目标,弱化对劳动者的保护,以便为“招商引资”创造良好“投资环境”。文章通过建立2000—2009年全国范围内和区域范围内的省级面板数据模型,验证了财政分权对劳动者收入份额的影响以及存在的区域差异,并提出改进目前以GDP作为主要指标的政绩考核机制、从制度上提高劳动收入占比的政策建议。     

财政分权、地方财政支出偏好与城市用地规模扩张——以长三角地区为例

摘要：文章通过利用1996-2010年长三角地区16个核心城市的面板数据,实证考察了财政分权、地方财政支出与城市用地规模扩张之间的关系。研究表明：财政务权和地方政府竞争体制使得地方政府在财政支出上存在着明显的偏向,三者均是城市用地规模扩张的主要推动因素;不同城市用地规模扩张的速度存在差异;体制因素是城市用地规模盲目扩张的深层次原因。为了从根本土改变地方政府的行为为鼓励,需立足中国实际,完善现有的财政体制,规范中央和地方的财政收支;改革现行的政绩考核体制,保持官员任期的连续性和稳定性;要深化我国的户籍制度改革,打破居民迁移的体制壁垒。实现”用脚投票”的机制．     

21世纪的公共治理:从“善政”走向“善治”

进入21世纪公民对政府的治理能力提出了更高的要求,"善治"也因此成为中国学术界的重要话语,实现从"善政"到"善治"的转变具有非常重要的理论和现实意义。     

金融发展、收入分权与地方政府债务

本文基于金融发展与收入分权的联合视角,将其与地方政府债务纳入到统一的内生经济增长理论框架之下,探究了其对地方政府债务的影响.并利用我国2000-2018年30个省市的面板数据进行实证检验,研究发现金融发展导致地方政府债务增长,而收入分权则有利于地方政府债务的减少;从联合项来看,收入分权并未缓解金融发展导致的地方政府债务问题.考虑到内生性问题,本文通过广义矩估计(GMM)的方法以及逐项增加控制变量进行稳健性检验,结果依然稳健显著.根据本文结论,分别从金融发展、收入分权两个角度提出了缓解地方政府债务的政策建议.     

Export Currency Pricing and Fiscal Multipliers

This paper develops a small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study the implications of the use of foreign currency in export pricing for fiscal policy in East Asian economies. The result shows that external currency pricing amplifies the effect of an exogenous government spending shock on output. The impact and cumulative multipliers are larger under external currency pricing. However, the result depends on the government policy regime. When the government allows for a systematic response of government spending to public debt, the multipliers in the medium-term are smaller under external currency pricing.     

Do Indian States Mimic,Compete or Interact in Local Public Spending? A Spatial Econometric Analysis

This paper analyses spatial interaction in public spending decisions across 22 Indian states during the period 1980–1981 to 2014–2015. In particular, we estimate interactive hypotheses for different proximities of states using a spatial panel data approach. The empirical results support strong spatial interaction and yardstick competition in public spending. Interactive behavior among the states has been found to be consistent and conditional on per capita income, fiscal transfers, infrastructure, literacy and population density. Interaction arising from yardstick competition significantly affects public spending decisions. The present study realizes the need for a well‐developed and comprehensive network to strengthen the interdependence in public spending among the states for higher welfare gain.     

环境规制对工业企业绿色创新效率的影响——基于空间杜宾模型的实证分析

对我国省域工业企业绿色创新效率的测算和财政分权条件下不同环境规制对企业绿色创新效率影响的分析表明,工业企业绿色创新效率具有明显的正向空间集聚效应,财政分权对工业企业绿色创新效率存在显著的抑制作用,不同环境规制工具存在明显差异,财政分权和环境规制的交互效应在"行政命令型"环境规制中尤为显著。不同地区的环境规制以及与财政分权的交互效应具有显著的区域异质性。我国应优化财政分权制度与地方官员绩效考核评价体系,充分考虑环境规制工具与地方财政分权的交互效应,在不同区域选择不同的环境规制工具,制定跨区域的环境规制政策,发挥东部地区绿色创新的优势,进一步完善中西部地区的绿色创新补偿机制。     

财政分权、环境规制与绿色全要素生产率

理解财政分权体制下我国环境治理对全要素生产率的影响对于我国经济和环境协调发展起到了重要作用,使用我国285个地级市2008-2015年的数据建立财政分权、环境规制与绿色全要素生产率的中介效应模型,并采用两阶段最小二乘和空间滞后解释变量模型处理内生性。研究表明：财政分权引起地方竞争以牺牲环境为代价换取经济增长,导致环境治理不足而影响绿色全要素生产率,财政分权不利于绿色全要素生产率的提升。     

Assessment of Local Public Finance Performance in China When Undesirable Fiscal Phenomena are Taken into Account

Making use of the data envelopment analysis (DEA) technique and taking undesirable fiscal phenomena into account, this paper comprehensively quantifies the public finance performance of local governments in China during the course of fiscal decentralization reform. The introduction of undesirable fiscal outcomes into this assessment makes it possible to identify meaningful and informative characteristics of local public finance performance in China. When reforms are first implemented, local public financial performance improves because undesirable fiscal phenomena have not yet become too serious. The tax sharing system reform did not work well in its early stages, and negatively impacted public expenditure efficiency. The reform started to play a substantial role between 2001 and 2005, when local governments experienced better public finance performance. Corresponding to the deterioration of the financial sector in recent years, local public financial performance worsened after 2007. Further reform of the current fiscal and taxation system is necessary in China, to ensure a brighter future for the nation.     

Local municipality productive efficiency and its determinants in South Africa

This paper assesses the technical efficiency of 231 local municipalities in South Africa for 2007 and investigates the potential determinants of efficiency gaps using the non-parametric data envelopment analysis technique. Efficiency scores are explained in a second-stage regression model using a Tobit regression model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt, using such a technique, to assess technical efficiency at the local government level in the African context. The results show that, on average, B1 and B3 municipalities could have theoretically achieved the same level of basic services with about 16% and 80% fewer resources respectively. Furthermore, fiscal autonomy and the number and skill levels of the top management of a municipality's administration were found to influence the productive efficiency of municipalities in South Africa. Perhaps most importantly, the results depict a bleak picture of the democratic behaviour at the local level in South Africa. It appears that higher income and highly educated households do not feel the incentive to be active participants in public decision-making processes. The paper findings raise concerns over the future of local municipalities in the country, especially about their capability to efficiently deliver expected outcomes on a sustainable basis.     

Indonesian Local Government Spending,Taxing and Saving: An Explanation of Pre‐ and Post‐decentralization Fiscal Outcomes*

As a result of Indonesia's decentralization program, local governments have gained significantly more responsibility for service delivery, considerably larger fiscal resources, and much greater authority over the use of those resources than before. The present paper develops a simple budget model to describe and explain the substantial differences in pre‐ and post‐decentralization local government fiscal behavior related to spending, taxing and saving. During the post‐decentralization period special attention is paid to the fiscal behavior of natural resource rich regions. Among other things, the evidence suggests that: post‐decentralization local government spending is partly responsive to increasing needs and partly the subject of elite capture; local government taxation has become more aggressive under decentralization and appears to be mostly driven by local bureaucratic expectations related to routine overhead budgets; and the increased savings of local governments during the post‐decentralization period is determined to a large degree by delayed central government transfer payments.