Robust results on the sharing of firm-specific information: Incentives and welfare effects

Contrary to much of the existing literature, we obtain robust and clear-cut results for the incentives and welfare effects of information sharing when information is firm-specific. We show that firms’ incentives to share this type of information are aligned with social welfare. Whenever revealing information is the dominant strategy (such as for Cournot firms revealing costs or Cournot and Bertrand firms revealing demand), it is socially beneficial. Only cost information in Bertrand competition will not be revealed but this is socially desirable, too. These findings are independent of distributional assumptions on random shocks and signals and hold for general asymmetric oligopoly with any mixture of substitute, complementary and independent goods.     

Demand and supply estimation biases due to omission of durability

We build a dynamic equilibrium model of a durable goods oligopoly with a competitive secondary market to evaluate the bias in estimating the structural parameters of demand and supply when durability is omitted. We simulate data from our dynamic model and use them to estimate the model’s static counterpart. We find that the static estimate of the elasticity of demand is an overestimate of the true elasticity and that the static estimate of the markup is an underestimate. Our results provide a benchmark on the magnitude and sign of the bias when static models are used for economic inference.     

日本企业竞争模式思考及对我国企业的启示

文章分析了日本企业的竞争战略模式是营运效率的竞争,是缺乏战略的竞争,这在一定程度上影响了日本企业的发展,而中国的企业,尤其是外贸企业主要是以低成本作为自己的竞争力,想要得到进一步的发展,则需改变企业的竞争模式。     

Entrepreneurship: Origins and returns

We examine the origins and outcome of entrepreneurship on the basis of exceptionally comprehensive Norwegian matched worker-firm-owner data. In contrast to most existing studies, our notion of entrepreneurship not only comprises self-employment, but also employment in partly self-owned limited liability companies. Based on this extended entrepreneurship concept, we find that entrepreneurship tends to be profitable. It also raises income variability, but the most successful quartile gains much more than the least successful quartile loses. Key determinants of the decision to become an entrepreneur are occupational qualifications, family resources, gender, and work environments. Individual unemployment encourages, while aggregate unemployment discourages, entrepreneurship.     

浅析企业全面预算管理的目标

全面预算管理是企业管理的重要组成部分。明确全面预算所要达到的管理目标对于制定全面预算计划,提升企业的全面预算管理水平都有非常重要的意义。从企业战略管理和企业核心竞争力的角度,分析了全面预算的管理目标,指出了全面预算的真正管理意义所在。     

敏捷供应链的战略研究

首先从传统供应链发展状况入手,指出其存在的问题,进而提出了敏捷供应链;通过对敏捷供应链的特点分析,以及战略匹配理论的引进,论证了敏捷供应链的战略优势,为供应链的发展方向提供了依据。     

我国快递业战略转型模式创新研究

我国快递业经过近30年的快速发展,先前推动快递业快速发展的经营模式已经越来越难以适应市场竞争的需要,进行战略转型,引入新的发展模式势在必行。文中根据熊彼特创新理论,结合我国快递业现状及存在的问题,提出我国快递业战略转型的方向是由传统粗放型管理模式向品牌经营模式的转型,并对如何建立品牌经营模式进行了详细的阐述。     

Robust firm pricing with panel data

Firms often have imperfect information about demand for their products. We develop an integrated econometric and theoretical framework to model firm demand assessment and subsequent pricing decisions with limited information. We introduce a panel data discrete choice model whose realistic assumptions about consumer behavior deliver partially identified preferences and thus generate ambiguity in the firm pricing problem. We use the minimax-regret criterion as a decision-making rule for firms facing this ambiguity. We illustrate the framework’s benefits relative to the most common discrete choice analysis approach through simulations and empirical examples with field data.     

Price competition in the spatial real estate market: allies or rivals?

This paper examines whether real estate firms can avoid price competition when properties in the vicinity are priced by allies. An oligopoly model with differentiated products generally suggests that real estate firms engage in price competition with their spatially closest rivals. Yet, they can raise property prices when the market share of their allies increases. To test this prediction, a spatial autoregressive model with spatial autoregressive disturbances, including a share of allies in the vicinity, is estimated using data on the prices of residential condos in central Tokyo, Japan. The model prediction is supported by the empirical results. In the data set, the magnitude of the market share on property prices increases with the expansion of the size of the spatial market.     

价值链分析在战略成本管理中的应用研究

价值链分析是战略成本管理的首要步骤,但目前对价值链的研究仅限于理论探讨。如何具体展开价值链分析,仍是一个难题。本文从价值链分析出发,探讨了企业寻求成本竞争优势的战略途径,提出了价值链的分解与整合,有利于提高企业的战略成本竞争优势,形成企业的核心竞争力。     

Estimating a tournament model of intra-firm wage differentials

We consider the estimation of a tournament model with moral hazard (based on Rosen (1986), AER)) when only aggregate data on intra-firm employment levels and salaries are available. Equilibrium restrictions of the model allow us to recover parameters of interest, including equilibrium effort levels in each hierarchical stage of the firm. We illustrate our estimation procedures using data from major retail chains in the US. We find that only a fraction of the wage differential directly compensates workers for higher effort levels, implying that a large portion of the differentials arises to maintain incentives at lower rungs of the retailers.     

The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games

The comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria are derived for the ubiquitous class of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games. The resulting refutable implications are intrinsic to the said class of differential games, and thus form their basic, empirically testable, properties. Their relationship with extant results in the optimal control theory and the static game theory is discussed. Separability conditions are identified on the instantaneous payoff and transition functions under which the intrinsic comparative dynamics collapse, in form, to those in optimal control problems. Applications of the results to capital accumulation and sticky-price games are provided.