Employer‐Sponsored Training and Longer‐Tenured Workers: Evidence from Australia

I estimate the incidence and intensity of training with particular emphasis on where along the tenure‐training profile formal training occurs. Using data from the Survey of Education and Training gathered by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, I find a different relationship between training and tenure than what is suggested by human capital models. Instead of training being concentrated towards the beginning of the employment relationship, it tends to be evenly distributed along the tenure profile. Such findings are more consistent with theories of wage compression and strategic complementarity than traditional human capital approaches.     

Effects of Works Councils on Firm‐Provided Further Training in Germany

Unions are an important indicator of various measures of firm performance in Anglo‐Saxon countries. The same is true for the German analogue of the workplace union, the works council. Using German establishment data, I examine the impact of works councils on further training. I employ pooled logit and count‐data models to analyse the further training activity and intensity of German firms. Because the treatment variable may suffer from endogeneity, I also adopt linear and nonlinear instrumental variable techniques. The analysis reveals a positive impact of works councils on firm‐provided training and provides slightly weaker evidence for firm‐size differentials in workplace representation. I conclude that enhanced management–employee relations foster the training efforts of firms.     

Firm‐Level Monopsony and the Gender Pay Gap

This study uses linked employer–employee data to estimate firm‐by‐gender specific labor supply elasticities. Using a dynamic model of labor supply, I find evidence that females face a greater degree of search frictions than males. However, the majority of the gender gap in labor supply elasticities is driven by across‐firm sorting rather than within‐firm differences. I find that males face a labor supply elasticity 0.15 points higher than females, which leads to 3.3 percent lower earnings for women. Sixty percent of the elasticity differential can be explained by marriage and child penalties faced by women but not men.     

Influencing public policymaking: Firm‐, industry‐, and country‐level determinants

This paper examines the determinants of firms' public policymaking influence. Using a novel and global database that measures firms' perceived influence over the executive and legislative branches of government, a systematic analysis of the firm‐, industry‐, and country‐level determinants, and interrelationships among these determinants of firms' public policymaking influence is undertaken. The empirical results indicate that large firms perceive they have more public policymaking influence than small firms, but these differences are conditioned by the number of industry competitors and the structure of the country political institution environment. Nonmarket strategy implications that follow from this refined understanding are developed and discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐Size Wage Gaps along the Formal‐Informal Divide: Theory and Evidence

Observationally equivalent workers are paid higher wages in larger firms. This fact is often called the “firm‐size wage gap” and is regarded as a key empirical puzzle. Using microlevel data from Turkey, we document a new stylized fact: The firm‐size wage gap is more pronounced for informal (unregistered) jobs than for formal (registered) jobs. To explain this fact, we develop a two‐stage wage‐posting game with market imperfections and segmented markets, the solution to which produces wages as a function of firm size in a well‐defined subgame‐perfect equilibrium. The model proposes two explanations. First, taxes on formal employment generate a wedge between formal and informal size wage gaps. Thus, government policy can potentially affect the magnitude of the firm‐size wage gaps. The second explanation features a market‐based framework with strategic interactions. Relative to small firms, large firms typically post higher wages for both formal and informal jobs. A high‐wage formal job attracts a larger pool of applicants than a high‐wage informal job. The larger pool of applicants for the formal job, in turn, allows the firm to somewhat lower the initial wage offer, while this second‐round effect is negligible for informal jobs. As a result, size differentials are lower in formal jobs than informal jobs. We argue that the observed patterns in the use of social connections in job search and heterogeneity in job preferences can be used to justify the validity of this second mechanism.     

Bribery and investment: Firm‐level evidence from Africa and Latin America

Research summary : Using a unique database that measures firm‐level bribery in Africa and Latin America, we corroborate extant results in the literature that paying bribes deters firm investments in fixed assets. Our contribution is to explore four mechanisms. By adopting a reverse causality approach (Gelman and Imbens, 2013), we find evidence consistent with one of them: short‐term oriented firms prefer to bribe rather than invest in fixed assets, while the opposite is true for firms with a long‐term orientation. We rule out that bribe payments drain financial resources for investment, that firms that invest do not bribe because fixed assets make them less flexible and more vulnerable to future bribes, and that less efficient firms bribe rather than invest. Managerial summary : We ask whether, along with ethical issues, bribing affects the behavior and performance of firms in Africa and Latin America. Our statistical analysis shows that bribe payments do not reduce the short‐term performance of firms, but frustrate investments in fixed assets, which is the foundation of firms' long‐term growth. It is like seeking a job via nepotism or education. Nepotism makes it likely to find a job in the short term. However, the solid skills generated by education raise the odds of finding better jobs in the future. We rule out some common explanations for the trade‐off between bribing and investment (e.g., bribes drain resources to invest or that less efficient firms bribe and do not invest). Our analysis suggests that firms with short‐term orientations are more likely to bribe and firms with long‐term orientation are more likely to invest. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Human Resource Management’s Effects on Firm‐Level Relative Efficiency

Using stochastic frontier production functions methodology with data from 1579 private‐sector establishments, we demonstrate that HR practices are significantly associated with differences in relative firm‐level efficiency. Supplemental analysis implies that this efficiency analysis is substantively different than the common approach to evaluating HRM’s relationships with firm‐level labor productivity. The results suggest that HR practices’ contributions to relative firm‐level efficiency are an important but heretofore overlooked factor in the relationship between HRM and firm performance.     

Policy risk,strategic decisions and contagion effects: Firm‐specific considerations

Research summary : In this article, we investigate the firm‐specific environment and its impact on firm strategy focusing on adverse changes in the policy environment and their effect on divestitures. We argue that experiencing a negative change in the firm‐specific policy environment causes firms to reassess their exposure to policy risk and their ability to manage their policy environment, making them more likely to divest. Operationalizing negative shifts in the firm‐specific policy environment through formal policy disputes between firms and governments, we find that following a dispute, firms are more likely to divest both in the country where the dispute occurs and in other countries in the same region. However, the impact of disputes on divestitures is firm specific, applying only to firms directly involved in a dispute . Managerial summary : What is the impact of change in the firm‐specific environment on firm strategy? We argue that when firms directly experience a negative change in their policy environment that is specific to them, they negatively reassess their exposure to policy risk and their ability to manage their policy environment, which makes them more likely to undertake a divestiture. We analyze formal disputes between firms and governments that arise from adverse changes in policy and find that, following a dispute, firms are more likely to divest in the country where the dispute occurs and in other countries in the same region. However, the impact of disputes on divestitures is firm specific as it applies only to firms directly involved in a dispute . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific knowledge resources and competitive advantage: the roles of economic‐ and relationship‐based employee governance mechanisms

The resource‐based view of the firm emphasizes the role of firm‐specific resources, especially firm‐specific knowledge resources, in helping a firm to achieve sustainable competitive advantage. However, the deployment of firm‐specific knowledge often requires key employees to make specialized human capital investments that are not easily redeployable to other settings. Thus, in the absence of effective safeguards and trust building devices, employees with foresight may be reluctant to make such specialized investments. This study explores both economic‐ and relationship‐based governance mechanisms that might mitigate this underinvestment problem. Effective use of these governance mechanisms enables a firm to obtain greater performance from its efforts to deploy firm‐specific knowledge resources. Empirical results further support these key arguments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Where Firm‐Level Innovation and Industrial Policy Meet: Consensus Roadmaps for Low‐Carbon Powertrain Technologies

Environmental mandates, energy security concerns, and societal demands place considerable pressure on automotive manufacturers to develop novel powertrain technologies that reduce energy consumption, and in turn, carbon emissions. The economic case for these novel technologies is far from clear, however, and firms often turn to the respective national governments for R&D aid and demand‐side subsidies. Government on the other hand often feels unable to back any single technology for competition regulatory reasons, while at the same time being presented with conflicting messages from industry where to focus its support. This paper reports on an initiative by the U.K. Government that led to the establishment of a permanent forum for government‐industry exchange, the Automotive Council U.K., in which the author has participated from the outset. In the course of the Council's work, two “consensus roadmaps” have been developed jointly by industry and the U.K. Government to guide national efforts in the transition for both passenger car and commercial vehicle powertrain technologies toward low‐carbon alternatives. This paper discusses the key technological development stages and projections outlined in these technology roadmaps and comments on the general determinants of an effective interaction between government and industry in the light of a technological discontinuity.     

Firm‐Level Collective Bargaining and Wages in Greece: A Quantile Decomposition Analysis

This article analyzes the effect of firm‐level contracting on the wage structure in the Greek private sector. Using a matched employer–employee dataset for 2006, unconditional quantile regressions and relevant decomposition methods, we identify a wage premium associated with firm‐level contracting, which follows a hump‐shaped profile across the wage distribution. Further, the wage differential between workers under firm‐level and broader‐level collective agreements can be primarily attributed to the differences in the regime‐specific wage setting structure, for those below the median of the unconditional wage distribution, and to differences in worker and firm‐specific characteristics for those in the upper tail.     

The ‘Flexible Firm’: Strategy and Segmentation

This paper draws together and provides further analysis of two research projects commissioned by the Department of Employment, with a focus on employers' labour use strategies in Britain. It seeks to place on a firmer statistical basis arguments about the presence and growth of the ‘flexible firm’, and it draws also on case-study data to explore some of the issues relating to flexibility and strategy. Our conclusions are that there has been a marked absence of strategy in this area, and reasons for this are explored, as are the implications for gender and segmentation in the labour market.     

The Structure of Hiring Costs in Germany: Evidence from Firm‐Level Data

This paper analyzes the structure of hiring costs of skilled workers in Germany. Using detailed and representative firm‐level data on recruitment and adaptation costs of new hires, we find that average hiring costs amount to more than 8 weeks of wage payments (€4700). The structure of hiring costs is convex, as an increase in the number of hires by 1 percent increases hiring costs by 1.3 percent. We find moderate effects of labor market institutions on the magnitude but none on the structure of hiring costs. Furthermore, we provide evidence in favor of monopsony power in the German labor market.     

Firm‐specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal

Research summary : We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long‐term perspective, and provide job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accordingly, we found empirical evidence that specificity in firm knowledge assets is positively associated with the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation design (indicating the effort of CEO retention) and negatively associated with CEO dismissal (indicating the job securities the firm committed to CEOs). Furthermore, firm diversification was found to mitigate the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal, as CEOs are more removed from the deployment of knowledge resources in diversified firms. Managerial summary : A firm's knowledge structure, that is, the extent to which its knowledge assets are firm‐specific versus general, has implications for both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal. In particular, we find that a firm with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge has the incentive to retain its CEO through the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation. Such a firm is also likely to provide job security for its CEO, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal. These arguments, however, are less likely to hold in diversified corporations as CEOs in such corporations are more removed from the deployment of knowledge assets. A key managerial implication is that CEO compensation and job security design should be made according to the nature of firm knowledge assets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Workforce Composition and Innovation: How Diversity in Employees’ Ethnic and Educational Backgrounds Facilitates Firm‐Level Innovativeness

This article studies how workforce composition is related to a firm's success in introducing radical innovations. Previous studies have argued that teams composed of individuals with diverse backgrounds are able to perform more information processing and make deeper use of the information, which is important to accomplish complex tasks. We suggest that this argument can be extended to the level of the aggregate workforce of high‐technology firms. In particular, we argue that ethnic and higher education diversity within the workforce is associated with superior performance in radical innovation. Using a sample of 3,888 Swedish firms, this article demonstrates that having greater workforce diversity in terms of both ethnic background and educational disciplinary background is positively correlated to the share of a firm's turnover generated by radical innovation. Having more external collaborations does, however, seem to reduce the importance of educational background diversity. The impact of ethnic diversity is not affected by external collaboration. These findings hold after using alternative measures of dependent and independent variables, alternative sample sizes, and alternative estimation techniques. The research findings presented in this article would seem to have immediate and important practical implications. They would suggest that companies may pursue recruitment policies inspired by greater ethnic and disciplinary diversity as a way to boost the innovativeness of the organization. From a managerial perspective, it may be concluded that workforce disciplinary diversity could be potentially replaced by more external links, while ethnic diversity could not.     

Firm‐specific human capital,organizational incentives,and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking

This paper explores conflicting implications of firm‐specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more‐sophisticated ‘gaming’ of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high‐FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high‐FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Form of Relationship between Firm‐Level Product Innovativeness and New Product Performance in Developed and Emerging Markets

This study compares the new product performance outcomes of firm‐level product innovativeness across a developed and emerging market context. In so doing, a model is constructed in which the relationship between firm‐level product innovativeness and new product performance is anticipated to be curvilinear, and in which the nature of this relationship is argued to be dependent on organizational and environmental factors. The model is tested using primary data obtained from chief executive officers and finance managers in 319 firms operating in the United Kingdom, an advanced Western market, and 221 firms from Ghana, an emerging Sub‐Saharan African market. The model is assessed using a structural equation model multigroup analysis approach with LISREL 8.5. In the United Kingdom and Ghana, the basic form of the relationship between firm‐level product innovativeness and business success is inverted U‐shaped, but the strength and/or form of this relationship changes under differing levels of market orientation, access to financial resources, and environmental dynamism. While commonalities are identified across the two countries (market orientation helps firms leverage their product innovativeness), differences are also observed across the samples. In Ghana, access to financial resources enhances the relationship between product innovativeness and new product performance, unlike in the United Kingdom where no moderation is observed. Furthermore, while U.K. firms leverage product innovativeness to their advantage in more dynamic environments, Ghanaian firms do not benefit in this way: here, high levels of innovation activity are less useful when markets are more dynamic. If the study's findings generalize, there are a number of implications for managers of both emerging and developed market businesses. First, managers in both developed and developing market firms should focus on determining and managing an optimal balance of novel and intensive product innovativeness within the context of their unique institutional environments. Second, for emerging market firms, a market orientation capability helps businesses leverage local market intelligence, enabling them to compete with multinational giants flocking to emerging markets, but typical developed market learning approaches may be insufficient for multinational firms when seeking to compete in emerging markets. Third, for emerging market firms, access to finances helps deliver product innovation success (although this is not the case for developed market firms, possibly due to strong financial institutions). Finally, unlike developed market firms, burdened by institutional voids at home, emerging market firms appear to be less capable of competing on an innovation front in more dynamic market conditions. Accordingly, policymakers in emerging markets should consider identifying ways to help businesses raise market orientation levels, and seek to create conditions that enhance access to financial capital (e.g., direct financing, matching grants, tax rebates, or rewarding firms that innovate creatively and intensely). Likewise, since environmental dynamism is likely to be a growing issue for emerging markets, efforts to help firms become more adept at keeping up with more agile developed market counterparts are needed.     

Inter‐Firm Training Co‐ordination in Britain

This paper examines employer co‐operation in the provision of training. Such collective action has a long history in Britain, but has varied over time in extent and strength. It exists in a strong form in the German‐speaking countries, where employers’ organizations and chambers of commerce are a fundamental part of the training system. On the basis of new data, we argue that this form of training is important in the UK and has a positive effect on the quantity and quality of training. Case studies are presented on several examples of collective action — a local chamber of commerce, an industry‐wide employers’ organization, a group training association, a network of firms in a large company’s supply chain and a local consortium of big employers. Although such forms of organization have much to commend them, in the UK coverage is uneven and stability is fragile.     

The Impact of Wage Bargaining Regime on Firm‐Level Competitiveness and Wage Inequality: The Case of Ireland

This paper uses a linked employer‐employee dataset to analyze the impact of institutional wage bargaining regimes on average labor costs and within‐firm wage dispersion in private sector companies in Ireland. The results show that while centralized bargaining reduced labor costs within both the indigenous and foreign‐owned sectors, the relative advantage was greater among foreign‐owned firms. The analysis suggests that there are potentially large competitiveness gains to multinational companies that locate in countries implementing a centralized bargaining system. Furthermore, the results provide additional support to the view that collective bargaining reduces within‐firm wage inequality.