Executive Compensation and Financial Performance Measures: Evidence from Significant Financial Institutions

We survey the use of financial performance measures in determining executive pay among significant Australian financial institutions. We document evidence of the pervasiveness with which externally disclosed non‐GAAP (non‐Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) financial measures are also used internally to determine variable remuneration, with the apparent popularity of cash profit after tax in short‐term incentives plans. Our evidence also highlights the increasing use of peer group‐adjusted measures (e.g., relative cash earnings per share and return on equity ranking against a peer group) in determining longer‐run incentives, despite the fact that members of the peer group do not measure financial performance in a directly comparable manner. Detailed analysis of the four major trading banks (Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, Commonwealth Bank, National Australia Bank and Westpac) reveals differences in the way non‐GAAP earnings measures are calculated across the major banks, as well as some variation over time in the way individual banks measure performance. We also document evidence of non‐GAAP earnings restatements, with around 25% of non‐GAAP results subsequently being restated. These restatements are more likely to result in a downward revision of the initially reported non‐GAAP result than an upward revision. We therefore conclude that existing measures of financial performance used to determine senior executive compensation are not as ‘objective’, as might be assumed.     

The Impact of Media Attention on the Use of Alternative Earnings Measures

The practice of reporting earnings measures that deviate from generally accepted accounting principles (non‐GAAP measures) has received negative attention in the media. In a period of increased regulatory concern for these reporting practices, we explore whether there has been a shift away from the use of non‐GAAP metrics. This study focuses on the Dutch situation, where regulators responded conservatively (‘light’) to the accounting scandals. This contrasts with the U.S., where regulators intervened with a radical (‘heavy’) reform of regulation. We analyse a sample of earnings press releases published in the period 2000–05 from companies listed at Euronext Amsterdam. Our findings indicate that Dutch companies report non‐GAAP measures frequently and prominently. However, companies' reporting behaviour changes after a peak in negative media attention for non‐GAAP reporting. The magnitude of the adjustments to GAAP earnings becomes smaller and companies seem to have different reasons to report non‐GAAP measures. The effect of the media attention is stronger when companies have been criticized for their non‐GAAP reporting in the press. Investors seem to have become more hesitant towards the use of non‐GAAP measures for their decision‐making after negative media attention. Together, these findings suggest that the negative media attention for non‐GAAP measures has influenced the decisions of investors and managers.     

Disclosure Prominence and the Quality of Non‐GAAP Earnings

The SEC prohibits the presentation of non‐GAAP measures before corresponding GAAP measures; however, a large proportion of non‐GAAP reporters present non‐GAAP EPS before GAAP EPS in their earnings announcements. This noncompliance raises questions about whether firms use prominence to highlight higher or lower quality non‐GAAP information. For firms reporting non‐GAAP EPS between 2003 and 2016, prominent non‐GAAP EPS is associated with higher quality non‐GAAP reporting. Further tests reveal that nonregulatory incentives, rather than regulatory costs, explain this relation. Specifically, prominence is associated with higher quality non‐GAAP reporting in settings where prominence is not regulated, investors ignore prominence when non‐GAAP reporting quality is lower, and the minority of firms using prominence to mislead exhibit characteristics associated with weaker investor monitoring. Overall, we provide evidence that regulatory noncompliance can reflect an intent to inform, and that most firms use prominence to highlight higher quality non‐GAAP information despite prohibitive regulation.     

The Impact of the Disclosure of Non‐GAAP Earnings in Australian Annual Reports on Non‐Sophisticated Users

The disclosure of non‐GAAP earnings in Australian annual reports has risen steadily in recent years. These non‐statutory earnings measures are generally disclosed in the unaudited section of the annual report and are not consistent with statutory profit as defined under generally accepted Australian accounting standards (GAAP). Recent research conducted in the United States (US) has provided evidence that non‐sophisticated investor decisions are influenced by the presence and prominence of non‐GAAP earnings information. Further evidence suggests that investor perception changed after non‐GAAP earnings disclosures became subject to regulation in that jurisdiction. Australia has high investor participation rates by international standards, including investors operating self‐managed superannuation funds, resulting in a significant number of active individual investors. This study employs an experimental design to investigate the impact on non‐sophisticated investors of the reporting of non‐GAAP earnings information in addition to GAAP earnings information in Australian annual reports. The results of this study show a positive association between the prominent disclosure of non‐GAAP earnings information and non‐sophisticated investor reliance on this information. These results provide important evidence to Australian regulators as these narrative disclosures are not subject to regulation, in contrast to the US where mandatory regulation has been in place since 2003.     

Disentangling Managers’ and Analysts’ Non‐GAAP Reporting

Researchers frequently proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures using performance metrics available through analyst forecast data providers (FDPs), such as I/B/E/S. The extent to which FDP‐provided earnings are a valid proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP reporting, however, has been debated extensively. We explore this important question by creating the first large‐sample data set of managers’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures, which we directly compare to I/B/E/S data. Although we find a substantial overlap between the two data sets, we also find that they differ in systematic ways because I/B/E/S (1) excludes managers’ lower quality non‐GAAP numbers and (2) sometimes provides higher quality non‐GAAP measures that managers do not explicitly disclose. Our results indicate that using I/B/E/S to identify managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures significantly underestimates the aggressiveness of their reporting choices. We encourage researchers interested in managers’ non‐GAAP reporting to use our newly available data set of manager‐disclosed non‐GAAP metrics because it more accurately captures managers’ reporting choices.     

Voluntary Disclosures as a Mechanism for Defining Entity Status in Australian Not‐for‐Profit Organisations

This study examines managerial efforts to portray an entity's not‐for‐profit (NFP) status based on voluntary disclosure practices. The annual report text of 61 NFPs are analysed in accordance with Salamon and Anheier's (1997) NFP definitional framework. Results indicate a predominant application of the structural‐operational definition. Furthermore, the ‘organised’ attribute of this definition prevails over the ‘non‐profit‐distributing’ criterion that has been advocated by various parties. Standard‐setting bodies may want to consider: (1) NFP management perspectives in any revised NFP definition; and (2) greater clarity in conceptual framework and standard‐setting arrangements to improve overall transparency in NFP reporting practices.     

Transitory earnings components and the two faces of non‐generally accepted accounting principles earnings

Non‐generally accepted accounting principles (non‐GAAP) earnings reporting has been linked with both informative and strategic incentives. We seek to disentangle these conflicting effects by examining the association between non‐GAAP earnings disclosure and transitory items in GAAP earnings, conditional on managers' reporting incentives. We report evidence of a statistically and economically significant asymmetric relation between disclosure propensity and transitory items in GAAP earnings conditional on both the sign and magnitude of the GAAP earnings surprise. Our findings suggest that non‐GAAP earnings disclosures tend to be driven by a desire for informative (strategic) reporting when GAAP earnings beat (undershoot) market expectations.     

Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: three strikes and the board is out

From 2011 in Australia, if over 25% of shareholders vote against a non‐binding remuneration resolution, firms are awarded a ‘strike’. We examine 237 firms that receive a strike relative to matched firms, and find no association with any measure of CEO pay. However, we do find that strike firms have higher book‐to‐market and leverage ratios, suggesting that the remuneration vote is not used to target excessive pay. We also find that firms respond to a strike by decreasing the discretionary bonus component of CEO pay by 57.10% more than non‐strike firms and increasing their remuneration disclosure by 10.95%.     

The options market response to accounting earnings announcements

We examine the reaction of the equity options market to accounting earnings announcements over the period 1996–2008 using changes in implied volatility to measure the options market response to earnings news. We find that positive earnings surprises and positive profit announcements produce a larger uncertainty resolution than negative earnings surprises and loss announcements. We demonstrate an inverse relation between the change in implied volatility and earnings news in a three-day window immediately after an earnings announcement. We refer to the magnitude of this relation as the ‘options market earnings response coefficient’. This ‘options market earnings response coefficient’ is stronger for both bad news announcements and positive profit announcements. We do not find any significant relation between changes in implied volatility and earnings news in the pre- or post-announcement periods. We conclude that the options market efficiently absorbs earnings information.     

Non‐GAAP Earnings Disclosure in Loss Firms

This study examines the incremental information in loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures relative to GAAP earnings. Using a large sample obtained through textual analysis and hand‐collection, we posit and find that loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings exclusions offset the low informativeness of GAAP losses for forecasting and valuation. Loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings are highly predictive of future performance and are valued by investors, while the expenses excluded from GAAP earnings are not. Additional tests suggest that loss firms disclosing non‐GAAP profits have significantly better future performance than GAAP‐only loss firms and are not overvalued by investors. Comparing non‐GAAP earnings of profitable firms to those of loss firms, we find that loss firms’ non‐GAAP metrics are significantly more predictive and less strategic. We conclude that non‐GAAP earnings disclosures are particularly informative about loss firms and help investors disaggregate losses into components that have differential implications for forecasting and valuation.     

Have ‘European’ and US GAAP measures of income and equity converged under IFRS? Evidence from European companies listed in the US

The EU's adoption of IFRS, combined with the SEC's removal of the US GAAP reconciliation requirement for non‐US registrants reporting under IFRS, signifies a major shift towards the acceptance of global standards. Based on 20‐F reconciliations provided by the population of US listed European companies filing IFRS‐based statements with the SEC in 2005, we examine whether ‘European’ and US GAAP measures of income and equity converged under IFRS. We find that during the period immediately preceding IFRS, for our sample companies, European and US GAAP measures are generally comparable in respect of income and equity. However, as an exception to the latter, we find that UK GAAP yielded significantly lower measures of equity than US GAAP For companies adopting IFRS for the first time in 2005, we find a significant gap between IFRS and US GAAP measures of income, thereby, signifying de facto divergence from US GAAP in regard to income determination. Furthermore, we find that, following IFRS adoption, significant differences with US GAAP equity persisted for companies that previously reported using UK GAAP. Our findings, thus, support critics’ claims that standard‐setters, most notably the IASB and FASB, have more work to do to achieve a sufficient degree of convergence between IFRS and US GAAP that will convince the SEC to require US companies to use IFRS.     

Application of the Reporting Entity Concept in Australia

For decades, the reporting entity concept has been the foundation of differential reporting in Australia. Those entities classified as ‘reporting entities’ are, prima facie, required to produce full GAAP‐based financial reports while other (non‐reporting) entities are generally able to produce less complex and shorter ‘special purpose’ financial reports. In recent years, the application of the concept, as originally set out in the Statement of Accounting Concepts (SAC) 1 Definition of the Reporting Entity, has been criticized on several grounds—particularly, that it does not yield the reporting outcomes originally intended by regulators. Our analysis of 1,546 companies lodging financial statements with the corporate regulator in Australia (ASIC) shows the principles‐based criteria in SAC 1, designed to indicate the existence of a reporting entity, do not systematically explain its application by entities. Our findings are relevant for policy makers, researchers, and regulators concerned with how these choices might be more effectively regulated in future and whether this is best done through principles‐based or rules‐based approaches.     

Independently Certified Industry-specific Disclosures to the Capital Market: The JORC Code in the Australian Mining Industry

We investigate compliance with the Australian JORC Code for reporting mineral resources and ore reserves, the quality of the disclosure, and its impact on the capital market. The compliance and quality assessment is conducted by two experienced geologists who find that while the overall reporting quality improved after the 2012 revisions to the Code, they disagree on the extent of improvement. This reflects the uncertainties involved and the difficulty in interpreting the reports. Both geologists agree that the greatest improvement is seen in early-stage projects, consistent with the expectation that there are more uncertainties surrounding these, and the additional information disclosed under the 2012 JORC Code appears to assist in reducing the uncertainties to some extent. The capital markets study shows that JORC announcements have a significant impact on investors’ assessments of firm value, and that the announcement impact is higher after the 2012 revisions designed to strengthen the disclosure requirements. This is consistent with post-2012 JORC reports conveying higher information content. There continues to be information leakage prior to announcement date. Further tests show a widening of bid–ask spreads in the post-2012 period, suggestive of higher information asymmetry. While the probability of informed trading declines for large firms, it remains statistically unchanged for the rest of the sample. The findings reiterate the need for regulators and standard setters to be cognisant of unintended consequences of their decisions. The substantiation process under JORC involves a delay in the release of ‘news’, a ‘chilling’ effect with larger announcement effects.     

The Impact of Asbestos and Environmental Reserves Increases on Shareholder Wealth

Abstract

Between 1992 and 2001 significant reserves increase announcements were made by several major property/liability insurers. These reserves increases were for the purpose of recognizing expected asbestos and environmental (A&E) liability. Although most analysts agree that U.S. insurers are underreserved for asbestos and environmental liability, how the market reacts to an insurer’s announcement of an increase in these reserves has not been analyzed. An insurer that is significantly underreserved is likely to be viewed by the market as lacking financial stability for the long term. However, when a company increases its reserves, there is a charge to income and a reduction in capital. If surplus is diminished sufficiently as a result of the increased reserving, regulatory attention and eroding shareholder and market confidence could result as well. By calculating the sample insurers’ cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the largest asbestos and environmental reserves increase announcements made between 1992 and 2001, the study estimates and documents the market’s reaction to these reserves increase announcements. We further explore the potential impact of additional asbestos and environmental liability exposure reporting requirements. Starting with 1995 statutory annual accounting statements, Footnote 24 required additional reporting by insurers of their asbestos and environmental liability exposure (1995 statements were publicly available by the end of the first quarter of 1996). When looking at reserves increase announcements prior to this additional reporting requirement, we find that most insurers announcing large increases in asbestos and environmental reserves prior to 1996 experience a significant reduction in stock price in the days surrounding their announcement. However, consistent with the notion that the additional accounting disclosure requirements after 1995 (Footnote 24) provide valuable information on insurers’ exposure, we find that the announcement of A&E reserves increases after 1995 had no statistically significant effect on the market value of announcing insurers.     

The Impact of the FMA Guidelines on Non‐GAAP Earnings Disclosures

In 2012 the New Zealand Financial Markets Authority (FMA) introduced guidelines for the disclosure of non‐GAAP financial information. This study investigates the effect of those guidelines on New Zealand listed companies. The findings show that, despite not being mandatory, these guidelines are modifying corporate disclosure behaviour. Companies have improved the way in which they disclose non‐GAAP earnings information and there has been a reduction in the emphasis given to non‐GAAP earnings compared with the emphasis given to audited statutory profit. However, the study also highlights areas for improvement, including the depth of explanation of non‐GAAP earnings calculations and adjustments, and concern about multiple adjusted earnings figures to explain performance.     

Signalling power of special dividends in an imputation environment

The present study examines the impact of the announcement of special dividends for a sample of Australian companies over the period July 1989 to June 2002. The risk‐adjusted price reaction to special dividend announcements from the day before the announcement to the day after the announcement (day ?1 to day 1) is positive and statistically significant, averaging 3.67 per cent. Initial special dividend announcements (4.68 per cent) led to stronger price reaction than special dividend announcements that follow an earlier special dividend (1.51 per cent) in the previous year. The magnitude of price reactions to special dividend announcements is statistically related to the size of the special dividend, the existence of prior special dividend announcements, abnormal cash flow for the year ended after the special dividend announcement, the existence of dividend reinvestment plans (DRP) versus non‐DRP, and a preannouncement effect. Finally, we found strong support for the information content/signalling hypothesis for special dividend announcements that do not participate in DRP and limited support for those associated with DRP.     

Credibility Attributes and Investor Perceptions of Non‐GAAP Earnings Exclusions

Recent empirical evidence suggests that investors focus more on non‐GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) than on traditional GAAP earnings because non‐GAAP earnings are believed to proxy for a firm's ongoing profitability, a measure useful for valuation. Managers determine these non‐GAAP earnings by excluding certain items from their GAAP income. However, because these non‐GAAP earnings are both unaudited and may be disclosed by a firm to manage investors’ perceptions as opposed to inform, investors must infer the credibility of the disclosure through observable firm attributes. In this study we examine whether firms with stronger credibility attributes (corporate governance, higher‐quality auditors, and higher historical information quality) will be perceived as providing more credible non‐GAAP exclusions than those with weaker attributes. Our expectation is that the market reaction to non‐GAAP earnings exclusions of firms with stronger credibility attributes will be greater than for those with weaker attributes. Our results support our expectation.     

ACCOUNTING DOESN'T NEED MUCH FIXING (JUST SOME REINTERPRETING)

In response to Stewart's proposal for comprehensive reform of GAAP, this article offers a classic defense of traditional accounting practices and standards. Like the recent efforts of the FASB to achieve greater balance sheet realism through "fair value accounting," Stewart's call to make economic profit the centerpiece of GAAP is said to rest on a mistaken premise–the widespread notion that audited financial statements are intended primarily to guide equity investors in setting stock prices. More important than the valuation role of public accounting is its "stewardship" function in detecting theft and gross misuse of corporate assets. And it is this stewardship role, with its emphasis on producing reliable (and conservative) numbers that can be readily verified by auditors, that is likely to be compromised by Stewart's proposal, fair-value accounting, and other well-meaning attempts to incorporate greater economic realism into GAAP statements.
At the same time, however, the author agrees with Stewart's contention that GAAP a accounting numbers have major limitations for investors seeking to establish the market values of companies and for managers attempting to make value-increasing investment and operating decisions. Accordingly, he endorses many of Stewart's proposed modifications of GAAP both for internal purposes, such as performance evaluation and incentive compensation, and for voluntary supplemental reporting to the investment community.     

The Value Relevance of Mandatory Non‐GAAP Earnings

This paper examines the value relevance of earnings components where there is a mandatory requirement to report generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) earnings and non‐GAAP earnings, and where the items to be eliminated from GAAP earnings are defined in detail. The setting is different from non‐GAAP earnings disclosures presented in the United States and elsewhere, where managers have discretion over whether to report a non‐GAAP earnings number, and what to exclude from GAAP earnings. Our mandatory setting enables us to report value relevance results that are not confounded by managers' discretionary choices regarding non‐GAAP earnings exclusions. We use price‐level regressions, based on the Ohlson (1995) model, to test for incremental and relative value relevance. The results show that non‐GAAP earnings reported under a mandatory regime have higher value relevance than GAAP earnings. The disaggregation of these items is useful to investors in a setting where managerial motivations are minimized.