Changing board behaviour: The role of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in improving the efficacy of Australian Say-on-Pay

This article analyses whether the transition from the 2004 CLERP 9 advisory Say-on-Pay regime to the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in 2012 influenced CEO pay in Australian firms. Analysing a panel of 2,074 firm-years (2005–2015), we find that (i) CEO pay is a positive predictor of shareholder dissent; (ii) firm performance has a reducing effect on shareholder dissent; (iii) excessive shareholder dissent moderated CEO pay under the ‘Two Strikes’ rule relative to the CLERP 9 regime, and (iv) the market responded favourably to the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule and negatively to ‘strike’ instances after its introduction.     

Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: three strikes and the board is out

From 2011 in Australia, if over 25% of shareholders vote against a non‐binding remuneration resolution, firms are awarded a ‘strike’. We examine 237 firms that receive a strike relative to matched firms, and find no association with any measure of CEO pay. However, we do find that strike firms have higher book‐to‐market and leverage ratios, suggesting that the remuneration vote is not used to target excessive pay. We also find that firms respond to a strike by decreasing the discretionary bonus component of CEO pay by 57.10% more than non‐strike firms and increasing their remuneration disclosure by 10.95%.     

Do corporate governance mechanisms influence CEO compensation? An empirical investigation of UK companies

The aim of this paper is to empirically examine the influence of corporate governance mechanisms, that is, ownership and board structure of companies, on the level of CEO compensation for a sample of 414 large UK companies for the fiscal year 2003/2004. The results show that measures of board and ownership structures explain a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in the total CEO compensation, which is the sum of cash and equity-based compensation, after controlling other firm characteristics. We find that firms with larger board size and a higher proportion of non-executive directors on their boards pay their CEOs higher compensation, suggesting that non-executive directors are not more efficient in monitoring than executive directors. We also find that institutional ownership and block-holder ownership have a significant and negative impact on CEO compensation. Our results are consistent with the existence of active monitoring by block-holders and institutional shareholders. Finally, the results show that CEO compensation is lower when the directors’ ownership is higher.     

Does Firing a CEO Pay Off?

We examine whether involuntary chief executive officer (CEO) replacements pay off by improving firm prospects. We find CEO successors’ acquisition investments to be associated with significantly higher shareholder gains relative to their predecessors and the average CEO. This improvement in postturnover acquisition performance appears to be a function of board independence, hedge fund ownership, and the new CEO's relative experience. CEO successors also create sizable shareholder value by reversing prior investments through asset disposals and discontinuing operations and by employing more efficient investment strategies. Our evidence suggests that firing a CEO pays off.     

Australia’s ‘two-strikes’ rule and the pay-performance link: Are shareholders judicious?

To improve accountability of executive compensation, Australia introduced the ‘say-on-pay’ legislation in 2011, which is widely known as the ‘two-strikes’ rule. We investigate the consequences of this new rule for the pay-performance link in Australian firms. Employing a matched-pair design, we find that pay changes of the chief executive officer and the key management personnel were not significantly positively related to the stock returns of the firms that registered a ‘first strike’ in 2011 under the ‘two-strikes’ rule. However, the relations improved significantly in 2012. Our results also suggest that the shareholders of the ‘first-strike’ firms may have been over-enthusiastic about their voting power in 2011 but exercised this power more judiciously in 2012. Our findings provide important insights for the global debate on governance of executive compensation.     

Blockholder monitoring and the efficiency of pay-performance benchmarking

In this article I examine how the performance sensitivity of CEO compensation is related to the level and turnover of outside block ownership. Separating firm performance into firm-specific (Skill) and exogenous (Luck) components, I find that pay sensitivity to Luck increases with blockholder turnover, whereas pay sensitivity to Skill increases with blockholding size. Furthermore, when blockholder turnover is higher, CEO pay increases more with positive Luck but does not decrease as much with negative Luck; also, excess CEO compensation is larger. Thus, the rent accruing to CEOs via asymmetric pay sensitivity to Luck is partly explained by short investment horizons of large shareholders.     

Managerial ownership,board monitoring and firm performance in a family‐concentrated corporate environment

Using data from Hong Kong, a market that has family‐concentrated ownership structure, we examine the relation between managerial ownership, the board of directors and firm performance. We first conduct analysis on the managerial ownership and firm performance to derive the turning points where either ‘convergence of interest’ or ‘entrenchment’ effect of managerial ownership is dominant. Based on these estimated turning points, we find that at low and high level of ownership, effective board mitigates the entrenchment effect associated with managerial ownership; at medium level of ownership, board effectiveness is less demanded. These findings suggest that managerial ownership and board monitoring are substitutes in mitigating the agency problem between managers and shareholders. We also find that effective board curbs the excessive compensation by entrenched managers to themselves at low level of managerial ownership.     

How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives?

We examine how CEO compensation is affected by the presence of busy and overlap directors. We find that CEOs at firms with more busy directors receive greater total pay, fixed salary and equity‐linked pay and exhibit higher pay‐performance (delta) and pay‐risk (vega) sensitivities. Our results also suggest that CEOs at firms with more overlap directors take smaller total pay and equity‐linked pay and reveal lower delta and vega. We further show that the impact of busy and overlap directors on CEO pay is more visible for firms with less complexity and low information acquisition cost.     

Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes

This paper assesses whether reducing ‘readability’ is an effective obfuscation strategy for influencing the level of shareholder say-on-pay voting dissent in firms with excessive CEO pay. Based on a sample of UK-listed firms, our results indicate that in cases of excessive CEO pay, a less readable remuneration report is associated with reduced say-on-pay voting dissent. However, the effect of the obfuscation strategy diminishes as institutional ownership increases. Using obscurely written remuneration reports may even backfire (i.e. associated with increased voting dissent) when a firm’s majority shares are held by institutional investors. Our results are robust to controlling for compensation contract complexity as well as other alternative explanations. The results are also robust to various controls for endogeneity including a two-stage instrumental variable approach and propensity-score matching. Our findings offer regulatory implications that regulators could minimize the use of ‘obfuscation’ in pay-related disclosures by prescribing how information is to be presented.     

Explanations for Not Having an Audit Committee in a ‘Comply or Explain’ Regime

We utilise the Australian ‘comply or explain’ corporate governance regime to examine the explanations given for not having an audit committee and whether these explanations are consistent with underlying firm characteristics. We hand‐collect explanations provided by firms, and find the most common explanations are that the firm or board size is too small or that the firm is insufficiently complex to justify an audit committee. Thus, the reasons that firms provide for not having an audit committee are focused on internal factors limiting their ability to supply an audit committee. As we find that these explanations are associated with lower total assets, smaller board size and lower leverage, they are consistent with underlying firm characteristics. Thus firms are not providing inconsistent or unrelated explanations as pretexts to avoid forming an audit committee. Documenting that the explanations given for non‐compliance are associated with related firm characteristics should be of interest to regulators and policy makers.     

On the relation between ownership dispersion and the firm's market value

Firms with widely-held ownership are relatively few. Shareholders controlling a firm are willing to forego the benefit of portfolio diversification because they can obtain a ‘rent from control’ at the expense of minority shareholders. This entails relevant conclusions for financial theory: (1) the total market value of a closely-held firm is lower, and its cost of capital higher than that of an identical widely-held firm is lower and its cost of capital higher than that of (3) different prices of control and minority shares and disconuities may impede evolution from closely to widely-held ownership.     

Agency conflicts and auditing in private firms

We are interested in understanding how agency conflicts in private firms arise through ownership structures and family relationships. Specifically, we analyze auditors’ increase of effort and firms’ choice of auditors in situations with higher level of agency conflicts. For a large sample of private firms, we use unique and confidential data (obtained through special permission by the government) to measure direct and ultimate ownership for each shareholder as well as extended family relationships (based on marriage and blood lines, going back four generations and extending out to fourth cousin) among all shareholders, board members, and CEOs. We first find that audit fees, our proxy for audit effort, vary as hypothesized with firm-level characteristics related to ownership structures and family relationships. Second, we find evidence that firms in higher agency cost settings respond by having their financial statements audited by a higher-quality auditor (i.e., a Big 4 firm). However, for CEO family-related settings (i.e., where the CEO is related to the major shareholder or as the number of board members related to the CEO increases), we find no evidence of a greater demand for a Big 4 auditor.     

A path analysis investigation of the relationships between CEO pay ratios and firm performance mediated by employee satisfaction

We posit that information about CEO pay ratios is important to investors because employees' perceived fairness of their firm’s CEO pay ratio has consequences for firm performance. We use path analysis to examine the association between firm performance and (1) the predicted CEO pay ratio as determined by economic factors (the fair component of CEO pay ratio) and (2) the predicted CEO pay ratio as determined by non-economic factors (the unfair component of CEO pay ratio). We test for the existence and relative importance of direct and indirect paths using two measures of employee satisfaction and two measures of firm performance. We find that pay equity, a larger CEO pay ratio driven by economic factors, is associated with employee contributions to better firm performance. Conversely, we show that pay inequity, a larger CEO pay ratio driven by non-economic factors, is associated with employees' contributions to poorer firm performance. Consistent with the view that managerial entrenchment may amplify the negative effects of the CEO pay ratio, we find that the negative indirect path between pay inequity and firm performance, mediated by employee satisfaction, is more pronounced in firms with entrenched CEOs. Our findings contribute to the accounting compensation literature because they are consistent with CEO pay ratio information having economic consequences.     

Institutional investors,controlling shareholders and CEO pay‐performance relationship: evidence from China

Using a large sample of China’s listed firms between 2005 and 2015, we find that domestic mutual funds have a positive effect on the CEO pay‐performance relationship, and this effect becomes stronger when their ownership is higher and closer to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. This effect is stronger in non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs), firms facing weaker industry competition incentives, and firms located in more developed regions. However, Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) do not have such an influence. Overall, our study contends that the effectiveness of institutional investors’ monitoring role is subject to their identity, controlling shareholders and institutional environments.     

Equity‐based incentives and shareholder say‐on‐pay

We study the relationship between CEO pay‐performance sensitivity, pay‐risk sensitivity, and shareholder voting outcomes as part of the “say‐on‐pay” provision of the 2010 US Dodd‐Frank Act. Consistent with our hypothesis, we provide evidence that shareholders tend to approve of compensation packages that are more sensitive to changes in stock price (pay‐performance sensitivity). Our findings are consistent with theoretical predictions that outside owners approve of equity incentives as a means of aligning managers' interests with those of shareholders. We also document that future changes to equity‐based incentives are related to voting outcomes and that shareholders incorporate CFO incentives into their votes. Collectively, these results provide evidence of the importance of equity‐based incentives from the perspective of those most concerned with firm value and of the effectiveness of say‐on‐pay as a governance mechanism.     

Public Investment,the Stability Pact and the ‘Golden Rule’

The fiscal rules set in the Treaty of Maastricht and in the Stability and Growth Pact have sometimes been criticised as an excessively binding constraint for appropriate counter‐cyclical action. The risk that the rules may permanently reduce the public sector's contribution to capital accumulation has also been pointed out. In this framework, the adoption of a ‘golden rule’ has been suggested. Starting from the recent debate, this paper tackles two questions: (a) the implications of the Pact for public investment and (b) the pros and cons of introducing a golden rule in EMU's fiscal framework, given the objectives of low public debts and adequate margins for a stabilising budgetary policy. The analysis suggests that the rules set in the Treaty and in the Pact may negatively influence public investment spending. However, the golden rule, although intuitively appealing, does not seem to be an appropriate solution to the problem.     

Corporate governance and firm value: Evidence from Chinese state-controlled listed firms

The association between corporate governance and firm value has been extensively studied in Chinese listed firms. Based on the characteristics of their ultimate shareholders, Chinese listed firms can be categorised as (1) central state-controlled, (2) local state-controlled or (3) non-state-controlled. Some scholars have described Chinese government policy as ‘zhuada fangxiao’, thus suggesting that the corporate governance mechanisms (CGMs) of central state-controlled listed firms (SCLFs) are better than those of local state-controlled listed firms. Therefore, this paper specifically examines the influence of CGMs on the value of central SCLFs and local SCLFs. Analysis of 2006 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2009 suggests that the aggregate ownership of other large shareholders and the remuneration of top executives exhibit different effects on firm value in central and local SCLFs. The results also provide evidence that there is no endogenous effect of firm value on the ownership of the largest shareholder in central and local SCLFs.     

CEO's Inside Debt and Dynamics of Capital Structure

Debt‐type compensation (inside debt) exacerbates the divergence in risk preferences between the chief executive officer (CEO) and shareholders and, in turn, affects capital structure decisions. An excessively risk‐averse CEO tends to use less debt than the shareholders desire, reduce debt quickly when the firm is overlevered, but is reluctant to increase debt when the firm is underlevered. We find that higher CEO's inside debt ratio (i.e., inside debt as a percentage of total incentive compensation) is associated with lower firm leverage and faster (slower) leverage adjustments toward the shareholders’ desired level for overlevered (underlevered) firms. The CEO's inside debt ratio most conducive to capital structure rebalancing is around 10% of the firm's market debt ratio.     

Leadership Structure and Corporate Governance in Switzerland*

The question of whether the CEO should also serve as chairman of the board continues to be a controversial issue in corporate governance. While “agency cost” arguments would lead one to advocate separation of the top decision‐making and control functions, there are efficiency and coordination arguments for vesting the powers of the CEO and chair in the same person. And helping to keep the controversy alive, the empirical evidence on U.S. companies is inconclusive, with no clear loss of value associated with having combined CEO/chairmen. The authors use their recent research on Swiss companies, for which separation of the CEO and chair has long been the rule, to shed light on whether one leadership structure clearly dominates. But like most previous studies of U.S. companies, the authors report no evidence of a systematic difference in valuation between companies with combined and those with dual leadership. The authors also investigated whether companies with CEO‐chairmen use other governance mechanisms to counteract potential agency problems associated with giving the CEO effective control. Consistent with this hypothesis, the authors report that CEO/chairmen tend to have larger percentage ownership than CEOs who are not chairmen, but at the same time they find that the value of the firm appears to rise with increases in CEO equity holdings up to a certain point—around 40–50%— and then declines with further increases above that point. The suggestion here is that the potential for agency costs associated with combining the two leadership functions appears to be managed by providing larger—though not too large—equity incentives for CEO/chairmen. Finally, the authors investigated whether firm value is significantly related to firm‐level corporate governance as measured by a broad survey‐based index for a representative sample of Swiss firms. The results show a positive and significant relationship between the governance index and firm value—one that proves robust after controlling for a series of other governance mechanisms related to ownership structure and board characteristics as well as the possible “endogeneity” of these mechanisms.     

Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500

We investigate the relation between founding‐family ownership and firm performance. We find that family ownership is both prevalent and substantial; families are present in one‐third of the S&P 500 and account for 18 percent of outstanding equity. Contrary to our conjecture, we find family firms perform better than nonfamily firms. Additional analysis reveals that the relation between family holdings and firm performance is nonlinear and that when family members serve as CEO, performance is better than with outside CEOs. Overall, our results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that minority shareholders are adversely affected by family ownership, suggesting that family ownership is an effective organizational structure.