Endogenous Market Structure and Technology Licensing

This paper analyses the optimal licensing strategy of a licensor firm that competes with potential licensee firms in an industry with endogenous entry. The optimal licensing strategy of the licensor firm is to have zero royalty and positive fixed fees, which is a result that sharply contrasts with the existing literature whereby licensor firms tend to charge positive royalties to their rival licensees. Under the optimal licensing strategy, the licensor firm and the licensee firms are active in the market, but not the non‐licensed firms. This equilibrium market structure is socially desirable if the fixed production cost is not too small.     

逆向选择条件下技术许可中非排他性价格契约研究

通过经典的委托代理理论的应用,文章揭示了一类逆向选择条件下的技术许可中非排他性价格契约理论的内在机理。文章认为,通过针对差的类型的技术使用者的包含可变费用的契约和对好的类型的技术使用者的纯固定费用的契约,可以达到有效的排他性技术许可的目的;但为了有效的激励,技术所有者事前要对好的类型的技术使用者转移一定的信息租。     

Multiple steady states and indeterminacy in the Uzawa–Lucas model with educational externalities

This paper examines a foreign technology holder’s licensing choices between royalty and fixed-fee scheme. We emphasize that foreign licensor chooses the quality of licensed technology when the licensee country does not implement perfect intellectual property protection for licensor’s technology. We study quality choice as the foreign licensor’s selection for a particular grade of technical skills. We show that fixed fee emerges as the equilibrium licensing scheme when both the transfer of his technology is relatively efficient and the licensee is sufficiently cost competitive in the domestic market, and that royalty licensing prevails otherwise. We further show it need not hold the general belief that welfare in the licensor country unambiguously rise with a stronger patenting system in the licensee country when, in particular, such patenting system in place is sufficiently lax.     

Technology licensing and environmental policy instruments: Price control versus quantity control

This paper analyzes the welfare implications of abatement technology licensing under taxation and emission trading schemes. We demonstrate that a firm with a better abatement technology optimally sells a per-unit royalty license to a competitor under both schemes but offers a higher royalty rate under the latter. The emission trading scheme may outperform the taxation scheme regarding social surplus by inducing more production by the licensor and less production by the licensee. These are reversals of the welfare implications suggested by the literature that adopts a partial equilibrium approach or omits either the market for the advanced technology or the final goods.     

Mixed Competition and Patent Licensing

This paper studies the patent licensing decision of an insider patentee when two firms engage in a mixed (Cournot–Bertrand or Bertrand–Cournot) competition where one firm adopts the quantity strategy while the other uses the price strategy and vice versa. If either the fixed fee or royalty is applied, then the licensor prefers the fixed fee when the licensor takes the quantity strategy, while the licensee uses the price strategy (Cournot–Bertrand). If the two‐part tariff is applied, then the two‐part tariff is more likely to be adopted by the licensor under Cournot–Bertrand than under Bertrand–Cournot competition.     

Quality differentiation and product innovation licensing

Evidence reveals that there are more than 50% product innovation licensings applied within industries. We study product innovation licensing (quality-enhancing licensing) in both exclusive and non-exclusive schemes each under unit/revenue royalty and fixed fee in a vertically differentiated Cournot oligopoly, where a quality-leading firm is an internal licensor. We show that, under a non-exclusive licensing, royalty licensing is the superior policy for the licensor if quality difference within firms is small, regardless of whether a unit or revenue royalty scheme is offered. Under an exclusive licensing, a two-part tariff is optimal. If fixed fee licensing is practicable, the licensor favors an exclusive licensing. Furthermore, an increase in quality difference within firms increases the optimal rates. Using the simulated results, we examine that licensing improves social welfare in all schemes, and the number of licensees will influence the magnitude of welfare enhancement.     

The benefits of the reciprocal grantback clause in patent licensing

This paper shows that a reciprocal grantback clause could potentially be a better licensing provision than a one-way type. There are two benefits associated with the use of a reciprocal grantback clause. First, it improves efficiency by reducing the (minimum) contract compatible royalty rate to zero. As a result, the production becomes efficient because both the licensor and the licensee produce at the same marginal cost. Second, a reciprocal grantback clause is a more effective provision than a one-way grantback clause to guarantee the transfer of superior technology, hence it promotes better technology diffusion.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality,product variety,public input and increasing returns: A static general equilibrium analysis

The paper develops a four sector small open economy model with two traded final good sectors, a public intermediate good producing sector and a nontraded good sector producing varieties of intermediate goods. There are three primary factors: capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour. Industrial sector producing a traded good uses capital, intermediate goods and skilled labour as inputs. Intermediate goods producing sector also uses capital and skilled labour. Public input producing sector and the agricultural sector producing the other traded good use capital and unskilled labour as inputs. It is shown that, if production technologies are the same for the agricultural sector and the public input producing sector and if the scale elasticity of output is very low, then an increase in capital stock (unskilled labour endowment) raises (lowers) the skilled–unskilled wage ratio. However, an increase in skilled labour endowment does not produce any unambiguous effect. On the other hand, an increase in the tax rate on industrial output and/or an increase in the price of the agricultural product, armed with the same set of assumptions, lowers the skilled–unskilled wage ratio.     

Local Import Competition in a Lumpy Country

This paper examines the effects of a fall in the price of an imported good in a region of a country that is specialized in producing that good. The context is a “lumpy country” model in which factors are unable to move between locations, although in this case I assume that only labor is immobile, and that the other factor, capital, is perfectly mobile between regions. With mobile capital, the lumpy-country equilibrium can be anywhere in the factor-price equalization set, but my focus is on a region that initially produces only one good, on the border of that set. When the price of that good falls due to import competition, it would be possible for both factors to reallocate partially into production of the other good, but I assume instead that some capital simply leaves the region, so that it continues to produce only the same good that it did before. The result of this is a fall in the real wage of labor, just as under Stolper-Samuelson assumptions. I then look at production also of a non-traded good, and find that the same import competition that cheapened the traded good also cheapens the nontraded good. The result is that the region shrinks, losing capital and producing less of both goods unless the substitution in favor of the nontraded good expands its consumption out of a smaller income.     

Patent Licensing in the Presence of Trade Barriers

We develop a two‐country duopoly model to explore the optimal licensing contract for an outsider licensor in terms of fixed‐fee and royalty licensing by taking into account trade barriers when firms produce a homogeneous product and engage in Bertrand competition in each market. The present paper focuses on the interaction between licensing and trade barriers in two international markets. We show that both royalty and non‐exclusive fixed‐fee licensing can be optimal. Furthermore, exclusive fixed‐fee licensing can be optimal, which is a result that is not discussed in the existing literature.     

我国粮食主产区农业高质量发展的区域差异及收敛性分析

全面认识粮食主产区农业高质量发展差异的空间特性,为推动粮食主产区农业高质量的协调发展提供有益启示。本文从新发展理念出发,构建农业高质量发展综合评价指标体系,运用加入时间变量的熵值法测度2003-2018年我国粮食主产区农业高质量发展水平,利用Dagum基尼系数揭示其发展的区域差异大小及其来源,并采用多种收敛方法考察其收敛性特征。结果显示：粮食主产区农业高质量发展水平较低,在波动中呈总体上升趋势;粮食主产区农业高质量发展存在显著的区域差异,其差异在波动中呈总体下降趋势,区域内差异与区域间差异交替成为区域差异的主要来源;粮食主产区农业高质量发展具备典型的收敛和收敛特征,分区域和分时期的收敛性具有明显的异质性特征。因此为提升农业高质量发展水平和缩小区域差距,需要进一步深化农业供给侧结构性改革,积极发展农业新业态和新模式,并通过“追赶效应”和“以高带低”拉动机制,推动粮食主产区农业高质量发展的跨区域协同提升。     

技术许可中道德风险问题的价格契约治理机制研究

本文利用现代契约经济学基本理论,对同一技术条件下、由技术使用者替代性投入行为而产生的道德风险问题的价格契约治理机制进行了分析。分析结果表明,技术所有者总可以设计一种分离价格契约治理道德风险问题,其中,对自己偏好的高成本投入行为采用纯固定费用,而对低成本投入行为采用“固定费用 提成费”。本文进一步认为,价格契约中提成费比率对成本效率较高的投入行为所造成的扭曲程度,要大于成本效率较低的投入行为。     

技术许可中道德风险问题的价格契约治理机制研究

本文利用现代契约经济学基本理论，对同一技术条件下、由技术使用者替代性投入行为而产生的道德风险问题的价格契约治理机制进行了分析。分析结果表明，技术所有者总可以设计一种分离价格契约治理道德风险问题，其中，对自己偏好的高成本投入行为采用纯固定费用，而对低成本投入行为采用“固定费用＋提成费”。本文进一步认为，价格契约中提成费比率对成本效率较高的投入行为所造成的扭曲程度，要大干成本效率较低的投入行为。     

Foreign-exchange distribution in Yugoslavia's new planning system: An input-output approach

Under the new planning system in Yugoslavia, the foreign-exchange earnings of the final exporter should be shared by all the producing units that contributed to the production of the exported goods or services. A method of calculating the contributions of the various producing sectors to a country's exports is developed. This method makes use of the value-added/gross-output ratios of individual sectors and the Leontief inverse matrix. The analysis is extended to an examination of the balance-of-trade effects of exports.     

木薯燃料乙醇的净能量分析与环境影响评价——基于广西20万吨木薯燃料乙醇项目的分析

基于对广西北海年产20万吨木薯燃料乙醇项目实地调研获得的数据资料,对燃料乙醇项目进行了净能量分析,对其环境影响进行了考察。由于采用的技术工艺先进,燃料乙醇生产的能量多于生产过程的能量消耗,是有效的,但是净能量值并不十分乐观;项目的循环经济运行模式对于保护环境免受污染伤害起到了很好的作用,生产过程中产生的大部分固体废弃物得到了回收利用,避免了对环境的危害。     

Determinants of inter-firm technology licensing in the EU

This article investigates the determinants of technology licensing, focusing on how country-specific characteristics affect technology holders’ incentives to sell their proprietary technologies through licensing alliances. An empirical examination of licensing is done using a unique panel data set of licensing transactions involving companies in the EU. The strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection, the degree of economic freedom, the level of country risk, and the number of patent granted in the country are found to be important determinants of inter-firm technology licensing. In addition, firms with prior independent experience as a licensor and public companies tend to license technology more.     

Trade liberalization and the Labor Market Revisited

This paper provides new insights in understanding the adjustments of the labor market to trade liberalization policies in an economy producing tradeables and nontradeables. The results of the paper indicate that the short-run effects of trade liberalization on wages, labor allocation and worker welfare is contingent on certain explicit production and demand conditions that exist in an economy. The production condition is related to the slope of the labor demand curve in a given economy and the demand condition is related to the difference in the cross-price elasticity of demand of nontradeables to the price of importables and exportables. The necessary combination of these conditions needed for trade liberalization to be welfare improving in the short run is explored.     

Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge

We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interimresearch knowledge between two participants in an R&D race for an ultimate,patentable invention. Licence fee schedules that are functions of the'amount of knowledge disclosed', by the leading to the laggingagent, are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes andvarying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure. In hersequential-offers bargaining games, the uninformed buyer is able to elicitfull disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type ofthe licensor, and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminatingknowledge licensee.     

供应链管理环境下Push/Pull生产方式研究

根据供应链管理环境对企业生产计划的新要求，提出了供应链管理环境下的Push／Pull生产方式，并介绍了这种生产方式的组织形式，描述了这种以看板控制体系为依托的供应链环境下的生产运作模式。     

三螺旋互动下专利联营促进成果转化的许可优势研究

在世界产业竞争格局下,基于许可进行成果转化的专利联营日渐成为高新技术产业竞争和发展的主导范式。传统的纵向结构专利联营由于必要专利权人来源单一,已经出现了许可困境,不利于必要专利的转化,而基于大学-产业-政府三螺旋互动创新的专利联营有利于合理配置资源,有效促进必要专利的转化。对三螺旋互动下专利联营促进成果转化的许可优势进行研究发现,与纵向结构专利联营相比,三螺旋互动下专利联营具备促进成果转化的许可动力优势、许可契约优势和许可市场优势等多维优势,具体表现在：多元来源的必要专利可持久的资本化特性保证了许可动力强劲,契约双方的合作共赢目标保证了许可契约的顺利达成,容易形成事实标准保证了许可市场的有效占领。