What should the value of lambda be in the exponentially weighted moving average volatility model?

Forecasting volatility is fundamental to forecasting parametric models of value-at-risk. The exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) volatility model is the recommended model for forecasting volatility by the Riskmetrics group. For monthly data, the lambda parameter of the EWMA model is recommended to be set to 0.97. In this study, we empirically investigate if this is the optimal value of lambda in terms of forecasting volatility. Employing monthly realized volatility as the benchmark for testing the value of lambda, it is found that a value of lambda of 0.97 is far from optimal. The tests are robust to a variety of test statistics. It is further found that the optimal value of lambda is time varying and should be based upon recent historical data. The article offers a practical method to increase the reliability and accuracy of value-at-risk forecasts that can be easily implemented within an Excel spreadsheet.     

基于Miller-Orr模型的省级政府现金管理实证研究

现代国库制度的两项重要功能是,确保对预算执行过程的有效监控和对政府现金资源的妥善管理,而高效的现金管理系统对监控预算执行起着重要的支持性作用.在政府现金管理已逐渐为政府和理论界所关注的背景下,本文从政府现金管理的基本理论、本质及意义入手,以实际调研数据为基础,通过将西部某省2003-2005年的实际数据运用到修正的Miller-Orr模型中,较准确的测算出了2006年该省国库现金月余额的控制范围,为建立省级政府现金管理模式提供了有益的参考.     

Monitoring and forecasting annual public deficit every month: the case of France

In this paper we forecast annual budget deficits using monthly information. Using French monthly data on central government revenues and expenditures, the method we propose consists of: (1) estimating monthly ARIMA models for all items of central government revenues and expenditures; (2) inferring the annual ARIMA models from the monthly models; (3) using the inferred annual ARIMA models to perform one-step-ahead forecasts for each item; (4) compounding the annual forecasts of all revenues and expenditures to obtain an annual budget deficit forecast. The major empirical benefit of this technique is that as soon as new monthly data become available, annual deficit forecasts are updated. This allows us to detect in advance possible slippages in central government finances. For years 2002–2004, forecasts obtained following the proposed approach are compared with a benchmark method and with official predictions published by the French government. An evaluation of their relative performance is provided.      

Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders

A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders but need not be identical, and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means of a sequence of open ascending auctions, then it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first; (2) the sequential auction yields more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction used recently by the FCC if the discrepancy in the values is large, or if there are significant complementarities; (3) a hybrid simultaneous-sequential form is revenue superior to the sequential auction; and (4) budget constraints arise endogenously.     

Some tests of the government's intertemporal budget constraint using US data

US monthly data, for the period 1951–1984, are used to test a key element of the Ricardian equivalence doctrine, namely the government's intertemporal budget constraint. It is demonstrated that the US empirical evidence is not supportive of this constraint. Some explanations for this finding are noted.     

Fisher Ideal Indexes in the National Income and Product Accounts

The mastery of the spreadsheet technique has become almost universal in economics departments. The authors explain, step-by-step, how the spreadsheet can be used as an instructional aid to teach basic microeconomic concepts.     

Demand system estimation in the absence of price data: an application of Stone-Lewbel price indices

This article evaluates the feasibility of estimating a system of demand equations in the absence of price information using the approach developed by Lewbel (1989). Stone-Lewbel (SL) price indices for commodity groups are constructed using information on the budget shares and the Consumer Price Indices (CPIs) of the goods comprising the commodity groups, which allows for household-level prices to be recovered. This study evaluates how susceptible are elasticities and marginal effects estimates from traditional parametric demand systems to the CPI used in the construction of the SL prices. To do this, three alternative regional CPIs are considered for the construction of the SL prices: monthly, quarterly and a constant (unity) price index. Elasticities and marginal effect estimates are computed for eight food commodity groups using the Exact Affine Stone Index (EASI) model as the parametric demand system and data from the United States Consumer Expenditure Survey. The estimates proved to be robust to the alternative regional CPIs considered in the construction of SL price indices, even to the absence of one. Hence, the results suggest that it is possible to accurately estimate a demand system even in the absence of price information.     

Teaching Chain-Weight Real GDP Measures

In 1996, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) changed the method used to calculate measures of real GDP from a Laspeyres or Paasche index to a Fisher ideal index, also called a chain-weight index. Even though this is a significant change in approach and has resulted in extensive revisions of reported statistics, many authors of intermediate-level textbooks treat this topic casually, if at all. In this article, the author presents two applications in which this topic can be explored more thoroughly, with the help of spreadsheet software. One exercise introduces the concept of the chain-weight index by comparing it to Laspeyres, Paasche, and ideal indexes with the use of utility analysis. The second exercise is a step-by-step process to calculate chain-weight index statistics.     

An efficient budget allocation policy for decentralisation of responsibility for site decontamination projects

Selection and execution of site decontamination projects is often best left to local authorities, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, even though the budget for such projects is made available through a central authority. In this paper we suggest a practical budget allocation policy which a central authority can employ to allocate budgets to local authorities, while still optimising the central authority's environmental objective function. The procedure is fully consistent with the principle of decentralisation of responsibility for selection and execution of projects, and requires a minimum information exchange between local and central levels. Despite the information asymmetry between local and central levels, incentive compatibility problems can be (partially) prevented by choosing an appropriate evaluation mechanism. At the same time, the procedure is computationally effective and efficient, and can guarantee a fair budget allocation, making it easy to implement and politically acceptable.     

Do market prices aggregate information about macroeconomic uncertainty (or risk)?

This article examines several economic variables that represent either confidence in future economic conditions or the degree of risk/uncertainty about future conditions in order to determine which contain more information about future employment and output. Some of these variables are prices, while others are from surveys. Causality tests, historical decompositions within a VAR and out-of-sample forecasts are among the tools used. This article concludes that monthly stock returns contain much more information about future economic conditions than the other variables. The spread between Moody’s BAA and AAA bonds, the spread between the constant maturity 10-year government bond and the federal funds rate, as well as uncertainty in future economic conditions as measured by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Business Outlook Survey also provide information about future economic conditions. Notably, this article finds that monthly stock returns contain more information about future economic conditions than does the vix and that variables based on market prices provide more information than survey data. This result provides some support for the notion that market prices aggregate information.     

Budget Cuts, Social Assistance and Voluntary Unemployment

The theory of optimal taxation has shown that bunching can be optimal under certain circumstances so that low–skilled agents are not offered any work incentives. Optimal bunching balances the marginal costs of voluntary unemployment and the marginal reduction in information rents for high–skilled workers. This paper demonstrates how the optimal scheme will change if the budget is cut. It shows that a tighter budget constraint will lead to more voluntary unemployment and less work incentives.     

Merger negotiations and ex-post regret

We consider a setting in which two potential merger partners each possess private information pertaining both to the profitability of the merged entity and to stand-alone profits, and we investigate the extent to which this private information makes ex-post regret an unavoidable phenomenon in merger negotiations. To this end, we consider ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms, which use both players' reports to determine whether or not a merger will take place and what each player will earn in each case. When the outside option of at least one player is known, the efficient merger decision can be implemented by such a mechanism under plausible budget-balance requirements. When neither outside option is known, we show that the potential for regret-free implementation is much more limited, unless the budget balance condition is relaxed to permit money-burning in the case of false reports.     

Profiling science and innovation policy by object-based computing

Named entities, such as key initiatives, research programmes, scientific strategies and policies, are research objects or objects that are embedded in many web pages of science and innovation institutes. These objects provide important information that can be extracted intelligently from those pages. This paper brings forward an object-based computing method by using objects and their semantic information for profiling science and innovation policies. After extracting the objects and the relationships between them, we proposed an object grid to represent web pages. Objects were transferred into machine-readable knowledge units with rich semantic information. By using computational objects, we judged the intelligence value of web resources and classified policies into more detailed categories, such as strategic plan, research and development, and budget. To test the effectiveness of profiling science and innovation policies by using the object-based computing method, this paper conducted a research profiling experiment system.     

Political budget cycles revisited: Testing the signalling process

A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive and perceive the signal in that way. To empirically assess the relevance of the signalling channel at the municipal level, we conducted a survey among 2000 representative German citizens in 2018. Only a small fraction of voters feel well-informed about the fiscal budget signal and use the information it contains to decide whether to vote for the incumbent politician. Persons paying more attention to the signal sent by local politicians live in smaller municipalities, are more satisfied with their economic situation, are more educated, and do not feel that they are being electorally manipulated. Our analysis raises doubt about the relevance of budget composition as a signalling mechanism for voters at the local level.     

THE STRUCTURE OF HOUSEHOLD SPENDING IN SOUTH AMERICAN CITIES: INDEXES OF DISSIMILARITY AND CAUSES OF INTER-CITY DIFFERENCES

Household budget data collected in 1966–1971 in eleven cities in six South American countries are used to define individual mean budget structures (means of budget shares across households). These structures are then compared by indexes of dissimilarity, calculated for the entire budget and also for major components: food, animal protein foods, nonfood, and housing and clothing. Differences among cities in real income account for much of the difference in the share of the consumer budget devoted to food, which in turn is a principal source of overall budget dissimilarity. Within the food and nonfood budgets separately, income is of somewhat less importance; prices and preferences become more significant. Budget structures tend for this reason to be similar for cities in the same country. The structure of nonfood spending also varies markedly between coastal and interior cities, largely because of differences in housing costs. The available price data account for dissimilarities which depend on the price of a single large category of spending, but they do not help explain structural differences involving many categories: prices seem more important for nonfood than for food expenditures. Regression analysis is used to weigh the importance of each variable contributing to dissimilarity.     

Public transaction costs of agri-environmental schemes and their determinants—Analysing stakeholders' involvement and perceptions

Despite an overall budget increase for rural development in the new programming period (2007-2013), most older Member States in the now expanded European Union are facing a substantial reduction in their budget for rural development and thus for agri-environmental schemes (AESs). It can be assumed that, in most countries, none or at best only part of this loss can be offset by national funds. Therefore the design of more efficient national governance structures for AESs, which decrease public transaction costs (TCs), would be an appropriate solution to this problem. The objective of this paper is to define the factors that influence these public TCs, so that appropriate action can then be taken to reduce them. A statistical analysis, with a proxy for public TCs, is combined with an analysis of stakeholder perceptions (excluding farmers) concerning public TC influencing factors. The research showed that it is mainly scheme related factors that are perceived to be important, although the governance structure, institutional environment and level of trust also play a role. Finally, the analysis of perceptions concerning TCs also showed that AES related actors have a limited knowledge of TCs.     

Inefficient Investment,Information Asymmetry,and Competition for Managers

We investigate the possible inefficiency of investment when the manager has better information than the principal. We assume that projects can be grouped into two categories based on their information characteristics of soft and hard information. We consider a case in which the manager faces competition for appointment at the end of term. We consider several cases in which the competitor's ability is known, or proxied by the performance of other managers, or is uncertain. We find that hard information projects are preferred to soft information projects and that the efficiency in project selection critically depends on the competitor's ability. Interestingly, information asymmetry may be socially beneficial, because it can provide the manager with incentives to select high‐quality hard‐information projects. Welfare improvement can be made by a budget change that is in the opposite direction to the optimum. Several empirical implications of the theory are discussed.     

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future. We show that, maybe somewhat surprisingly, dictators who are less likely to lose power, are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support.     

Bioeconomic modeling for control of weeds in natural environments

When a weed invasion is first discovered a decision has to be made on whether to attempt to eradicate it, contain it or do nothing. Ideally, these decisions should be based on a complete benefit-cost analysis, but this is often not possible. A partial analysis, combining knowledge of the rate of spread, seedbank longevity, costs of control and techniques of economic analysis, can assist in making a good decision. This paper presents a decision model to determine when immediate eradication of a weed should be attempted, or more generally whether weed control should be attempted at all. The technique is based on identifying two ‘switching points’: the invasion size at which it is no longer optimal to attempt eradication but where containment may be an option; and the invasion size at which it becomes optimal to apply no form of control at all. The model is applied to a woody perennial weed in a natural environment. The results show that seedbank longevity is the main constraint on the maximum eradicable area and spread rate is the main constraint on the maximum containment area. Stochastic simulations are undertaken to derive probability distributions of costs which are than used to evaluate the effect of budget constraints on areas that can be eradicated. We find that, in the absence of a budget constraint, it may be desirable to eradicate invasions from areas as large as 8000 ha, but when budget constraints typical of those faced by agencies in Australia are introduced, feasible eradicable areas are less than 1000 ha.     

Does Capital Account Liberalization Discipline Budget Deficit?

The paper investigates whether free capital mobility leads a government to tighten its budget deficit for fear of being penalized from the international capital market. The author tests the hypothesis using three‐stage least squares (3SLS), which can control for the endogenous nature of capital account liberalization. Even the conservative measure shows that, if capital account liberalization were exogenously imposed, ceteris paribus, government budget deficit would be reduced by 2.275% of GDP. Furthermore, 3SLS results show that this disciplinary effect is stronger for countries under a fixed exchange rate regime or for countries with weak central bank independence. The disciplinary effect is also found to be stronger in more recent periods—the 1990s—during which capital market integration has been most prevalent.