Remedies for Microsoft

Thewisestsolutionwouldbeforthecompanyitselftoembraceabreak-upItmayhavecomeasashocktotheInaretsbutfewotherscanhavebeensmprisedthatMicrosofwasthisweekfoundguilty.TheJudgeintheantitrustcaseagainstthesoftwarefirmruledthatitwasamonopolythathaddemonstratedaPatternofabuse,done"violencetothecompetitiveprocess"and"placedanoppressivethumbonthescaleofcompetitivefortune,therebygUareteeingitscontinueddondnance".ThestrengthoftheverdictsuggeststhathoPesofanegotiat-edsettlementwerealwaysslim.Tooofteninthep…     

在现代管理中应用Excel

解决计算机技术与财经管理实践脱节的问题，不仅需要我们在教学工作中予以特别关注，同时也需要利用各种渠道来引导学生及社会各个层次管理人员认识并掌握现代管理中的计算机技术。在决策管理中Excel的应用将数学模型转变为相应的计算机模型。应用Excel所提供的函数、控件以及数据分析对象，能够使管理工作效率更高，决策更科学。     

微软诉讼背后的学术流派之争

自1998微软首次被美国地方法院起诉以来,围绕着微软是否违反了美国的《谢尔曼法》,美国的经济学界展开了激烈的争论。由于微软所从事行业的特殊性以及“微软奇迹”的影响巨大,微软诉讼案在美国社会引起了巨大的反响,几乎所有的美国知名经济学家都卷入了这场争论,或多或少地发表了自己的看法。尽管众多经济学家众说纷纭,看法不尽相同,但是总的来说,他们的看法可以归为泾渭分明的两大阵营：一方认定微软垄断了市场且实施了搭售的限制竞争行为,应该对其进行拆分,以维护市场的竞争性;另一方则认为由于市场范围难以确定,很难说微软垄…     

Excel Models for International Trade Theory and Policy: An Online Resource

URL: http://sites.google.com/site/jgilberteconomics/Home/excel/     

统计工作中几个Excel常用函数的使用体会

在基层统计的日常工作中,经常遇到加权求和的计算,如在计算企业能源消费量或工业产值时,还经常需要在会计报表或其他统计表中查找满足条件的数据。为提高基层统计工作效率,主要阐述使用SUMPRODUCT、HLOOKUP和MATCH函数提高工作效率的体会。     

浅谈VB中使用Excel的VBA对象制表

本文介绍了VB环境下制作数据报表的常用方法,着重介绍了在VB中使用Excel 的VBA对象制作数据报表的优点,详细阐述了数据报表的制作过程。     

Goodbye,Good Luck,See Ya Next Week——BusinessWeek talks to Bill Gates as his final day at Microsoft approaches

It's been one of the most carefully orchestrated transitions in corporate his- tory.Microsoft Chairman William H. GatesⅢannounced two years ago he would walk away from his day-to-day duties at the company he co-founded to spend more time working on philan-     

Competitive equilibrium with unawareness in economies with production

This paper investigates an extension of the GEI-unawareness framework by Modica et al. (Econ. Theory 12 (1998) 259) to economies with entrepreneurial production. Existence of equilibrium is guaranteed given decreasing returns to scale. Firm's value and investment decision in equilibrium are characterized. An example of commodity innovation shows that the effect of different degrees of awareness on investment decisions depend upon the degree of risk aversion. In the case of log preferences unawareness may not matter for commodity innovation, although this depends on other preference features.     

Endogenous Timing with Incomplete Information and with Observable Delay

This paper analyzes endogenous timing in a duopoly model with incomplete information. Firms announce the period in which they will move before choosing an action and are then committed to their choices. Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria, with either the informed or the uninformed firm as the Stackelberg leader, may emerge. For most parameters, the Cournot equilibrium in the first production period results endogenously. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72; C73; D82; L10.     

31例妊高症剖宫产麻醉配合体会

目的探讨妊高症剖宫产麻醉配合体会经验.方法对2009年4月－2012年3月在牡丹江医学院附属二院妇产科住院的31例妊高症剖宫产产妇资料进行回顾性分析.结果31例患者中,18例行腰-硬联合麻醉,13例行硬膜外麻醉,入ICU率及住院天数,腰硬联合麻醉组明显低于硬膜外麻醉组;新生儿1－5min Apgar评分≤7分的百分率,腰硬联合麻醉组明显低于硬膜外麻醉组,两组患者的术后血压、胎儿娩出时间、术后并发症均无显著性差异.结论腰-硬联合麻醉运用于妊高症剖宫产是疗效确切并且安全的.     

Deregulation with consensus

We analyze the problem of eliminating an inefficient regulation, such as protection, in a dynamic model in which there is incomplete information and unanimous approval from all parties involved is necessary. Existing firms have heterogeneous cost, and efficiency requires some of them to shut down when the inefficient regulation is eliminated. The government can set up a revelation mechanism, giving subsidies and requiring firms to exit the market at a given time depending on the information collected. Under full commitment the optimal policy prescribes that some inefficient firms remain active and are subsidized. The optimal policy takes a simple form, with at most two times at which the firms are allowed to exit. We are very grateful to Matt Mitchell whose comments substantially improved the paper.     

Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale

We study a model of common-value auctions with two bidders in which bidders’ private information are independently and asymmetrically distributed. We present sufficient and necessary conditions, respectively, under which the expected revenues from first-price and second-price auctions can be ranked. Using these conditions and a bid-equivalence between common-value auctions and private-value auctions with resale, we extend the revenue-ranking result of Hafalir and Krishna [Am Econ Rev 98, 2008a] and provide necessary conditions for their ranking to hold. In addition, we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the opposite ranking of revenues, respectively. Our analysis helps clarify the roles of two forms of regularity assumptions (buyer-regularity and seller-regularity) in ranking revenues and illustrates how revenue ranking is linked to submodularity and supermodularity of the common-value function and to a single-crossing property of a function derived from the monopoly or monopsony pricing function in the resale stage.