Credit Risk Spreads in Local and Foreign Currencies

Governments, corporations, and even small firms raise and denominate capital in different currencies. We examine the micro‐level factors that should be considered by a borrower when structuring debt denominated in various currencies. This paper will show how the currency composition of debt affects the cost of debt through the interaction with the risk of company's assets. We look at the currency mismatch in the firm and analyze its credit spread within a Merton's type model with bankruptcy. We show that foreign currency borrowing is cheaper when the exchange rate is positively correlated with the return on the company's assets. The determining factor is not just whether a given company is an exporter or importer, but rather the statistical correlation between the rate of return on the firm's assets and changes in the exchange rate.     

Value‐Added Per Share (VAPS): A Value‐Relevant Corporate Performance Metric

The authors introduce Value Added Per Share (VAPS) as a value‐relevant metric that is intended to complement earnings per share (EPS) in helping corporate managers and analysts understand and overcome the limitations of GAAP‐based reporting. VAPS discounts a firm's past and projected cash flows at its “cost of capital,” allowing companies to avoid the subjective accounting accrual process and other practices that often make EPS misleading. A company's VAPS is calculated in three main steps: (1) estimate the change in the capitalized value of after‐tax operating cash flow by taking the net change (plus or minus) of the firm's operating cash flow after taxes and dividing that number by the firm's cost of capital; (2) subtract total investment expenditures; and (3) divide by the number of shares outstanding. By capitalizing the change in after‐tax operating cash flow, one finds the net change in a firm's current operations value. By subtracting investment expenditures from that change in current operations value, the analyst gets a clearer picture of the benefit to shareholders net of the funds used to create that benefit. Consistent with basic theory, VAPS is positive when a company earns a return at least equal to its cost of capital and negative otherwise. Because of their fundamental differences, EPS and VAPS are likely to send different signals, and VAPS is expected to provide greater insight into stock price changes. The authors provide the findings of statistical tests showing the superior explanatory power of VAPS and recommend that companies publish statements of VAPS along with standard GAAP results, especially since the former can be readily calculated using the available income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement data.     

Capacity overhang and corporate disinvestment decisions

We use a stochastic frontier model to estimate a firm's capacity overhang. We find that excess capacity is positively related to a drop in new capital expenditures, an accumulation of depleted long-term assets, and outright sales of investment assets. However, the sale of long-term assets (property, plant, and equipment [PP&E]) peaks for intermediate levels of excess capacity and then declines. We attribute this to growth options. We test for evidence of a preference ordering in the firm's choice of responding to excess capacity and find evidence for a pecking order in firm disinvestment, where sales of long-term assets are a measure of last resort.     

ESG as a Value‐Creation Tool for Active Investors: A Profile of Inherent Group

A growing number of investment managers claim to integrate environmental, social, and governance considerations into their investment strategy and processes, but few have described how they do so in depth. Even fewer reinforce the importance of sustainability within their own firms by becoming a certified ‘B Corporation.’ This article offers a rare, inside look at how one such value‐oriented manager uses ESG as a tool for differentiated investment sourcing, underwriting, and corporate engagement with the aim of achieving superior risk‐adjusted returns. One of the main arguments of the article—and a key principle of the firm's investment approach—is that ESG, as applied to both corporate strategy and operations, is an important factor in determining a company's cost of capital. The authors present specific examples of their investment process at work, highlighting how active engagement with management on ESG issues can catalyze progress that becomes valued by the capital markets.     

An Investor Perspective on the Black Box of Corporate Social Responsibility

In summarizing the findings of their recent study, the authors report findings that suggest that not all socially responsible corporate policies are likely to have the same effect on a company's ownership and value. Using environmental policy as their proxy for CSR activities, the authors classify corporate environmental practices into two categories: (1) actions that reduce the likelihood of harmful outcomes by reducing the corporate exposure to environmental risk; and (2) actions that enhance companies' perceived ‘greenness’ through investments that go beyond both legal requirements and any conceivable risk management rationale. Although both groups of environmental practices are likely to be viewed as socially beneficial, corporate expenditures that reduce a firm's environmental risk exposure are more likely to benefit shareholders by limiting the risk of losses arising from environmental accidents, lawsuits, and fines—and possibly thereby reducing the firm's cost of capital. By contrast, corporate expenditures that enhance the firm's perceived greenness by going beyond legal requirements and risk management rationales could actually reduce shareholder value. Consistent with this hypothesis, the authors find that institutional investors tend to own smaller than average percentages of both companies the authors identify as ‘toxic’ and make limited efforts to manage their environmental risk, and companies they label ‘green’ with low environmental risk exposure but relatively high CSR spending on the environment. At the same time, such investors hold larger‐than‐average positions in ‘neutral’ companies with relatively low, or effectively managed, environmental risk exposures and limited investment in ‘greenness’ programs. The authors also find that both toxic and green companies have lower (Tobin's Q) valuations than neutral companies, and that otherwise toxic companies that effectively manage their environmental risk exposures have higher valuations.     

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON ENTERPRISE-WIDE RISK MANAGEMENT

For many years, MBA. students were taught that there was no good reason for a company that hedged a large currency exposure to trade at a higher P/E than an otherwise identical company that chose not to hedge. Corporate stockholders, simply by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of interest rate and currency risk on corporate values. And thus corporate efforts to manage risk were thought to be “redundant,” a waste of corporate resources on a function that was already accomplished by investors at far lower cost. But the theory underlying this “perfect markets” framework has changed in recent years to focus on ways that corporate risk management can add value. The academics and practitioners who participated in this roundtable began by discussing in general terms how risk management can be used to support a company's strategic plan and investment policy. At Merck, for example, where R&D spending was determined as a percentage of earnings, a policy of hedging foreign currency exposure to reduce earnings volatility was viewed as adding value by “protecting” the firm's R&D. The panelists also agreed that a well executed risk management policy can increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital by lowering the likelihood of financial distress. For example, companies with debt covenants might undertake a risk management program to lower earnings volatility and ensure a minimum level of earnings for debt compliance purposes. But one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that risk management and earnings management are not the same thing, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic functions. Moreover, in making decisions to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. That is, if there is an outside firm or investor willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. In addition to the cost savings and higher return on capital promised by such an approach, a number of the panelists also pointed to a less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—namely, a marked improvement of the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the firm's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among the firm's business units.     

Financial Planning and Investor Communications at GE (With a Look at Why We Ended Earnings Guidance)*

In this edited version of a talk given at a conference of accounting academics and corporate practitioners, the Vice Chairman and Chief Financial Officer of General Electric describes the company's internal budgeting and financial planning process, and how the information generated by this process is communicated to investors. The company's business model—the common thread running through all its different businesses—is to make large investments in technology that make possible the firm's equipment sales, which in turn provide the basis for a profitable long-term services business. The main role of the company's internal analysis and planning process is to help management allocate capital in a way that produces long-run growth in revenues and earnings but, most important, a competitive return on investor capital. Another major aim of the company's planning process is to help management identify and manage major risks that could interfere with management's ability to carry out its strategic investments and goals. The company's focus on risk management is both reflected in, and facilitated by, a forecasting process that puts less emphasis on the accuracy of “point estimates” and pays greater attention to the range and distribution of possible outcomes. “What we really care about,” as the author says, “is the quality of the thinking and the dialogue among our managers that takes place around the forecasting process.” And it is the output of these internal processes, and “the quality of the thinking and dialogue” behind it, that are “the essence of what the company is trying to communicate to analysts and investors.” Instead of holding up quarterly earnings targets—a practice the company ended in 2008—management's communications with investors are intended to create “a continuous flow of information and feedback about the ongoing performance, investment opportunities, and risks confronting the firm.” In the author's words, “Ending the firm's longstanding practice of holding up earnings target s to the Street, and then trying to meet them, helped us rid ourselves of needless pressures and burdens… that can get in the way of managing for long-run growth and profitability.”     

A NEW APPROACH TO CAPITAL BUDGETING FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The classic approach to capital budgeting based on the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) says that the hurdle rate (or cost of capital) for any new project or investment should depend only on the riskiness of that investment. Thus, the hurdle rate, and hence the expected value of the investment, should not be affected by the financial policy of the company evaluating the project. Nor should the hurdle rate be influenced by the company's risk management policy, or by the kind of assets it already has on the balance sheet. This article argues that such a “singlefactor” model may be inappropriate for banks and other financial institutions for two main reasons:

• ? it is especially costly for banks to raise new external funds on short notice;
• ? it is costly for banks to hold a buffer stock of equity capital on the balance sheet, even if this equity is accumulated over time through retained earnings.

The single-factor CAPM ignores such costs and, in so doing, understates the true economic costs of “illiquid” bank investments. Illiquid investments require special treatment because they impose risks that, although “diversifiable” by shareholders, cannot be readily hedged by the bank and therefore require it to hold more equity capital. The authors accordingly propose a “two-factor” model for capital budgeting— one in which banks' investment decisions are linked to their capital structure and risk management decisions. One of the key implications of the two-factor model is that a bank should evaluate new investments according to both their correlation with the market portfolio and their correlation with the bank's existing portfolio of unhedgeable risks. The authors describe several potential applications of their model, including the evaluation of proprietary trading operations and the pricing of unhedgeable derivatives positions. They also compare their approach to the RAROC methodology that has been adopted by a number of banks.     

Two Different Ways of Treating Corporate Cash in FCF Valuations—and the Importance of Getting the Cost of Capital Right

The methods for calculating free cash flow presented in texts on financial statement analysis and valuation appear to be very different from those in corporate finance texts, causing some confusion among academics as well as practitioners. Financial statement analysis and valuation texts generally begin by valuing just the enterprise operations—that is, the entity that engages in the firm's primary revenue‐generating activities—and then adding back the value of its cash holdings and other financial assets. The corporate finance approach is typically to value all the assets together, including financial assets that are not used in the production of the goods and services provided by the firm. Using a simple example, the authors show that the valuation of the equity ownership of the firm should be the same for both methods of calculating free cash flow, provided the analyst makes the appropriate adjustments to the method for calculating the cost of capital (WACC) used to discount forecasted free cash flows to a present value.     

Enterprise Risk Management and the Cost of Capital

Enterprise risk management (ERM) is a process that manages all risks in an integrated, holistic fashion by controlling and coordinating any offsetting risks across the enterprise. This research investigates whether the adoption of the ERM approach affects firms' cost of equity capital. We restrict our analysis to the U.S. insurance industry to control for unobservable differences in business models and risk exposures across industries. We simultaneously model firms' adoption of ERM and the effect of ERM on the cost of capital. We find that ERM adoption significantly reduces firm's cost of capital. Our results suggest that cost of capital benefits are one answer to the question how ERM can create value.     

Beyond Financial Reporting An Integrated Approach to Disclosure

A company's market value is a key determinant of its future success, affecting its ability to raise capital, recruit and retain key employees, and make strategic acquisitions. Confident, well‐informed investors are necessary for achieving and maintaining accurate valuation of a company's stock. But standard disclosure practice has left many companies releasing a great deal of data while conveying only limited understanding to outsiders. This article presents the outline of an integrated approach to corporate disclosure in which each of the three major elements–required financial reports, supplemental disclosure, and interactions with investors and intermediaries–are consistent and mutually reinforcing. Such an approach begins with required reports that refiect as closely as possible the economic reality of a company's business. But if GAAP income statements and balance sheets are often useful for communicating current and past performance, they are not designed to convey management's strategic vision and the company's prospects for creating value. To achieve and maintain accurate valuation, management must supplement mandated financial reporting with voluntary communication that highlights value drivers and helps investors understand both the company's strategic goals and management's progress in meeting those goals. Finally, management must interact with investors and capital market intermediaries in ways that provide them with a clear and compelling picture of the company's prospects, which should help both analysts and institutional investors become more effective monitors of the firm's performance. Through consistent communication that goes well beyond the sell side's focus on quarterly earnings per share, management will discover that it has the power to set the agenda for how the company's performance is evaluated by the market. In the process, companies are also likely to find that their investors (and analysts) are more patient than they thought, while their operating managers feel less pressure to take shortsighted steps to boost EPS. Both of these expected benefits of an integrated disclosure policy should end up increasing a company's value.     

Postmodern Corporate Finance

One of the core tenets of modern finance theory is that corporations create value by producing operating rates of return on capital that are greater than the cost of capital. “Postmodern” corporate finance, while reaffirming the importance of earning an adequate return on capital, also attempts to restore at least part of the traditional corporate emphasis on top-line growth that prevailed before the intense focus on returns by modern shareholder value advocates. One important reason for the heightened emphasis on growth in addition to returns is that most rate-of-return measures used by companies and investors are based on conservative accounting practices that make old assets look more profitable than new ones, thereby discouraging investments in growth. This article introduces a new return measure called “Gross Business Return” that, when evaluated against a Required Return framework that reflects the level of current stock prices, has a stronger correlation with how companies are valued by the stock market. Moreover, in reviewing historical returns over time for both the market and specific industries, the author's research suggests that the market appears to demand considerably lower current returns than those implied by traditional weighted average cost of capital (WACC) approaches. And to the extent corporate executives rely on WACC, they could be passing up valuable growth opportunities. To help evaluate tradeoffs between growth and return, the author introduces a cash-based measure of corporate economic profit called Residual Cash Earnings. Unlike most traditional return and economic profit measures, Residual Cash Earnings, when expressed as a percentage of sales, provides a way for corporate managers to identify growth opportunities that, while producing current returns lower than WACC, are likely to add value over a multi-year time horizon. These new measures and analytical tools are suitable for strategic planning, budgeting, resource allocation, performance measurement, and rewards. Consistent application of these principles across these management processes provides a framework for constantly rebalancing the emphasis on growth and return to adapt to changes in the economy, industry, and competitive landscape.     

Asset Pricing Implications of Nonconvex Adjustment Costs and Irreversibility of Investment

This paper derives a real options model that accounts for the value premium. If real investment is largely irreversible, the book value of assets of a distressed firm is high relative to its market value because it has idle physical capital. The firm's excess installed capital capacity enables it to fully benefit from positive aggregate shocks without undertaking costly investment. Thus, returns to equity holders of a high book‐to‐market firm are sensitive to aggregate conditions and its systematic risk is high. Simulations indicate that the model goes a long way toward accounting for the observed value premium.     

Do a firm's equity returns reflect the risk of its pension plan?

This paper examines the empirical question of whether systematic equity risk of US firms as measured by beta from the capital asset pricing model reflects the risk of their pension plans. There are a number of reasons to suspect that it might not. Chief among them is the opaque set of accounting rules used to report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and liabilities are off-balance sheet and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the firm, with its own trustees. Pension accounting rules are complicated. Furthermore, the role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation clouds the real relation between pension plan risk and firm equity risk. The empirical findings in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reflect the risk of the firm's pension plan despite arcane accounting rules for pensions. This finding is consistent with informational efficiency of the capital markets. It also has implications for corporate finance practice in the determination of the cost of capital for capital budgeting. Standard procedure uses de-leveraged equity return betas to infer the cost of capital for operating assets. But the de-leveraged betas are not adjusted for the risk of the pension assets and liabilities. Failure to make this adjustment typically biases upward estimates of the discount rate for capital budgeting. The magnitude of the bias is shown here to be large for a number of well-known US companies. This bias can result in positive net present value projects being rejected.     

What determines the composition of a firm's cash reserves?

We investigate what determines variation in the composition of the financial assets that constitute corporate cash reserves and how this variation relates to other key liquidity management practices. The degree to which a firm invests its cash reserves in less liquid, longer-maturity financial assets that earn a higher yield is explained by financial constraints, the ability to accurately forecast short-term liquidity needs, and the firm's likelihood of defaulting on its debt. During years when a firm's cash reserves are required to fund increases in investment or operating expenses the firm transfers funds from less liquid to more liquid financial assets. A firm's decisions relating to the composition of its cash reserves interacts with other key liquidity management practices, such as relying on credit lines for liquidity, extending trade credit or using it as a source of financing, and holding large amounts of inventories. Our findings provide insights on an important component of corporate liquidity management decisions.     

Interactions of Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions: A Dynamic Framework

This article analyzes the interaction between a firm's dynamic investment, operating, and financing decisions in a model with operating adjustment and recapitalization costs. Using numerical analysis, we solve the model for cases that highlight interaction effects. We find that higher production flexibility (due to lower costs of shutting down and reopening a production facility) enhances the firm's debt capacity, thereby increasing the net tax shield value of debt financing. While higher financial flexibility (resulting from lower recapitalization costs) has a similar effect, production flexibility and financial flexibility are, to some extent, substitutes. We find that the impact of debt financing on the firm's investment and operating decisions is economically insignificant.     

What Cost of Capital Should You Use? The Market Has an Answer

The most widely used means of estimating a company's cost of equity capital is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). But as a growing number of academics and practitioners have suggested, use of the CAPM produces estimates that often fail to reflect the risks of the companies as perceived by current and potential investors. The authors' work, together with other research, also suggests that the cost of equity produced by the CAPM is often too high. To the extent this is so, companies are discounting investment projects at rates of return that may be leading them to pass up value‐adding opportunities. The authors advocate the use of a simple and practical alternative to the CAPM that does not use either an assumed market risk premium or a beta. It uses instead an equity premium that is implied by the current market price of a company's stock and, as such, is implicitly derived from investors' assessments of the firm's risk that are reflected in that price. More specifically, the alternative approach solves for the internal rate of return that equates the present value of expected future cash flows to the current market price. In support of this approach, studies have shown that such market‐implied measures are better predictors than CAPM‐based estimates of future stock returns, both at the individual‐firm and aggregate market levels.     

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON: Enterprise‐Wide Risk Management

For many years, MBA students were taught that there was no good reason for companies that hedge large currency or commodity price exposures to have lower costs of capital, or trade at higher P/E multiples, than comparable companies that choose not to hedge such financial price risks. Corporate stockholders, just by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of currency and commodity price risks on corporate values. And corporate efforts to manage such risks were accordingly viewed as redundant, a waste of corporate resources on a function already performed by investors at far lower cost. But as this discussion makes clear, both the theory and the corporate practice of risk management have moved well beyond this perfect markets framework. The academics and practitioners in this roundtable begin by suggesting that the most important reason to hedge financial risks—and risk management's largest potential contribution to firm value—is to ensure a company's ability to carry out its strategic plan and investment policy. As one widely cited example, Merck's use of FX options to hedge the currency risk associated with its overseas revenues is viewed as limiting management's temptation to cut R&D in response to large currency‐related shortfalls in reported earnings. Nevertheless, one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that effective risk management has little to do with earnings management per se, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic function: maintaining access to low‐cost capital to fund long‐run investment. And a number of the panelists pointed out that a well‐executed risk management policy can be used to increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital. Moreover, in making decisions whether to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. If an outside firm or investor is willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. Along with the greater efficiency and return on capital promised by such an approach, several panelists also pointed to one less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—a significant improvement in the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the company's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among its business units.     

Expectations‐Based Management

The authors begin by summarizing the results of their recently published study of the relation between stock returns and changes in several annual performance measures, including not only growth in earnings and EVA, but changes during the year in analysts' expectations about future earnings over three different periods: (1) the current year; (2) the following year; and (3) the three‐year period thereafter. The last of these measures—changes in analysts' expectations about three‐ to five‐year earnings—had by far the greatest explanatory “power” of any of the measures tested. Besides being consistent with the stock market's taking a long‐term, DCF approach to the valuation of companies, the authors' finding that investors seem to care most about earnings three to five years down the road has a number of important implications for financial management: First, a business unit doesn't necessarily create shareholder value if its return on capital exceeds the weighted average cost of capital—nor does an operation that fails to earn its WACC necessarily reduce value. To create value, the business's return must exceed what investors are expecting. Second, without forecasting returns on capital, management should attempt to give investors a clear sense of the firm's internal benchmarks, both for existing businesses and new investment. Third, management incentive plans should be based on stock ownership rather than stock options. Precisely because stock prices reflect expectations, the potential for prices to get ahead of realities gives options‐laden managers a strong temptation to manipulate earnings and manage for the short term.     

The valuation of projects under the dividend imputation tax system

This paper proves that a modified weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”) valuation methodology is a rigorous and practicable method of valuing projects and companies under the Australian dividend imputation tax system. This methodology uses an effective tax rate in calculating both the discount rate and the ungeared after tax cash flow. A cash flow after effective corporate tax is shown to be equivalent to a cash plus value of imputation credit stream. Importantly, this valuation methodology is applicable to returns that are non-uniform and of finite duration. Also examined is the discounting of equity returns at the company's cost of equity capital. A worked example is presented to clarify and quantify the effects discussed.