Reputation and its risks

Regulators, industry groups, consultants, and individual companies have developed elaborate guidelines over the years for assessing and managing risks in a wide range of areas, from commodity prices to natural disasters. Yet they have all but ignored reputational risk, mostly because they aren't sure how to define or measure it. That's a big problem, say the authors. Because so much market value comes from hard-to-assess intangible assets like brand equity and intellectual capital, organizations are especially vulnerable to anything that damages their reputations. Moreover, companies with strong positive reputations attract better talent and are perceived as providing more value in their products and services, which often allows them to charge a premium. Their customers are more loyal and buy broader ranges of products and services. Since the market believes that such companies will deliver sustained earnings and future growth, they have higher price-earnings multiples and market values and lower costs of capital. Most companies, however, do an inadequate job of managing their reputations in general and the risks to their reputations in particular. They tend to focus their energies on handling the threats to their reputations that have already surfaced. That is not risk management; it is crisis management--a reactive approach aimed at limiting the damage.The authors provide a framework for actively managing reputational risk. They introduce three factors (the reputation-reality gap, changing beliefs and expectations, and weak internal coordination) that affect the level of such risks and then explore several ways to sufficiently quantify and control those factors. The process outlined in this article will help managers do a better job of assessing existing and potential threats to their companies' reputations and deciding whether to accept a particular risk or take actions to avoid or mitigate it.     

公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉

本文基于“隐性—显性”契约激励研究范式,探讨公司社会声望对高管薪酬的影响以及作用机制。本文选取2009—2017年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,拥有较高社会声望的公司,其高管显性薪酬较低。具体而言,公共地位较高的国有企业、具有较高市场声誉的民营上市公司,其高管薪酬平均而言分别比其他上市公司低4.97%和6.30%。进一步地,我们发现公司声望对我国高管显性薪酬契约存在两种作用机制:一方面,公共地位较高的国有企业,可以为高管带来较高的社会声誉和社会认可,满足了“公共服务”类高管的社会声望偏好,从而降低了显性薪酬的支付水平;另一方面,市场声誉较高的民营企业,可以为高管带来较高的职业声誉和未来职业利益,符合“以商为荣”类高管的社会声望偏好,使高管愿意接受较低的显性薪酬。本文的结论为公司声望作为一种有价值的资源,可以对高管显性薪酬形成议价能力提供了重要证据,揭示了公司声望对高管显性契约激励的影响路径;同时,为国有企业高管薪酬契约设计以及激励机制提供了一定启示。     

公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉

本文基于"隐性—显性"契约激励研究范式,探讨公司社会声望对高管薪酬的影响以及作用机制。本文选取2009—2017年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,拥有较高社会声望的公司,其高管显性薪酬较低。具体而言,公共地位较高的国有企业、具有较高市场声誉的民营上市公司,其高管薪酬平均而言分别比其他上市公司低4.97%和6.30%。进一步地,我们发现公司声望对我国高管显性薪酬契约存在两种作用机制:一方面,公共地位较高的国有企业,可以为高管带来较高的社会声誉和社会认可,满足了"公共服务"类高管的社会声望偏好,从而降低了显性薪酬的支付水平;另一方面,市场声誉较高的民营企业,可以为高管带来较高的职业声誉和未来职业利益,符合"以商为荣"类高管的社会声望偏好,使高管愿意接受较低的显性薪酬。本文的结论为公司声望作为一种有价值的资源,可以对高管显性薪酬形成议价能力提供了重要证据,揭示了公司声望对高管显性契约激励的影响路径;同时,为国有企业高管薪酬契约设计以及激励机制提供了一定启示。     

Dividend Policy and Reputation

Abstract:  We examine the role of reputation when firms use dividends to signal their profitability. We analyze a signaling model in which reputation plays no role in equilibrium. We then show that taking reputation into account as a link between sequential dividend decisions makes it possible to endogenize signaling costs and obtain a separating equilibrium. Lastly, we use the reversibility hypothesis and assume that in each period, managers can reverse their choices in terms of dividend distribution. We find that in most cases, the signaling equilibrium becomes unstable, causing any dividend signaling policy to become difficult to implement.     

Auditor Reputation Building

This paper reports the results of an experimental economics study designed to examine reputation building by information verifiers (auditors). The results identify boundary conditions to reputation formation and supply insight into auditors' incentives to form reputations. Reputations form in all sessions of treatments that supply nearly immediate rewards to participants who adopt reputation equilibrium strategies. In contrast, reputations form in less than half of the sessions of a treatment where participants have to maintain reputation equilibrium strategies for number of periods before the market rewards their effort. The results suggest the immediacy of rewards for adopting reputation strategies is a critical determinant of reputation formation.     

轻轻重重话尊严

职业的尊严随着知识经济时代对专业人才需求的加大而日益凸显。关于尊严的价值评判通常从两个方面进行：一是国家或者社会的尊严，此为经线；另一方面是个人或职业的尊严，此为纬线。我们在“转型经济国家会计改革的典范”的中国执业，经线至尊；我们承受着丰富的痛苦与成长的烦恼，纬线正伸!英文中的“dignity”一词，不仅有尊严之义，还有体面、身份的意思。尊严首先表现为个体的人受到外部的尊重。在中国古代，没有什么人拥有属于自己的尊严。譬如，皇上只要发觉一言不和，就可能对大臣施以廷杖，当众羞辱。高官尚且如此，遑论百姓。今天…     

Reputation and Performance Among Security Analysts

Members of the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team supply more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts when forecasts are matched by the corporation followed and by the date of brokerage house issuance. This contemporaneous advantage is complemented by a timing advantage; All-Americans supply forecasts more often than other analysts. Stocks returns immediately following large upward forecast revisions suggest that All-Americans impact prices more than other analysts. However, there is virtually no difference in returns following large downward revisions. Nevertheless, the collective results suggest a positive relation between reputation and performance, and, assuming that All-Americans are better paid, pay and performance.     

Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation

This paper examined the returns earned by subscribing to initial public offerings of equity (IPOs). Rock (1986) suggests that IPO returns are required by uninformed investors as compensation for the risk of trading against superior information. We show that IPOs with more informed investor capital require higher returns. The marketing underwriter's reputation reveals the expected level of “informed” activity. Prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings. With less risk there is less incentive to acquire information and fewer informed investors. Consequently, prestigious underwriters are associated with IPOs that have lower returns.     

合伙人信誉及其基础

会计师事务所的合伙人必须诚实、守信、公正和有合作精神.人的信誉实际上是为长远利益牺牲短期利益的一种责任,并因此而换取的不可准确测度的财富.     

企业购并中的商誉及其会计核算

商誉的价值计量和会计处理是企业购并过程中经常发生的问题，企业购并过程中是否存在商誉，如何认识商誉，商誉可否计量，如何进行会计处理是这一问题争论焦点。本区分外购商誉、外购负商誉、自创商誉等几个方面，介绍了对上述问题的研究进展，以期服务于企业购并的实际工作。     

声誉机制、信任机制与小额信贷

小额信贷之所以在不需要抵押担保的情况下也能为借款者放款,究其原因,除了贷款者所实施的信贷规范起到了降低风险的作用以外,建立在"声誉效应"基础上的信任机制作用的发挥起到了关键性的作用,如果借贷双方以及借款联保小组成员间缺乏基本的信任,那么合作行为是不会出现的.本文对建立在声誉效应基础上的信任机制所发挥的作用进行动态博弈分析,在此基础上根据实地调研的数据进行实证剖析,提出了通过借贷双方长期博弈建立信任关系、不断投入资源以维护信任机制、发挥农业保险与专业组织的作用降低农户经营风险等政策建议.     

Reputation,risk-taking,and macroprudential policy

This paper examines the role of macroprudential capital requirements in preventing inefficient credit booms in a model with reputational externalities. In our model, unprofitable banks have strong incentives to invest in risky assets when macroeconomic fundamentals are good in order to avoid the stigma of being assessed as low ability by the market. We show that across-the-system countercyclical capital requirements that deter such gambling are constrained optimal when fundamentals are neither extremely weak nor extremely strong.     

审计师声誉研究:述评与展望

审计师声誉是审计师保持独立性的动机,对审计师声誉的研究在2001年安然事件后逐渐增多并引发了广泛关注。现有文献主要从审计师声誉的形成、作用、毁损与修复机制等方面展开。具体而言,监管、行业专门化、审计质量、媒体及法律等是审计师声誉形成的重要影响因素,审计师声誉的建立有助于审计师保持独立、提高审计质量和收费等,而审计师声誉的毁损将会导致市场反应和溢出效应,同时也催生了相应的声誉修复问题。本文的综述有助于全面了解审计师声誉的现状并可能对其未来发展方向提供建议。     

经营透明化与银行名誉风险管理

中国银行业经营透明化既是改革的要求，也是银行自身成本-收益比作用的结果，还是银行外部监管者提高监管能力的要求。然而信息屏蔽收益的递减并非意味透明化收益的自然递增，事实上，透明化也加大了银行的名誉风险。名誉风险有社会性、内生性、间接性和综合性等特征，对其进行科学管理能为银行带来巨大的商业利益。为此，中国银行业应加强名誉风险的基础管理，科学制订名誉规划，建立管理责任制度。同时，要强化名誉风险意识，扩大名誉风险管理视野，提高名誉风险管理人员素质，实行专业化管理。就现实而言，中国银行业名誉风险管理亟待解决商标管理、改革面临的矛盾、透明化进程及文化建设等四方面问题。     

经营透明化与银行名誉风险管理

中国银行业经营透明化既是改革的要求,也是银行自身成本-收益比作用的结果,还是银行外部监管者提高监管能力的要求。然而信息屏蔽收益的递减并非意味透明化收益的自然递增,事实上,透明化也加大了银行的名誉风险。名誉风险有社会性、内生性、间接性和综合性等特征,对其进行科学管理能为银行带来巨大的商业利益。为此,中国银行业应加强名誉风险的基础管理,科学制订名誉规划,建立管理责任制度。同时,要强化名誉风险意识,扩大名誉风险管理视野,提高名誉风险管理人员素质,实行专业化管理。就现实而言,中国银行业名誉风险管理亟待解决商标管理、改革面临的矛盾、透明化进程及文化建设等四方面问题。     

公司声誉、审计师声誉与权益资本成本——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据

以2009~2013年中国沪深两市 A 股民营上市公司为样本,实证检验审计师声誉、公司声誉与权益资本成本的关系。研究发现：限制其他条件,审计师声誉、公司声誉分别与公司权益资本成本呈显著负相关。进一步研究发现,随着公司自身声誉的逐步建立,审计师声誉对于公司权益资本成本的影响将会逐渐减弱,公司声誉对于审计师声誉具有替代作用。     

Risk, Reputation, and IPO Price Support

Immediately following an initial public offering, underwriters often repurchase shares of poorly performing offerings in an apparent attempt to stabilize the price. Using proprietary Nasdaq data, I study the price effects and determinants of price support. Some of the key findings are (1) Stabilization is substantial, inducing price rigidity at and below the offer price; (2) I find no evidence that stocks with larger information asymmetries are stabilized more strongly; (3) Larger underwriters stabilize more, perhaps to protect their reputations with investors; and (4) Investment banks with retail brokerage operations stabilize much more than other banks, inconsistent with the view that stabilization benefits primarily institutional investors.     

Analyst Reputation,Communication, and Information Acquisition

Earlier studies have shown that reputational concerns tend to reduce agents' opportunistic behavior. However, a recent study by Morris argued that analysts' (experts') reputational concerns may discourage truthful communication when they try to avoid being perceived as being misaligned with investors. In this paper, I examine the effect of reputational concerns on communication in a setting where analysts can choose their precision endogenously. Because both misaligned and aligned analysts want investors to trust their reports in the future, both will aim to build a reputation for being aligned. In equilibrium, aligned analysts will acquire more information than misaligned analysts. As a result, investors may favorably update their beliefs about the analysts' type when the report is proven to be accurate. Therefore, both types of analysts will have reputational incentives to communicate truthfully. The paper also derives conditions under which the analysts' reputational concerns have a nonmonotonic impact on aligned analysts' equilibrium precision choices and investors' welfare.     

证券承销商声誉机制:机理、缺失动因与路径

证券承销商担负着“信息生产者”和“质量认证中介机构”的功能,然而也面临着“可信性”的问题。在与证券发行企业、投资者的重复博弈过程中,承销商通过建立自身的行为规范,达成与证券发行企业、投资者之间的合作均衡所形成的声誉能有效缓解承销商的道德风险,保证承销商信息生产的可信性。通过分析承销商声誉机制的相关理论模型、形成机理及机制缺失的原因,提出了充分发挥承销商声誉机制的政策建议。