Bidding to lose? Auctions with resale

A losing bidder can still purchase the prize from the winner after the auction. We show why a strong bidder may prefer to drop out of the auction before the price has reached her valuation and acquire the prize in the aftermarket: a strong bidder may be in a better bargaining position in the aftermarket if her rival won at a relatively low price. So it can be common knowledge that, in equilibrium, a weak bidder will win the auction and, even without uncertainty about relative valuations, resale will take place. The possibility of reselling to a strong bidder attracts weak bidders to participate in the auction and raises the seller's revenue.     

Auctions with resale markets: an exploratory model of Treasury bill markets

This article develops a model of competitive bidding with aresale market. The primary market is modeled as a common-valueauction, in which bidders participate for the purpose of resale.After the auction the winning bidders sell the objects in asecondary market, and the buyers in the secondary market, receiveinformation about the bids submitted in the auction. The effectof this information linkage between the primary auction andthe secondary market on bidding behavior in the primary auctionis examined. The auctioneer's expected revenues from organizingthe primary market as a discriminatory auction versus a uniform-priceauction are compared, and sufficient conditions under whichthe uniform-price auction will yield higher expected revenuesare obtained. An example of our model, with the primary marketorganized as a discriminatory auction, is the U.S. Treasurybill market.     

First‐price auctions with resale and with outcomes robust to bid disclosure

Although there exists a pure separating equilibrium of the two‐bidder first‐price auction with resale when the bids are kept secret, the ratchet effect prevents the existence of such an equilibrium if the bidders are heterogeneous and the bids are fully disclosed. Nevertheless, we construct a behavioral equilibrium under full disclosure that is equivalent to the pure separating equilibrium under no disclosure. Thus, if the bidders follow this equilibrium, the choice of the disclosure regime does not affect the final allocation of the item nor the expected payoffs.     

要么维持垄断,要么就分拆--访世界银行金融专家王君

<银行家>:加入WTO以后,国有银行面对的竞争将加剧.如何认识它们未来的作用和地位呢?     

银行垄断与银行危机

银行垄断不必然产生无效率，更不用说银行危机了。但是这一状况却出现在我国的四大专业银行上。在这篇文章里，作者指出，由于我们在国有银行作用定位上的错误，强使它们承担了许多本不属于它们的社会和政治的义务，从主观和客观两方面确定了其垄断地位，因此产生了许多严重的问题，如资本金不足，技术上的破产等，尤其是潜在的银行危机。     

打破金融垄断势在必行

目前中国社会最大的问题是就业问题,中国有13亿人口,每年有大量的新增劳动力需要就业,城市中有大量的国有企业在裁员,而农民又纷纷涌入城市.所有这些问题,单靠吸引外资、吸引世界五百强企业是肯定解决不了的.     

Activity-Based Pricing in a Monopoly

In this article, I study the interaction between cost accounting systems and pricing decisions in a setting where a monopolist sells a base product and related support services to customers whose preference for support services is known only to them. I consider two pricing mechanisms—activity‐based pricing (ABP) and traditional pricing—and two cost‐accounting systems—activity‐based costing (ABC) and traditional costing, for support services. Under traditional pricing, only the base product is priced, whereas support services are provided free because detailed cost‐driver volume information on the consumption of support services by each customer is unavailable. Under ABP, customers pay based on the quantities consumed of both the base product and the support services because detailed cost‐driver volume information is available for each customer. Likewise, under traditional costing for support services the firm makes pricing decisions on cost signals that are noisier than they are under ABC. I compare the equilibrium quantities of the base product and support services sold, the information rent paid to the customers, and the expected profits of the monopolist under all four combinations of cost‐driver volume and cost‐driver rate information. I show that ABP helps reduce control problems, such as moral hazard and adverse selection problems, for the supplier and increases the supplier's ability to engage in price discrimination. I show that firms are more likely to adopt ABP when their customer base is more diverse, their customer support costs are more uncertain, their costing system has lower measurement error, and the variable costs of providing customer support are higher. Firms adopt ABC when their cost‐driver rates for support services under traditional costing are noisier measures of actual costs relative to their cost‐driver rates under ABC and when the actual costs of support services are inherently uncertain. I also show that cost‐driver rate information and cost‐driver volume information for support services are complements. Although the prior literature views ABC and activity‐based management (ABM) as facilitating better decision making, I show that ABC and ABP (a form of ABM) are useful tools for addressing control problems in supply chains.     

行业垄断的收入分配效应——对城镇垄断部门的实证分析

垄断行业借助于政府赋予的垄断权力,长期获取较其他行业更高的收入和利润,导致了垄断与非垄断行业间收入分配差距的不断扩大及居民收入不平等程度的不断提高。通过对垄断行业收入分配状况的分解计算,考察垄断与非垄断行业之间及其内部的收入分配效应并提出合理的应对措施,已成为中国收入分配领域的当务之急。     

横向垄断协议解析

<正>横向垄断协议的形式横向垄断协议又称卡特尔,是指两个或两个以上在生产或者销售过程中处于同一阶段的经营者之间,以协议、决议或者其它形式,为了达到排除或者限制竞争、牟取超额利润的目的,而实施的垄断行为。     

垄断与竞争：二律背反下的共生—兼论中国证券业的集中、垄断与竞争

中国证券业存在一种现象：在证券业进一步集中与垄断因素得到不断强化的同时，竞争也同时得到了强化并且日趋尖锐与激烈，二者在中国证券业出现了共生，这从现代产业组织理论与微观经济学理论的角度来看显然是一个离经叛道的异象。……     

Information Monopoly and Commitment in Intermediary-Firm Relationships

A bank may use the private information that it acquires through monitoring to hold up borrowers. This information monopoly of the bank may inefficiently distort the borrowers investment decisions in environments where moral hazard is prevalent. The paper analyses how this problem is resolved within bank-firm relationships. In the benchmark case when the bank can contractually commit to future actions, the optimal contract turns out to be ambiguous in nature. When commitment contracts cannot be written, firms have an incentive to develop multiple banking relationships in order to decrease the inside banks bargaining power. However, with costly monitoring, this may defeat the initial purpose for contracting with a financial intermediary, namely information production. The paper argues that when contractual commitment is not feasible, bank size may serve as an alternative commitment device that prevents the bank from holding up borrowers in the future.     

Monopoly versus Competition in Setting Accounting Standards

Financial accounting standards are set by organizations granted a significant degree of monopoly power by various governments. While there has been considerable debate on the merits of national (e.g., US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)) versus international (International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)) monopolies, little attention has been paid to the merits of using competing standard‐setting organizations (SSOs) for setting accounting standards. We compare the standard‐setting processes of the FASB/IASB to the processes of four technology‐oriented SSOs to assess the role of competition. We also provide a case study of monopoly and competitive standards in telephony. Both telephony and accounting yield some gains from coordination, and similar arguments are used (under the labels of comparability and consistency of accounting) in debates about granting a monopoly to their respective SSOs. Our results show that a group of volunteers competing with the government‐sanctioned monopoly of International Telecommunications Union transformed the telephone industry. Thanks to this standards competition, we enjoy free video internet calling and massive cost savings. Implications for accounting standard setting are discussed.     

自然垄断理论研究综述

论文在总结自然垄断理论的传统演变和创新发展的基础上,指出了基于网络经济效益概念的创新理论存在的明显不足,同时提出回归自然垄断传统思想的观点。     

房地产评估业应该打破垄断

资产评估事务所(或具有资产评估资格的会计师事务所,以下简称事务所)能否对房地产进行评估,一直是注册评估师行业内比较关注的一个问题.财政部和原国家国有资产管理局曾两次发文对此问题予以明确.但由于房地产和土地主管部门坚持认为只有取得经他们认可的资格后事务所方可从事上述业务,故事务所对此一直抱有疑虑,社会各界对此认识更是模糊不清.下面介绍的这个案例,就是在这样的背景下发生的.     

体制:埋葬垄断

放松管制 必须放松设立金融机构的行政管制,鼓励金融机构之间的市场竞争 长期以来,对金融业实行行政管制和限制准入政策的一个基本理由是,强调金融业在国民经济中占居特殊地位从而具有特殊意义产业,金融业一旦出现风险,不仅将严重影响实体经济部门的各产业正常运行和城乡居民的生活,而且将严重影响经济社会的稳定和国家安全.实际上,这种认识是似是而非的.     

垄断与通货膨胀:理论与证据

本文从微观层面构建多维状态非线性系统理论模型,应用非线性模型预测控制方法研究了垄断与通货膨胀之间的关系。理论分析表明,垄断与通胀存在明显的正向关系。本文进一步应用变系数半参数估计方法为上述理论预期提供了经验支持,并发现我国在生产效率较低的行业中,垄断会导致显著的通胀效应,但这种效应在生产效率较高的行业中则明显减弱。上述结论对我国当前“下限保增长、上限防通胀”的宏观调控目标具有重要的启示意义。     

Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance

We present a model of vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers with nonlinear pricing strategies. Using home‐scan data on bottled water produced by manufacturers and sold by retail chains in France, we estimate a structural demand and supply model allowing for two‐part tariff contracts between manufacturers and retailers. Using price‐cost margins recovered from estimates of demand parameters, we select the best supply model by performing nonnested tests, and find that manufacturers use two‐part tariff contracts with resale price maintenance. We then perform counterfactual policy simulations that restrict the use of these vertical contracts and assess welfare effects under alternative scenarios.     

垄断性质、国有产权与企业人力资本贡献

企业是人力资本与非人力资本的特别契约,企业人力资本对于企业产出到底带来怎样的效应却并不确定,本文利用上市公司年报披露数据研究企业职工教育水平与企业业绩的关系。研究发现：在我国上市公司,企业职工的综合教育水平对于企业业绩有着正向的影响,人力资本对于业绩有着较大贡献,且中等学历（大专及本科）对于企业业绩的贡献最大,低等学历的职工对于企业业绩贡献为负。进一步研究发现。企业性质和行业垄断性影响着二者的关系：国有企业,特别是垄断行业的国有企业,职工教育水平对于业绩的贡献并不明显。这从侧面显示了国有企业特别是国有垄断企业人力资源配置的不合理性。     

银行业垄断及收益损失分析

1978年人民银行从财政部门脱离出来以后 ,中国银行业就走上了一条不断扩张、不断发展的道路 ,目前已形成了业务种类齐全、机构庞大、经营手段先进的金融体系 ,至 1999年底共有国有独资银行 4家 ,政策性银行 3家 ,股份制银行 10家 ,城市商业银行 90家 ,地级城市信用社 836家 ,农村信用社4 1,755家 ,外资银行分支机构 16 3家。存款总量达10 5,710亿元 ,贷款总量达 89,0 55亿元 ,分别是1999年ＧＤＰ的 1.2 9倍和 1.0 9倍。可以说 ,银行业务已经渗透到经济活动的每一个环节 ,在国民经济活动中起着举足轻重的作用。在银行业的发展过程中 ,四大专…