The effect of entry on R&D networks

We investigate the effect of potential entry on the formation and stability of R&D networks considering farsighted firms. The presence of a potential entrant often alters the incentives of incumbents to collaborate. Incumbent firms may form an otherwise undesirable collaboration to deter entry of a new firm. Moreover, an incumbent may refrain from establishing an otherwise desirable collaboration, expecting to form a more profitable link with the entrant. Finally, potential entry may lead an inefficient incumbent to exit the market. Welfare analysis shows market and social incentives to be often misaligned. We propose a subsidy scheme that encourages welfare‐improving entry.     

Leverage and strategic preemption: Lessons from entry plans and incumbent investments

This paper empirically investigates the effect of leverage on strategic preemption. Using new data on entry plans and incumbent investments from the American casino industry, I find that high leverage prevents incumbents from responding to entry threats. Facing the same set of entry plans, low-leverage incumbents expand physical capacity (by 30%), whereas high-leverage incumbents do not. This difference in investment matters because capacity installations preempt eventual entry. Stock market reactions to withdrawn plans imply that effective preemption increases incumbent firm value by 5%. My findings suggest that leverage matters for industry composition, not just firm-level investment.     

Inferring market power under the threat of entry: the case of the Brazilian cement industry

Consider a setting where threatened rather than actual import competition restrains a domestic oligopoly's prices. I show that not modelling the entry threat may underestimate the true degree of market power, as incumbents' blunted price responses to demand shocks resemble perfectly competitive behavior. Evidence from Brazilian cement markets points to an important role for imports in determining domestic cement prices, despite the near absence of imports. On assuming autarky, models with market power are rejected in favor of competition among incumbents. However, allowing a role for imports rejects the autarky assumption and precludes one from rejecting the presence of market power.     

Networking as a Barrier to Entry and the Competitive Supply of Venture Capital

We examine whether strong networks among incumbent venture capitalists (VCs) in local markets help restrict entry by outside VCs, thus improving incumbents' bargaining power over entrepreneurs. More densely networked markets experience less entry, with a one‐standard deviation increase in network ties among incumbents reducing entry by approximately one‐third. Entrants with established ties to target‐market incumbents appear able to overcome this barrier to entry; in turn, incumbents react strategically to an increased threat of entry by freezing out any incumbents who facilitate entry into their market. Incumbents appear to benefit from reduced entry by paying lower prices for their deals.     

The Bright Side of Internal Capital Markets

We examine capital expenditure decisions of discount firms in response to Wal-Mart's entry into their markets. Before Wal-Mart's entry, focused incumbents and discount divisions of diversified incumbents are similar in size, geographic dispersion, and firm debt levels. However, discount divisions of diversified firms are significantly more productive. After Wal-Mart's entry, diversified firms are quicker to either "exit" the discount business or "stay and fight." Also, their capital expenditures are more sensitive to the productivity of their discount business. Internal capital markets function well, as transfers are away from the worsening discount divisions. It appears diversified firms make better investment decisions.     

Corporate risk management,product market competition,and disclosure

This paper studies the effects of hedge disclosure requirements on corporate risk management and product market competition. The analysis is based on a model of market entry and shows that to prevent entry incumbent firms engage in risk management when these activities remain unobserved by outsiders. In the resulting equilibrium, financial markets are well informed and entry is efficient. However, potential attempts for more transparency by additional disclosure requirements introduce a commitment device that provides incumbents with incentives to distort risk management activities thereby influencing entrant beliefs. In equilibrium, firms engage in significant risk-taking. This behavior limits entry and adversely affects the nature of competition in industries.     

Entry,exit, and the determinants of market structure

This article estimates a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit for two US service industries: dentists and chiropractors. Entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short‐run price competition are important determinants of long‐run firm values, firm turnover, and market structure. In the dentist industry entry costs were subsidized in geographic markets designated as Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSA) and the estimated mean entry cost is 11 percent lower in these markets. Using simulations, we find that entry cost subsidies are less expensive per additional firm than fixed cost subsidies.     

First offshore bond issuances and firm valuation

Does the first offshore bond initial public offering (BIPO) affect firm valuation? By using a sample of US firms we document the dynamics of the firm valuation in response to initial offshore bond issuance. We find that offshore BIPOs have a positive short-term effect on US firms' valuations. The effect varies in firm characteristics, timing, and the location of the issue. Positive valuation effect is further confirmed by using difference-in-differences analysis approach, where offshore bond issuers are compared with their domestic counterparts. Additionally, firms with a strong need for external funds and growth prospects accelerate their offshore public debt market entry.     

Building new plants or entering by acquisition? Firm heterogeneity and entry barriers in the U.S. cement industry

I estimate a model of entry for the cement industry that considers two options of expansion: building a plant or acquiring an incumbent. The model takes into account that there is a transfer of the buyer firm‐level characteristics to the acquired plants, which affects profits from the acquisition. Estimates show that a less‐permissive Reagan–Bush administration's merger policy would decrease the number of acquired plants by 71%, greenfield entry would increase by 9.2% and consumer surplus would decrease by 23.5%. Results suggest that regulators should be concerned about policies that negatively affect the efficient reallocation of assets between incumbents and entrants.     

Can Unemployment Insurance Spur Entrepreneurial Activity? Evidence from France

We evaluate the effect of downside insurance on self-employment. We exploit a large-scale reform of French unemployment benefits that insured unemployed workers starting businesses. The reform significantly increased firm creation without decreasing the quality of new entrants. Firms started postreform were initially smaller, but their employment growth, productivity, and survival rates are similar to those prereform. New entrepreneurs' characteristics and expectations are also similar. Finally, jobs created by new entrants crowd out employment in incumbent firms almost one-for-one, but have a higher productivity than incumbents. These results highlight the benefits of encouraging experimentation by lowering barriers to entry.     

Search,product market competition and CEO pay

We develop a market equilibrium model to show how search frictions in the CEO market, agency conflicts and product market characteristics interact to affect CEO market tightness, firm size and CEO incentive pay. The theory generates novel implications that link firms' product markets with CEO markets. Different determinants of competition—the entry cost, product substitutability, and market size—have contrasting effects on CEO market tightness, CEO pay and firm size. We also derive new predictions for the impact of product market risk on firm size and CEO incentive compensation. We show empirical support for several cross-sectional hypotheses derived from the theory for how CEO pay, CEO incentives, firm size and market tightness vary with product market characteristics.     

The effect of foreign bank presence on firm entry and exit in transition economies

This study investigates the impact of foreign bank penetration on firm entry in Central and Eastern Europe. Acquisition of domestic banks by foreign investors has lowered rates of firm creation, decreased the average size of entrants, and increased firm exit in industries with greater informational opacity, while entry of greenfield foreign banks appears to have spurred firm creation and exit. We modify the view in earlier studies that informational opacity equates with firm size, defining opacity in terms of technological characteristics for a given industry. We find the economic significance of foreign bank entry is larger for opaque industries than industries with large shares of small firms. The study provides evidence of increased credit constraints for start-ups in Central and Eastern Europe which is consistent with the theoretical proposition that the presence of foreign banks exacerbates informational asymmetries.     

Capital structure effects of international expansion

This study investigates and qualifies the impact of internationalization on the capital structure of a firm. Previous studies have associated firm internationalization with foreign sales or foreign assets. However, an increase in sales volume generated abroad does not necessarily mean that a firm has actually invested in a new foreign country. This study examines non-financial firms included in the main developed stock indexes that report a new geographical area of operation. It reveals that, at less advanced levels of internationalization, growth in foreign volumes and new geographic expansion lead to differential decision-making in capital structure choices.This study concludes that (1) when the target foreign market is developed, the new market entry does not lead to significant changes in capital structure, whatever the past experience of the firm. (2) The capital structure of well-diversified firms is not significantly modified following a new foreign entry. (3) Both domestic firms and firms only active in developed markets significantly increase their debt to equity ratio when expanding into a region or country where they had no operation before. Well-diversified firms clearly exhibit a different behavior compared to firms in less advanced levels of internationalization.     

Informational Barriers to Entry into Credit Markets*

Economic theory suggests that asymmetric information between incumbents and entrants can generate barriers to entry into credit markets. Incumbents have superior information about their own customers and the overall economic conditions of the local credit market. This implies that entrants are likely to experience higher loan default rates than the incumbents. We test these theoretical predictions using a unique database of 7,275 observations on 729 individual banks’ lending in 95 Italian local markets. We find that informational asymmetries play a significant role in explaining entrants’ loan default rates. The default rate is significantly higher for those banks that entered local markets without opening a branch, suggesting that having a branch on site may help to reduce the informational disadvantage. We also uncover a positive correlation between banks’ loan default rates in individual local markets and the number of banks lending in that market. We argue that these informational barriers can help to explain why entry into many local credit markets by domestic and foreign banks was slow, even after substantial deregulation. * The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not involve the responsibility of the Bank of Italy. The authors thank Franklin Allen, Dario Focarelli, Andrea Generale, Luigi Guiso, Francesca Lotti, Marco Pagano, Alberto Franco Pozzolo, Paola Sapienza, Alessandro Secchi, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, the Federal Reserve of Chicago, the 2003 BIS Workshop on Applied Banking Research, the 2003 EARIE Conference, the First Banca d’Italia/CEPR Conference on Money, Banking and Finance, the 2004 FIRS Conference on Banking, Insurance and Intermediation and the 2004 EEA Meeting for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies to all of them.     

Threat of entry and the use of discretion in banks’ financial reporting

This paper studies managers’ use of accounting discretion to deter entry. Using state-level changes in branching regulation under the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, I find geographically-constrained community banks increased their loan loss provisions to appear less profitable when faced with the threat of entry by competitors. Additional tests rule out alternative explanations that firm economics or regulators drove the increase. I complement my analyses with survey-based evidence. Findings from the survey confirm that banks prefer to locate in markets where incumbents have high profitability and low credit losses, and that banks use competitors’ financial statements to analyze competition.     

银行业竞争、创新资源配置和企业创新产出——基于中国工业企业的经验证据

本文利用城市级商业银行分支机构数据,结合中国工业企业数据和企业专利数据,实证分析银行业竞争对中国企业创新产出的影响。研究发现,竞争性的银行业市场结构显著促进了企业创新产出,对非国有企业和中小企业尤为显著。进一步地,本文基于资源配置角度,从新进入企业和在位企业双重视角探讨银行业竞争影响企业创新产出的作用途径。检验发现,银行业竞争提高条件下,更多的高效率企业进入创新部门,更多的高效率在位企业增加创新投入,且上述影响在非国有企业和中小企业中更为明显。本文检验结果显示,银行业竞争能提高银行对高效率企业的信贷支持,优化企业之间创新资源配置,并通过引导高效率非国有企业和中小企业增加创新投入而推动整体层面的创新产出。本文拓展了银行业竞争对企业创新的微观影响研究,为制定基于创新驱动的金融发展政策提供新思路。     

Barriers to entry to the big firm audit market: Evidence from market reaction to switches to second Tier audit firms in the post-sox period

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied concentration in the audit market and found that the Big 4 firms continue to dominate the market for clients with revenue of more than $500 million while non-Big 4 firms have gained market share among clients with revenue of $500 million or less (GAO, 2008). The US Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession has expressed concern about barriers to entry that might prevent a non-Big 4 firm from increasing its market share among large publicly-traded clients (Advisory Committee, 2008). One of these barriers may be the potential cost to shareholders if the stock market reacts negatively to the appointment of a non-Big 4 auditor (GAO, 2003). We examine whether the stock market reacts negatively when clients switch from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4, because a negative reaction might make such switching less likely to occur. We find that the market does not react more negatively when clients move from a Big 4 to a Second Tier auditing firm than when clients move from a Big 4 to another Big 4 firm. Our results suggest that a negative market reaction may not represent a significant barrier to entry among Second Tier auditing firms.     

Threat of entry and debt maturity: Evidence from airlines

I explore the effect of the threat posed by low-cost competitors on debt structure in the airline industry. I use the route network expansion of low-cost airlines to identify routes where the probability of future entry increases dramatically. I find that when a large portion of their market is threatened, incumbents significantly increase debt maturity before entry occurs. Overall, the main findings suggest that airlines respond to entry threats trading off the benefits of short-term financing for lower rollover risk. The results are consistent with models in which firms set their optimal debt structure in the presence of costly rollover failure.     

Index composition changes and the cost of incumbency

This paper provides evidence of information effects and portfolio rebalancing effects that occur when stocks are added to or excluded from the S&P 500 index and finds that incumbents in the index realize negative excess returns when S&P revises the composition of the index. We also find that for incumbents that are in the same industry as the added firm, the price-pressure effects are mitigated by positive industry-level information and momentum effects. For index exclusions, the magnitude of the loss sustained by incumbents from the same industry as the excluded firm is larger than that realized by the non-industry incumbents, as the negative information and momentum effects reinforce the price-pressure effects. Our results suggest that changes in the composition of the index are not information-free events; however, the portfolio rebalancing effects dominate the industry information effects.     

Entry and pricing in a differentiated products industry: evidence from the ATM market

We estimate a structural equilibrium model of the automatic teller machine market (ATM) to evaluate the implications of regulating ATM surcharges. We use data on bank characteristics, potential and actual ATM locations, and consumer locations; identify the model parameters with a regression discontinuity design; and develop methods to estimate the model without computing equilibria. A surcharge ban reduces ATM entry 12% and consumer welfare 24% but increases firm profits 27%. Total welfare under either regime is 4% lower than the surplus maximizing level. The article can help shed light on the implications of unregulated entry for differentiated products industries.