Expected Mispricing: The Joint Influence of Accounting Transparency and Investor Base

We examine how accounting transparency and investor base jointly affect financial analysts' expectations of mispricing (i.e., expectations of stock price deviations from fundamental value). Within a range of transparency, these two factors interactively amplify analysts' expectations of mispricing—analysts expect a larger positive deviation when a firm's disclosures more transparently reveal income‐increasing earnings management and the firm's most important investors are described as transient institutional investors with a shorter‐term horizon (low concentration in holdings, high portfolio turnover, and frequent momentum trading) rather than dedicated institutional investors with a longer‐term horizon (high concentration in holdings, low portfolio turnover, and little momentum trading). Results are consistent with analysts anticipating that transient institutional investors are more likely than dedicated institutional investors to adjust their trading strategies for near‐term factors affecting stock mispricings. Our theory and findings extend the accounting disclosure literature by identifying a boundary condition to the common supposition that disclosure transparency necessarily mitigates expected mispricing, and by providing evidence that analysts' pricing judgments are influenced by their anticipation of different investors' reactions to firm disclosures.     

The use of management forecasts to dampen analysts' expectations by Chinese listed firms

This paper studies the use of management earnings forecasts (MEF) to dampen analysts' expectations, i.e. expectation management, by Chinese listed companies. We reveal several important findings: Firstly, information asymmetry is positively associated with the use of MEF to dampen analysts' expectations. State control has been found to moderate this relationship. Secondly, dampening analysts' expectations using MEF leads to negative stock return reactions and downward analysts' forecast revisions. Thirdly, the effectiveness of “pre-empting bad news through MEF” appears mixed and dependent on the information content of MEF and measures of actual earnings surprises. Finally, firms that disclose MEF are found to engage in more earnings management to meet the forecasts than firms that do not.     

Expectations and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns

Previous research has shown that stocks with low prices relative to book value, cash flow, earnings, or dividends (that is, value stocks) earn high returns. Value stocks may earn high returns because they are more risky. Alternatively, systematic errors in expectations may explain the high returns earned by value stocks. I test for the existence of systematic errors using survey data on forecasts by stock market analysts. I show that investment strategies that seek to exploit errors in analysts' forecasts earn superior returns because expectations about future growth in earnings are too extreme.     

Financial Management Association Roundtable on Stock Market Pricing and Value‐Based Management

A group of academics and practitioners addresses a number of questions about the workings of the stock market and its implications for corporate decision‐making. The discussion begins by asking what the market wants from companies: Is it mainly just steady increases in earnings per share, which are then “capitalized” by the market at the current industry P/E multiple to produce a higher stock price? Or does the market pay attention to the “quality,” or sustainability, of earnings? And are there more revealing measures of annual corporate performance than GAAP earnings—measures that would provide investors with a better sense of companies' future cash‐generating capacity and returns on capital? The consensus was that although many investors respond uncritically to earnings numbers, the most sophisticated and influential investors consider far more than current earnings when pricing stocks. And although the stock market is far from omniscient, the heightened scrutiny of companies resulting from the growth of hedge funds, private equity, and investor activism of all kinds appears to be making the market “more efficient” in building information into stock prices. The second part of the discussion explored the implications of this view of the market pricing process for corporate strategy and the evaluation of major investment opportunities. For example, do acquisitions have to be “EPS‐accretive” to be value‐adding, or is there a more reliable means of assessing an investment's value added than pro forma EPS effects? Does the DCF valuation method always offer a better guide to value than the method of comparables used by many Wall Street dealmakers? And under what circumstances are the relatively new real options valuation approaches likely to provide a significant advantage over conventional methods? The main message offered to corporate practitioners is to avoid letting cosmetic accounting effects get in the way of value‐adding investment and operating decisions. As the corporate record on acquisitions makes painfully clear, there is no guarantee that an accretive deal will turn out to be value‐increasing (in fact, the odds are that it will not). As for choosing a valuation method, there appears to be a time and place for each of the major methods—comparables, DCF, and real options—and the key to success is understanding which method is best suited to the circumstances.     

Is Economic Growth Good for Investors?1

When measured over long periods of time, the correlation of countries' inflation‐adjusted per capita GDP growth and stock returns is negative. This result holds for both developed countries (for which the correlation coefficient is –0.39 using data from 1900–2011) and emerging markets (the correlation is –0.41 over the period 1988–2011). And this means that investors would have been better off investing in countries with lower per capita GDP growth than in countries experiencing the highest growth rates. This seems surprising since economic growth is generally assumed to be good for corporate profits. In attempting to explain this finding, the author begins by noting that economic growth can be achieved through increased inputs of capital and labor, which don't necessarily benefit the stockholders of existing companies. Growth also comes from technological advances, which do not necessarily lead to higher profits since competition among firms often results in the benefits accruing to consumers and workers. What's more, it's important to recognize that growth has both an expected and an unexpected component. And one explanation for the negative correlation between growth and stock returns is the tendency for investors to overpay for expected growth. But there is another—and in the author's view, a more important—part of the explanation. Along with the negative correlation between long‐run average stock returns and per capita growth rates, the author also reports a strong positive association between (per share) dividend growth rates and overall stock returns. Such an association is not surprising since unusual growth in dividends is a fairly reliable predictor of increases in future earnings. But another effect at work here is the role of dividends—and, in the U.S., stock repurchases too—in limiting what might be called the corporate “overinvestment problem,” the natural tendency of corporate managers to pursue growth, if necessary at the expense of profitability. One of the main messages of this article is that corporate growth adds value only when companies reinvest their earnings in projects that are expected to earn at least their cost of capital—while at the same time committing to return excess cash and capital to their shareholders through dividends and stock buybacks.     

From Stock Selection to Portfolio Alpha Generation: The Role of Fundamental Analysis

In this roundtable sponsored by Columbia Business School's Center for Excellence in Accounting Research and Security Analysis, a group of successful investors discuss their approaches and methods. A common saying among financial economists is that stock prices are set not by the average investor, but “at the margin” by the most sophisticated and influential investors. The intent of this roundtable is to furnish a portrait of such “marginal” investors, one that turns out to be quite different from the quarterly earnings‐driven, momentum traders often depicted by the media and deplored by corporate executives. In response to the common charge of short termism leveled by corporate managers, most of the investors at the table claimed to take large, multi‐year positions in companies they believed to be well‐managed, but temporarily undervalued. Instead of being attracted to earnings momentum, and rather than simply capitalizing current earnings at industry‐wide multiples to arrive at price targets, the analysis of these investors begins with a “deep dive” into a company's financials, which is often reinforced by primary research—visits with management, customers, suppliers. The aim of such research is to identify, well before the broad market does, companies that promise to earn consistently high and sustainable returns on invested capital.     

An Empirical Analysis of Analysts' Target Prices: Short-term Informativeness and Long-term Dynamics

Using a large database of analysts' target prices issued over the period 1997–1999, we examine short‐term market reactions to target price revisions and long‐term comovement of target and stock prices. We find a significant market reaction to the information contained in analysts' target prices, both unconditionally and conditional on contemporaneously issued stock recommendation and earnings forecast revisions. Using a cointegration approach, we analyze the long‐term behavior of market and target prices. We find that, on average, the one‐year‐ahead target price is 28 percent higher than the current market price.     

Why EVA Bonus Plans Failed—and How to Revive Them

Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure their financial performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings growth may come at the expense of future earnings through, say, shortsighted cutbacks in corporate investment, including R&D or advertising. But growth in earnings per share can also be achieved by “overinvesting”—that is, committing ever more capital to projects with expected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, exceed the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance, and often fails to motivate corporate managers who believe that meeting consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA often doesn't work well because increases in current EVA often come with reduced expectations of future EVA improvement—and reductions in current EVA are often accompanied by increases in future growth values. Since EVA bonus plans reward current EVA increases without taking account of changes in expected future growth values, they have the potential to encourage margin improvement that comes at the expense of business growth and discourage positive‐NPV investments that, because of longer‐run payoffs, reduce current EVA. In this article, the author demonstrates the possibility of overcoming such short‐termism by developing an operating model of changes in future growth value that can be used to calibrate “dynamic” EVA improvement targets that more closely align EVA bonus plan payouts with investors’ excess returns. With the use of “dynamic” targets, margin improvements that come at the expense of business growth can be discouraged by raising EVA performance targets, while growth investments can be encouraged by the use of lower EVA targets.     

The role of financial analysts in stock market efficiency with respect to annual earnings and its cash and accrual components

This study examines biases in stock prices and financial analysts' earnings forecasts. These biases take the form of systematic overweighting or underweighting of the persistence characteristics of cash versus accrual earnings components. Our evidence suggests that stock prices tend to overweight and financial analysts tend to underweight these persistence characteristics. Furthermore, we find that analysts' underweighting attenuates stock price overweighting. However, we find little evidence that the overweighting in stock prices attenuates analyst underweighting. This study brings a new perspective to the literature regarding the disciplining role of financial analysts in capital markets.     

Difference of opinion and the cross-section of equity returns: Australian evidence

This paper examines the relationship between difference of opinion among investors and the return on Australian equities. The paper is the first to employ dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts, abnormal turnover and idiosyncratic volatility as proxies for difference of opinion. We document a negative relationship between difference of opinion and stock returns when dispersion in analysts' forecasts and idiosyncratic volatility are employed as proxies. This result provides support for Miller's (1977) model and is consistent with the findings of Diether et al. (2002). In contrast, we find mixed results when using abnormal turnover to proxy difference of opinion.     

A Better Way to Measure Operating Performance (or Why the EVA Math Really Matters)

Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure operating performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings can come at the expense of future earnings through, for example, short‐sighted cutbacks in investment, including spending on R&D. But growth in EPS can also be achieved by investing more capital with projected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, are higher than the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem with earnings because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance—and often fails to provide the intended incentives for the (many) corporate managers who believe that meeting current consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA doesn't work well when new investments take time to become profitable because the higher capital charge comes before the related income. In this article, the author presents two new operating performance measures that are likely to work better than either earnings or EVA because they reflect the value that can be lost either through corporate underinvestment or overinvestment designed to increase current earnings. Both of these new measures are based on the math that ties EVA to discounted cash flow value, particularly its division of current corporate market values into two components: “current operations value” and “future growth value.” The key to the effectiveness of the new measures in explaining changes in company stock prices and market values is a statistical model of changes in future growth value that captures the expected effects of significant increases in current investment in R&D and advertising on future profits and value.     

Predicting long-term earnings growth from multiple information sources

While expected long-term earnings growth plays a pivotal role in valuation and investment applications, its common proxy, analysts' long-term growth forecasts (LTG), is well known for being over-optimistic. Guided by a stylized growth model, this paper uses three information sources to improve growth prediction—analysts' forecasts, stock prices, and financial statements. We find that the growth model using LTG, past earnings growth, the forward earnings-to-price ratio and past returns as predictors is unbiased and most accurate among the models considered in this paper. We further show that this growth prediction results in higher trading profits, more accurate equity predictions, and more reliable estimates of cost of equity. The findings suggest that this improvement in growth prediction leads to economically significant consequences in valuation and investment applications.     

Earnings characteristics and analysts’ differential interpretation of earnings announcements: An empirical analysis

This study provides empirical evidence on factors that drive differential interpretation of earnings announcements. We document that Kandel and Pearson's forecast measures of differential interpretation are decreasing in proxies for earnings quality and pre‐announcement information quality. This evidence yields new and useful insights regarding which earnings announcements are less likely to generate newfound disagreement among analysts and investors. Recent research suggests that investor disagreement can increase investment risk, increase the cost of capital, and cause stock prices to deviate from fundamental value. Therefore, our results support prior intuition that increasing the quality of earnings and pre‐announcement information can improve the efficiency of capital markets.     

The Explanatory Power of Canadian Accounting Measures of Earnings Dilution*

This paper examines the properties of the accounting measures of dilution under pre‐2001 Canadian GAAP. Fully diluted earnings per share (EPS) presents investors with a per‐share figure that attempts to capture the maximum potential dilution that would occur if all dilutive convertible securities were converted and all dilutive stock options and rights exercised. We examine how the difference between basic and fully diluted EPS, which we refer to as the dilutive adjustment, affects the ability of EPS to predict one‐period‐ahead EPS. Moreover, we address the issue of the explanatory power of changes in the dilutive adjustment for unexpected stock returns over the year and at the earnings announcement date. Surprisingly, in contrast with the traditional accounting view that increases in the dilutive adjustment present the investor with bad news due to potential dilution of the future earnings stream, the dilutive adjustment is positively related to next period's earnings and increases in the dilutive adjustment are positively correlated with contemporaneous long‐window stock returns. These results can be attributed to the relation between the dilutive adjustment and the earnings process combined with a partial resolution of the uncertainty attached to growth firms. We find no evidence that investors use information from the disclosure of fully diluted EPS at the earnings announcement date. These results are consistent with increases in the dilutive adjustment capturing the partial realization of a firm's growth potential that more than outweighs the potential dilution attached to the convertible securities; however, this information appears to be already embedded in price prior to the disclosure of fully diluted EPS.     

Analysts and anomalies

Analysts' price targets and recommendations contradict stock return anomaly variables. Using an index based on 125 anomalies, we find that analysts' annual stock return forecasts are 11% higher for anomaly-shorts than for anomaly-longs. Anomaly-shorts’ return forecasts are excessively optimistic, exceeding realized returns by 34%. Recommendations also tend to be more favorable for anomaly-shorts, although this result varies across anomaly types. Consistent with analysts' slowly incorporating anomaly information, anomalies forecast revisions in both price targets and recommendations. Our findings imply that investors who follow analysts' actionable information contribute to mispricing.     

The Real Options Component and Market Value of Taiwan Technological Companies

Real options valuation has been applied in real investment extensively. However the empirical researches of real options components’ value are seldom studied. This study uses the panel data model to test whether the stock prices of Taiwan listed companies reflect investor’s expectations regarding the value of real options. This article demonstrates that investors cannot ignore the real options components when evaluating stock market value. The results also confirm that the proportion of a firm’s market value not due to assets-in-place is significantly and positively related to the variables of stock beta, skewness of stock returns, size, capital stock, and research and development. In addition, firms with lower firm life cycle have a higher real options value.     

How Common Are Intentional GAAP Violations? Estimates from a Dynamic Model

This paper uses data on detected misstatements—earnings restatements—and a dynamic model to estimate the extent of undetected misstatements that violate GAAP. The model features a CEO who can manipulate his firm's stock price by misstating earnings. I find the CEO's expected cost of misleading investors is low. The probability of detection over a five‐year horizon is 13.91%, and the average misstatement, if detected, results in an 8.53% loss in the CEO's retirement wealth. The low expected cost implies a high fraction of CEOs who misstate earnings at least once at 60%, with 2%–22% of CEOs starting to misstate earnings in each year 2003–2010, inflation in stock prices across CEOs who misstate earnings at 2.02%, and inflation in stock prices across all CEOs at 0.77%. Wealthier CEOs manipulate less, and the average misstatement is larger in smaller firms.     

Accounting and Valuation: How Helpful Are Recent Accounting Rule Changes?

The longstanding debate over the proper definition of “earnings”—whether investors when setting stock prices focus primarily on GAAP earnings or other measures like operating cash flow—is both misguided and theoretically unresolvable. The biggest problem faced by investors in evaluating earnings reports is not their inability to understand the effects of the different accounting methods companies use when aggregating accounting line items into reported net income. More challenging, and more critical to the investment process, is getting complete and reliable information about the line items themselves. The authors' underlying premise is that investors, when provided sufficient information about these “components” of earnings, can combine or reconfigure them in whatever way they find most useful. But without sufficient and reliable information about the individual line items, investors will find it difficult to understand how earnings are generated and thus to produce the forecast of future earnings necessary to value a company. In the past few years, there have been significant rule changes in accounting for employee options, derivatives, and special purposes entities. The authors evaluate the extent to which the new rules encourage disclosures that are helpful from a valuation perspective. Although there has been some progress, financial reporting in each of the three areas continues to fall well short of providing the complete, disaggregated data required to value a firm with confidence.     

Acquirers’ earnings management ahead of stock-for-stock bids in ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ markets

The accounting literature has found evidence that acquirers in stock-for-stock M&A have typically managed earnings upwards ahead of a bid. Other literatures have concluded that, when stock prices are high and rising, M&A is higher, more M&A is financed with stock, market sentiment and stockholders’ perceptions of information appear to change, and in these circumstances new (arbitrage) motivations for M&A emerge. This paper revisits earnings management ahead of M&A in the light of these findings, comparing experience in ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ markets. It finds that such earnings management is more pronounced in hot markets; that only in such markets are positive discretionary accruals commonly associated with positive abnormal returns on the announcement of earnings; and that in such markets – against the expectations from signalling theory – these positive returns are not reversed on announcement of a stock-for-stock bid. The results suggest that the economic benefits achieved by engaging in earnings management during hot markets are indeed significant: in hot markets, we estimate that on average share acquirers engage in working capital accrual management equivalent to over a third of the average acquirer’s return on total assets in that year; and that this earnings management is associated with increases in market value which are statistically and economically significant, enabling the bidder to secure control of the target with fewer shares.     

The Pricing of Relative Performance Based Incentives for Executive Compensation

Japanese firms report both parent-only and consolidated financial statements. Because of the unique business environment in Japan, there is a widely held view that parent-only data provides a better means for assessing the value of the entire firm. We find that both parent-only and subsidiary earnings are important in predicting future consolidated earnings. However, while stock prices accurately reflect the persistence of parent-only earnings, the Japanese stock market appears to underestimate the persistence of subsidiary earnings, causing a significant positive relation between changes in subsidiary earnings in year t and stock returns in year t +1. This relation between subsidiary earnings and future stock returns does not persist beyond year t 7plus;1. Taking a long (short) position in firms with large, positive (negative) changes in subsidiary earnings results in an average annual abnormal return of 7.06% with positive returns in 12 of the 13 years in the test period.