Valuation Implications of Unconditional Accounting Conservatism: Evidence from Analysts' Target Prices

We examine whether financial analysts understand the valuation implications of unconditional accounting conservatism when forecasting target prices. While accounting conservatism affects reported earnings, conservatism per se does not have an effect on the present value of future cash flows. We examine whether analysts adjust for the effect of conservatism included in their earnings forecasts when using these forecasts to estimate target prices. We find that signed target price errors (actual minus forecast) have a significant positive association with the degree of conservatism in forward earnings, suggesting that target prices are biased due to accounting conservatism. Cross‐sectional analysis suggests that more sophisticated analysts and superior long‐term forecasters adjust for conservatism to a greater extent than other analysts. In additional analyses, we explore the mechanism through which conservatism leads to bias in target prices. We first show that analysts' earnings forecasts are negatively associated with the degree of conservatism; that is, analysts include the effect of unconditional conservatism in their earnings forecasts. Based on alternative earnings‐based valuation models that analysts may use, our evidence suggests that analysts fail to appropriately adjust their valuation multiple for the effect of conservatism included in their earnings forecasts when using these forecasts to derive target prices. As a consequence, we find that, for extreme changes in conservatism, the bias in analysts' target prices due to conservatism leads to a distortion of market prices. The evidence highlights the concern that analysts may not appreciate the valuation implications of conservative accounting which could inhibit price discovery.     

Conservative Accounting and Linear Information Valuation Models*

Prior research using the residual income valuation model and linear information models has generally found that estimates of firm value are negatively biased. We argue that this could result from the way in which accounting conservatism effects are reflected in such models. We build on the conservative accounting model of Feltham and Ohlson 1995 and the Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 1999 (DHS) methodology to propose a valuation model that includes a conservatism‐correction term, based on the properties of past realizations of residual income and “other information”. “Other information” is measured using analyst‐forecast‐based predictions of residual income. We use data comparable to the DHS sample to compare the bias and inaccuracy of value estimates from our model and from models similar to those used by DHS and Myers 1999. Valuation biases are substantially less negative for our model, but valuation inaccuracy is not markedly reduced.     

The Commitment to Income-Decreasing Accounting Choices as a Credible Signal to Reducing Information Asymmetry: The Case of Asset Revaluations*

Bagnoli and Watts (2005) proposed that a manager could reduce information asymmetry by choosing an income-decreasing accounting choice that signals the firm's relatively good future prospects. A limitation in testing this theory is that most income-decreasing accounting choices over time reverse such that aggregated earnings would be the same, regardless of the choice. One income-decreasing accounting choice that never reverses is the choice of upward asset revaluation, where the resulting gains are recognized through other comprehensive income and reduce future earnings by increasing future depreciation expense. In the United Kingdom, prior to FRS15, firms had the option to upwardly revalue on a one-time basis. FRS15, and subsequently International Financial Reporting Standards, however, require those firms that upwardly revalue precommit to revalue on a consistent basis. This precommitment sacrifices future reporting discretion, which, according to the aforementioned study, serves as a costly signal of a firm's relatively good future prospects that reduces information asymmetry. The choice not to upwardly revalue, therefore, serves as a signal of a firm's relatively poor future prospects and also reduces information asymmetry, but this choice does not require precommitment such that the reduction in information asymmetry would be less than the choice to precommit to upward revaluations. Using a propensity-score matched-pair design on a sample of United Kingdom firms to test our predictions during the period requiring precommitment, we find lower forecast dispersion, lower return volatility, and a lower cost of capital for firms that precommit to upward asset revaluations, relative to those firms that choose not to upwardly revalue their operating assets. Keywords: upward asset revaluations, income-decreasing accounting choice, information asymmetry, precommitment     

Does Accounting Conservatism Discipline Qualitative Disclosure? Evidence From Tone Management in the MD&A*

We investigate whether accounting conservatism, which has been found to be effective in constraining management opportunism in other settings, constrains upward tone management (UTM) in the Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) portion of the 10-K filing. We hypothesize that conservatism makes it harder for managers to opportunistically downplay bad news and magnify good news when discussing current performance. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that UTM is negatively associated with several accounting conservatism proxies. Additionally, we hypothesize and find that this association is stronger for firms where managers have higher incentives to manipulate tone. In supplemental analyses, we find evidence to suggest that our results are not due to an endogenous relationship between conservatism and UTM. We also find that conservatism neither encourages downward tone management (DTM) nor constrains managers from conveying real information about future good news. Together, our results suggest that accounting conservatism improves disclosure narratives.     

Gender Differences in Financial Reporting Decision Making: Evidence from Accounting Conservatism

This paper investigates the effect of CFO gender on corporate financial reporting decision making. Focusing on firms that experience changes of CFO from male to female, the paper compares the firms' degree of accounting conservatism between pre‐ and post‐transition periods. We find that female CFOs are more conservative in their financial reporting. In addition, we find that the relation between CFO gender and conservatism varies with the level of various firm risks, including litigation risk, default risk, systematic risk, and CFO‐specific risk such as job security risk. We further find that the risk aversion of female CFOs is associated with less equity‐based compensation, lower firm risk, a higher tangibility level, and a lower dividend payout level. Overall, the study provides strong support for the notion that female CFOs are more risk averse than male CFOs, which leads female CFOs to adopt more conservative financial reporting policies.     

Forecast Accuracy and Consistent Preferences for the Timing of Information Arrival

We study a principal's choice of whether to produce an imperfect forecast about a firm's outcome either before or after an agent's effort choice. The early forecast affects the agent's effort choice, which means the forecast can also be used to infer information about the effect of the agent's effort on outcome. The late forecast is more accurate because, by working hard, the agent also learns about productivity, implying that the late forecast has an additional performance measurement role. With verifiable information, the principal prefers a late forecast when the agent's effect on the accuracy of the forecast is either large or small. The agent has consistent preferences when the agent's effect on the accuracy of the late forecast is not too large. With unverifiable information, the agent's information rents imply that the principal cannot use either forecast as a performance measure. Thus, the accuracy of the late forecast has no effect on the principal's preference. However, if the accuracy of the early forecast is low and its decision‐making function is diminished, the principal prefers a late signal.     

PCAOB Inspections: Public Accounting Firms on “Trial”

The objective of our article is to obtain a better understanding of how auditors anticipate the potential for PCAOB inspection, experience the inspection, cope with the consequences of the inspection, and understand the PCAOB's influence within the context of professionalism. We use a qualitative approach that uses both surveys (55) and interviews (20) of auditors (of varying rank and firm) across a five‐year period (2012–2017). Respondents suggest that PCAOB inspectors are powerful, representing the “prosecution,” “judge,” and “jury” of the auditing profession. We therefore use a structural metaphor of the PCAOB inspection as a judicial “trial.” By controlling the criteria used to evaluate performance, inspectors have the power to repeatedly “subpoena,” “interrogate,” and return a “verdict” on the firm (auditor); those judged as “guilty” require supervised “probation.” This process is perceived as having improved audit quality but at a cost. Passing an inspection is so important that auditors (firms) have resorted to impression management strategies and “functionally stupid” work practices (e.g., excessive documentation, a decrease in critical thinking as a result of a “box ticking” approach to auditing). Furthermore, some respondents believe that being a good auditor has come at the expense of being a good accountant; the emphasis on audit process and concurrent de‐emphasis on technical accounting could ultimately lead to audits themselves falling short. In addition, it is evident that inspectors and auditors differ in their perceptions of risk, likely manifesting because inspectors are standards‐focused while auditors (firms) are methodology‐focused. Finally, the inspection process has created excessive stress and tension, beyond budget and fee pressures, which some auditors perceive as affecting the pool of talented auditors that firms may be able to attract and retain in the future.     

CEO compensation and firm performance in Japan: Evidence from new panel data on individual CEO pay

Prior studies on Japanese executive compensation have been constrained by the lack of longitudinal data on individual CEO pay. Using unique 10-year panel data on individual CEO's salary and bonus of Japanese firms from 1986 to 1995, we present the first estimates on pay-performance relations for Japanese CEO compensation. Specifically we find consistently that Japanese CEO's cash compensation is sensitive to firm performance (especially accounting measures), and that the “semi-elasticity” of CEO's cash compensation with respect to ROA is 1.3 to 1.4, which is in general agreement with prior estimates elsewhere. As such, our estimates do not support that Japanese corporate governance is unusually defunct with regard to the significance and size of the sensitivity of CEO compensation to accounting profitability. On the other hand, to be consistent with the literature on Japanese corporate governance that tends to downplay the role of shareholders and stress the role of banks and employees, we find that stock market performance tends to play a less important role in the determination of Japanese CEO compensation. Finally, we find that the bonus system makes CEO compensation more responsive to firm performance in Japan. The finding is in contrast to the literature on compensation for regular employees in Japan which often argues that bonus is a disguised base wage. J. Japanese Int. Economies 20 (1) (2006) 1–19.     

Accounting Conservatism and the Temporal Trends in Current Earnings’ Ability to Predict Future Cash Flows versus Future Earnings: Evidence on the Trade‐off between Relevance and Reliability*

This research reports that an increasing level of accounting conservatism over the 1973–2005 period is associated with: (1) an increase in the ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows and (2) a decrease in the ability of current earnings to predict future earnings. We also find that usefulness of earnings for explaining stock prices over book values is positively related to reliability but not to relevance. Our results hold for the constant and full samples in both in‐sample and out‐of‐sample analyses and are robust to the use of alternative measures for relevance, reliability, earnings usefulness, and conservatism. Our findings about the relations among conservatism, relevance, reliability, and usefulness suggest a trade‐off between relevance and reliability and seem to indicate that the adoption of an increasing number of conservative accounting standards has a possible adverse impact on earnings usefulness through a negative effect on reliability.     

Corporate Investment Incentives and Accounting‐Based Debt Covenants*

This paper studies the conditions under which accounting‐based debt covenants increase firm value in a setting that incorporates the conflicting incentives of shareholders, bondholders, and managers. We construct a model in which debt is needed to discipline managerial investment decisions despite endogenous compensation contracts. We show that accounting covenants increase value when (1) debt serves as a credible commitment to penalize poor investment decisions; (2) the firm faces other (exogenous) sources of uncertainty that can make debt risky despite good investment decisions; and (3) accounting information serves as a contractible proxy for firm's economic performance. In these circumstances, accounting covenants ensure that shareholders do not offer compensation schemes that would encourage bondholder wealth expropriation when the debt becomes risky. A covenant specifying a required level of accounting performance provides additional bondholder power when performance is low. An accounting‐based dividend covenant allows a disbursement to maintain investment incentives when performance is high without allowing dividend‐based expropriation. The optimal covenants depend on the reliability of accounting information, and the interaction between accounting performance and the different incentive conflicts provides new insight into the empirical literature on accounting‐based covenants.     

Accounting Recognition,Moral Hazard,and Communication*

Two complementary sources of information are studied in a multiperiod agency model. One is an accounting source that partially but credibly conveys the agent's private information through accounting recognition. The other is an unverified communication by the agent (i.e., a self‐report). In a simple setting with no communication, alternative labor market frictions lead to alternative optimal recognition policies. When the agent is allowed to communicate his or her private information, accounting signals serve as a veracity check on the agent's self‐report. Finally, such communication sometimes makes delaying the recognition optimal. We see contracting and confirmatory roles of accounting as its comparative advantage. As a source of information, accounting is valuable because accounting reports are credible, comprehensive, and subject to careful and professional judgement. While other information sources may be more timely in providing valuation information about an entity, audited accounting information, when used in explicit or implicit contracts, ensures the accuracy of the reports from nonaccounting sources.     

Monitoring in Multiagent Organizations*

This paper studies how to assign “monitors” to productive agents in order to generate signals about the agents' performance that are most useful from a contracting perspective. We show that if signals generated by the same monitor are negatively (positively) correlated, then the optimal monitoring assignment will be “focused” (“dispersed”). This holds because dispersed monitoring allows the firm to better utilize relative performance evaluation. On the other hand, if each monitor communicates only an aggregated signal to the principal, then focused monitoring is always optimal since aggregation undermines relative performance evaluation. We also study team‐based compensation and randomized monitoring assignments. In particular, we show that the firm can gain from randomizing the monitoring assignment, compared with the optimal linear deterministic contract. Furthermore, under randomization, the conditional expected utility for the agent is higher when the agent is not monitored compared with the case where the agent is monitored. That is, the chance of being monitored serves as a “stick” rather than a “carrot”.     

Separating the Political and Technical: Accounting Standard‐Setting and Purification

The U.S.‐based Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) emphasizes that accounting standard‐setting is not and should not be regarded as a “political process.” Employing the case of accounting for stock compensation, I examine a recent debate in which FASB appears to have successfully established and maintained a boundary between a technical accounting process and politics. This case is interesting because an earlier, failed effort to expense stock compensation was described as highly politicized. However, the boundary between technical and political processes was maintained in the more recent episode. I find that a focus on due process, characterizations of existing accounting requirements as anomalous and available measurement methods as reliable, and warnings about the dangers of injecting “politics” into standard‐setting were important to this boundary work. I also find that the boundary work required considerable interpretive flexibility in selecting (or ignoring) the evidence to be used in justifying the standard‐setting project and its conclusions. I conclude by suggesting that a different understanding of what it means to be involved in a “political process” might help all parties understand more fully what is taking place during the accounting standard‐setting process. Attention could be turned to developing processes to facilitate debates over which values should guide decisions occurring throughout the standard‐setting process. To this end, an enhanced standard‐setting process might allow for increased participation in agenda setting, in framing and scoping standard‐setting projects, and in providing opportunities for nonexperts to participate.     

Project Termination Decisions,Underinvestment and Overinvestment*

In this article, I use the principal‐agent framework to examine the incentives of risk‐and work‐averse agents to work on projects that are long‐term, multistage, and subject to abandonment. Periodic applications of effort by the agent are required. The agent also obtains private information as the project evolves, and he decides whether the project should be abandoned or continued. The principal not only seeks to provide incentives to induce the agent to take up such risky investments and work hard at them, but also seeks to provide incentives for the agent to abandon the project if the profit prospect is low. We show that the agent's decision to continue is not always aligned with the principal's desire. The result provides an economic rationale for the sunk cost phenomenon. There also exist conditions under which the agent chooses to prematurely abandon the project.     

保守主义思想回归与特朗普政府的网络安全战略调整

特朗普执政后,保守主义思想的回归引领了美国网络安全战略的转向。“美国优先”和传统共和党保守主义两种思想自上而下的调整与“黑客干预大选”事件自下而上的驱动共同推动形成了保守主义网络安全战略。联邦政府各部门并以此为指导制定了“全政府”的网络安全政策。主要表现为网络军事力量发展更加激进,并且试图突破“主权”限制,通过“持续交手”“前置防御”将行动空间拓展到他国主权范围;网络外交地位明显弱化,美国与主要大国之间网络外交陷入低谷,并消极对待网络空间国际治理进程;国土安全防御一改过去“虚大于实”的状况,定位得到了明显提升;信息与通信技术政策成为网络安全战略的新领域,引发了大国之间围绕供应链安全的激烈博弈。保守主义网络安全战略调整能否获得预期的战略收益还很难说,但一系列负面效应已经开始显现,单边主义让美国陷入了双重网络安全困境,进攻性网络行动增加了大国冲突风险。对外交和网络空间国际治理地位的弱化则加剧了国际秩序失范。作者旨在从特朗普政府保守主义网络安全战略调整入手,通过分析其背后的保守主义战略思想源流,并结合网络军事、外交、国土安全、信息与通信技术政策等领域的实际政策调整进行论证,对特朗普政府网络安全战略调整的影响进行评估。     

Bank Indonesia and The Recent Crisis

This paper is a personal note describing the crisis as it unfolded while the writer was a key player in Indonesia's macroeconomic management. The crisis is seen as multi-faceted. It originated externally from a shock in the currency market that triggered a downward spiral from currency depreciation to fully-fledged crisis. The currency shock that hit the rupiah in July 1997 exposed in sequence the flaws embedded in the banking sector, the economic system, the social and the political system, flaws that had been obscured by long years of good economic performance. Through a complicated process of contagion and feedback effects—market disturbances, policy responses and market reactions—Indonesia deteriorated from a relatively well managed economy to the “worst case” among the Asian crisis economies. The paper discusses this process, the IMF's role, the bank closure issue, the currency board controversy and the author's dismissal as Governor of Bank Indonesia.     

Do Economists Recognize an Opportunity Cost When They See One? A Dismal Performance or an Arbitrary Concept?

2005 asked 199 professional economists a multiple‐choice question about opportunity cost. Given that only 21.6% answered “correctly,” they conclude that professional understanding of the concept is “dismal.” We challenge this critique of the profession. Specifically, we allow for alternative opportunity cost accounting methodologies—one of which is derived from the term's definition as found in Ferraro and Taylor— and rely on the conventional relationship between willingness to pay and substitute goods to demonstrate that every answer to the multiple‐choice question is defensible. The Ferraro and Taylor survey question suggests difficulties in framing an opportunity cost accounting question, as well as a lack of coordination in opportunity cost accounting methodology. In scope and logic, we conclude that the survey question does not, however, succeed in measuring professional understanding of opportunity cost. A discussion follows as to the concept's appropriate role in the classroom.     

Accounting Conservatism and Performance Covenants: A Signaling Approach

This study examines the relation between performance covenants in private debt contracting and conservative accounting under adverse selection. We find that under severe adverse selection (i.e., high information asymmetry), accounting conservatism and performance covenants act as complements to signal that the borrower is unlikely to appropriate wealth from the lender. No such relation obtains in a low information asymmetry regime. We further show that in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants generally enjoy lower interest rate spreads than borrowers with low levels of conservatism and loose performance covenants. Consistent with our signaling theory, in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants are less likely to make abnormal payouts to shareholders. Our empirical results are robust to alternative measures of conservatism and covenant restrictiveness.     

An index of growth due to depreciation*

Abstract. While factors such as inflation, technological change and growth often have been discussed in connection with the adequacy of provisions for depreciation under a historical cost model, there is another dimension to the capital maintenance problem and it concerns the multiplier effect of depreciation. When an amount equal to depreciation is reinvested, a firm's productive capacity tends to increase. Reinvestment of depreciation also increases a firm's financial capital if book depreciation is more accelerated than economic depreciation. Based on a model developed by Ijiri (1967), this paper derives an index of this growth due to depreciation. The index estimates a bias in conventional depreciation methods that has been overlooked in the literature on the subject. This bias has implications for inflation accounting because if conventional depreciation methods have a built-in growth bias, adjustments for inflation may be a type of double counting. A second implication mentioned concerns the bias in accounting rates of return. Résumé. Bien que des facteurs tels l'inflation, les changements technologiques et la croissance ont souvent été examinés à propos de la pertinence des provisions pour dépréciation dans le cadre du modèle au coût historique, un autre aspect du problème de préservation du capital subsiste et il concerne l'effet multiplicateur de l'amortissement. Lorsqu'un montant égal à l'amortissement est réinvesti, la capacité d'exploitation de la firme a tendance à s'accroître. Le réinvestissement de l'amortissement fait aussi augmenter le capital de la firme si l'amortissement comptable est plus accéléré que la dépréciation économique. En se basant sur un modèle élaboré par Ijiri (1967), cet article dérive un indice de cette croissance attribuable à l'amortissement. L'indice estime un biais des méthodes traditionnelles, qui a été négligé dans les recherches consacrées au sujet. Ce biais a des implications en comptabilité des effets de l'inflation, car si les méthodes d'amortissement traditionnelles comportent implicitement ce biais de croissance, les redressements relatifs à l'inflation peuvent être assimilés à un double comptage. Une deuxième conséquence est signalée, soit le biais relatif aux taux de rendement comptable.