Estimating a continuous hedonic‐choice model with an application to demand for soft drinks

Using micro‐level scanner data, I study empirically the consumer demand for soft drinks, which is characterized by multiple‐product, multiple‐unit purchasing behavior. I develop a continuous hedonic‐choice model to investigate how consumers choose the best basket of products to satisfy various needs. My model's embedded‐characteristics approach both helps to reduce the dimensionality problem in model estimation and generates flexible substitution patterns. Hence, the model is useful in application to data with many product choices that are correlated with each other at the individual level. The estimation results show that interesting substitutability and even a form of complementarity exist among soft drinks.     

A Markov‐perfect equilibrium model of the impacts of price controls on the performance of the pharmaceutical industry

I introduce a computable dynamic equilibrium model of the pharmaceutical industry, parameterize it using industry facts, and use it to predict what happens if the United States adopts price controls or one or more non‐U.S. countries abandon their controls. The model generates implications for firm value, research and development (R&D), the flow of new drugs, and consumer welfare. I highlight the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions about R&D costs, market size, technological opportunities, consumer heterogeneity, the extent to which choices internalize prices, barriers to entry in R&D, the extent to which R&D outcomes are correlated, and the nature of the controls.     

Spatial competition in retail markets: movie theaters

Retail markets are extremely important, but economists have few practical tools for analyzing the way dispersed buyers and sellers affect the properties of markets. I develop an econometric model of retail demand in which products are location specific and consumers have preferences over both geographic proximity and other store and product characteristics. The model uses data on the observed geographic distribution of consumers within a market to (1) help explain observed variation in market shares and (2) affect predicted substitution patterns between stores. Using data from the U.S. cinema industry, I use the estimated model to evaluate the form of consumer transport costs, the effect of a theater's price and quality choices on rivals, the effects of geographic differentiation, and the nature and extent of market power.     

Product differentiation and efficiencies in the retail banking industry

We empirically quantify the welfare implications of bank entry in the United States between 2000 and 2008. We use a fully structural framework that combines a differentiated demand model with an endogenous product model to investigate the market outcomes. We find no evidence for under- or over-entry. Compared with the socially efficient outcome, there is a mild welfare loss resulting from banks entering wrong locations in product space. Compared with the observed outcome, consumer surplus drops by 20–38% and bank profits decline by 48–59% when banks are homogeneous. Therefore product differentiation significantly improves welfare under free entry.     

Free entry and social efficiency under vertical oligopoly

We analyze a successive vertical oligopoly model that incorporates vertical relationships between industries and demonstrate that free entry in an industry that produces a homogeneous product can lead to a socially insufficient number of firms. This is in contrast with the proevious findings that, under Cournot oligopoloy with fixed set‐up costs, level of entry in the free‐entry equilibrium is socially excessive. It has often been argued that this result can provide a justification for apparently anticompetitive entry regulations. Our finding yields an important policy implication that such a justification is not necessarily valid when vertical relationships ar taken into account.     

The effect of satellite entry on cable television prices and product quality

How has the entry of satellite television affected the pricing and product quality of incumbent cable firms' programming packages? I estimate a model in which firms compete over both price and product quality (as determined by what channels are offered). Satellite entry typically causes cable firms to raise quality and lower price. However, in some markets, cable optimally responds by raising both price and quality or by lowering both price and quality. A counterfactual scenario that eliminates quality competition results in, on average, softer price competition and lower aggregate consumer surplus, but greater surplus for consumers with weaker preferences for quality.     

Management,productivity, and technology choices: evidence from U.S. mining schools

A key difference between managers and other production inputs is that managers choose the other inputs. Modelling management as a Hicks-neutral productivity shifter, which is a common practice, omits the productivity returns from these input decisions. I illustrate this through a historical episode in which technology choices were important and managers plausibly influenced those choices. I study the entry of the first mining college graduates into coal mine management positions in Pennsylvania. Whereas the Hicks-neutral productivity effect of these managers was negative and not significantly different from zero, their indirect productivity effect through electrical locomotive adoption was 3% on average.     

Building new plants or entering by acquisition? Firm heterogeneity and entry barriers in the U.S. cement industry

I estimate a model of entry for the cement industry that considers two options of expansion: building a plant or acquiring an incumbent. The model takes into account that there is a transfer of the buyer firm‐level characteristics to the acquired plants, which affects profits from the acquisition. Estimates show that a less‐permissive Reagan–Bush administration's merger policy would decrease the number of acquired plants by 71%, greenfield entry would increase by 9.2% and consumer surplus would decrease by 23.5%. Results suggest that regulators should be concerned about policies that negatively affect the efficient reallocation of assets between incumbents and entrants.     

Disentangling Managers’ and Analysts’ Non‐GAAP Reporting

Researchers frequently proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures using performance metrics available through analyst forecast data providers (FDPs), such as I/B/E/S. The extent to which FDP‐provided earnings are a valid proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP reporting, however, has been debated extensively. We explore this important question by creating the first large‐sample data set of managers’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures, which we directly compare to I/B/E/S data. Although we find a substantial overlap between the two data sets, we also find that they differ in systematic ways because I/B/E/S (1) excludes managers’ lower quality non‐GAAP numbers and (2) sometimes provides higher quality non‐GAAP measures that managers do not explicitly disclose. Our results indicate that using I/B/E/S to identify managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures significantly underestimates the aggressiveness of their reporting choices. We encourage researchers interested in managers’ non‐GAAP reporting to use our newly available data set of manager‐disclosed non‐GAAP metrics because it more accurately captures managers’ reporting choices.     

Anticompetitive Financial Contracting: The Design of Financial Claims

This paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product‐market channels. In existing models, a firm's choice of financial instruments deters entry by affecting product market behavior; here entry deterrence occurs by affecting the credit market behavior of investors towards entrant firms. We find that to deter entry, the claims held on incumbent firms should be sufficiently risky, that is, equity. This contrasts with the standard Brander and Lewis (1986) result that debt deters entry. This effect is more marked the less competitive the credit market is—so more credit market competition spurs more product market competition.     

Semiparametric estimation of multinomial discrete‐choice models using a subset of choices

Nonlogit maximum‐likelihood estimators are inconsistent when using data on a subset of the choices available to agents. I show that the semiparametric, multinomial maximum‐score estimator is consistent when using data on a subset of choices. No information is required for choices outside of the subset. The required conditions about the error terms are the same conditions as for using all the choices. Estimation can proceed under additional restrictions if agents have unobserved, random consideration sets. A solution exists for instrumenting endogenous continuous variables. Monte Carlo experiments show the estimator performs well using small subsets of choices.     

Assessing competition in hospital care markets: the importance of accounting for quality differentiation

Quality differentiation is especially important in the hospital industry, where the choices of Medicare patients are unaffected by prices. Unlike previous studies that use geographic market concentration to estimate hospital competitiveness, this article emphasizes the importance of quality differentiation in this spatially differentiated market. I estimate a random-coefficients discrete-choice model that predicts patient flow to different hospitals and find that demand responses to both distance and quality are substantial. The estimates suggest that patients do not substitute toward alternative hospitals in proportion to current market shares, implying that geographic market concentration is an inappropriate measure of hospital competitiveness.     

Consumer preferences and product and process R&D

Firms often conduct both product and process R&D. Consumer preferences typically play a vital role in determining these R&D choices. The economics literature, however, has mostly ignored the interrelationship between the R&D choices of firms and consumer preferences. Istudy product and process R&D from the perspective of their relationship with consumer preferences. In doing so, I find a novel distinction between the two kinds of R&D. This distinction can explain several empirical observations regarding firms' choices of the two, and can also potentially enable us to better empirically identify the two.     

Investment Externalities and a Corrective Subsidy

The paper proposes an intertemporal equilibrium model that highlights the interdependence between aggregate investment and the degree of product differentiation with free entry of monopolistic producers. An investment externality is identified that results in underaccumulation of capital in the decentralized market equilibrium. Some form of investment promotion is called for. The paper compares the effectiveness of a general investment tax credit and an ad valorem output subsidy with policies that favor smaller business size. It is also shown that the complementarity among individual investments creates a potentially powerful investment multiplier.     

The Allocational Effects of the Precision of Accounting Estimates

This paper studies the allocational effects associated with the precision of accounting estimates when the precision of estimates is a choice variable for firms. One part of the paper considers the effects of the observability of precision choices. We show that, generally, making precision choices private increases firms' equilibrium precision choices and also, as a by‐product, their equilibrium investment choices. We further show that, when firms' precision choices are private, there may be a “disclosure trap,” in which, unless investors conjecture the owner has chosen an estimate with the highest possible precision, the owner will respond to investors' conjecture by choosing an estimate whose precision is higher than investors' conjecture. In a multifirm version of the model with endogenous investment, we show that the equilibrium investment by the firm increases in the precision of the firm's own estimate and decreases in the precisions of other firms' estimates. Finally, we show that, in a setting where the firm's initial owner sells his stake in the firm over the course of two periods, with disclosures of estimates of the firm's value occurring prior to each sale of shares, if the precisions of the estimates are public, the equilibrium precisions of the estimates increase over time when the owner sells a sufficiently large fraction of the firm in the first period, and otherwise the equilibrium precisions of estimates remain constant over time.     

Information, Trading, and Product Market Interactions: Cross-sectional Implications of Informed Trading

I present a simple model of informed trading in which asset values are derived from imperfectly competitive product markets and private information events occur at individual firms. The model predicts that informed traders may have incentives to make information‐based trades in the stocks of competitors, especially when events occur at firms with large market shares. In the context of 759 earnings announcements, I use intraday transactions data to test the hypothesis that net order flow and returns in the stocks of nonannouncing competitors have information content for announcing firms.     

Individual and Aggregate Labor Supply with Coordinated Working Times

I analyze two extensions to the standard model of life‐cycle labor supply that feature operative choices along both the intensive and extensive margin. One assumes that individuals face continuous wage‐hours schedules, while the other assumes that all work must be coordinated across individuals. Though similar qualitatively, the two models have very different implications for aggregate labor supply responses to tax policy. In the first model, curvature in the individual utility from leisure function plays relatively little role, but in the second model, it is of first‐order importance. The second model also has important implications for what data are best able to provide evidence on the extent of curvature in the utility from leisure function.     

Competition and disclosure incentives: an empirical study of HMOs

I examine Health Maintenance Organizations' (HMOs) voluntary disclosure of product quality, which is not as complete as unraveling theories predict. After controlling for cost and demand factors, I find that HMOs use voluntary disclosure to differentiate from competitors, with lower disclosure rates in highly competitive markets. These findings are consistent with product differentiation, but challenge the intuition that competition should lead to more provision of quality information.     

Trade Credit and Industry Dynamics: Evidence from Trucking Firms

Long payment terms are a strong impediment to the entry and survival of liquidity‐constrained firms. To test this idea and its implications, I consider the effect of a reform restricting the trade credit supply of French trucking firms. In a difference‐in‐differences setting, I find that trucking firms' corporate default probability decreases by 25% following the restriction. The effect is persistent, concentrated among liquidity‐constrained firms, and not offset by a decrease in profits. The restriction also triggers an increase in the entry of small trucking firms.     

Contagion of accounting methods: evidence from stock option expensing

I examine how a firm’s accounting methods can be influenced by the choices of other firms, which I label contagion. I model accounting method choice as a combination of intrinsic propensities to adopt a method and contagion effects. I predict contagion of accounting methods occurs for two reasons: (1) adoption decisions of other firms are informative for the adoption decision, and (2) prior adoptions change the net benefits of the decision. I test these predictions in the stock option expensing setting where firms had the choice to use the intrinsic or fair value method. Using a firm-level diffusion model, I document evidence consistent with my predictions.