Adverse selection when loss severities differ: First-best and costly equilibria

With information asymmetry between contracting parties, adverse selection may result. A separation may be achieved if low-risk types can signal their identity—for example, by selecting from a menu of price-quantity contracts. In such models, signaling is costly and solutions are, at best, second best. These models characterize risk types by differences in the probability, rather than in severity, of the costs they impose. However, when severity differences also are considered, first best solutions become feasible. We identify the circumstances in which costly separating equilibria prevail and those in which full-information equilibria can be attained.     

Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem

This article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship‐specific investment and renegotiation. In such a setting, a contract plays an additional role that it does not have in the standard holdup model, namely that of transmitting information between the parties. The article shows that a partial‐disclosure contract may be optimal and describes the optimal contract. If the investment is cooperative and the information between the trading parties is asymmetric, the optimal contract generally cannot result in the first best, but dispensing with either of these assumptions makes the first‐best achievable.     

How much discretion for risk regulators?

We analyze the regulation of firms that undertake socially risky activities but can reduce the probability of an accident inflicted on third parties by carrying out non verifiable effort. Congress delegates regulation to an agency, although these two bodies may have different preferences toward the industry. The optimal level of discretion left to the agency results from the following trade‐off: the agency can tailor discretionary policies to its expert knowledge about potential harm, but it implements policies that are too “pro‐industry.” The agency should be given full discretion when the firm is solvent; partial discretion is preferred otherwise. We then investigate how this trade‐off changes as the political and economic landscapes are modified.     

The boundaries of firms as information barriers

When contracts are incomplete, the property‐rights theory of firms suggests that ownership of physical assets provides better outside options, which in turn strengthen the owner's incentives to invest in the enterprise. This approach is less suitable for human capital firms such as management consulting that lack physical assets. This article develops an alternative theory for integration that sheds light on the boundaries of human capital firms. In particular, when a relationship between parties includes large potential externalities, reducing the outside option of each party will be beneficial. Integration provides this reduction by blurring the contribution of individual parties within the firm, and thus lowering their independent market valuation. Unlike some results in the property‐rights literature, the results here are robust to variations in ex post bargaining solution.     

Gains from Mergers and Acquisitions Around the World: New Evidence

Using a global M&A data set, this paper provides evidence that the empirical observations relating public acquisitions to, at best, zero abnormal returns, and their stock-financed subset to negative abnormal returns for acquiring firms around the deal announcement are not unanimous across countries. Acquirers beyond the most competitive takeover markets (the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada) pay lower premia and realize gains, while share-for-share offers are at least non-value-destroying for their shareholders. In contrast, target shareholders within these markets gain significantly less, implying that the benefits generated are more evenly split between the involved parties.     

The economics of network neutrality

Under the current regime for Internet access, “network neutrality,” parties are billed only by the Internet service provider (ISP) through which they connect to the Internet; pricing is not contingent on the content being transmitted. Recently, ISPs have proposed that content and applications providers pay them additional fees for accessing the ISPs’ residential clients, as well as fees to prioritize certain content. We analyze the private and social implications of such fees when the network is congested and more traffic implies greater delays. We derive conditions under which network neutrality would be welfare superior to any feasible scheme for prioritizing service.     

The double liability rule

Conventional liability rules do not lead to a first best allocation. Optimal bilateral risk control can be achieved by not compensating any losses and, in addition, charging each party a fine equal to the loss suffered by the other party. In this way, each party internalizes the full accident loss. This paper investigates the properties of this “double liability” rule under risk neutrality and risk aversion of the parties. Finally the use of this rule in the context of multiple-party accidents is discussed.     

Five ways to keep disputes out of court

Even if you win, a lawsuit can be a disaster. Attorney fees eat up $20 billion a year in the United States alone, and that doesn't count the cost of diverting key personnel from productive work or of damaging profitable business relationships. But more and more managers are discovering that litigation can be avoided with inventive use of alternative dispute resolution, or ADR. All forms of ADR are designed to do two things: save time and money and soften the sharp edges of the adversarial system. In the majority of cases, disputants settle their differences quickly and to the satisfaction of both parties. In the best of cases, opponents resolve their disputes cooperatively and forge new ties. Arbitration, the oldest and most adversarial form of ADR, is now a compulsory prerequisite to litigation in about 20 states. Mediation, perhaps the most versatile and the least coercive, depends greatly on the skill and personality of the mediator. Other methods include the rent-a-judge program, summary jury trial, and minitrial, all of which simulate real litigation to one degree or another but with greater speed, more privacy, and less expense. (The last two have settled several bitter disputes in weeks-after years of litigation.) Variations and hybrids of ADR methods are limitless. In picking the ADR method best suited to your circumstances, factors to consider include: the extent to which both disputants are committed to ADR, the closeness of the business relationship between the two parties, the need for privacy, the urgency of reaching a settlement, the absolute and relative financial health of both parties, the importance of the principles involved, the complexity of the case, the size of the stakes, and the ability and willingness of company executives to get involved.     

Project selection and execution in teams

We use a mechanism‐design approach to study a team whose members select a joint project and exert individual efforts to execute it. Members have private information about the qualities of alternative projects. Information sharing is obstructed by a trade‐off between adaptation and motivation. We determine the conditions under which first‐best project and effort choices are implementable and show that these conditions can become relaxed as the team grows in size. We also characterize the second‐best mechanism and find that it may include a “motivational bias,” that is, a bias in favor of the team's initially preferred project, and higher‐than‐optimal effort by uninformed team members.     

Optimal Disbursement of a Sunk Resource and Decentralised Cost Allocation

We consider whether the allocation of the sunk cost of a central resource to operating divisions can be consistent with economically optimal resource consumption decisions. When it is recognised that the central resource is scarce, one may, in principle, defend the allocation of sunk cost, if it measures the opportunity cost of usage. However, typically it has been proposed that such allocations are, at best, a proxy for opportunity cost. Applying classical control theory techniques in a wide range of operating environments, we are able to identify cost allocations that exactly equal opportunity cost. Hence, for our model environment, we provide a rationale for sunk cost allocation in terms of guiding optimal decisions, in contrast to the traditional defence in terms of providing a proxy for opportunity cost. We demonstrate clearly how cost allocations are related to opportunity costs, and identify the circumstances under which the allocation of full costs or alternatively a fixed proportion (related to acquisition conditions) of costs, results in the implementation of economically optimal resource consumption decisions.     

Timing of Sale,Pricing, and Cost Information: Evidence from the Airline Industry*

This study examines the association between when an airline sells its passenger seats and the pricing method (marginal cost or full cost) it employs. Prior literature suggests that when firms are able to change prices during the selling period, the optimality of full cost pricing or marginal cost pricing depends on when demand information is revealed during the period between capacity commitment decisions and time of sale. Full cost‐based pricing is appropriate in determining capacity commitment and prices simultaneously, while marginal cost provides more relevant information for pricing when capacity has been committed. Using the price and cost data from a sample of four U.S. domestic airlines, we find that full cost explains price variations of first‐day sales robustly. The adjusted R² of the marginal cost pricing model is larger in the sample of sales two days prior to departure than in the sample of first‐day sales. In the analysis of the sample of sales two days prior to departure, we find that, based on the adjusted R² of the full cost pricing and marginal cost pricing models, the explanatory power of marginal cost pricing is relatively weaker than full cost pricing. Our results document the use of different cost information along the dynamic change of price and provide implications in understanding the role of cost information in setting prices.     

Thinking and Learning in the Tax Evasion Game

Equilibrium behaviour is one of the fundamental concepts of economics: that each player's strategy is a best response to their beliefs about other players' strategies (and that these beliefs are realised). It is therefore striking that one of the most utilised economic models of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) lacks this property as random audit selection is not a best response for the tax administration. The game theory literature of tax compliance has solved the equilibrium under assumptions of perfect information, full rationality and representative agents (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Erard and Feinstein, 1994). The recent application of behavioural economics to tax compliance (Hashimzade et al., 2014) allows richer assumptions such as heterogeneity and asymmetric information to be included in agent‐based models. This paper investigates the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy with heterogeneous taxpayers, imperfect information and evolutionary survival of taxpayers. It finds that, under these conditions, the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy is an adaptive learning approach and not a well‐defined audit function. This fits with actual practice of ‘predictive analytics’ by OECD tax administrations. Behavioural game theory also predicts that when actors are information rich, adaptive learning will dominate abstract thinking.     

The Relationship between Shareholder Return and CEO Pay over a CEO's Full Period of Service

The author reports the findings of his examination of the relationship between CEO pay and performance, as measured by shareholder returns, using measures of compensation and returns that span a CEO's full period of service. Unlike studies that look at annual measures of CEO pay and stock returns—which are distorted by the widespread use of options and the arbitrary effects of when CEOs choose to exercise their options—the author finds a statistically significant connection between total compensation and shareholder return measured over full periods of service for 521 S&P 500 CEOs. Indeed, after one adjusts for differences in the length of a CEO's service, shareholder return is arguably the most important determinant of variation in the amount paid CEOs over their complete tenures. Besides answering the legion of critics of CEO pay, the author's analysis refutes the claim that bull markets are the main force driving executive pay by demonstrating that the increases in career pay attributable to increases in shareholder returns are almost exactly offset by reductions in pay when the Value‐Weighted (S&P 500) Index increases by the same amount. In other words, CEOs’ cumulative career pay is effectively driven by the extent to which their stock returns outperform the broad market. The analysis also casts doubt on the popular claim that the link between CEO pay and corporate size provides incentives to undertake even value‐reducing acquisitions to boost size. As the author's analysis shows, the estimated losses in career CEO pay associated with even small declines in shareholder returns are likely to be offset by the pay increases attributable to size.     

Science and proven experience: a Swedish variety of evidence-based medicine and a way to better risk analysis?

A key question for evidence-based medicine (EBM) is how best to model the way in which EBM should ‘[integrate] individual clinical expertise and the best external evidence’. We argue that the formulations and models available in the literature today are modest variations on a common theme and face very similar problems when it comes to risk analysis, which is here understood as a decision procedure comprising a factual assessment of risk, the risk assessment, and the decision what to do based on this assessment, the risk management. Both the early and updated models of evidence-based clinical decisions presented in the writings of Haynes, Devereaux and Guyatt assume that EBM consists of, among other things, evidence from clinical research together with information about patients’ values and clinical expertise. On this A-view, EBM describes all that goes on in a specific justifiable medical decision. There is, however, an alternative interpretation of EBM, the B-view, in which EBM describes just one component of the decision situation (a component usually based on evidence from clinical research) and in which, together with other types of evidence, EBM leads to a justifiable clincial decision but does not describe the decision itself. This B-view is inspired by a 100-years older version of EBM, a Swedish standard requiring medical decision-making, professional risk-taking and practice to be in accordance with ‘science and proven experience’ (VBE). In the paper, we outline how the Swedish concept leads to an improved understanding of the way in which scientific evidence and clinical experience can and cannot be integrated in light of EBM. How scientific evidence and clinical experience is integrated influences both the way we do risk assessment and risk management. In addition, the paper sketches the as yet unexplored historical background to VBE and EBM.     

Stock Prices and the Secondary Dissemination of Information: The Wall Street Journal's "Insider Trading Spotlight"Column

In this paper we test whether a secondary dissemination of information affects stock prices. We examine stock price reactions to the publication of the “Insider Trading Spotlight”(ITS) column in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Since insider trades reported in the ITS column are initially disclosed to the public when insiders’ reports are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the information contained in the WSJ is a secondary dissemination. Around the WSJ publication day, we find significant abnormal stock performance accompanied by a significant increase in trading volume. Our evidence suggests that a secondary dissemination of information can affect stock prices if the initial public disclosure attracts only limited attention by the market. In addition, we document how insider trading information is conveyed to the market.     

Exclusive contracts foster relationship‐specific investment

Exclusive contracts prohibit one or both parties from trading with anyone else. Contrary to earlier findings, we show that investments that are specific to the contracting parties may be encouraged by exclusivity. Results depend on the nature of investments and the bargaining solution. The major part of the analysis shows that exclusivity deals designed to “assure” the supply of essential inputs promote investment. Infinite penalties for breach, even if ex post renegotiable, may result in excessive investment, in which case a positive but finite damage payment yields the first‐best outcome.     

Leverage,executive incentives and corporate governance

This paper analyses the effect of executive incentives and internal governance on capital structure. Using a large sample of non‐financial US‐listed firms over the period 1999–2005, it is found that managers have different attitudes towards leverage when offered different incentive schemes; leverage initially decreases in bonuses and stock incentives and then increases in these incentives after a certain incentive level, suggesting the existence of the entrenchment–alignment effects under these incentive schemes. In contrast, leverage initially increases in option incentives and then decreases after a certain option incentive level. When all of these incentive schemes are combined together into a single incentive package, the entrenchment–alignment effects prevail. It is also found that leverage increases in internal governance and managers behave differently under different governance regimes such that the entrenchment–alignment effects prevail under weak governance firms, whereas the alignment–entrenchment effects prevail under strong governance firms. The results also suggest that managers’ target leverage ratio is less than the one predicted by theory or preferred by firm shareholders.     

Higher education and firms: on the interaction between research and regional policies

In the European Union, a series of competencies are shared between a central agency called the European Commission, and the governments of the Member States. This paper focuses on two of those policies: research and regional development. Here, we model and discuss how the level of commitment of a central authority toward poor regions affects the design of the best decision-making process. We explore cases of full centralization and full decentralization, and situations where the two levels of government are allowed to take decisions, either simultaneously or sequentially. In the latter case, we make a distinction between a situation where the central agency decides first as in most federations, and one in which it decides second, then being an agent of national governments. This setting is especially relevant for the European Union. We show, in particular, that when the degree of commitment of the center is high, assignment of redistributive competencies to both levels of power is a proxy for centralization. Additionally, the poorer region may find its best interest in an institutional design where the regions decide first.     

证券市场均衡理论及其对我国市场的启示

证券市场均衡理论说明证券市场是在以市场制度为依托,市场机制充分发挥作用,经济当事人具有贝叶斯理性并能无障碍获得市场信息条件下,才能实现的均衡状态。我国证券市场是在计划经济向市场经济转轨中形成的,政府主导制度供给、干预证券市场运行。一方面政府行为直接推动了证券市场的发展,有利于证券市场服务于改革,服务于政策目标的实现;另一方面,由于政府行为也蕴含了与市场机制不相溶的因素,妨碍了证券市场功能的发挥。