Asymmetric information in health insurance: evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey.

Adverse selection is perceived to be a major source of market failure in insurance markets. There is little empirical evidence on the extent of the problem. We estimate a structural model of health insurance and health care choices using data on single individuals from the NMES. A robust prediction of adverse-selection models is that riskier types buy more coverage and, on average, end up using more care. We test for unobservables linking health insurance status and health care consumption. We find no evidence of informational asymmetries.     

Asymmetric information in securitization: An empirical assessment

Asymmetric information in securitization deals is analyzed based on a unique dataset comprising a million mortgages, both securitized and not, and using a methodology, previously applied to insurance data, that looks at the correlation between risk transfer and default probability. The main finding is that, for given observable characteristics, securitized mortgages have a lower default probability than non-securitized ones. We show that this finding is consistent with banks caring about their reputation for not selling lemons.     

Competition in the general insurance industry

Using a large sample of cross-sectional data for 1998 of companies operating in the general insurance industry we attempt to shed some light on the issue of competition in this industry. Companies offering products and services in the general insurance market are believed to trade under very competitive conditions. In order to test this widely-held claim we investigate whether firms’ pricing policies reflect competitive or monopolistic market features. Under competitive conditions companies are forced to pass on any increase in costs in prices and thus their revenues will rise pari passu should wages, underwriting costs or other expenses are increasing. By contrast, a firm operating under monopolistic competition responds to an increase in marginal and average costs by increasing price and reducing output, resulting in a less then complete pass-through in revenue; profit falls. Our study is the first, to our knowledge, to apply this research methodology to the general (casuality/liability) insurance industry. Firms in this industry generate revenue through underwriting of insurance risks and from investing their assets. As underwriting and capital markets are in general segmented (catastrophe bonds apart), our empirical approach is based on the insurance and portfolio behaviour of firms and not on an integrated view of both. Previous investigations of this kind have focussed on the banking industry. Contrary to widely held views we find that competition is less than perfect.     

Asymmetric information and options

In an extension of the Kyle (1985) model of continuous insidertrading, it is shown that asymmetric information can make itimpossible to price options by arbitrage. Even when an optionwould appear to be redundant, its introduction into the marketcan cause the volatility of the underlying asset to become stochastic.This eliminates the potential for dynamically replicating theoption. The change in the price process of the asset reflectsa change in the information transmitted by volume and priceswhen the option is traded.     

Perspectives on changing times: implications for insurance medicine

Profound changes are occurring in medicine. These changes are in both medicine itself and also in the economic and social context. The driving forces for change include health care reform, sophisticated consumers, new technology, information explosion and ethics of controlling human biology.     

Abdominal aortic aneurysm repair--life insurance implications

Aortic aneurysms can be managed surgically using an open graft replacement approach, or the less invasive approach, endovascular repair. The endovascular devices and patient selection methodology have evolved over the past decade. Intuitively, it would appear that the open approach affords a better long-term survival in low operative-risk individuals, but some current studies suggest otherwise. Until there are more long-term (20+ year) mortality studies that compare the open approach with the endovascular repair approach, we will not know with certainty how their survival outcomes compare.     

Asymmetric information and liquidity constraints: A new test

Using a novel measure of the degree of information asymmetry across firms, this study shows that information-related financial market imperfections do matter for a firm’s access to external finance. Prior studies of the importance of liquidity constraints faced by nonfinancial firms have suffered from a glaring weakness. They have been based on a sample of publicly traded firms, omitting precisely those firms most likely to be liquidity constrained. Furthermore, they have tended to rely on indirect measures of the degree of information asymmetry, such as firm size. We overcome these limitations by focusing on the banking sector. Unlike the nonfinancial sector, the banking sector has balance sheet and income data available for all firms, whether or not they are publicly traded. This allows the use of a superior measure of the degree of information asymmetry across firms by distinguishing between publicly traded and non-publicly traded banks.     

保险企业信息系统的数据标准化

近年来,中国保险业发展极为迅速,各个保险企业的后台信息系统支持平台也在不断增多并完善。由于缺乏统一的数据标准,信息孤岛在不断增加,各个系统都在用不同的数据结构去描述基本相同的数据。由于数据定义不同,对问题分析造成了较大的困难,从而加大了保险企业信息系统的运维成本。对于信息系统的建设而言,数据管理和数据标准化都是基础性的工作,没有卓有成效的数据管理,     

A general equilibrium model of portfolio insurance

This article examines the effects of portfolio insurance onmarket and asset price dynamics in a general equilibrium continuous-timemodel. Portfolio insurers are modeled as expected utility maximizingagents. Martingale methods are employed in solving the individualagents' dynamic consumption-portfolio problems. Comparisonsare made between the optimal consumption processes, optimallyinvested wealth and portfolio strategies of the portfolio insurersand 'normal agents'. At a general equilibrium level, comparisonsacross economies reveal that the market volatility and riskpremium are decreased, and the asset and market price levelsincreased, by the presence of portfolio insurance.     

Micro-level stochastic loss reserving for general insurance

The vast literature on stochastic loss reserving concentrates on data aggregated in run-off triangles. However, a triangle is a summary of an underlying data-set with the development of individual claims. We refer to this data-set as ‘micro-level’ data. Using the framework of Position Dependent Marked Poisson Processes) and statistical tools for recurrent events, a data-set is analyzed with liability claims from a European insurance company. We use detailed information of the time of occurrence of the claim, the delay between occurrence and reporting to the insurance company, the occurrences of payments and their sizes, and the final settlement. Our specifications are (semi)parametric and our approach is likelihood based. We calibrate our model to historical data and use it to project the future development of open claims. An out-of-sample prediction exercise shows that we obtain detailed and valuable reserve calculations. For the case study developed in this paper, the micro-level model outperforms the results obtained with traditional loss reserving methods for aggregate data.     

Life insurance in a contingent claim framework: Pricing and regulatory implications

In this paper we develop a contingent claim model to evaluate the equity and liabilities of a life insurance company. The limited liability of shareholders is explicitly modelled. We focus on a specific type of life insurance policy—namely, the profit-sharing policy. In this policy, the policyholder is entitled to a guaranteed interest rate and a percentage of the company's yearly financial revenues. The implicit equilibrium interest rate and profit-sharing ratio are derived and analyzed. We finally discuss regulatory measures frequently encountered in the life insurance business such as rate ceilings, capital ratios, and asset restrictions.     

Asymmetric information and portfolio performance measurement

This note argues that though Dave Mayers and Edward Rice were able to show that the CAPM could be used to detect superior investors in a world of asymmetric information, their demonstration does not resurrect the CAPM as a practical tool for performance measurement. To employ the Mayers-Rice model, an investment advisor would first have to determine that the CAPM holds for uninformed investors. As a means of avoiding the problem of testing the CAPM, a performance measure based only on returns is outlined. The measure is robust in that it would correctly designate superior investors in context of the CAPM, the arbitrage pricing model and many other equilibrium models of security pricing.     

Asymmetric information and target firm returns

This article examines the relationship between asymmetric information and target firm returns in mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We argue that if managers possess favourable (unfavourable) asymmetric information, they will offer, ceteris paribus, a high (low) premium, affecting target firm returns accordingly. We propose several proxies of asymmetric information. The empirical evidence strongly supports our hypothesis as we find that target firm returns are significantly negatively related to asymmetric information regarding synergy gains. Our results are robust after controlling for several target and deal characteristics.     

Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads

This paper estimates the cost arising from information asymmetry between the lead bank and members of the lending syndicate. In a lending syndicate, the lead bank retains only a fraction of the loan but acts as the intermediary between the borrower and the syndicate participants. Theory predicts that asymmetric information will cause participants to demand a higher interest rate and that a large loan ownership by the lead bank should reduce this effect. In equilibrium, however, the asymmetric information premium demanded by participants is offset by the diversification premium demanded by the lead. Using shifts in the idiosyncratic credit risk of the lead bank's loan portfolio as an instrument, I measure the asymmetric information effect of the lead's share on the loan spread and find that it accounts for approximately 4% of the total cost of credit.     

Economies of scale in financial institutions: A general model applied to insurance

This study describes and applies an alternative methodology for measuring economies of scale in financial institutions. A complete model of a profit maximizing financial intermediary is constructed which yields a set of first-order conditions. These together with linear specifications of appropriate revenue and cost functions permit a two-stage estimation of cost and revenue parameters.Application of the model is illustrated by using data from the Canadian general insurance industry. Estimated cost functions suggest (1) that joint stock insurance firms realize no economies of scale from expansion of activity in any one line of insurance but realize diversification economies from writing the same aggregate dollar premiums over appreciably more lines; (2) that mutual companies enjoy direct economies of scale from a simultaneous expansion of insurance lines and, possibly, some diversification economies. Diversification economies may or may not yield special advantages to large firms depending on the competitive state of the reinsurance market.     

Adverse selection and moral hazard: Quantitative implications for unemployment insurance

A model of optimal unemployment insurance with adverse selection and moral hazard is constructed. The model generates both qualitative and quantitative implications for the optimal provision of unemployment insurance. Qualitatively, for some agents, incentives in the optimal contract imply consumption increases over the duration of non-employment. Calibrating the model to a stylized version of the U.S. economy quantitatively illustrates these theoretical predictions. The optimal contract achieves a welfare gain of 1.94% relative to the current U.S. system, an additional 0.87% of gains relative to a planner who ignores adverse selection and focuses only on moral hazard.     

Life insurance companies as investment managers: New implications for consumers

This paper examines the attractiveness of the equity portfolios of life insurance companies as an alternative investment to mutual funds. In particular, this study analyzes the risk-adjusted investment performance of the stock portfolios of life insurance companies, attributable to their stock selection and market timing abilities. Using conventional measures of risk-adjusted portfolio performance, we find that life insurance companies exhibit performance similar to mutual funds. The evidence suggests that the life insurance companies, like their mutual fund counterparts, fail to exhibit differential stock selection or market timing abilities that are statistically significant. While the risk-adjusted investment performance of the two investment vehicles is similar, the variable annuity contracts of life insurance companies may offer an edge over mutual funds due to their ability to defer taxes.     

Optimal insurance with background risk: An analysis of general dependence structures

Finance and Stochastics - In this paper, we consider an optimal insurance problem from the perspective of a risk-averse individual who faces an insurable risk as well as some background risk and...     

Asymmetric information and price competition in small business lending

This paper examines the relationship between bank lending rates and their cost of funds in New Zealand. Our results show that on average mortgage rates respond more quickly to changes in the cost of funds than base business lending rates. We also find an asymmetry in the initial (short-run) response of banks to changes in funding costs; in particular, our results show banks adjust mortgage rates downwards faster than upwards. The speed to which lending rates revert back to their equilibrium relationship with funding costs varies across the lending markets. We find the adjustment speed is faster when mortgage rates are below equilibrium, whereas it is slower when business lending rates are above long-run levels in relation to funding costs. Our analysis suggests that banks prefer the plain-vanilla type of lending such as mortgages in comparison to small business lending consistent with asymmetric information associated with business loans.