The Link between Earnings Conservatism and the Price‐to‐Book Ratio*

We hypothesize and find that (1) earnings conservatism, the tendency of firms to recognize bad news in earnings on a more timely basis than good news, is substantially greater in portfolios of firms with lower price‐to‐book ratios than in portfolios of firms with higher price‐to‐book ratios; and (2) the negative association between earnings conservatism and the price‐to‐book ratio stems primarily from the accrual component of earnings, not the operating cash flow component of earnings. Our results suggest that studies using earnings‐returns associations to investigate cross‐sectional or time‐series differences in earnings conservatism risk drawing erroneous inferences unless the research designs control for cross‐sectional or time‐series variation in price‐to‐book ratios.     

The Circumstances and Legal Consequences of Non‐GAAP Reporting: Evidence from Restatements*

Our study examines the circumstances of non‐GAAP financial reporting by 492 U.S. companies that announced restatements from 1995 to 1999. We focus on income statements to analyze the occurrence and resolution of litigation over restatements and explore the role of accounting items in bringing and resolving this litigation. We provide evidence on the pervasiveness of accounting misstatements, describe their nature, and show how, if at all, they affect litigation. We assess the nature of restatements by determining whether regular, recurring earnings from primary operations (core) or other components of earnings (noncore) are misstated, and we assess their pervasiveness by estimating the number of primary accounts misstated. In our sample, companies with core restatements have higher frequencies of intentional misstatements (fraud) and subsequent bankruptcy or delisting. Likewise, these companies have, on average, more material misstatements, more negative security price reactions to restatement announcements, and more negative security price changes over the six months preceding and following restatement announcements. However, controlling for these and other factors, we find a significant association between accounting items and litigation, whether occurrences or resolutions. Specifically, core restatements — driven primarily by misstatements of revenue, a component of core earnings — and more pervasive restatements each play a role, while misstatements of noncore earnings alone do not.     

JIT Adoption: The Effects of LIFO Reserves and Financial Reporting and Tax Incentives*

Using matched samples of JIT adopters and nonadopters, we examine the association of JIT adoption with firms' financial reporting and tax incentives, earnings‐management histories, and LIFO reserve levels. We find evidence that adoption decisions are influenced by the interaction of firms' LIFO reserves with their income smoothing, debt covenant, and tax incentives. We also find that adoption is less likely for firms historically engaging in high degrees of earnings management, particularly when such firms have no substantial LIFO reserves. Our study extends earlier research demonstrating a relation between inventory valuation method and year‐end inventory transactions, and documents a relation between earnings‐management incentives and a fundamental supply‐chain design choice.     

Managing Stock Option Expense: The Manipulation of Option‐Pricing Model Assumptions*

This paper examines whether firms that voluntarily recognize stock option expense in their financial statements manage that expense downward more than firms that do not recognize the expense by adjusting option‐pricing model assumptions. To examine this issue, I collect option‐pricing model assumptions from fiscal year 2002 for both a sample of firms that voluntarily recognize stock option expense (“recognizing firms”) and a sample of control firms that do not (“disclosing firms”). The empirical results suggest that recognizing firms manage the recognized stock‐based compensation expense reported in their financial statements downward more than do firms that only disclose the expense. Additional analyses reveal that recognizing firms assume a lower level of volatility than disclosing firms in the option‐pricing model calculations; however, I find no evidence that recognizing firms manage the dividend yield and risk‐free interest rate assumptions more than disclosing firms. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recently issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123(R), which requires the expensing of the fair value of stock options, so these results may be of interest to capital‐market participants and the FASB as they assess the reliability of stock option expense as determined by option‐pricing models.     

The Walk‐down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives*

It has been alleged that firms and analysts engage in an "earnings‐guidance game" where analysts first issue optimistic earnings forecasts and then "walk down" their estimates to a level that firms can beat at the official earnings announcement. We examine whether the walk‐down to beatable targets is associated with managerial incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (through new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (through option exercises and stock sales). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the walk‐down to beatable targets is most pronounced when firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on the impact of capital‐market incentives on communications between managers and analysts.     

The Declining Value‐relevance of Accounting Information and Non‐Information‐based Trading: An Empirical Analysis*

Recently, a growing body of literature has suggested that financial statements have lost their value‐relevance because of a shift from a traditional capital‐intensive economy to a high‐technology, service‐oriented economy. These conclusions are based on studies that find a temporal decline in the association between stock prices and accounting information (earnings and book values). This paper empirically tests a theoretical prediction arising from the noisy rational expectations equilibrium model that suggests that the decline could be driven by non‐information‐based (NIB) trading activity, because such trading reduces the ability of stock prices to reflect accounting information. Specifically, Dontoh, Radhakrishnan, and Ronen (2004) show that when NIB trading increases, the R²s of a regression of stock price on accounting information declines. Our empirical tests confirm this prediction; that is, the decline in the association between stock prices and accounting information as measured by R²s is driven by an increase in NIB trading.     

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 and Capital‐Market Behavior: Early Evidence*

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act”) was enacted in response to numerous corporate and accounting scandals. It aims to reinforce corporate accountability and professional responsibility in order to restore investor confidence in corporate America. This study examines the capital‐market reaction to the Act and finds a positive (negative) abnormal return at the time of several legislative events that increased (decreased) the likelihood of the passage of the Act. We interpret this finding as evidence supporting the notion that the Act is wealth‐increasing in the sense that its induced benefits significantly outweigh its imposed compliance costs. We also find that the market reaction is more positive for firms that are more compliant with the provisions of the Act prior to its enactment.