Horizon‐Dependent Underreaction in Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

This paper provides empirical evidence that underreaction in financial analysts' earnings forecasts increases with the forecast horizon, and offers a rational economic explanation for this result. The empirical portion of the paper evaluates analysts' responses to earnings‐surprise and other earnings‐related information. Our empirical evidence suggests that analysts' earnings forecasts underreact to both types of information, and the underreaction increases with the forecast horizon. The paper also develops a theoretical model that explains this horizon‐dependent analyst underreaction as a rational response to an asymmetric loss function. The model assumes that, for a given level of inaccuracy, analysts' reputations suffer more (less) when subsequent information causes a revision in investor expectations in the opposite (same) direction as the analyst's prior earnings‐forecast revision. Given this asymmetric loss function, underreaction increases with the risk of subsequent disconfirming information and with the disproportionate cost associated with revision reversal. Assuming that market frictions prevent prices from immediately unraveling these analyst underreac‐tion tactics, investors buying (selling) stock on the basis of analysts' positive (negative) earnings‐forecast revisions also benefit from analyst underreaction. Therefore, the asymmetric cost of forecast inaccuracy could arise from rational investor incentives consistent with a preference for analyst underreaction. Our incentives‐based explanation for underreaction provides an alternative to psychology‐based explanations and suggests avenues for further research.     

Intra‐Industry Information Transfers and the Post‐Earnings Announcement Drift

This study examines the role of intra‐industry information transfers in the analyst forecast‐based post‐earnings announcement drift. I find that subsequent same‐industry‐peer earnings announcements influence a firm's post‐earnings announcement drift if these subsequent announcements confirm the firm's initial earnings surprise and the firm's industry exhibits ex ante positive (common effect) intra‐industry information transfers. The results suggest that underreaction to industry‐specific information contributes to analyst forecast‐based post‐earnings announcement drift.     

International Diversification,SFAS 131 and Post‐Earnings‐Announcement Drift

Using 1990 through 2013 data of U.S. firms with foreign operations, we show that (i) the serial correlation of analyst forecast errors increases in the extent of international diversification, (ii) post‐earnings‐announcement drift (PEAD) based on analyst forecast errors increases in the extent of international diversification, and (iii) the impact of international diversification on the serial correlation of analyst forecast errors and its associated drift is significantly reduced after the implementation of SFAS 131 on segment disclosures. When we replicate our tests using seasonally differenced earnings, we fail to observe similar patterns. Overall, our results suggest that investors’ underreaction to announced earnings is a likely explanation for PEAD. Our findings also indicate that disclosures required under SFAS 131 are useful to analysts in forming efficient earnings expectations, thereby helping capital market participants in the pricing of internationally diversified firms’ earnings.     

The Timeliness of the Bond Market Reaction to Bad Earnings News

We find that bond price quotes impound bad earnings news on a more timely basis than good earnings news and that the bond market impounds bad news on a more timely basis than the stock market. We also find that the timeliness of the bond market reaction to bad news is concentrated primarily among speculative‐grade bonds, consistent with earnings news having a larger effect on bond price quotes when default risk is high. In addition, we find that a portion of the bad news impounded by the bond market reverses following the earnings announcement. Overall, our findings are consistent with bondholders’ asymmetric payoff function having important implications for the valuation role of accounting information in the bond market. Specifically, our findings indicate that bond quotes impound bad earnings news much earlier in the pre‐earnings announcement period than stock prices. In addition, bondholders appear to overreact to the bad earnings news initially and correct this overreaction subsequent to the earnings announcement.     

Analyst Following and Market Liquidity*

This paper investigates the relation between analyst characteristics (number of analysts following a firm and their forecast dispersion) and market liquidity characteristics (bid‐ask spreads and depths and the adverse‐selection component of the spread). Prior research has found contradictory results on the relation between analyst following and market liquidity and has offered differing theories on how analysts affect liquidity. While prior research has posited analysts as proxies for privately informed trade or as signals of information asymmetry, I hypothesize that analysts provide public information, implying that analyst following (forecast dispersion) should have a positive (negative) association with liquidity. Cross‐sectional simultaneous estimations provide support for this hypothesis. The results are both statistically significant and economically important. Granger causality tests indicate that analyst characteristics lead market liquidity characteristics. These results clarify the role of analysts in providing information to financial markets and highlight benefits of increased analyst following.     

An Empirical Examination of the Divergence between Managers’ and Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts

We study circumstances when analysts’ forecasts diverge from managers’ forecasts after management guidance, and the consequences of this divergence for investors and analysts. Our results show that investors’ return response to earnings surprises based on analyst forecasts is significantly weaker when analyst and management forecasts diverge, and that this attenuating effect is stronger when the management forecast is more credible. When the divergent management forecast is more accurate than the analyst consensus forecast, the subsequent‐quarter analyst consensus forecast is significantly more accurate than that of the current quarter, and exhibits less serial correlation. Overall, our findings suggest that, when analyst and management forecasts diverge, investors find the two sources to contain complementary information, and analysts learn to improve their subsequent forecasts.     

The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings: An Event‐Based Approach*

We test the asymmetric timeliness hypothesis by using information in extreme events as a measure of good/bad news. Our focus on extreme events is motivated by two arguments. First, the accounting concept of materiality in conjunction with litigation risk influences managers and auditors to make more conservative choices with respect to material events. Second, focusing on extreme shocks minimizes the probability that accounting slack may obscure the effect of asymmetric timeliness (Beaver and Ryan 2005). We identify individual events using short‐window extreme returns, since long‐window returns would aggregate the effect of multiple events and thus limit our ability to detect the asymmetry. Taken together, these features of our research design provide a more powerful test of asymmetric timeliness. Consistent with prior studies, we document that the correlation between bad news and concurrent earnings is significantly higher than that between good news and concurrent earnings. Our analysis of extreme events also enables us to document higher correlation of good news with earnings two or more quarters ahead. This is in contrast to prior studies that were unable to document asymmetry in the relation between returns and subsequent earnings in the opposite direction to that between returns and concurrent earnings. Our paper contributes to the growing literature on conservatism by modifying the Basu methodology to enhance the power of the test of asymmetric timeliness.     

Short Sellers and Long-Run Management Forecasts

We examine how short sellers affect long-run management forecasts using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO) that relaxes short-selling constraints on a group of randomly selected firms (referred to as pilot firms). We find that compared to other firms, the pilot firms issue more long-run good news forecasts but do not change the frequency of long-run bad news forecasts. The increase in good news forecasts is greater when the pilot firms have higher-quality forecasts, greater uncertainty about firm value, or higher manager equity incentives. Overall, these results and the results of additional analyses indicate that the reduction in short-selling constraints and the increase in short-selling threat induce managers to enhance disclosures through more long-run good news forecasts to discourage short sellers.     

Measuring News in Management Range Forecasts

Management earnings forecasts expressed as a range have become the most common form of quantitative management guidance. Traditionally, the proxy for the sign and the magnitude of the information conveyed by these forecasts—the forecast news—is calculated as the difference between a pre-forecast earnings expectation and the midpoint of the forecasted range. We provide strong evidence that this traditional measure understates the amount of information conveyed by range forecasts. More importantly, we demonstrate that information conveyed by the upper and lower bounds of the forecasts can be used to improve the classification of forecasts as conveying good or bad news and for calculating the magnitude of that news. We rely on these findings to suggest alternative methods of classifying management range forecasts as conveying good versus bad news and to refine the calculation of forecast news to include the broader information set. Our analysis also suggests that the information conveyed by the range when the forecasts are bundled (issued concurrent with an earnings announcement) is significantly different than when forecasts are not bundled. Overall, our study documents the importance of incorporating range-related information when assessing the sign and the magnitude of the information conveyed by management range forecasts.     

The Voluntary Inclusion of Forecasts in the MD&A Section of Annual Reports*

Abstract. In this study, we appeal to theories advanced by Darrough and Stoughton (1990) to enhance our understanding of why some firms may voluntarily include directional forecasts in their annual reports while others do not. The data are consistent with their predictions that a firm's disclosure policy reflects its concern for both financial market valuation and product market competition. We find that for “good news firms, the probability of forecasting is increasing in the financing requirements but decreasing in the threat of competitor entry. The converse holds for “bad news” firms. These results lend further empirical support to the observation that the familiar good news hypothesis tested in the management earnings forecast literature offers only a partial explanation for the decision to forecast. Interestingly, however, even after controlling for financial and product market considerations, an overall voluntary disclosure bias still exists in the data. The data also provide support for the OSC's concern about a voluntary disclosure bias. Only 17.5 percent of our sample forecasts represent revisions downward relative to the previous year's results. However, in contrast to the OSC's concern about a general lack of forward-looking disclosures in annual reports, 35.9 percent of our sample firms include directional forecasts in their MD&A or elsewhere in the annual report.     

Option Trading,Price Discovery,and Earnings News Dissemination*

Abstract. Option market activity increases by more than 10 percent in the four days before quarterly earnings announcements. We show that the direction of this preannouncement trading foreshadows subsequent earnings news. Specifically, we find option traders initiate a greater proportion of long (short) positions immediately before “good” (“bad”) earnings news. Midquote returns to active-side option trades are positive during nonannouncement periods and are significantly higher immediately prior to earnings announcements. Bid-ask spreads for options widen during the announcement period, but traders do not gravitate toward high delta contracts. Collectively, the evidence shows option traders participate generally in price discovery (the incorporation of private information in price), and more specifically in the dissemination of earnings news.     

Does Mandatory IFRS Adoption Improve the Information Environment?*

More than 120 countries require or permit the use of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by publicly listed companies on the basis of higher information quality and accounting comparability from IFRS application. However, the empirical evidence about these presumed benefits is often conflicting and fails to distinguish between information quality and comparability. In this paper we examine the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on firms’ information environment. We find that after mandatory IFRS adoption consensus forecast errors decrease for firms that mandatorily adopt IFRS relative to forecast errors of other firms. We also find decreasing forecast errors for voluntary adopters, but this effect is smaller and not robust. Moreover, we show that the magnitude of the forecast error decrease is associated with the firm‐specific differences between local GAAP and IFRS. This finding suggests that it is IFRS adoption rather than a correlated unobservable factor that is causing forecast errors to decrease. Exploiting individual analyst level data and isolating settings where analysts would benefit more from either increased comparability or higher quality information, we document that the improvement in the information environment is driven both by information and comparability effects. These results suggest that mandatory IFRS adoption has improved the quality of information intermediation in capital markets, and as a result firms’ information environment, by increasing both information quality and accounting comparability.     

Accounting Comparability and Economic Outcomes of Mandatory IFRS Adoption

This study examines the associations between four economic outcomes of the 2005 mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and concurrent changes in two important accounting constructs, accounting comparability and reporting quality. My primary purpose is to evaluate the relative importance of cross‐country accounting comparability and firm‐specific reporting quality in explaining previously documented increases in Tobin's Q, stock liquidity, analyst forecast accuracy, and analyst forecast agreement following IFRS adoption. Given that improvements in both comparability and reporting quality are primary stated objectives of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), it is important to understand their relative roles in shaping the information environment of financial statement users following IFRS adoption. Using 1,861 first‐time adopters in 23 countries, I find that firms with a larger improvement in comparability have larger increases in Q, liquidity, forecast accuracy, and forecast agreement following adoption, relative to other adopters. In contrast, improvements in reporting quality around adoption appear to have only a second‐order effect that is generally limited to Q effects among those adopters with concurrent improvements in comparability. These results are robust to alternative design and variable specifications. Finally, I continue to find these results for samples restricted to countries with weaker pre‐adoption institutional environments and countries that did not initiate proactive financial statement reviews, indicating that strong institutions and regulatory improvements are not driving the results. Overall, my results suggest that improvements in cross‐country accounting comparability played an important role in the previously documented economic benefits that accrued to 2005 mandatory IFRS adopters.     

Did Houston Clients of Arthur Andersen Recognize Publicly Available Bad News in a Timely Fashion?*

Despite the allegations of audit failure and the enormous publicity surrounding Arthur Andersen's indictment, there is no systematic empirical evidence on characteristics of accounting information of clients of Arthur Andersen vis‐à‐vis other Big 6 auditors. I examine whether earnings of Andersen's Houston‐based clients are timely in reporting bad news about future cash flows. I find that relative to a control group consisting of Houston‐based clients audited by other Big 6 auditors, earnings of Andersen clients are less timely in reporting bad news. Further, it appears that operating accruals of Andersen clients are less effective in accelerating the timely recognition of bad news than operating accruals of non‐Andersen clients. The findings suggest that the clients of Andersen's Houston office engaged in aggressive accounting practices, including delayed recognition of publicly available bad news.     

The Consequences of Audit‐Related Earnings Revisions

In this study, we investigate the consequences that auditors and their clients face when earnings announced in an unaudited earnings release are subsequently revised, presumably as a result of year‐end audit procedures, so that earnings as reported in the 10‐K differ from earnings as previously announced. Specifically, we examine whether the likelihood of an auditor “losing the client” is greater following such revisions, and whether the likelihood of dismissal is influenced by revisions that more negatively impact earnings, that cause the client to miss important earnings benchmarks, by greater local auditor competition, or by auditor characteristics. We also examine audit pricing subsequent to audit‐related earnings revisions for evidence of pricing concessions to retain the client. Finally, we examine whether client executives experience a greater likelihood of turnover following an audit‐related earnings revision. Consistent with expectations, we find that auditor dismissals are more likely following audit‐related earnings revisions. We also find that dismissals are more likely when revisions cause clients to miss important benchmarks and when there is greater local auditor competition. Among nondismissing clients, we find that future audit fees are lower when the effect of the revision on earnings is more negative, consistent with auditors offering price concessions to retain clients when revisions are more displeasing. We also find a greater likelihood of future chief financial officer (CFO) turnover as the effect of the revision worsens. Our findings offer important insights into the consequences that auditors face when balancing their responsibility for high audit quality and client satisfaction, as well as into the consequences that CFOs face when releasing inflated but not fully audited earnings.     

To Guide or Not to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance

In recent years, quarterly earnings guidance has been harshly criticized for inducing “managerial short‐termism” and other ills. Managers are, therefore, urged by influential institutions to cease guidance. We examine empirically the causes of such guidance cessation and find that poor operating performance — decreased earnings, missing analyst forecasts, and lower anticipated profitability — is the major reason firms stop quarterly guidance. After guidance cessation, we do not find an appreciable increase in long‐term investment once managers free themselves from investors’ myopia. Contrary to the claim that firms would provide more alternative, forward‐looking disclosures in lieu of the guidance, we find that such disclosures are curtailed. We also find a deterioration in the information environment of guidance stoppers in the form of increased analyst forecast errors and forecast dispersion and a decrease in analyst coverage. Taken together, our evidence indicates that guidance stoppers are primarily troubled firms and stopping guidance does not benefit either the stoppers or their investors.     

Determinants of Managerial Earnings Guidance Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure and Bias in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”), some management privately guided analyst earnings estimates, often through detailed reviews of analysts' earnings models. In this paper I use proprietary survey data from the National Investor Relations Institute to identify firms that reviewed analysts' earnings models prior to Reg FD and those that did not. Under the maintained assumption that firms conducting reviews guided analysts' earnings forecasts, I document firm characteristics associated with the decision to provide private earnings guidance. Then I document the characteristics of “guided” versus “unguided” analyst earnings forecasts. Findings demonstrate an association between several firm characteristics and guidance practices: managers are more likely to review analyst earnings models when the firm's stock is highly followed by analysts and largely held by institutions, when the firm's market‐to‐book ratio is high, and its earnings are important to valuation but hard to predict because its business is complex. A comparison of guided and unguided quarterly forecasts indicates that guided analyst estimates are more accurate, but also more frequently pessimistic. An examination of analysts' annual earnings forecasts over the fiscal year does not distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms; both experience a “walk‐down” in annual estimates. To distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms, one must examine quarterly earnings news: unguided analysts walk down their annual estimates when the majority of the quarterly earnings news is negative; guided analysts walk down their annual estimates even though the majority of the quarterly earnings news is positive.     

The Link between Earnings Conservatism and the Price‐to‐Book Ratio*

We hypothesize and find that (1) earnings conservatism, the tendency of firms to recognize bad news in earnings on a more timely basis than good news, is substantially greater in portfolios of firms with lower price‐to‐book ratios than in portfolios of firms with higher price‐to‐book ratios; and (2) the negative association between earnings conservatism and the price‐to‐book ratio stems primarily from the accrual component of earnings, not the operating cash flow component of earnings. Our results suggest that studies using earnings‐returns associations to investigate cross‐sectional or time‐series differences in earnings conservatism risk drawing erroneous inferences unless the research designs control for cross‐sectional or time‐series variation in price‐to‐book ratios.     

电子指令驱动市场上的交易持续期与知情交易的相互关系研究

微观结构文献和实证模型对于交易强度（交易持续期的倒数）与知情交易之间的关系的预测是相互矛盾的。本文试图建立一个研究该问题的实证框架,并采用上海股票市场交易数据进行实证研究。本文的主要发现是：（1）基于利好消息的交易通常会使交易强度增大,而基于利空消息的交易通常会导致较长的交易持续期;（2）较长的持续期会导致价格下跌和较低的波动率;（3）在较低频率数据（如日数据、周数据或月数据）中普遍存在的杠杆效应在本文采用的交易数据中被拒绝。     

Readability of 10‐K Reports and Stock Price Crash Risk

This study shows that less readable 10‐K reports are associated with higher stock price crash risk. The results are consistent with the argument that managers can successfully hide adverse information by writing complex financial reports, which leads to stock price crashes when the hidden bad news accumulates and reaches a tipping point. Cross‐sectional analyses show that the effect of financial reporting complexity on crash risk is more pronounced for firms with persistent negative earnings news or transitory positive earnings news, greater chief executive officer stock option incentives, or lower litigation risk. Finally, accrual manipulation appears to be positively related to crash risk, even since the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, if the manipulation is accompanied by complex 10‐K reports.