私募股权基金的价值创造研究

私募股权基金能否创造价值及如何创造价值,是更好发展私募股权基金的前置问题。本文构建了一个私募股权基金价值创造模型,并通过微观和宏观的两个视角,对这一模型进行了探讨。研究发现,私募股权基金能够创造价值,但是并非所有的基金都能够创造价值,其价值创造源于无形资产、资金和好的投资项目的匹配。     

股权投资企业运营风险的理论与实证研究

本文以股权投资企业为研究对象,给出了股权投资企业运营风险整体性概念及内涵,然后在分析其内在运营机制基础上,研究了其运营风险的传递规律,提出股权投资企业的运营风险集中体现于资金流流动的持续性,并且通过其在资金募集市场、股权投资市场和退出市场的交易成果得到反映;同时我们利用欧美股权投资企业数据实证检验了上述观点,发现股权投资企业运营风险受退出市场交易成果影响最大,特定的股权投资企业存在最优市场交易量。     

基于价值创造的企业会计人才评价:理论框架、关键概念与运行机制

2018年2月,中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅印发《关于分类推进人才评价机制改革的指导意见》提出"以职业属性和岗位要求为基础,健全科学的人才分类评价体系,创新多元评价方式"。基于该文件,本文尝试从价值创造视角构建企业会计人才评价的理论框架,并研究企业会计人才评价范围等问题;探讨企业会计人才评价的运行机制,重点分析企业会计人才评价的原则,初步构建了企业会计人才评价指标体系。     

Private Equity 4.0: Using ESG to Create More Value with Less Risk

A growing number of private equity firms have responded to the increased focus on climate change, social issues, and technology disruption by broadening their corporate mission to encompass all important stakeholders, as well as their limited partners. And in the process, the management of ESG risks and pursuit of ESG opportunities have become increasingly fundamental to the staying power and value creation potential of PE firms by reducing the risk of their investments, discovering new sources of growth, and increasing their resilience to changes in the political and regulatory environment. This article tells the story of how the Nordic PE firm, Summa Equity, has turned its ESG approach into a core competence and a source of competitive advantage that has enabled the firm to distinguish itself from its competitors and bring about significant improvements in the financial performance of its portfolio companies while providing benefits for their stakeholders. Using the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals to guide them, the firm invests in companies they perceive to be addressing major environmental or social challenges in an innovative and commercially successful way. This has led to investments in significant growth opportunities in areas such as health care, education, waste management, and acqua‐culture. And the firm's returns to its investors have been high enough—and the perceived social benefits large enough—that the firm recently closed its second fund (which was significantly oversubscribed) for 650 million euros, and received the ESG award at the 2019 Private Equity Awards in London.     

The Private Equity Market: An Overveiw

The private equity market is an important source of funds for start‐up firms, private middle‐market firms, firms in financial distress, and public firms seeking buyout financing. Over the past fifteen years it has been the fastest growing corporate finance market, by an order of magnitude over the public equity and public and private bond markets. Despite its dramatic growth and increased significance for corporate finance, the private equity market has received little attention. This study examines the economic foundations of the private equity market, analyzes its development and current role in corporate finance, and describes the market's institutional structure. It examines the reasons or the market's explosive growth over the past fifteen years and highlights the main characteristics of that growth. It provides data on returns to private equity investors and analyzes the major secular and cyclical influences on returns. It describes the important investors, intermediaries, issuers, and agents in the market and their interactions with each other. Drawing on data from trade journals, the study also estimates the market's size as of year‐end 1995.     

关心私募股权基金

在资本市场这个地方,要想只赢不赔或是多赢少赔,就必须赢在制度上,仅靠个人聪明才智是远远不够的＂江山代有才人出,各领风骚数百年＂。继共同基金、网络公司和次贷金融产品创新之后,私募股权基金大行其道,收购交易金额越来越大。2007年黑石收购希尔顿饭店的金额高达260亿美元,收购股权办公室财产（Equity Office Properties）的金额高达390亿美元。     

The Future of Private Equity

After a period of robust growth, the private equity industry has experienced a marked decline. In the wake of the 2008 economic crisis, the future of the venture and buyout industries seems unclear. This speech discusses four possible scenarios for the future of the private equity industry by examining the short‐ and long‐run determinants of private equity supply and demand. Possible scenarios include Recovery, Back to the Future, The Limited Partners' Desertion, and A Broken Industry. Although support is given for each of the scenarios, a clear prediction for the future remains difficult. The future of the private equity market is likely to be the subject of debate for some time to come.     

The Future of Private Equity

A distinguished University of Chicago financial economist and longtime observer of private equity markets responds to questions like the following:

• ? With a track record that now stretches in some cases almost 30 years, what have private equity firms accomplished? What effects have they had on the performance of the companies they invest in, and have they been good for the economy?
• ? How will highly leveraged PE portfolio companies fare during the current downturn, especially with over $400 billion of loans coming due in the next three to five years?
• ? With PE firms now sitting on an estimated $500 billion in capital and leveraged loan markets shut down, are the firms now contemplating new kinds of investment that require less debt?
• ? If and when the industry makes a comeback, do you expect any major changes that might allow us to avoid another boom‐and‐bust cycle? Have the PE firms or their investors made any obvious mistakes that contribute to such cycles, and are they now showing any signs of having learned from those mistakes?

Despite the current problems, the operating capabilities of the best PE firms, together with their ability to manage high leverage and the increased receptiveness of public company CEOs and boards to PE investments, have all helped establish private equity as “a permanent asset class.” Although many of the deals done in 2006 and 2007 were probably overpriced, the “cov‐lite” deal structures, deferred repayments of principal, and larger coverage ratios have afforded more room for reworking troubled deals. As a result of that flexibility, and of the kinds of companies that get taken private in leveraged deals in the first place, most troubled PE portfolio companies should end up being restructured efficiently, thereby limiting the damage to the overall economy. Part of the restructuring process involves the use of the PE industry's huge stockpile of capital to purchase distressed debt and inject new equity into troubled deals (in many cases, their own). At the same time the PE firms have been working hard to rescue their own deals, some have been taking significant minority positions in public companies, while gaining some measure of control. Finally, to limit overpriced and overlev‐eraged deals in the future, and so avoid the boom‐and‐bust cycle that appears to have become a predictable part of the industry, the discussion explores the possibility that the limited partners and debt providers that supply most of the capital for PE investments will insist on larger commitments of equity by sponsors to their own funds and individual deals.     

Private Equity Fair Value Measurement: A Critical Perspective on IFRS 13

In this paper, we discuss IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement with regard to private equity valuation. We raise issues on the fair value definition as an exit price and question the reliability of valuation techniques, which are categorised into Level 2 fair value hierarchy. Our paper questions whether fair value as defined by IFRS 13 is an appropriate measure for private equities and can contribute to enhancing transparency and comparability in financial statements, which is one of the purposes of the International Accounting Standards Board and the European Union Regulation 1606/2002.     

The Return to Direct Investment in Private Firms: New Evidence on the Private Equity Premium Puzzle*

This paper uses a novel dataset to analyze the return to direct investments in private firms by pension funds. We have two key findings. First, direct investments in private firms have underperformed public equity by 392 basis points per annum under conservative risk adjustments. Second, initial mispricing, due to over‐optimism or misperceived risk, and subsequent low capital gains seem to explain the gap in returns to private firms. Overall, these findings complement the finding of Moskowitz and Vissing‐Jørgensen (2002) of low returns on entrepreneurial investments and provide new insight into the existence of what they call the private equity premium puzzle: Even professional investors with well‐diversified portfolios like pension funds seem to get a poor risk‐return tradeoff from investing directly in private firms.     

Private Equity: Accomplishments and Challenges

The authors provide an overview of the main accomplishments of private equity since the emergence of leveraged buyouts in the 1980s, and of the challenges now facing the industry—challenges that have been encountered before during three major growth waves and two full boom‐and‐bust cycles. In so doing, the authors review a large and growing body of academic studies responding to questions like these:

• (1) How have PE buyout companies performed relative to their public counterparts? And to the extent there have been improvements in operating performance and productivity gains, how have such gains been achieved? What role have PE firms played in this process?
• (2) Especially in light of the large fees and profit shares paid to the PE firms, or GPs, and the significant “control” premiums over market paid to the selling companies, how have the returns to the LPs that provide the bulk of the funding for PE funds compared to the returns earned by the shareholders of comparable public companies?
• (3) Apart from the high fees earned by its GPs, why is PE so controversial? Beyond their effects on productivity and benefits for investors, what are the employment and other social effects of buyouts and PE?
• (4) What are the prospects for future PE returns to their LPs, especially in light of the volume of capital commitments and high purchase multiples that were being paid, at least until the onset of the COVID pandemic? And what role, if any, should PE activity be expected to play in the recovery from the pandemic?

     

The Role of Private Equity in Life Sciences

In a roundtable published in this journal a year ago, there was a clear consensus that the R&D function in big pharma was inefficient and in need of major restructuring, possibly through increased investments by venture capital and private equity firms. In this discussion, an accomplished group of industry practitioners begins by looking at the prospects for both venture capital and private equity to play meaningful roles in financing early- and mid-stage drug development. In so doing, they explore questions like the following:

• • Are there ways for big pharma and biotech to reduce “science risk” and make R&D funding more profitable and attractive to venture capital and private equity—and perhaps even hedge funds?
• • What roles do you see for specialty PE firms like Symphony Capital and Paul Capital, which are now bundling mid-stage development assets and securitizing royalties?

Then the panelists turn to the broader life sciences industry and consider the outlook for leveraged private equity transactions involving marketed products, late-stage development, and services. Here they consider issues like the following:

• • Will PE be attracted to less-R&D-intensive activities like medtech and generics?
• • Have the recent consolidation through mergers and reorganization of big pharma into decentralized business units created opportunities for carve-outs of certain businesses?

For big pharma and life sciences companies in general, the answers to such questions point to greater specialization and focus achieved partly through strategic alliances with venture capital, private equity, and even hedge funds, and involving marketed products and services as well as early-stage drug development.     

西方国家私人股权投资基金的监管及其对我国的启示

西方国家对私募融资的私人股权投资基金主要通过证券私募豁免注册制度和合格投资者管理制度进行管理,一般不进行严格监管.我国目前对不同类型的私人股权投资基金采取不同的监管标准,而且未建立私募融资与合格投资者管理制度.为此,我国应加快建立证券私募融资制度和合格投资者管理制度,统一对不同类型私人股权投资基金的监管标准,在维持私人股权投资基金业较为宽松监管环境的同时,加强对部分潜在风险的监测.     

Fee Variation in Private Equity

We study how investment fees vary within private equity funds. Net-of-fee return clustering suggests that most funds have two tiers of fees, and we decompose differences across tiers into both management- and performance-based fees. Managers of venture capital funds and those in high demand are less likely to use multiple fee schedules. Some investors consistently pay lower fees relative to others within their funds. Investor size, experience, and past performance explain some but not all of this effect, suggesting that unobserved traits like negotiation skill or bargaining power materially impact the fees that investors pay to access private markets.     

Style Drift in Private Equity

Abstract:  We introduce the concept of style drift to private equity investment. We present theory and evidence pertaining to style drifts in terms of a fund manager's stated focus on particular stages of entrepreneurial development. We develop a model that derives conditions under which style drifts are less likely among younger fund managers. We also show ways in which changes in market conditions can affect style drifts, and differences for funds committed to early-stage investments compared to funds committed to late-stage investments. We find some evidence of a positive relation between style drifting and investment performance.     

我国私募股权基金监管刍议

私募股权基金的监管模式主要有行业自律和政府监管两种,国内对此还存在很多争议。借鉴美国行业自律的监管模式,本文提出我国私募股权基金的监管模式应以内部监管为主,引入托管人机制加强内部治理,在此基础上构建我国私募股权基金的监管体系。     

The Evolution of Private Equity in Emerging Markets: The Case of Poland

In the last ten years, there has been a pronounced shift toward emerging markets in institutional investor allocations of capital to private equity. While the lion's share of the allocations to emerging markets have gone to the “BRIC” nations, lesser‐known markets like Poland are threatening to steal the spotlight. Economic stabilization, development of the private sector, a favorable business outlook, and continuous improvement of the local institutional infrastructure (laws, accounting rules, and fiscal regimes) have all contributed to the development of a vibrant private equity industry in Poland. Most private equity firms in Poland structure their deals around five broad investment themes: technology; media; and telecommunications; manufacturing; consumer services; business services; and financial services. Local private equity firms have traditionally adopted two different strategies towards these sectors. The first group of private equity firms initially targeted manufacturing, with the conviction that, as the Polish economy developed, the satisfaction of consumer needs for basic products would be the largest source of market demand. The second group assumed that the market would require access to more services to accommodate the growing local economy. Both approaches have proved reasonably successful, as the leaders among these two groups of firms have continued to succeed in raising new funds while achieving high returns for their limited partners. And while the accomplishments of the private equity industry have been made possible by the extent of Poland's transformation from a socialist into a market economy, the industry itself continues to play an important role in this transformation by providing both outside capital and know‐how for local firms and managers.     

EQT: Private Equity with a Purpose

The primary factors driving the remarkable growth of private equity have been the industry's attractive and stable returns in combination with its active ownership model. Nevertheless, critics have been questioning whether the PE industry can maintain its historic returns, and challenging its fee and incentive structures as well as its notable lack of transparency and diversity. And the alleged systemic effects of the industry on social problems like income inequality and climate change have become large enough to create a perceived threat to PE's long‐term “license to operate.” In this article, the authors discuss the commitment of EQT, the publicly listed and Stockholm‐headquartered private markets firm (and eighth largest PE fundraiser in the world), to the “future‐proofing” of both its portfolio companies and the company itself. The company envisions itself as undertaking a “journey” toward sustainability and positive impact and, in so doing, furnishing a model that other PE firms might find useful in helping “future‐proof” the entire industry. As part of that commitment, EQT recently published a “Statement of Purpose” signed by its the board of directors that focuses a societal impact lens on its entire portfolio of companies and assets, reinforces its public commitments to diversity and other “clean and conscious” practices, and aims to leverage digital technologies to enhance financial returns and real‐world outcomes. Transparency and a mindset focused on achieving positive impact are the keys to PE's earning high and stable returns and to securing its long‐term license to operate.     

Private Equity: Boom and Bust?

The private equity or leveraged buyout (LBO) market in Europe and the U.S. has grown enormously over the last two decades, from $7.5 billion in 1991 to $500 billion in 2006. Much of the financing of recent transactions has come in the form of syndicated debt, which is dispersed after origination to many non‐bank financial institutions. This financing practice has two important possible consequences: First, bankers' incentives to engage in effective ex‐ante screening and ex‐post monitoring of deals have been weakened, which may have led to excessive lending while encouraging buyers to overpay. Consistent with this possibility, the authors provide new evidence that some recent transactions have occurred at very low EBITDA‐to‐capital ratios, financed with high levels of debt that recall those of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Second, there is a scarcity of information about the identity of the ultimate holders of the LBO debt; and as a consequence of the resulting uncertainty, a few defaults of major LBO deals could cause a drying up of new funding for financial institutions. The end result could be that the veil covering the repackaging of LBO debt converts a small shock to the LBO sector into a liquidity crisis for its financiers. Such liquidity problems could in turn affect not the financing and re‐financing of just LBO deals, but other as set classes as well, including lending by banks to public firms. The authors offer a number of suggestions for increasing the transparency of this market.