Commentary. An alternative stability pact for the European Union

This paper proposes an alternative stability and growth pactto the one which accompanied the introduction of the euro inJanuary 1999. The latter is part of the third stage of economicand monetary union and, will govern the economic policies ofthe member countries which have joined the single currency andstrongly constrain the policies of those who do not join. Thealternative proposed in this paper is a Full Employment, Growthand Stability Pact and would have a number of features, themost important of which is the creation of new institutionalarrangements, including the creation of an investment bank.     

West African Currency Unions: Rationale and Sustainability

Drawing on the recent literature and experience of monetaryintegration in Europe, the paper examines the rationale forestablishing regional currency unions in western Africa. Despitedramatic economic, political and historical differences betweenthe two regions, the analysis indicates that monetary unificationmight well be beneficial for a number of the member states ofthe Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Themain reason is that the costs stemming from the loss of monetaryautonomy are often more than offset by the gains originatingin the (partial) separation of monetary and fiscal powers. However,large countries with relatively ambitious public expenditureobjectives would not be attractive partners because they wouldbe expected to pressure the common central bank, creating excessiveinflation in the entire union. Hence, the desirability and sustainabilityof a currency union critically depends on fiscal disciplineamong its members. We also explore the vulnerability of regionalmonetary institutions to country-specific disturbances. Overall,the desirability of an ECOWAS monetary union requires a strongfiscal surveillance procedure both in the transition phase andafter the establishment of the union. (JEL E58, E61, F42)     

Costs and benefits of unilateral euroization in central eastern Europe

Countries unable or unwilling to join a monetary union can replicate most membership effects unilaterally through either a currency board or the formal replacement of domestic currency by that of the Union. Potential benefits include lower transaction costs, lower interest rates, and lower exposure to speculative attacks. Costs include initial reserves, inadequate response to asymmetric shocks, loss of seigniorage, no lender of last resort. Expected costs and benefits have probably been exaggerated. Net effects depend primarily on the degree of monetary, real, and institutional convergence. Positive net advantages will accrue to countries that are either already converging, or wish to use a single currency to speed up convergence — especially if small. There is no legal or economic justification for EU aversion to unilateral euroization in accession candidate countries. JEL classification: F33, F36, E58, P33.     

The endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area criteria in East Asia

The Asian financial crisis in mid-1997 has increased interest in policies to achieve greater regional exchange rate stability in East Asia. It has renewed calls for greater monetary and exchange rate cooperation. A country's suitability to join a monetary union depends, inter alia, on the trade intensity and the business cycle synchronization with other potential members of the monetary union. However, these two Optimum Currency Area criteria are endogenous. Theoretically, the effect of increased trade integration (after the elimination of exchange fluctuations among the countries in the region) on the business cycle synchronization is ambiguous. Reduction in trade barriers can potentially increase industrial specialization by country and therefore resulting in more asymmetry business cycles from industry-specific shocks. On the other hand, increased trade integration may result in more highly correlated business cycles due to common demand shocks or intra-industry trade. If the second hypothesis is empirically verified, policy makers have little to worry about the region being unsynchronized in their business cycles as the business cycles will become more synchronized after the monetary union is formed. This paper assesses the dynamic relationships between trade, finance, specialization and business cycle synchronization for East Asian economies using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach. The dynamic panel approach improves on previous efforts to examine the business cycle correlations — trade link using panel procedures, which control for the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables. Based on the findings on how trade, finance and sectoral specialization have effects on the size of common shocks among countries, potential policies that can help East Asian countries move closer toward a regional currency arrangement can be suggested. The empirical results of this study suggest that there exists scope for East Asia to form a monetary union.     

The Macroeconomic Implications of the New Basel Accord

This paper assesses the macroeconomic implications of BaselII in light of recent development in the literature. It arguesthat although Basel II is likely to strengthen banks' incentivesto control their risk-taking, it may reduce credit supply tocertain borrowers, such as small- and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) and firms based in developing countries. Furthermore,Basel II may increase procyclical fluctuation of bank loanswhile weakening the monetary transmission mechanism during recessions.A widespread adoption of the "through-the-cycle" risk modelsmay mitigate these problems, but not completely eliminate them.This paper also considers whether monetary policy can be usedto counter effectively the procyclicality problem inherent inBasel II. (JEL E52, G21, G28)     

A simulation study of an ASEAN monetary union

This paper analyzes some pros and cons of a monetary union for the ASEAN¹ countries, excluding Myanmar. We estimate a stylized open-economy dynamic general equilibrium model for the ASEAN countries. Using the framework of linear quadratic differential games, we contrast the potential gains or losses for these countries due to economic shocks, in case they maintain their status-quo, they coordinate their monetary and/or fiscal policies, or form a monetary union. Assuming for all players open-loop information, we conclude that there are substantial gains from cooperation of monetary authorities. We also find that whether a monetary union improves upon monetary cooperation depends on the type of shocks and the extent of fiscal policy cooperation. Results are based both on a theoretical study of the structure of the estimated model and a simulation study.     

Monetary union in West Africa: who might gain,who might lose,and why?

Abstract.  We develop a model in which governments' financing needs exceed the socially optimal level because public resources are diverted to serve the narrow interests of the group in power. From a social welfare perspective, this results in undue pressure on the central bank to extract seigniorage. Monetary policy also suffers from an expansive bias, owing to the authorities' inability to precommit to price stability. Such a conjecture about the fiscal‐monetary policy mix appears quite relevant in Africa, with deep implications for the incentives of fiscally heterogeneous countries to form a currency union. We calibrate the model to data for West Africa and use it to assess proposed ECOWAS monetary unions. Fiscal heterogeneity indeed appears critical in shaping regional currency blocs that would be mutually beneficial for all their members. In particular, Nigeria's membership in the configurations currently envisaged would not be in the interests of other ECOWAS countries unless it were accompanied by effective containment on Nigeria's financing needs. JEL classification: E58, E61, E62, F33     

Some empirical tests on the integration of economic activity between the euro area and the accession countries

This note looks at the correlation of short‐term business cycles in the euro area and the EU accession countries. The issue is assessed with the help of vector autoregressive models. There are clear differences in the degree of correlation between accession countries. For Hungary and Slovenia, euro area shocks can explain a large share of variation in industrial production, while for some countries this influence is much smaller. For the latter countries, the results imply that joining the monetary union could entail reasonably large costs, unless their business cycles converge closer to the euro area cycle. Generally, for smaller countries the relative influence of the euro area business cycle is larger. Also, it is found that the most advanced accession countries are at least as integrated with the euro area business cycle as some small present member countries of the monetary union. JEL classification: E32, F15, F42.     

A Coalition-Form Analysis Of The “One Country - One Vote” Rule In The Governing Council Of The European Central Bank *

This paper analyses the “one country—one vote” rule for monetary policy decision

making of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank in a framework of cooperative game theory. The Shapley value is used as a solution concept. In contrast to former papers analysing the allocation of abstract "voting power" in committees of international organisations, preferences for monetary policy are modelled to obtain a prediction about potential transfers implied by an equal allocation of voting rights when countries are of different size. It is shown that if the number of countries participating to a currency union grows and the weight of the largest country within the currency union becomes small, the allocation of voting rights becomes irrelevant in the sense that transfers per country tend in any case to zero. [C71, E5, F02]     

Monetary union in Latin America: an assessment in the context of optimum currency area

The article applies the optimum currency area (OCA) theory to Latin America to assess the potential of a monetary union in Latin America and in its major existing regional trade agreements (RTAs). According to OCA criteria we find that Latin America is far from being an optimum currency area, as its countries’ exposure to asymmetric shocks is high and their capacities to adjust in response to macroeconomic disturbances are limited. Using a panel of 20 Latin American countries from 1990 to 2014, we apply the dynamic OLS estimation techniques to estimate the costs and benefits of a potential monetary union in Latin America and in its various RTAs. to estimate the costs and benefits of a potential monetary union in Latin America and in its various RTAs. We find that the costs are high, because Latin America’s economies are vulnerable to severe macroeconomic disturbances and its RTAs differ significantly in their response to negative demand shocks. Most of the monetary efficiency gains are shown to be the result of a common restrictive monetary policy which would result in higher FDI inflows and, to a more limited extent, increased GDP, both overall and per capita. Although Central American countries are shown to be most suitable for further monetary integration, we conclude that Latin American countries should head first towards greater economic and political integration.     

The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone

When entering a monetary union, member countries change the nature of their sovereign debt in a fundamental way; that is, they cease to have control over the currency in which their debt is issued. As a result, financial markets can force these countries’ sovereigns into defaulting. This makes the monetary union fragile and vulnerable to changing market sentiments. It also makes it possible that self‐fulfilling multiple equilibria arise. I analyse the implications of this fragility for the governance of the Eurozone. I argue that the role of the European Central Bank as a lender of last resort is crucial in reducing the fragility of the Eurozone. In addition, steps towards a budgetary union are key in structurally strengthening the union.     

Leaving EMU: a real options perspective

The real option implicit in a country's decision of whether to leave an existing monetary union when there is uncertainty over the future benefits of this move is examined. The theoretical model used is calibrated for the current Euro-12 area by proxying policymakers’ inflation preferences with unemployment rates and debt-to-GDP ratios. A robust group of countries is observed that would choose to remain within EMU consisting of Belgium, Finland, Greece and Italy; France and Spain loosely also belong to this core. Only Luxembourg would robustly want to leave EMU; Ireland and The Netherlands, however, complement that core closely.     

Is There a Link Between Exchange Rate Pass-Through and the Monetary Regime: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America

This paper investigates the relationship between the monetary regime: pegged, currency board, dollarization, and the exchange rate pass-through for a sample consisting of 15 Sub-Saharan Africa countries and 12 Latin American countries. The research findings about pass-through rates will shed light on the feasibility of a monetary union for Sub-Saharan Africa. The inclusion of the latter country group was deemed desirable to explore pass-through behavior in several monetary regime options not often used in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Stability of the Demand for Money in Monetary Unions: Some Empirical Evidence from WAEMU

Previous studies of the stability of the demand for money have been largely conducted in the context of individual countries. To the extent that these countries have control over their monetary policies, such an approach is well justified. However, for monetary unions, where the control over monetary policy is usually vested in a central or outside authority, it is more appropriate to examine the stability of the money demand for the union as a collective entity. This paper follows this approach with respect to a West African monetary union, the WAEMU, whose monetary policies are largely dictated by the French authorities. Using cointegration theory and CUSUM stability tests, we find evidence that the demand for broad money is stable in this union. Given the empirical results, the paper draws inferences regarding their implications for the formulation of optimal monetary policy for the WAEMU.     

A synthesized discussion on the Macao monetary reform

The prolonged RMB appreciation affects Macao deeply and requires a major monetary reform without further delay. What we propose for Macao reform as an optimal choice includes shifting its monetary anchor to the strong RMB, revaluing its domestic currency to the original level, and setting up a sovereign wealth fund for autonomous growth. This proposal is based on Macao’s economic fundamentals such as trade competitiveness, business relations, real welfare, monetary stability, and genuine development. We also recommend a monetary union of Macao with Hong Kong as the 2^nd-best choice of reform by introducing what we term the SAR dollar.     

What does the experience of German monetary union tell us about the theory of monetary union?

This paper summarizes the modern theory of monetary unions to identify in what circumstances such unions are supposed to impose low costs on, and give substantial benefits to, their members and then considers the case of the effect on Eastern Germany of German monetary and economic union. This union satisfied most of the conditions for low cost and high benefit, yet the initial impact of union was a severe fall in economic activity in Eastern Germany. The paper concludes that the conventional theory is deficient in ignoring the effects on the poorer member countries of a union of the expectations engendered by the creation of the union, and argues that an explicit regional policy is required in a union of members of widely different income levels.     

Are OECD policy recommendations for public sector reform biased against welfare states? Evidence from a new database

Policy advice by the OECD has long been at the heart of academic debates on welfare state reform, with frequent claims questioning the ideological orientation of recommendations. This paper constructs an indicator of perceived reform need for 24 countries, quantifying the policy advice contained in the OECD Economic Surveys around 1985, 1995, and 2005. These recommendations describe a policy consensus that is based on competition, work incentives, monetary reform, fiscal discipline, and labor market reform. Empirically, perceived need for reform is well explained by preceding levels of economic freedom. In particular, countries with more government intervention, lower property rights protection, and more regulation are perceived to have a bigger reform need. In turn, perceived reform need has no explanatory power for subsequent changes in social expenditure and welfare state entitlements. Only in countries with right wing governments, perceived reform need might be followed by marginal reductions in welfare state entitlements, but definitely not in social expenditure.     

The fundamentals of sovereign debt sustainability: evidence from 15 OECD countries

We study the sustainability of sovereign debt accumulation in 15 OECD countries using quarterly data from 1980 to 2010 with a focus on how and in what countries debt sustainability changed after the commencement of the Euro Convergence Criteria in 1997 as well as after the financial meltdown in 2007. We define sustainability as the validity of the inter-temporal budget constraint of the government and test a sufficient condition motivated by Bohn (Q J Econ, 113(3):949–963, 1998) using single-country and pooled regressions. We find evidence that the Euro Convergence Criteria contributed to the sustainability of debt accumulation. Further, while the yield spreads suggest the debt crisis is a problem of the southern Euro countries, we find a lack of debt sustainability for Greece, Portugal and France but not for Italy and Spain. In terms of debt sustainability, the crisis adversely affected primarily stand-alone countries rather than members of the European Monetary Union. Nevertheless, yield spreads increased more in the southern countries of the monetary union than in stand-alone countries. Our results support the view that countries within a monetary union are more prone to investors’ sentiments than stand-alone countries.     

Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.     

An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact

We use a stylised model to analyse the Stability and Growth Pact for countries that have formed the European Monetary Union (EMU). In our model, shortsighted governments fail to internalise the consequences of their debt policies for the common inflation rate fully. Therefore, while governments have no incentive to sign a stability pact in the absence of a monetary union, they do so with monetary union to restrain this externality. With uncertainty, a monetary union combined with an appropriately designed pact will be strictly preferred to autonomy. With differences in initial conditions, conflicts of interest arise. We study the Nash bargaining solution.