论货币市场与资本市场的协调发展

我国目前货币市场与资本市场之间的不协调性突出表现为货币市场与资本市场之间苦乐不均现象十分严重 ;要解决这一问题 ,必须围绕“新”字做文章 ,即要树立新思维、开辟新领域、推出新产品、引进新方式、运用新方法、营造新环境、制定新目标。     

The Economic Case for Monetary Union in the European Union

Differential requirements for seigniorage provide a weak case for retaining monetary independence. As regards adjustment to asymmetric shocks, nominal exchange rate flexibility is at best a limited blessing and at worst a limited curse. Absence of significant fiscal redistribution mechanisms among EU members is not an obstacle to monetary union. Neither is limited international labour mobility. Convergence of real economic performance is irrelevant for monetary union. A common currency is the logical implication of unrestricted capital mobility. The Maastricht criteria need not hinder monetary union provided the political will exists to adopt a flexible interpretation of the fiscal criteria.     

普罗科菲耶夫论前苏联的改革

本文从三个方面分析了前苏联改革.(1)前苏联改革失误主要是决策随意,所通过的决议、法律不是巩固发展而是破坏经济、社会和文化.(2)苏共垮台的主要原因是党内没有民主化,党的上层领导蓄意、千方百计地搞垮党,党自身也有弱点.(3)前苏联解体的原因是不按经济规律办事,企业和科研机构的激励机制、制度有缺陷,煤矿工人罢工,民族问题,国家发展战略失误,上层领导任意违宪,西方因素,等等.     

Until the End of Time: Labour Market Reform in Australia

While it is widely acknowledged that labour market reform is a necessary ingredient of the strategy to make the Australian economy world-competitive, there are divergent views on what the nature of the reform process should be. The changes being currently implemented and mooted may not provide the basis for strong productivity growth; holistic enterprise bargaining and voluntarist labour market arrangements are required.     

论货币市场与资本市场的融合

货币市场与资本市场的整合，是现代经济条件下适应客户客观需求和金融市场一体化的反映，也是金融创新的发展趋向，它的根本动力是金融企业的利益激励和内部约束。有计划、有组织地推进金融市场的融合、促进金融企业组织结构的调整和进化，将从根本上改变中国金融业的面貌，推动金融业的全面进步，并促进国家经济的长期、持续、快速发展。     

Monetary Stabilisation Policy in a Monetary Union: Some Simple Analytics

We do two things in this paper. First, we look at some simple models of monetary decision making in a monetary union and ask how much more variable a country's output and inflation is likely to be if it joins the union. We answer this analytically and then go on to 'calibrate' the simple model. The model has few structural equations, but it is useful in allowing us to examine how the variability of output and inflation are likely to change as key parameters change. Our conclusions on this front are likely to be sensitive to model specification. However, we also identify a second best issue concerning the optimal make–up of the monetary union which is likely to be more robust: namely that only when all members of the union have the same structural parameter values (and shocks are perfectly correlated) will it be optimal for a new member to have these same structural parameter values.     

The Enlargement Challenge: Can Monetary Union Be Made to Work in an EU of 25 Members?

This article considers the evolution of Europe's monetary union over the next five to ten years, concentrating on the most important likely change, namely the increased number and heterogeneity of participating states.     

Monetary policy implementation and transmission in the European Monetary Union

I discuss possible problems engendered by loss of national monetary policies, and study them from three empirical perspectives. First, are business cycles sufficiently synchronized across EMU member countries? The evidence suggests that economic activity in those countries has become increasingly correlated in the 1990s, and that policy co–ordination has played a role in generating that outcome. Second, are there asymmetries in the mechanisms through which policy affects economic activity? The paper documents that policy transmission was indeed heterogeneous in the member countries, and that structural and financial factors were sensibly related to cross–country differences in the response of output to a monetary policy shock. Third, how is policy implemented in an environment of diverse business cycle fundamentals and transmission mechanisms? Estimation of monetary policy reaction functions finds that the European Central Bank is closer to an aggregate of the central banks in Germany, France, and Italy than to the Bundesbank alone.     

中国西部地区劳动力市场发展探讨

加快西部大开发具有重大的经济、政治和社会意义。作者认为,劳动力市场缺乏是西部地区落后的重要原因之一。文章通过对制约西部劳动力市场发展的因素分析,提出了西部劳动力市场的几个设想;发展非公有制经济,加快劳动力市场信息网络建议,以及尽快形成西部地区的区域性劳动力市场。     

On Contracting Out: Some Labour Market Considerations

Fashion is the great governor of this world; it presides not only in matters of dress and amusement, but in law, physic, politics, religion, and all other things of the gravest kind.     

Sharing Money Creation in a Monetary Union*

How to share money creation among the members of the European Monetary Union? To address this issue, we construct a two‐country New Open‐economy Macroeconomics model of an asymmetric monetary union with an incomplete financial market and home bias in consumption. We consider two sharing rules consistent with the current regulations of the European System of Central Banks. First, each participating National Central Bank supplies half of the European Central Bank determined money creation in the monetary union. Secondly, each National Central Bank adapts the national increase in money demand, under the constraint that the total money creation in the union does not exceed the level determined by the ECB for the whole union. We show that the current sharing rule, which ignores countries’ heterogeneity, is superior in terms of welfare. The key role of the current account is emphasized. It proves an efficient decentralized mechanism for allocation of money.     

Unemployment Responses to 'Skill-biased' Technology Shocks: the Role of Labour Market Policy

Do skill-biased shocks that increase the spread of labour productivities, interacting with different policy regimes, explain the rise in unemployment in Europe relative to the United States in the 1980s and 1990s? The hypothesis is an implication of a version of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model of equilibrium unemployment which allows for worker heterogeneity. A calibrated version of the model implies that a similar unemployment increase would have occurred in the United States over this period, given changes in relative productivity by education implied by observed wage changes, had unemployment compensation and employment protection policies been at European levels.     

基于劳动力市场分割的劳动力流动模型的构建

国内外学者对于劳动力流动进行了大量深入的研究,成果颇丰.然而,由于历史的原因,我国在劳动力流动方面呈现出与其他国家不同的特性,目前,我国的劳动力市场尚未发展成熟,劳动力流动存在很严重的不合理现象.因此,结合我国的现实情况对其进行研究意义更加重大.本文试图结合以往学者的研究成果,构建基于劳动力市场分割的劳动力流动模型,对其进行深入的探讨,为实现劳动力的合理流动提供帮助.     

Monetary Union and the Transaction Cost Savings of a Single Currency

This paper computes the transaction cost savings derived from the European Monetary Union. A continuoustime, stochastic, Baumol-like model is generalized to include several currencies and calibrated to fit European data. The analysis implies an upper bound for the savings derived from reductions in transaction costs of approximately 0.69% of Union GDP. Additionally, the magnitudes of the brokerage fee and the volatility of transactions, whose estimation has traditionally been difficult to address empirically, are approximated for Europe.     

Asymmetric Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union

We analyze the conduct of monetary policy in a currency union in the face of asymmetric shocks. In particular, we compare the stabilization properties of a currency union versus alternative exchange rate arrangements. The relative performance of a currency union is shown to depend on the extent of economic integration in patterns of consumption and production and on the relative weights placed on price stability versus employment stability in the monetary authority's objective function.
JEL classification : F 33; F 40     

Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union

Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell (1961) : a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective. If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable.
This paper explores this argument in a setting with both monetary and fiscal policies. In an economy with monetary policy alone, we confirm the presence of the trade-off and find that indeed a monetary union will not be welfare improving if the correlation of national shocks is too low. However, fiscal interventions by national governments, combined with a central bank that has the ability to commit to monetary policy, overturn these results. In equilibrium, such a monetary union will be welfare improving for any correlation of shocks.