The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost. We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support.     

Importance of status quo when lobbying a coalition government

Lobbying a coalition government is different from lobbying a single-party government, since in the case of a coalition government, the interest group can intervene in the intragovernmental decision process. In the case where the interest group prefers the status quo to the surplus maximizing policy, the interest group influences the policy without any contribution due to its credible threat to block unfavorable proposals. Furthermore, we show that when, say, a leftist coalition government may be replaced by a rightist coalition government, the final policy reflects a rightist interest group’s preferences more heavily due to the interest group’s forward-looking considerations.     

A theory of coalition formation in committees

Let G = (N,W) be a strong weighted majority game and let A be a set of alternatives. Denote by L the set of linear orders on A. A social choice function F:L^N → A is a representation of G if the simple game G¹(F) associated with F equals G. A coalition S is determining in G if it satisfies the following condition. Let F be a representation of G and let R^N ? L^N. Then, if a simple majority of the members of S consider an alternative x to be their best choice, then S can ‘enforce’ x to be a Nash equilibrium payoff in the resulting non-cooperative voting game g(F,R^N). In this paper we generalize the above notion of a determining coalition to committees (i.e., proper and monotonic simple games), and give a complete characterization of the set of determining coalitions of a committee. Furthermore, we discuss our notion of a determining coalition in the light of some real-life data on formation of coalitions in town councils in Israel.     

供应链电子采购的Stackelberg模型分析

利用Intemet进行采购是企业电子商务战略中最重要的部分。但是。目前关于电子采购的研究仍比较少。现有文献大多都是定性研究、实证研究或案例分析。定量研究非常少。文章从采购双方行为动机的角度出发,建立采购商为主方、供应商为从方的Stackelberg博彝模型;在模型的最优性分析基础上．讨论采购商的采购量与供应商的退款额之间的交互影响关系。     

供应链应收账款质押融资的双重Stackelberg博弈分析

供应链金融是银行将核心企业和上下游企业联系在一起提供灵活运用的金融产品和服务的一种融资模式。文章从供应链金融的视角研究供应链成员企业的融资决策,将双重Stackelberg博弈应用于供应链金融的三种融资模式之一的应收账款质押融资,通过博弈模型的建立分析供应链金融中各个参与主体的期望收益,考察融资运作的影响因素,给出了参与主体选择策略的条件,为成员企业融资决策提供依据,维持供应链整体稳定运行。     

Walras degrees and probability of a blocking coalition at pareto allocations

We attempt to determine the probability of a blocking coalition from a notion of being non- Walrasian which does not rely on the explicit use of norms. The key concept introduced is that of Walras degrees. Theorem 1 gives the bounds of the probability of blocking in terms of these degrees. Theorem 2 gives the asymptotic conditional probability of a blocking coalition given that coalitions are losing. The relationship between the degrees of the conventional norms on allocations is also investigated.     

基于信息共享的供应链双源渠道Stackelberg博弈分析

对于双源渠道供应链系统中零售商和制造商的信息共享问题,引入市场需求不确定信息作为信息共享的重要影响因素,利用Stackelberg主从对策,构建了四个考虑信息共享的双源渠道供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了零售商和制造商在是否分享市场不确定信息和是否运用于商务活动的博弈过程。研究结果显示:零售商和制造商都会尽可能去获取市场需求不确定信息,并且制造商会把此信息充分运用到电子商务市场来提高自己以及供应链整体利益。     

一种逆向物流Stackelberg博弈下的库存契约研究

供应链中的库存协调是供应链管理的一项重要工作，而如何针对不同的供应链设计有效而合理的契约是其中的关键。本文分析研究了由一个供应商和一个生产商组成的供应链在集成条件下和分散条件下的最优库存，并研究了stackelberg主从博弈下如何通过设计契约使供应链库存达到最优。     

Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods

We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation where neither has a comparative advantage in making contributions to the public good. The Stackelberg leader is willing to accept such transfers if the actual contribution game is fully non-cooperative because the transfer generates a Pareto superior outcome. If the contributions in the Stackelberg equilibrium is the threat point of a possible cooperative Nash bargaining game, the Stackelberg leader will refuse to accept the transfer if she can. Received: 30 June 1995 / Accepted: 18 February 1997     

A formulation of the aggregation problem in terms of coalition and bargaining theory

The object of this paper is to demonstrate in economic terms the equivalence of the problem of aggregation in input-output analysis with coalition and bargaining problems. Depending on the specific norm for aggregation it is shown that the aggregation criterion and the coalition forming criterion in an n-person game leads to a broadly similar situation in the market sense given that the market operates to that criterion. It is also shown that a mathematical analogue to this formulation may be obtained via the techniques of geometric programming.     

Time horizons matter: the hazard rate of coalition governments and the size of government

This study examines how coalition governments affect the size of government, measured by total central government expenditure as a share of GDP. Existing studies suggest that the presence of multiple political parties within ruling coalitions generate common pool resource problems or bargaining inefficiencies which, in turn, leads to more government spending when coalition governments are in office. We demonstrate that coalition governments have shorter time horizons than single party governments and use that finding to motivate a simple formal model. The model shows that coalition governments have greater incentives to increase government spending because of a lower discount factor in office. Results from empirical models estimated on a global sample of 111 democracies between 1975 and 2007 provide strong statistical support for the aforementioned theoretical prediction. The empirical results remain robust when we control for alternative explanations, employ different estimation techniques, and use different measures of government spending.     

Accounting in Turkey with reference to the particular problems of lease transactions

Leasing in Turkey has grown rapidly in the later part of the 1980s. This has presented challenges to accountants which have yet to be resolved. At present the country does not have an accounting standard on this topic and as a consequence transactions are recorded in accordance with tax laws. This paper considers the development of accounting in Turkey and whether the principles stated in International Accounting Standard (IAS) 17 on leasing are applicable for Turkey. The responses to questionnaires sent to accountants in Turkey suggest that the principles in IAS 17 are acceptable to accountants in that country.     

Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions

This paper endogenizes in a standard hidden action model the point in time when a risk neutral and wealth constrained agent and the principal observe the realization of an additional signal: before the agent’s effort choice (ex ante information) or after (ex post information). In a decision problem, ex ante information does (weakly) better than ex post information because the decision maker can tailor efforts to the information. We show that this is not the case for incentive problems: a negative incentive effect arises under ex ante information that prevails even though the principal tailors the agent’s effort to the information.     

Not-for-profit pressure group work: A marketing analysis of whether to operate solo or in coalition

Pressure (or interest or lobby) group work in charities/not-for-profits can benefit from a marketing approach. Product development, other player (competitor) analysis and positioning of the pressure group vis-à-vis associated and sometimes competitor organisations or groups are explored, as are the conditions (including advantages and disadvantages) under which solo versus coalition ways of working are likely to be most effective.     

Interpretation problems of the partial correlation with nonnormally distributed variables

The partial correlation is a commonly used measure for assessing the bivariate correlation of two quantitative variables after eliminating the influence of one or more other variables. The partial correlation is generally interpreted as the correlation that would result if the variables to be eliminated were fixed (not allowed to vary and influence the other variables), which is referred to in the statistical literature as conditional correlation. The present paper demonstrates, by means of theoretical derivations and practical examples, that when the assumption of multivariate normality is violated (e.g., as a result of nonlinear relationships among the variables investigated) the usual interpretation of the partial correlation coefficient will be basically incorrect. In extreme cases the value of the partial correlation coefficient may be strongly positive, close to 1, whereas the conditional correlation may have a large negative value. To solve this problem the paper suggests to partial out a certain function (in most cases the square) of the variables whose effects are to be eliminated if nonlinear relationships are likely to occur.     

实木地板装饰施工质量问题研究

文章分析了实木地板在装饰施工中发响、表面不平、拼缝不严、局部起拱等常见问题,并提出了预防与处理方法,旨在提高实木地板的装修质量。     

Planning in the smaller city: Major problems and a possible solution

The study is based on interviews with 29 mayors, 26 planning commission chairmen and 23 professional planners in an Eastern state. It presents the four major problems confronting planning in these communities: (1) a lack of official commitment to planning, (2) the “gap” between professional planners and municipal officials, (3) an underdeveloped advocacy for planning and (4) several indigenous community hindrances. Each problem is examined in detail and a framework for dealing with resistance to planning is proposed.     

浅谈如何防治钻孔灌注桩钻孔施工时质量通病

文章概括介绍了钻孔灌注桩钻孔施工时经常发生的质量通病及其防治措施,对目前中小跨径桥梁的钻桩施工与质量控制,具有一定的指导与参考意义,因此如何在施工工艺上采取一些措施,尽量避免或杜绝质量事故的发生,以确保施工顺利进行,一直是工程技术人员探讨的课题。笔者根据自己施工多座灌注桩桥梁的实践经验,谈谈这方面的体会。     

Conquering internal process problems with the use of cross-functional self-directed work teams

The purpose of this article is to introduce a no-nonsense approach to motivating employees while reducing cycle time, improving quality, and creating a flexibly trained, self-directed work force. The article focuses on both the use of cross-functional teams and the change in the role of management that must occur.