BRITISH MANAGERS: A STUDY OF THEIR EDUCATION,TRAINING, MOBILITY AND EARNINGS

This study uses information from the National Training Survey to investigate the education, qualifications, mobility and earnings of persons with managerial responsibilities. From this analysis, we conclude that there is a need for both private and public organisations to increase the quantity and improve the quality of the training available to their managers and potential managers. More important though is the need to monitor the impact of training programmes and reward managers accordingly.     

Leveraging foreign institutional logic in the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms

Research summary : We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option pay, which was developed with shareholder‐oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have self‐serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option pay. The study shows the active role of managers in facilitating the diffusion of a new governance practice embodying new institutional logic. Managerial summary : Why have Japanese firms adopted stock option pay for executives? Inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented tradition in corporate governance, such pay has been believed to prioritize managerial attention to the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders. However, to the extent that shareholders' interests are legitimate in the Japanese context, executives who have self‐serving incentives to adopt such pay can leverage the need to look after shareholders' interest in their firms to legitimize their decisions. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that foreign ownership (representing shareholders' interests) is more likely to be associated with the adoption of stock option pay when managers are motivated to receive such pay, such as when they have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, or poor sales growth. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Determinants of alliance partner choice: Network distance,managerial incentives,and board monitoring

Research Summary: We ask if managerial opportunism is a significant problem in alliance partner choice and examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms in explaining this choice. Using a sample of 313 alliances of U.S. firms from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries from 1992 to 2010, we find that managerial incentives lead to managerial preference for relationally risky distant partners over existing and new close partners. Further, board monitoring encourages managers to pursue existing and distant partners over new close ones, choices aligned with shareholder interests. In addition, we find that board monitoring substitutes for managerial incentives in alliance partner choice. We contribute to the literature on alliance partner choice to identify an important, and hitherto, unexplored perspective. Managerial Summary: This article examines whether managers and shareholders view alliance‐related risks differently, and how the divergent interests between managers and shareholders affect alliance partner choice. We argue that managers’ concern about their loss of employment and compensation from alliance failure impedes the choice of relationally risky alliance partners that may increase shareholder value. We also argue that managerial stock ownership and board monitoring mitigate this managerial propensity. Our findings suggest that stock ownership owned by managers and strong board monitoring are effective governance mechanisms to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders. Our study offers a novel perspective to understand alliance partner choice by viewing the firm as an entity comprised of fragmented interests.     

Increase in takeover protection and firm knowledge accumulation strategy

Research summary : We argue that the extent to which a firm faces takeover threats affects its knowledge structure. In particular, takeover threats may lead to managers' reluctance to adopt a strategy toward firm‐specific knowledge accumulation because implementing this strategy requires them to acquire specialized skills, which are at risk under takeover threats. Conversely, takeover protection leads to an increase in firm‐specific knowledge. Further, the relationship between takeover protection and firm‐specific knowledge is positively moderated by managerial ownership, which helps align managerial interests with those of shareholders. But the relationship is negatively moderated by managerial tenure, as long‐tenured managers have already committed to their firms. Using a differences‐in‐differences method with Delaware antitakeover rulings in the mid‐1990s as an exogenous shock, we found results supporting these arguments. Managerial summary : We examined how changes in the Delaware antitakeover rulings in mid‐1990s affected the knowledge structure of firms incorporated in Delaware. We reasoned that with a greater level of takeover protection, top managers of those firms incorporated in Delaware felt higher job security, thus providing them stronger incentives to make strategic decisions toward the development of firm‐specific knowledge and to make corresponding human capital investments in specialized skills. Empirically, firms incorporated in Delaware were found to have an increase in the level of firm‐specific knowledge in their knowledge structure after the mid‐1990s. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the role of takeover protection on top manager incentives is particularly salient when the managers are awarded with more company shares and when the managers have shorter organizational tenure. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An investigation into the roles of open innovation collaboration managers

The concept of open innovation has gained traction among practitioners and academics. Many different aspects of open innovation have been researched, but the question of how to manage open innovation collaboration in order to achieve the desired knowledge flow across organizational boundaries remains only partly answered. Consequently, this article argues for the need to complement prior firm-centric perspectives by investigating the roles of senior management in the postmodern form of organizing that characterizes open innovation collaboration. A more in-depth understanding of managerial roles in this context can increase the chances of fruitful collaboration. Thus, the article uses an inductive, interview-based approach to explore senior management roles in two institutionalized open innovation collaborations, thereby creating an initial conceptualization of the role of managers in open innovation and forming a basis for further studies on open innovation management. In this respect, the article identifies and discusses additional managerial roles that appear to be crucial for open innovation collaborations. These roles are those of a facilitator, tactician, and sensegiver.     

Managerial compensation and corporate spinoffs

Research summary : This article investigates how corporate spinoffs affect managerial compensation. These deals are found to improve the alignment of spinoff firm managers' incentive compensation with stock market performance, especially among spinoff firm managers that used to be divisional managers of the spun‐off subsidiary, and particularly when the spun‐off subsidiary performs better than or is unrelated to its parent firm's remaining businesses. By contrast, incentive alignment does not improve for the parent firm managers running the divesting companies. This finding appears to be driven by a significant post‐spinoff increase in these managers' incentive compensation, the magnitude of which is inversely related to governance quality in their firms. Together, these results elucidate how spinoffs influence managerial compensation in diversified firms and the companies they divest. Managerial summary : This article explores how spinoffs affect incentive alignment: the correlation between incentive compensation and stock market performance. The incentive alignment of spinoff firm managers improves following these deals. These gains are the largest when spinoff firm managers used to be divisional managers of the spun‐off subsidiary and when the spun‐off subsidiary performs better than or is unrelated to the other businesses in the parent firm. By contrast, incentive alignment does not improve for parent firm managers. Instead, the level of these managers' incentive compensation rises significantly post‐spinoff, and the magnitude of this increase is inversely related to governance quality in these firms. Together, these results shed light on the ways in which spinoffs influence managerial compensation in diversified firms and in the companies they divest. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The pattern of managerial behaviour in Thai culture

This paper examines the various factors which have shaped contemporary Thai managerial behaviour, exploring the influence of basic cultural values, beliefs and religion, and education. Though the paper is primarily conceptual in orientation, empirical data is presented on the leadership styles of Thai managers. The paper demonstrates how what is essentially an ethnographic approach can be useful in understanding the impact of culture on managerial style.The authors are from the Faculty of Management Sciences, Prince of Songkla University, Thailand.     

Consequences of misspecified mental models: Contrasting effects and the role of cognitive fit

Research summary: Mental models, reflecting interdependencies among managerial choice variables, are not always correctly specified. Mental models can be underspecified, missing interdependencies, or overspecified, containing nonexistent interdependencies. Using a simulation model, we find that under‐ and overspecification have opposite effects on exploration, and thereby, performance. The effects are also opposite, depending on whether a manager controls all choice variables. The mechanism underlying our results is a feedback loop: misspecified mental models influence managerial learning about the effectiveness of choices; this learning guides how the environment is explored, which in turn, affects which information will be generated for future learning. We explore implications of these results for strategic management and introduce the notion of “cognitive fit” between the mental model of the decision‐maker and the strategic environment. Managerial summary: Managers often rely on mental models to guide their decision‐making. These mental models, however, are often misspecified, that is, more or less complex than the situation managers are facing. Using a simulation model, we study the consequences of such misspecified mental models. We find that the performance implications of misspecified mental models crucially depend on whether the manager controls all choice variables. We identify situations in which simpler mental models are better than overly complex ones, and vice versa. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Takeover defenses,innovation, and value creation: Evidence from acquisition decisions

The desirability of antitakeover provisions (ATPs) is a contentious issue. ATPs might enable managerial empire building by insulating managers from disciplinary takeovers. However, some companies, such as “hard‐to‐value” (HTV) companies, might trade at a discount due to valuation difficulties, thereby exposing HTV companies to opportunistic takeovers and creating agency conflicts of managerial risk aversion. ATPs might ameliorate such managerial risk aversion by inhibiting opportunistic takeovers. This paper analyzes acquisitions made by HTV firms, focusing on whether the acquirer (not the target) is entrenched in order to examine the impact of entrenchment managerial decision making. The results show that HTV firms that are entrenched make acquisitions that generate more shareholder wealth and are more likely to increase corporate innovation, suggesting that ATPs can be beneficial in some firms. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance feedback and middle managers’ divergent strategic behavior: The roles of social comparisons and organizational identification

Research Summary: What drives middle managers to search for new strategic initiatives and champion them to top management? This behavior—labeled divergent strategic behavior—spawns emergent strategies and thereby provides one of the essential ingredients of strategic renewal. We conceptualize divergent strategic behavior as a response to performance feedback. Data from 123 senior middle managers overseeing 21 multi‐country organizations (MCOs) of a Fortune 500 firm point to social performance comparisons rather than historical comparisons in driving divergent strategic behavior. Moreover, managers’ organizational identification affects whether they attend to organizational‐ or individual‐level feedback. These results contribute to research on performance aspirations and strategy process by providing a multilevel, multidimensional framework of performance aspirations in middle management driven strategic renewal. Managerial Summary: Middle managers are essential actors in strategic renewal. Their unique positions offer insights into operations alongside knowledge of strategy. In contrast to typical assessments of managerial performance with reference to a prior year, this research shows that performance comparisons relative to peers and other organizational units better motivate managers’ divergent strategic behavior. Our results also show that managers who identify with the firm are more attentive to organizational rather than individual performance discrepancies. Thus, our study unveils an important approach for organizations aiming to spark strategic renewal.     

Foreshadowing as Impression Management: Illuminating the Path for Security Analysts

Research summary: Managers can disclose information to security analysts as a form of impression management, but doing so is problematic because competitors can use that same information at the expense of the firm. We identify an impression management technique we call foreshadowing, which refers to hinting about future potential strategic activity. Foreshadowing provides information of value to analysts that can influence their evaluations of a firm, but not so much information as to put the firm at a competitive disadvantage. We hypothesize and find that managers who foreshadow acquisition announcements receive fewer analyst downgrades following the announcements, especially when there is more analyst uncertainty about the firm. We also hypothesize and find that analysts' responses to foreshadowing positively influence the likelihood that managers eventually acquire other firms. Managerial summary: Security analysts are often suspicious when firms announce acquisitions as those announcements are cumbersome to analyze on short notice and raise questions about managerial motivations that might not represent the best interests of the firm. We find that managers can improve analyst reactions to acquisition announcements by disclosing some information of value to analysts—specifically by hinting that an acquisition could occur in the future. We refer to such hints as foreshadowing. Foreshadowing entails giving analysts information to reduce their suspicions and facilitate their analyses, but not so much information as to degrade the firm's competitive information advantage over other firms. Foreshadowing also allows managers the option to reconsider actually executing the acquisition if analysts respond negatively to its possibility. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial response to constitutional constraints on shareholder power

Research summary: We examine whether top managers engage in misconduct, such as illegal insider trading, illegal stock option backdating, bribery, and financial manipulation, in response to the presence, or absence, of governance provisions that impose constitutional constraints on shareholder power. Within the agency framework, shareholders typically oppose governance provisions that limit their power because those provisions could undermine shareholder influence and increase agency costs. However, when shareholders support provisions that constrain their power, managers could respond positively by refraining from self‐interested behavior in the form of managerial misconduct. We find this to be especially true in industries where these governance provisions are particularly relevant to managers and in scenarios where CEOs do not also serve as board chair. Managerial summary: In recent years, shareholders have become central to organizations and the managers who run them. Shareholders and managers establish a rapport with one another, such that the behavior of one affects the behavior of the other. One of the most consequential decisions shareholders can make pertains to the reach of their influence: They can choose to impose strict governance over firms they own or they can allow for constitutional constraints that limit shareholder power. When they act in the mutual interest of managers by allowing such constraints, we find that managers respond in kind by refraining from bad behavior, such as illegal stock options backdating, insider trading, and financial manipulation. This is especially true in industries and scenarios in which shareholder pressure is most relevant to managers. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managing Innovation Champions: The Impact of Project Characteristics on the Direct Manager Role*

A key challenge for organizations seeking to improve the management of innovation lies in determining when to lend direct managerial support, and how much support, to those championing such projects. This research provides insights into the connection between project characteristics and the type and frequency of direct manager involvement. As such, it addresses the following research question: how does the level of project innovativeness, strategic relatedness, and resource requirements impact the level of empowerment of innovation champions and the sponsor or supervisor role played by managers? The research method involves a survey of 89 project champions from four divisions of large, multinational Korean companies. The results show that when innovativeness was high but projects were strategically related, there was greater project champion empowerment but also a more frequent managerial sponsor role. This suggests it may be best to allow innovators, who are close to the project's markets, technologies, and industry conditions, to have greater freedom over objectives and decisions. Yet they may also need the advice and support of their managers to function optimally under the highly uncertain conditions that characterize innovative projects. This combination of empowerment and a sponsor role, though appropriate for highly innovative projects, may also require high strategic relatedness, however. On the other hand, when projects are less strategically related and when resource requirements are high, the analysis suggests managers are more likely to exert control. Managers may therefore need to become more closely involved in decision making for costly ventures representing new strategic directions for their organizations. Overall, this research suggests that both empowerment and manager roles are relevant to the management of innovation. These results offer academic value in recognizing the nature of the direct manager role under different innovation project conditions. It further reveals a need for academics to recognize both the supervisor and sponsor roles in the management of innovation. For managers, the findings suggest that for organizations to effectively develop and commercialize innovations managers need to recognize when certain projects call for different levels and types of involvement.     

Corporate governance antecedents to shareholder activism: A zero‐inflated process

Research summary: Shareholder activism has become more widespread, yet the role of corporate governance as antecedent to shareholder activism remains equivocal. We propose a new conceptual model that characterizes the stochastic of observable shareholder activism as a compound product of two latent components representing (1) shareholder activists' propensity to target a company and (2) executives' propensity to settle activists' demands privately. Our model explicitly decouples corporate governance expectations for the two latent components embedded in activism process, and thus allows us to relax assumptions of homogenous shareholder interests and constrained managerial discretion where corporate managers are expected to negotiate privately and settle only value‐creating activist demands. Bayesian analysis of zero‐inflated Poisson regression reveals that corporate governance relationships with activism vary across shareholder demands and private settlements. Managerial summary: Increasing shareholder activism has generated debates as to whether activism promotes managerial accountability and responsibility or instead encourages managerial short‐termism. Our research model allows for heterogeneous interests among a company's shareholders. We theorize and empirically investigate a broader role of corporate governance: governance mechanisms need to ensure that executives are not (1) ignoring activists' value‐increasing demands or (2) accommodating activists' value‐decreasing demands in a private, opaque manner that disenfranchises other shareholders. Our results indicate that corporate governance implications differ for visible shareholder demands in contrast with private activism. A plausible application of our model is that it provides estimates of the probability of the numbers of shareholder demands to be received by a firm and the probability of privately settling a demand. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of strategic dissent on organizational outcomes: A meta‐analytic integration

Research summary: Strategic dissent represents divergence in ideas, preferences, and beliefs related to ideal and/or future strategic emphasis. Conventional wisdom in strategic management holds that such differences in managerial cognitions lead to higher‐quality strategic decisions, and thus to enhanced firm performance. However, 4 decades of empirical research have not provided consistent findings or clear insights into the effects of strategic dissent. Hence, we analyze the relative validity of predictions about these effects from both social psychological theories of group behavior and information processing perspectives on decision‐making. Then, we conduct a meta‐analytic path analysis (MASEM) based on current empirical evidence. Synthesizing data from 78 articles, we put to rest the notion that strategic dissent leads to positive outcomes for organizations and estimate how negative its effects actually are. Managerial summary: Top management teams (TMTs) set the tone and direction for their firms in important ways. Top managers, however, often disagree over fundamental issues related to strategy. Such strategic dissent affects how important decisions are made, and thus how the firm performs. In more specific terms and contrary to popular belief, strategic dissent creates not only dysfunctional relationships among top managers, but also disrupts the process by which these managers exchange, discuss, and integrate information and ideas in making strategic decisions. In short, firms have not yet generated value through numerous perspectives, ideas, and opinions among their top managers. We discuss interventions that could prove helpful in efforts to benefit from having diverse cognitions in a TMT.     

Mapping managers' market orientations regarding new product success

Research shows that managers' cognitive structures influence their decisions and firm outcomes, and that managers' shared understanding is critical to new product success. Yet, little is known about the content and structure of managers' knowledge regarding their business's market orientation (MO) and how such orientation relates to new product development. By drawing from research on managerial cognition, we suggest that an examination of managers' cognitive maps of their business's MO can provide valuable insights. First, cognitive maps provide information regarding the relative ranking of concepts that managers consider important to new product success. Second, they offer insights about the relationship among concepts by illustrating the causal logic flow, centrality, and strength of the association between concepts. Finally, cognitive maps reveal a gestalt or pattern of managers' understandings. This pattern provides an overall view of their perceptions of their firms' MO. Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to begin developing theory to explain the nature and extent of the sharing of managers' understanding of their business's MO across a company within the context of new product development. We develop several theoretical propositions using established research on market orientation and an exploratory investigation of the cognitive maps of a stratified sample of thirty managers of a highly successful frozen food division of a multinational company. We argue that managers of innovative companies with a history of successful new products in moderately dynamic industries will have established market orientations, as reflected in cognitive maps, which emphasize customer orientations more than competitor or technological orientations. Moreover, we suggest that managers will consistently recognize the importance of interfunctional coordination because it influences the firm's orientations towards customers, competitors, and technology by facilitating sharing of important market information necessary for successful new product development. Furthermore, we propose that the division of labor and functional specialization in a company will result in predictable differences across cognitive maps of managers in different functions and levels of the organization. For example, senior managers are likely to have a more balanced and integrated MO than junior managers, due to their knowledge of organization wide issues. The article also proposes an agenda for scholars interested in investigating the relationship between managers' cognitive maps of their company's market orientation and new product success. We note the importance of studying managers' cognitive structures in different types of industries over time, and how managers' cognitive structures may relate to their company's ability to learn. Managers could use cognitive mapping to recognize and evaluate beliefs that inhibit the sharing and interpretation of information between managers, departments, and levels and could design appropriate interventions.     

Give it to us straight (most of the time): Top managers’ use of concrete language and its effect on investor reactions

Research Summary : Building on the communications and linguistics literatures, we explore the language attributes managers use in interactions with investors and the subsequent reactions of investors. Specifically, we hypothesize that top managers’ use of concrete language attributes in communication with investors broadly associates with positive investor reactions. We further posit that this relationship will be moderated by the level of firm risk. Our results support our hypotheses and, thus, offer important insights to the impression management literature. First, subtle elements of managerial communication can have significant impression management consequences. More specifically, language concreteness is a key language attribute that generally induces positive investor responses. Finally, the effectiveness of language concreteness is conditional on the informational environment of the firm. Managerial Summary : How can managers communicate in a way that presents the firm more positively or reduces the negativity associated with perceived firm risks? Our findings indicate that choosing appropriate persuasive language features in interactions with investors can help a firm manage its impressions. Specifically, we find that top managers’ use of concrete language that provides details and specific information in communication with investors, in general, garners positive investor reactions. Further, the effectiveness of top managers’ use of concrete language depends on investor concerns. More specifically, we find that when a firm is seen as having a riskier profile, using concrete language helps induce a more positive investor response; while when a firm is seen as low risk, using abstract language may be more beneficial.     

Empowering Management in New Product Development Units

In a study of management in new product development units, Josef Frischer compared managers who primarily intend empowering subordinates for the benefit of the whole organization (managers with the leadership motive pattern) with those who essentially are concerned with the establishment and maintenance of a friendly relationship with subordinates (managers high in need for affiliation). Thirty-five managers, heading new product development functions or units in four high-technology plants, were assessed along with their subordinates. When managers exhibited a leadership motive pattern, their subordinates perceived their work groups, their managers, and themselves as more influential (empowered). They also reported a more innovative climate as compared with subordinates of managers high in need for affiliation. Beside, those in subordinate positions, who are affected by the empowering managers, are given the opportunity to successfully influence and manage the turbulence and complexity arising from the development of new products, thus helping to establish an organizational climate that supports innovative pursuits.     

Reversing course: Competing technologies,mistakes, and renewal in flat panel displays

Research summary: The study explores renewal in a novel but understudied context—an era of ferment with competing technological options. It focuses on IBM's transition from market leadership in a failed path (plasma) to leadership in the emerging dominant technology (LCD) in the 1980s. Interviews and internal documents offer two primary factors explaining renewal at IBM. First, IBM Research had a hybrid structure that captured the benefits of both centralized and decentralized R&D. Second, middle managers shaped senior management cognitive frames to focus on business‐related issues instead of specific technical issues, thus bypassing biases often resulting from failure. The study offers an integrated framework on what facilitates flexibility at the technology, organization, and decision‐making levels. This flexibility helps firms survive a turbulent era of ferment. Managerial summary: Firms facing technological uncertainty may need to recover from unlucky bets. But responding to failure is politically and organizationally difficult. This study explores how IBM recovered from its failed bet on plasma displays to lead the LCD display market. This study identifies six key factors, highlighting two. First, IBM's researchers received centralized funding, but could also receive funding directly from division managers. This structure helped preserve options and variety. Second, internal LCD champions focused on the business case for displays and not technology. This fostered technology agnosticism and helped avoid managerial biases from failure. For managers looking to use real options to maintain flexibility in an uncertain environment, this study offers clear suggestions related to design and decision making that can foster flexibility. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.