Keeping up with the Joneses, consumer ethnocentrism, and optimal taxation

This paper sets up a two-good (domestically- and internationally-produced goods) model of a small open economy with consumption externalities and uses it to examine the optimal taxation. Since keeping up with the Joneses leads an individual consumption's to impose a negative externality on the consumption of others, a consumption tax and tariff are thereby socially desirable to correct this distortion. Due to the fact that the government has to account for additional distortion caused by consumer ethnocentrism and that keeping up with the Joneses in the consumption of domestic goods tends to reinforce the influence of ethnocentrism on the purchase of domestic products, the consumption of imported goods is subject to a higher tariff rate because of the cross-market externality. Of interest, if consumption only involves an own-market externality, there is no cyclical consequence for the optimal taxes. However, if consumption involves both own- and cross-market externalities, the optimal tariff is state-contingent and, more specifically, is countercyclical.     

A comparison between the log-linear and the parameterized expectations methods

This paper compares the performance of a log-linear method and a parameterized expectations method in solving a dynamic general equilibrium endogenous growth model with human capital. Quantitative evaluation based on second moment statistics shows that the results provided by the two numerical methods are very similar in this framework whenever the propagation mechanism of technology shocks is weak. However, the cross correlations of some relevant variables in the RBC literature obtained from the two methods are significantly different when the model exhibits a strong propagation mechanism. The parameterized expectations method captures the sensitiviness of second moment statistics to the curvature of the utility function while the log-linear method does not.     

Public debt in a basic endogenous growth model

We work out the mechanism that makes public debt affect the allocation of resources in the long-run. To do so we analyze an AK growth model with elastic labor supply and a government sector. The government levies a distortionary income tax and issues bonds to finance lump-sum transfers and non-distortionary public spending. We show that the long-run growth rate is the smaller the higher the debt ratio if the government adjusts public spending to fulfill its inter-temporal budget constraint. If the government adjusts lump-sum transfers the public debt ratio does not affect the balanced growth rate.     

Inflationary Financing of Government Expenditure in an Endogenous Growth Model

This paper analyses the role of inflation in economies with endogenous growth and congestion in public services. Optimal policy rules are derived for public services and investment. The other findings are as follows. Monetary policy should maximize economic growth. The more inefficient the public sector is, the higher the growth‐maximizing inflation rate is. If a currency union accepts a new member with an inefficient public sector, this will boost inflation in the union and decrease growth and welfare in all member economies of the union.     

A golden rule of public finance or a fixed deficit regime?: Growth and welfare effects of budget rules

In this paper, we compare growth and welfare effects of various budget rules within an endogenous growth model with productive public capital, utility enhancing public consumption and public debt. We find that introducing a fixed deficit regime does not affect the long run growth rate compared to a balanced budget while establishing a golden rule results in higher growth. Simulations of welfare effects indicate that a golden rule leads to highest welfare followed by a balanced budget and a fixed deficit regime. A maximum fraction of deficit financed public investment is derived. Varying the intertemporal elasticity of substitution shows that economies populated by households who have a strong tendency to smooth consumption should adhere to a balanced budget from a welfare point of view.     

Can productive government spending be a source of equilibrium indeterminacy?

This paper presents an examination of the interaction between indeterminacy and productive government spending financed by taxes in a one-sector growth model. In the paper, we show that the possibility of indeterminacy is positively affected by dependence on income tax financing and is negatively affected by consumption tax financing. Under balanced budget rules, a key determinant for indeterminacy is a revenue source for providing public services (i.e. income tax financing) rather than the presence of productive government spending.     

SECTOR‐SPECIFIC EXTERNALITIES AND STATUS PREFERENCES IN THE UZAWA‐LUCAS MODEL*

This paper shows that introducing preferences for social status based on human capital holdings modifies the finding of Gómez (2004 ) that sector‐specific externalities associated with human capital in the goods sector do not violate the optimality of the competitive economy in the Uzawa–Lucas model. The effect of an increase in the degree of sector‐specific externalities is qualitatively the same as that of an increase in the strength of the desire for status. Hence, paradoxically, a greater degree of sector‐specific externalities makes human capital accumulation more excessive from the social point of view.     

Public investment in developing countries: A blessing or a curse?

This paper analyzes the relationship between public and private investment in developing countries. We set up a simple theoretical model where two countervailing forces coexist. On the one hand, public investment raises the marginal productivity of private capital and leads to potential crowding-in of private investment. On the other hand, weak institutions and restricted access to financing could diminish the positive effects of public investment projects and crowd-out private investment. The empirical results - which exploit both the time series and cross sectional variation in the data using a panel of 116 developing countries with annual observations between 1980 and 2006 - suggest that on average the crowing-out effect dominates. Moreover, we find that this crowing-out effect is dampened (or even reversed) in countries with better institutions - where the marginal productivity of public investment is conceivably higher - and that are more open to international trade and financial flows, such that financing constraints are less binding.     

The trade-off between public debt reduction and automatic stabilisation

This paper addresses the basic tradeoff between the stabilisation properties of budgets and the sustainability of long run fiscal positions. The modeling framework consists of a simple non-monetary endowment economy with overlapping generations, extended to account for stochastic endowments and borrowing constrained households. A benign government chooses the optimal degree of responsiveness of net taxes to individual incomes and an optimal measure of long-run public debt in order to smooth households' consumption across states of nature. In the presence of a deficit constraint for the government, the results point to the desire for lower debt levels than those currently prevailing in European Union countries in order to enable a more effective hedging of personal income uncertainty by means of more active automatic fiscal stabilisers. The optimal degree of automatic stabilisation and debt reduction is conditional on the characteristics of economic cycles.     

Public debt and economic growth: what do neoclassical growth models teach us?

This paper aims to quantify the crowding-out effect of public debt and the related loss in long-run output in neoclassical growth models. To accomplish this task, we incorporate the government sector into the Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans (RCK) model, the Blanchard model and the Solow model, which differ only in their assumptions concerning the consumption behaviour of households. We also introduce a general framework that is capable of gauging the burden of public debt in a neoclassical world in the case of any type of consumption behaviour. Our results are threefold. First, contrary to the RCK model, public debt reduces long-run output in the Blanchard model and the Solow model, although to a different extent: the crowding-out effect is marginal in the former, whereas it can be very large in the latter. Second, the burden of public debt is country-specific depending crucially on the saving rate and the population growth rate. Finally, in developed countries the upper limit of the output loss related to public debt is moderate at best even if distortionary taxes are taken into account.     

Fiscal inertia, donor credibility, and the monetary management of aid surges

Donors cannot pre-commit to support scaled-up public spending programs on a continuing basis, nor can governments credibly commit to curtail expenditure rapidly in the event that aid revenues contract. An aid boom may therefore be accompanied by a credibility problem. When this is the case, the absorb-and-spend strategy recommended by the IMF leads to capital flight, higher inflation, and large current account surpluses inclusive of aid. The right policy package combines a critical minimum degree of fiscal restraint with reverse sterilization.     

The impact of public capital on the US private economy: new evidence and analysis

This paper presents new evidence on the impact of public capital on the productivity of the US private sector. Using a production function approach, we estimate the impact of public investment on private capital productivity, specifically addressing the empirical critiques of earlier studies. We find evidence of a cointegrating relationship in a dynamic specification of an empirical model that includes public infrastructure as a factor of production, indicating the existence of a long‐run relationship between the US public capital stock and the productivity of the private capital stock. The results are used to explore how the decline in the growth rate of the public capital stock would have affected the performance of the private sector.     

Production subsidies and redistribution

Who gains from stimulating output? We explore a dynamic model with production subsidies where the population is heterogeneous in one dimension: wealth. There are two channels through which production subsidies redistribute resources across the population. First, poorer agents gain from a rise in wages, since—to the extent there is an operative wealth effect in labor supply—they work harder. Second, because a current output boost will raise consumption today relative to the future, thus lowering real interest rates, poor agents gain in relative terms since their income is based less on interest income. We examine optimal redistribution from the perspective of an arbitrary consumer in the population. We show that, if this consumer has commitment at time zero to set all present and future subsidy rates, and for a class of preferences that admits aggregation in wealth, then output stimulation, and hence redistribution, will only occur at time zero; after that, subsidies are zero. A byproduct of our analysis of this environment is a median-voter theorem: with direct voting over subsidy sequences at time zero, the sequence preferred by the median-wealth consumer is the unique outcome. We also study lack of commitment, since interest-rate manipulation is associated with time inconsistency. We analyze this case formally by looking at the Markov-perfect (time-consistent) equilibrium in a game between successive identical decision makers (e.g., the median agent). Here, subsidies persist—they are constant over time—and are more distortionary than under commitment. Moreover, whereas under commitment asset inequality changes initially—in favor of the consumer who decides on policy—it does not under lack of commitment.