EVA动量在企业业绩评价中的应用

EVA Dimensions公司于2009年在EVA(经济增加值)指标的基础上创立了EVA动量(EVA Momentum)指标,以一段时间内EVA的增加量与上阶段销售额的比值作为价值创造能力的衡量指标,并据此以年为单位颁布价值创造排名。该指标相比传统的业绩评价指标具有很多优势,可以在企业业绩评价与分析中得以广泛应用。     

经济增加值与平衡计分卡的比较研究与应用探讨

众所周知,传统的企业业绩评价体系主要以财务指标为核心,在实际运用中存在着许多弊端.在这种形势下,产生了两种先进的业绩评价理论:经济增加值与平衡计分卡.这两者是目前财务管理及实务界讨论的焦点,同时也代表了企业业绩评价的发展方向.本文中笔者对经济增加值和平衡计分卡的基本原理、应用等方面进行了比较,寻找企业的最佳业绩评价体系.     

小议经济增加值在国有企业绩效考核中的运用

许多成功案例表明,经济增加值指标能够促进企业业绩获得很好的发展,从2010年起,该指标也将引入国有企业绩效考核.因此,介绍和研究经济增加值的业绩评价方法具有重要的现实意义.国有企业采用经济增加值考核指标应做到:应加强管理理念的提升,对经济增加值考核指标的设计应简明,应用经济增加值应循序渐进.经济增加值考核指标的运用能够提高企业资本使用效率,实现企业长期的可持续发展.     

小议经济增加值在国有企业绩效考核中的运用

许多成功案例表明。经济增加值指标能够促进企业业绩获得很好的发展，从2010年起，该指标也将引入国有企业绩效考核。因此，介绍和研究经济增加值的业绩评价方法具有重要的现实意义。国有企业采用经济增加值考核指标应做到：应加强管理理念的提升，对经济增加值考核指标的设计应简明，应用经济增加值应循序渐进。经济增加值考核指标的运用能够提高企业资本使用效率，实现企业长期的可持续发展。     

上市公司EVA测算及与会计利润的比较——以信达地产为例

EVA(经济增加值)是一种经营业绩评价指标,与传统的会计利润相比,EVA考虑了所有的资本成本,是名副其实的经济利润.它促使管理人员和财务人员更加关心公司的经营业绩是否真正意义上得到了实质性的改善.     

浅析经济增加值的利与弊

我国在20世纪末引入了新型的企业业绩评价与激励系-经济增加值,并将于2010年在央企全面推行经济增加值考核。本文主要通过经济增加值与传统会计利润指标的对比分析,总结出采用经济增加值的利与弊。     

浅析经济增加值的利与弊

我国在20世纪末引入了新型的企业业绩评价与激励系一经济增加值,并将于2010年在央企全面推行经济增加值考核.本文主要通过经济增加值与传统会计利润指标的对比分析,总结出采用经济增加值的利与弊.     

电力企业经济增加值应用研究

经济增加值是目前影响最大与应用最广的一项电力企业业绩评价指标。本文结合电力企业的特点和自身的实践经验,阐述了经济增加值的理论和发展史,说明了经济增加值的现状和研究意义,分析了影响电力企业经济增加值的主要因素,指出了电力企业经济增加值的管理措施,从而促进电力企业的发展。     

经济增加值（EVA）在业绩评价中的优势与局限性

一、经济增加值(Economic Value Added,简称EVA)的产生及基本内涵西方企业业绩评价体系的发展是以欧美企业业绩评价体系的发展为代表的。其发展历程大致可划分为三个阶段:成本业绩评价时期(19世纪初-20世纪初)、财务业绩评价时期(20世纪初-20世纪90年代)和企业业绩评价指标体系的创新时期(20世纪90年代至今)。通常把成本业绩评价时期和财务业绩评价时期通称为传统的企业业绩评价阶段,随后提出的业绩评价模式大体是针对传统阶段财务指标的缺陷从不同角度进行修正。主要包括在财务指标基础上的调整以及引入非财务指标等。经济增加值即属于…     

EVA指标在央企业绩评价应用中的优势及其局限性

企业业绩评价是及时评价、总结企业经营管理经验、采取措施提高企业经营效率的重要环节。2010年1月,国资委发布《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》,将经济增加值(EVA)指标列为中央企业负责人年度经营业绩考核的基本指标之一。EVA指标考核有很多传统业绩评价指标无法比拟的优势,但由于在我国的应用还不够成熟,在自身计算以及实践中还存在很多局限性。     

中国式经济增加值考核是否会导致投资不足

以央企控股上市公司为样本,研究发现经济增加值不仅没有导致企业投资不足,而且起到了抑制作用。研究结果表明,经济增加值为核心的业绩评价方式对当前央企构建价值投资理念和实现股东价值最大化经营目标具有重要正向作用。     

基于EVA的国企价值管理体系构建

2010年始,国资委在央企全面推行以EVA为核心指标的年度经营业绩考核体系,国企如何建立与此相适应的价值管理体系是亟需解决的理论和实践问题.本文在阐述EVA的历史沿革、核心理念、国资委EVA考核体系政策意义基础上,初步探讨了以EVA为导向的国企价值管理体系的几个核心要素-战略管控、财务决策、绩效考核和激励制度设计相关问...     

市场竞争、EVA评价与企业过度投资

在国资委对央企全面推行经济增加值(EVA)业绩考核之际,本文利用央企控股上市公司的数据,实证检验了EVA对企业过度投资的影响。研究发现,EVA评价体系的实施可显著降低央企过度投资;进一步研究显示,市场竞争环境差异对EVA抑制过度投资的效果产生显著影响,竞争度越高的行业EVA抑制企业过度投资的作用更为明显;反之则并不显著。本文研究结论支持了EVA评价机制应用的有效性,但也从产业竞争角度证明市场经营环境的改善是进一步提升EVA业绩评价体系有效性充分发挥的关键。     

央企是否迎合了EVA考核?——基于高管持股因素影响的研究(英文)

Since 2010, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (hereafter SASAC) started the full implementation of the EVA evaluation system in central enterprises. Our research finds out that the central enterprises have obvious acted to meet the EVA assessment, that is, executives intentionally regulate major EVA adjustments to gain a higher EVA performance. We also find that the factor of shareholding rate of executives may in some extent weaken the effect of the EVA assessment and there shows a U-shaped or inverted U-shaped relation between shareholding rate and each adjustment indicator.     

The Validity of the Economic Value Added Approach: an Empirical Application

This study investigates the relative explanatory power of the Economic Value Added (EVA) model with respect to stock returns and firms' market value, compared to established accounting variables (e.g. net income, operating income), in the context of a small European developing market, namely the Athens Stock Exchange, in its first market‐wide application of the EVA measure. Relative information content tests reveal that net and operating income appear to be more value relevant than EVA. Additionally, incremental information tests suggest that EVA unique components add only marginally to the information content of accounting profit. Moreover, EVA does not appear to have a stronger correlation with firms' Market Value Added than the other variables, suggesting that – for our Greek dataset – EVA, even though useful as a performance evaluation tool, need not necessarily be more correlated with shareholder's value than established accounting variables.     

基于EVA的商业银行经济资本管理与价值创造研究

只有为企业带来超过资本最低回报要求的业务,才真正为企业创造了价值,而那些创造收益水平低于资本最低回报要求的业务,实际上是在消耗企业的价值,因而价值最大化是银行经营最终目标。银行经济资本管理可以为银行创造价值。以EVA作为价值创造能力衡量指标,经济资本管理为银行创造价值路径有四个:绩效考评、战略制定、产品定价和资产组合选择。     

Does EVA performance evaluation improve the value of cash holdings? Evidence from China

This paper investigates the influence of the economic value added(EVA)performance evaluation,issued in 2010 by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administra...     

Incentives and Investor Expectations

This article argues that the Expectations‐Based Management (EBM) measure proposed by Copeland and Dolgoff (in the previous article) is essentially the same measure that EVA companies have used for years as the basis for performance evaluation and incentive compensation. After pointing out that the analyst‐based measures cited by Copeland and Dolgoff do not provide a basis for a workable compensation plan, the authors present the outline of a widely used expectations‐based EVA bonus plan. In so doing, they demonstrate the two key steps in designing such a plan: (1) using a company's “Future Growth Value”—the part of its current market value that cannot be accounted for by its current earnings— to calibrate the series of annual EVA “improvements” expected by the market; and (2) determining the executive's share of those improvements and thus of the company's expected “excess” return. One of the major objections to the use of EVA, or any single‐period measure, as the basis for a performance evaluation and incentive comp plan is its inability to reflect the longer‐run consequences of current investment and operating decisions. The authors close by presenting a solution to this “delayed productivity of capital” problem in the form of an internal accounting approach for dealing with acquisitions and other large strategic investments.     

EVA, ACCOUNTING PROFITS, AND CEO TURNOVER: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION, 1985–1994

A growing number of companies use EVA or related measures of economic profits as metrics for corporate planning and executive compensation. Unlike traditional accounting measures of performance, EVA attempts to measure the value that firms create or destroy by subtracting a capital charge from the cash returns they generate on invested capital. For this reason, EVA is seen by its proponents as providing the most reliable year-to-year indicator of a market based performance measure known as market value added, or MVA. Although EVA and MVA have received considerable attention in recent years, there has been little empirical study of these performance measures—and what studies have been produced have provided mixed results. This study joins the debate over EVA vs. conventional accounting measures by asking a different question: Which performance measures do the best job of explaining not only stock returns, but the probability that a CEO will be dismissed for poor performance? Using a sample of 452 firms during the period 1985–1994, the authors report that EVA has a somewhat stronger correlation with stock price performance than conventional accounting measures such as ROE and ROA. But, of greater import, EVA appears to be a considerably more reliable indicator of CEO turnover than conventional accounting measures.     

EVA Momentum: The One Ratio That Tells the Whole Story

Virtually all corporate managers use ratios like profit margin, earnings growth, and return on equity to set goals, analyze operations, and measure success or failure. Yet all ratios are wrong in the sense that every one of them can make it appear that operations are improving when a business actually is faltering, and vice versa .
In this article, one of the pioneers of the modern economic profit school of financial management claims to have discovered a new ratio that accurately consolidates all the pluses and minuses of decisions and operations into a single reliable overall measure that cannot be increased without truly creating value. "EVA Momentum," as the measure is called, is the change in a company's economic profit (or EVA) in a given period divided by its sales in the prior period. In other words, it is the size-adjusted change in economic profit.
The author goes on to demonstrate why most companies can use EVA Momentum as both their overarching financial target and the best way to keep score for multiple business lines. The article also shows why EVA Momentum is a better performance measure than ROI and that, as a diagnostic and management tool, it provides a more effective alternative to the popular DuPont ROI formula. Unlike the DuPont formula, EVA Momentum reflects the contributions to overall performance of important factors such as profitable growth, strategic retrenchment, and the quality of resource allocation decisions in general. At the same time, it provides a more accurate and informative means of examining performance, weighing tradeoffs, identifying investment opportunities, and prioritizing initiatives—all on the basis of their expected impact on a company's market value.