Litigation with Symmetric Bargaining and Two-Sided Incomplete Information

We construct game-theoretic foundations for bargaining in theshadow of a trial. Plaintiff and defendant both have noisy signalsof a common-value trial judgment and make simultaneous offersto settle. If the offers cross, they settle on the average offer;otherwise, both litigants incur an additional cost and the judgmentis imposed at trial. We obtain an essentially unique Nash equilibriumand characterize its conditional trial probabilities and judgments.Some of the results are intuitive. For example, an increasein trial cost (or a decrease in the range of possible outcomes)reduces the probability of a trial. We obtain a precise nonlinearexpression for the relationship. Other results reverse findingsfrom previous literature. For example, trials are possible evenwhen the defendant's signal indicates a higher potential judgmentthan the plaintiff's signal, and when trial costs are low, middlingcases (rather than extreme cases) are more likely to settle.     

Folk Theorem For Bilateral Bargaining with Vector Endowments

We analyse a bargaining game of two players on the division of the sum of their vector endowments, with alternating proposals and discounting of single period utilities. The pair of endowments is not weakly Pareto‐efficient. Until they reach an agreement, each of the parties can withdraw from bargaining and keep their endowments. Any strictly individually rational division of the sum of endowments can emerge in some subgame perfect equilibrium if discount factors are close enough to one. Each subgame perfect equilibrium, in which the parties’ decisions do not depend on past rejected proposals, leads to a weakly Pareto‐efficient agreement in the first period.     

双边市场与平台理论研究综述

有关双边市场和平台理论的研究是近年来产业经济学的最新进展之一.传统的"单边"市场仅涉及商品的交易,但在双边市场中,"平台"则成为核心,它通过实现两种(或多种)顾客之间的接触获取利润.研究中一般将双边市场分为交易中介、媒体、支付工具、软件平台等四种类型,根据这一划分对这四个方面的研究成果进行综述,总结各领域所重点关注的问题、得到的主要结论及研究中的重点,并指出未来可能的研究方向.     

Wage Bargaining Versus Efficiency Wages: A Synthesis

We construct a model integrating the efficiency wage model of Shapiro–Stiglitz (1984) (SS), with an individual wage bargaining model in the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides (DMP) tradition where firms and workers form pairwise matches. We show that when workers may threaten to shirk on the job and there is individual wage bargaining, the wage is always higher and employment lower than in either the SS model, or the (appropriately modified) DMP model. When firms determine workers' efforts unilaterally, efforts are set inefficiently low in the SS model. In the bargaining model, effort is higher, and is first best when the worker non–shirking constraint does not bind. The overall equilibrium allocation may then be more or less efficient than in the SS model, but is always less efficient than in a pure bargaining model with no moral hazard.     

Externalities: A Note on Avoiding Confusion

In distinguishing the difference between a genuine externality and a pecuniary externity, Bohanon observes that the latter never enters third-party utility (or production) functions, whereas this is always the case with technical externalities.     

A Bargaining Experiment to Motivate Discussion on Fairness

The author presents a classroom version of the popular research game called the Ultimatum Game. Researchers are placing growing importance on how fairness affects behavior, and this experiment provides a useful, fun, and engaging way in which a day or two of class time can be spent on the topic. The appendix contains all of the materials necessary to conduct this experiment, and the experiment can highlight several items of interest for the instructor. First, different individuals place different subjective weights on concerns for fairness versus money. Second, theories that incorporate concerns for fairness into agents' preferences can often explain behavior better than those that do not. Finally, when it is relatively cheap to purchase fairness (or equality) individuals purchase more of it. The classroom results can motivate discussion of a downward sloping demand curve for fairness.     

包容性增长——基于文献的注解

通过回顾现有文献,梳理了包容性增长的提出和倡导背景、内涵本质、实现对策,以及包容性增长的度量和实证量化研究及其具体应用。研究表明,从具体的应用领域和行业层面切入进行深度研究,进而在度量方法方面有所突破,探寻经验证据并提出具有针对性和可操作性的政策建议,是包容性增长研究可行的方向,可以推动包容性增长的践行。     

Optimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining: A Dynamic Perspective

Abstract. We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: (i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues and (ii) labour markets are subject to an inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets.     

A Note on Regulating Oligopolistic Industries: A Hierarchical Model

In a 1994 paper, extending the well-known incremental surplus subsidy scheme of Sappington and Sibley, Schwermer presented a non-Bayesian incentive scheme for regulating a Cournot oligopoly industry. This note designs an oligopolistic incentive scheme for a hierarchical Stackelberg model in which firms choose outputs sequentially.     

双边网络型市场结构下政府传媒规制及其优化

我国传媒产业一直在政府规制和市场竞争的双轨制下运行,政府监管的越位和市场竞争的不充分造成我国传媒产业集中度差、媒介整合能力低、区域分割以及市场竞争力不强的格局.传媒产业的社会媒介特征决定了其发展路径必定是在政府高效监管和有效市场竞争下逐步发展完善,双边网络型市场结构是我国传媒业发展的必然趋势.在这一市场结构下,政府应加强对传媒产业的有效监管和合理引导,通过制度创新提供促进传媒产业发展的市场环境,产业内部应形成有效竞争从而提升产业的整体竞争力.     

产业组织的双边市场理论——一个文献综述

本文对双边市场理论的相关文献进行梳理,并从双边市场的概念界定、特征、市场结构、市场行为、市场绩效等五个方面进行评述,认为双边市场理论研究将呈现出三大发展趋势:双边市场的市场绩效研究范围将进一步扩展;双边市场的政策制定将成为未来发展的一大趋势;双边市场的实证分析及动态研究将逐步加强.     

A Note on Inflation Targeting

The authors present a pedagogical graphical exposition to illustrate the stabilizing effect of price target zones. Based on a textbook AD-AS apparatus, they find that authorities' commitment to defend a price target zone will affect the public's inflation expectations and, in turn, reduce actual inflation. They also find that, when the economy experiences supply shocks, the announcement that the monetary authorities intend to defend a price target zone will reduce the variability of domestic prices but raise the variability of domestic output relative to a free-price regime. However, when the economy experiences demand shocks, a price target zone tends to lower the variability of both domestic prices and out-put relative to a free-price regime.     

A Note on Tradeable Permits

This note offers a perspective on whether tradeable permits are a passing fad or an enduring trend. It does so in noting how various types of tradeable permit systems relate to conventional environmental permits, what are the unique requirements of tradeable permit systems, and why they might be preferred to alternative instruments. A final observation concerns the analogy between tradeable permits for environmental goods and private property in land. This note first appeared in the CESifo Forum, 4: 3 (Spring 2003), a quarterly publication of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich, Germany, as an invited article. Permission to republish is gratefully acknowledged. In forming the ideas expressed here, I am indebted to many years of discussion and collaborative research with Paul Joskow, Juan-Pablo Montero, David Harrison, and Richard Schmalensee. All errors of fact and interpretation remain mine.     

A Note on Compensation Schemes

In general, an economic reform wins unanimous support only if it incorporates a scheme of compensation.
It is widely believed that
(a) all lump-sum compensations: (i) have impractical information requirements about the technology of firms and the preferences of households, or (ii) are not manipulation-proof.
(b) Non-lumpsum compensations constitute feasible alternatives.
Further to the dissenting views of Kemp and Wan, this note makes two points: The first is that in a realistic model with overlapping generations, there is a lump-sum compensation scheme which is manipulation-proof . The second is that the presence of multiple equilibria may create havoc for a non-lumpsum compensation scheme. In real life, we have no information to rule out multiplicity.