To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets

In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990, Games Econ. Behavior2, 29–46). In their duopoly game firms can choose their quantities in one of two periods before the market clears. If a firm commits to a quantity in period 1, it does not know whether the other firm also commits early. By waiting until period 2, a firm can observe the other firm's period-1 action. Hamilton and Slutsky predicted the emergence of endogenous Stackelberg leadership. Our data, however, do not confirm the theory. While Stackelberg equilibria are extremely rare, we often observe endogenous Cournot outcomes and sometimes collusive play. This is partly driven by the fact that endogenous Stackelberg followers learn to behave in a reciprocal fashion over time, i.e., they learn to reward cooperation and to punish exploitation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92, D43.     

From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence

We consider a sequential two-party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. The informed second mover can either accept or reject the offer and payoffs are determined as in the ultimatum game. Otherwise the uninformed second mover states his own demand and payoffs are determined as in the Nash demand game. In the experiment we vary the commonly known probability of information transmission. Our main finding is that first movers’ and uninformed second movers’ demands adjust to this probability as qualitatively predicted, that is, first movers’ (uninformed second movers’) demands are lower (higher) the lower the probability of information transmission. JEL Classification C72 · C78 · C92     

Second Mover Disadvantages in a Three-Player Stackelberg Game with Private Information

I consider a three-player Stackelberg. game where each player has its private signal concerning stochastic demand. I show that at a perfectly revealing equilibrium, the second mover earns the lowest and the third mover the highest expected profit of the three. I characterize this result by the strategic substitutes or complements relationships among three firms at the equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82, and L13.     

MANAGED TRADE WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION*

This article illustrates the importance of imperfect information in self‐enforcing trade agreements. It shows that expected welfare is higher with current period uncertainty, and a high level of uncertainty may even undermine the need for a safeguard clause. These results were derived by extending the seminal paper by Bagwell and Staiger (The American Economic Review 80 (1990), 779–95) to account for current period uncertainty.     

Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment

[1]claims that, in models of commitment, “the first-mover advantage is eliminated when there is aslightamount of noise associated with the observation of the first-mover's selection.” We show that the validity of this claim depends crucially on the restriction to pure strategy equilibria. The game analyzed by Bagwell always has a mixed equilibrium that is close to the Stackelberg equilibrium when the noise is small. Furthermore, an equilibrium selection theory that combines elements from the theory of[7]with elements from the theory of [6], actually selects this “noisy Stackelberg equilibrium.”Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.     

Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment

The Dixit (Econ J 90:95–106, 1980) hypothesis that incumbents use investment in capacity to deter potential entrants has found little empirical support. Bagwell and Ramey (J Econ 27:660–680, 1996) propose a model where, in the unique game-theoretic prediction based on forward induction or iterated elimination of weakly-dominated strategies, the incumbent does not have the strategic advantage. We conduct an experiment with games inspired by these models. In the Dixit-style game, the incumbent monopolizes the market most of the time even without the investment in capacity. In our Bagwell-and-Ramey-style game, the incumbent also tends to keep the market, in contrast to the predictions of an entrant advantage. Nevertheless, we find strong evidence that forward induction affects the behavior of most participants. The results of our games suggest that players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without having to pre-commit capacity. In our Bagwell–Ramey game, evolution and learning do not drive out this perception. We back these claims with data analysis and a theoretical framework for dynamics. Financial support by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia and Tecnología (SEC2002-01352 and SEJ2006-11665-C02-01) and the Barcelona Economic Program of CREA and excellent research assistance by David Rodríguez are gratefully acknowledged. The authors thank Aurora García Gallego and Armin Schmutzler for helpful comments.     

Saliency of outside options in the lost wallet game

This paper reports an experiment designed to shed light on an empirical puzzle observed by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (Games and Economic Behavior 30:163–182, 2000) that the size of the foregone outside option by the first mover does not affect the behavior of the second mover in a lost wallet game. Our conjecture was that the original protocol may not have made the size of the forgone outside option salient to second movers. Therefore, we change two features of the Dufwenberg and Gneezy protocol: (i) instead of the strategy method we implement a direct response method (sequential play) for the decision of the second mover; and (ii) we use paper money certificates that are passed between the subjects rather than having subjects write down numbers representing their decisions. We observe that our procedure yields qualitatively the same result as the Dufwenberg and Gneezy experiment, i.e., the second movers do not respond to the change in the outside option of the first movers.     

Information technology investment strategies: a review and synthesis of the literature

In spite of high importance of information technology (IT) investments, managers do not have sufficient guidelines to formulate IT investment strategy of a firm. In this paper, we review the literature to determine the factors that influence the IT investment strategy. The concept of IT investment strategy so far considered two domains: intensity and proactiveness; we enhance this concept by adding the domain of investment focus. Through this review, we made an attempt to answer three strategic questions related to IT investments: (i) level of investment that a firm should make in IT, that is, investment intensity; (ii) areas of firm where these investments should be more focused, that is, investment focus; and (iii) timing of investment, that is, whether to be an early mover in adopting IT or whether to invest relatively late compared to competitors.     

HOW MANY FIRMS BECOME LEADERS?*

This paper investigates a quantity-setting oligopoly model with endogenous timing. We formulate an n-firm two-period model. Each firm chooses whether to take its action in period 1 or take its action in period 2 after observing the first-period actions of other firms. We call firms taking their actions in period 1 ‘leaders’ and those taking action in period 2 ‘following’. We find that the number of followers is at most one regardless of whether leaders have first mover advantage.     

Economics of externalities and public policy

In this paper we study a particular case of “multiple” externalities associated to the production of a good/activity, whose external effects can change from positive to negative depending on the level of output (intersecting externalities). To analyze their impact on the public policy we propose a very simple two-agent partial equilibrium model in the technological context of externalities. In a static framework, the centralized solution always implies an optimal policy, which may consist of taxation or subsidization depending on the individual optimum and on the technology parameters. In a dynamic model with local knowledge of the efficiency function and instantaneous output adjustments, such an optimal policy can be structurally stable or unstable. In the latter case, under small changes of the parameters the policy may switch from low taxation/subsidization to high taxation/subsidization or vice versa, or even jump discontinuously from taxation to subsidization or vice versa. Furthermore, the decentralized solution based upon “tradable rights” can be economically equivalent to the centralized solution in the form of taxation policy but the two solutions may be not politically equivalent.

A simple note on herd behaviour

In his ‘Simple model of herd behaviour’, (Banerjee A (1992) A simple model of herd behaviour. Q J Econ CVII:797–817) shows that—in a sequential game—if the first two players have chosen the same action, player 3 and all subsequent players will ignore his/her own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. In this paper, we analyse the role played by the tie-breaking assumptions in reaching the equilibrium. We show that: players’ strategies are parameter dependent—an incorrect herd may be reversed; a correct herd is irreversible.

Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysis from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective

We construct a model in which an investment opportunity arisesfor a first mover before it knows the identity of a second moverand in which joint location results in a negative externality.Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover cannotbargain over its ex ante investment decision with the anonymoussecond mover. Given this departure from the setting of the Coasetheorem, the allocation of property rights over the externalityhas real effects on social welfare. We investigate the relativeefficiency of property rights regimes used in practice: injunctions,damages, the ruling in the Spur Industries case, etc. The firstbest can be obtained by allocating property rights (in particularthe right to sue for damages) to the second mover. Allocatingproperty rights to the first mover, as a "coming to the nuisance"rule entails, leads to overinvestment. In contrast to conventionalwisdom, this inefficiency persists even if a monopoly landownercontrols all the land on which the parties may locate.     

Common Trends and Common Cycles in Per Capita GDP: The Case of the G7 Countries, 1870–2001

In this paper we analyze per capita incomes of the G7 countries using the common cycles test developed by Vahid and Engle (Journal of Applied Econometrics, 8:341–360, 1993) and extended by Hecq et al. (Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 62:511–532, 2000; Econometric Reviews, 21:273–307, 2002) and the common trend test developed by Johansen (Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 12:231–254, 1988). Our main contribution is that we impose the common cycle and common trend restrictions in decomposing the innovations into permanent and transitory components. Our main finding is permanent shocks explain the bulk of the variations in incomes for the G7 countries over short time horizons, and is in sharp contrast to the bulk of the recent literature. We attribute this to the greater forecasting accuracy achieved, which we later confirm through performing a post sample forecasting exercise, from the variance decomposition analysis.

The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment

In this paper, the strategy method's impact on behavior in sequential bargaining games is investigated. Besides the decision procedure (hot versus cold), we varied the second mover punishment costs (high versus low). Significant impacts of both treatment variables were observed. For example, second movers punished significantly more often in the hot version of the low cost game. Furthermore, first mover behavior was significantly different in the hot and cold versions of both games. In the hot games, first mover behavior suggests an expectation of decreased rewards and/or punishments from second movers. We observed, however, no decrease in reward and an increase in punishment. The hot cold variable only informs first movers that the decision procedure used by second movers has changed. Therefore, first mover behavior must be shaped by their perceived assessment concerning how second movers make decisions. We argue that first mover behavior can be explained by the interaction of two well-known psychological effects: the consensus and positive self-image effects.     

Benchmarking Corporate Social Responsibility within Spanish Companies

In this paper, the authors focus on the influence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) upon business profitability. In order to be capable of working with homogeneous data, the authors’ starting point is to use the criteria defined by PricewaterhouseCoopers’ work on the subject, and published by the Spanish journal Actualidad Económica. In this work, an index was created which assigns between one and five points to the companies depending on the importance given by them to CSR. The CSR measurement published by the Observatorio de la RSE will also be considered. In order to measure companies’ profitability, this paper will take into account their return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) of 2005 and 2006. The authors’ purpose is to demonstrate that the relationship between CSR and business profitability is neutral.

Imagination and society. The affective side of institutions

Since the contributions by D. North [(1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. New York: CUP] and his Nobel Prize lecture [(1994). Economic performance through time, Nobel Prize Lecture. The American Economic Review, 84(3), 359–368], the relationship between mind and institutions has been increasingly investigated by economists. Mantzavinos, North, and Shariq [(2004). Learning, institutions, and economic performance. Perspectives on Politics, 2(1), 75–84] introduced the expression cognitive institutionalism in order to define this stream of research. In the first part of the paper we discuss some recent findings of the cognitive approach to institutions and its roots in the history of economic ideas. We also claim that in such an approach, no place has yet been found for a crucial faculty of the human mind, imagination. We then explore the concept of radical imaginary developed by Cornelius Castoriadis in his book The Imaginary Institution of Society (1975; 1987). From the perspective of cognitive economics, and on the grounds of Castoriadis’ legacy, we aim at highlighting some basic mechanisms of interaction between imagination, affectivity and institutions.

Legislative output and the Constitutional Court in Italy

This paper considers the impact of the Constitutional Court on legislative output in Italy. Following Tsebelis’ ((2002) Veto Players: Foundations of Institutional Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press) veto players model and the stylised facts as regards the Italian Constitutional Court’s activity, this paper presents a multi-stage game in the spirit of Gely and Spiller ((1990). A rational choice theory of supreme court statutory decisions with applications to the state farm and grove city cases. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6, 263–300). In the first stage, the legislative veto players, namely the parties in government, choose whether to change or not the policy status quo by enacting new legislation. In the second stage, the Court makes a constitutional interpretation: it decides whether to alter or not the outcome of the first stage through a sentence of constitutional illegitimacy. The Court has both the power of annulling laws and a limited power of creating new legally binding norms. Moreover, in the third stage, a constitutional law voted by a parliamentary qualified majority can overturn the Court’s decisions. The model predicts that the presence of the Court lowers legislative policy change and tests this prediction with 1956–2001 annual time series data for Italy.

Property rights and information flows: a simulation approach

With the growth of the information economy, the proportion of knowledge-intensive goods to total goods is constantly increasing. Lessig (The future of ideas: the fate of the commons in a connected world. Vintage, New York 2001) has argued that IPRs have now become too favourable to existing producers and that their ‘winner-take-all’ characteristics are constraining the creators of tomorrow. In this paper we look at how variations in IPRs regimes might affect the creation and social cost of new knowledge in economic systems. Drawing on a conceptual framework, the Information Space or I-Space to explore how the uncontrollable diffusibility of knowledge relates to its degree of structure, we deploy an agent-based modelling approach to explore the issue of IPRs. We take the ability to control the diffusibility of knowledge as a proxy measure for an ability to establish property rights in such knowledge. Second, we take the rate of obsolescence of knowledge as a proxy measure for the degree of turbulence induced by different regimes of technical change. Then we simulate the quantity and cost to society of new knowledge under different property right regimes.

The challenge of akrasia for the theory of rational choice

The phenomenon of akrasia, in which an actor makes a choice she regrets even while choosing it, appears problematic for theories of rational choice, which assume that an agent prefers any chosen course of action. The apparent possibility of akratic action presents a challenge to rational choice theorists, either to demonstrate that it is illusory or to show that akratic action does not violate the axioms of rational choice. The problematic status of akrasia is exhibited most sharply when set against the backdrop of praxeology. Therefore, this paper will explore whether the idea of akratic action can be reconciled with the fundamental principles of praxeology.

Industry specific effects in investment performance and valuation of firms

A necessary criterion for a performance measure in corporate governance is the degree to which it mirrors how well the management succeeds in maximizing firm value. Such a performance measure is marginal q which links changes in firm value to the investments undertaken by the management. Empirical studies of investment and performance based on marginal q have demonstrated the usefulness of this measure. Most research however, has mainly focused on long-term performance. This paper takes a short-term perspective and, based on the marginal q-theory, considers how firms’ market values change in the extreme stock price cycle of a stock market bubble. Using a data set of listed Swedish corporations we find an anomaly in form of a new industry specific effect that, in addition to investment, explains changes in firm value.