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1.
We consider infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information. A game is a K-coordination game if each player can decrease other players' payoffs by at most K times his own cost of punishment. The number K represents the degree of commonality of payoffs among the players. The smaller K is, the more interest the players share. A K-coordination game tapers off if the greatest payoff variation conditional on the first t periods of an efficient history converges to 0 at a rate faster than Kt as t→∞. We show that every subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is efficient in any tapering-off game with perfect information. Applications include asynchronously repeated games, repeated games of extensive form games, asymptotically finite horizon games, and asymptotically pure coordination games.  相似文献   

2.
A formula is derived for the probability that a "randomly selected" n-person matrix game has exactly k pure strategy equilibria. It is shown that for all n ≥ 2, this probability converges to e−1/k! as the sizes of the strategy sets of at least two players increase without bound. Thus the number of pure strategy equilibria in large random n-person matrix games is approximately Poisson distributed with mean one. The latter is a known result obtained by a new proof in this note. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.  相似文献   

3.
We study network games in which each player wishes to connect his source and sink, and the cost of each edge is shared among its users either equally (in Fair Connection Games—FCG's) or arbitrarily (in General Connection Games—GCG's). We study the existence and quality of strong equilibria (SE)—strategy profiles from which no coalition can improve the cost of each of its members—in these settings. We show that SE always exist in the following games: (1) Single source and sink FCG's and GCG's. (2) Single source multiple sinks FCG's and GCG's on series parallel graphs. (3) Multi source and sink FCG's on extension parallel graphs. As for the quality of the SE, in any FCG with n players, the cost of any SE is bounded by H(n) (i.e., the harmonic sum), contrasted with the Θ(n) price of anarchy. For any GCG, any SE is optimal.  相似文献   

4.
Consider a large population of finitely-lived agents organized into n different hierarchical levels. Every period, all those placed at each level are randomly matched to play a given symmetric game. Based on the resulting outcome, a ρ-fraction of agents who (within their own level) attain the highest payoffs are promoted upwards. On the other hand, newcomers replacing those who die every period enter at the lowest level and choose irreversibly the strategy to be played for the rest of their life. This choice is made, with some noise, by imitating one of the strategies adopted at the highest level.  In this setup, the unique long-run behavior of the system is fully characterized for the whole class of 2×2 coordination games and two alternative variations of the model. The results crucially depend on the key “institutional” parameters ρ and n. In particular, it is shown that inefficient behavior prevails in the long run (even when risk-dominated) if promotion is only mildly selective—high ρ—and the social system is quite hierarchical—large n. In a stylized manner, these parameter conditions may be viewed as reflecting a sort of institutional deficiency that impairs economic performance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C73, D72.  相似文献   

5.
This article investigates theories of payoff allocation in cooperative non-sidepayment games, that is, games where players can form coalitions and coordinate strategies but cannot redistribute payoffs via sidepayments. A labotatory experiment was conducted with 4-person, 3-strategy non-sidepayment games. The goal of this experiment was to ascertain which characteristic function, Vα(S) or Vβ(S), provides the more accurate basis for payoff predictions from solution concepts. Predictions from each of three solution concepts (core, stable set, imputation set) were computed on the basis of both Vα(S) and Vβ(S), making a total of six theories under test. The results showed two basic findings. First, for each of the three solutions, the prediction computed on the basis of Vα(S) was more accurate than the prediction computed from Vα(S). Second, the β-core was the most accurate of the six theories tested. Overall, these results support the view that Vβ(S) is superior to Vα(S) as a basis for payoff predictions in cooperative non-sidepayment games.  相似文献   

6.
This work presents the probability of determining a quantitative forecast of technological development S(t) defined by a set m of parameters S(1)(t),S(2)(t),…,S(m)(t), based on statistical game theory. Assuming that the coordinates S(i)(t) (i = 1, 2,…,m) of a forecasted vector S(t) are stochastic processes with given probabilistic characteristics, a formula of a function forecasting the value of a coordinate S(i)(t) of this vector can be obtained. This formula permits to determine a vector of forecasts τT(x) of technological development S(t) at a given moment t = τ+T.  相似文献   

7.
For suitable non-atomic TU games ν, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of ν, yielding one of two stark conclusions: either core(ν) is empty or it consists of a single measure that can be expressed explicitly in terms of derivatives of ν. In this sense, core theory for a class of games may be reduced to calculus. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.  相似文献   

8.
The square root function has a unique positive fixed point. This function has the following properties: it is strictly increasing and strictly concave, with f(0) = 0, and there are points a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0 such that f(a) ≥ a and f(b) ≤ b. It is shown that any function from n to n satisfying these properties has a unique positive fixed point. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C62.  相似文献   

9.
The formula given by McLennan [The mean number of real roots of a multihomogeneous system of polynomial equations, Amer. J. Math. 124 (2002) 49–73] is applied to the mean number of Nash equilibria of random two-player normal form games in which the two players have M and N pure strategies respectively. Holding M fixed while N→∞, the expected number of Nash equilibria is approximately . Letting M=N→∞, the expected number of Nash equilibria is , where is a constant, and almost all equilibria have each player assigning positive probability to approximately 31.5915 percent of her pure strategies.  相似文献   

10.
Amechanismfor a Bayesian gameGis a mapping μ from the set of states of nature to the set of players' actions. μ isself-fulfillingif players are truthful at the communication stage and, given the information revealed by μ, no player can gain in unilaterally deviating from the action prescribed by the mechanism. We investigate the properties of self-fulfilling mechanisms and we show in particular that they correspond to inert solutions of the infinitely repeated game generated byG. We also discuss applications to market games, regulation, and R&D games.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D82, C72.  相似文献   

11.
A monotone game comprises the infinitely repeated play of an n-person stage game, subject to the constraint that players' actions be monotonically nondecreasing over time. These games represent a variety of strategic situations in which players are able to make (partial) commitments. If the stage games have positive spillovers and satisfy certain other conditions, then the limit points of the subgame perfect equilibria are precisely the approachable action profiles. This characterization is applied to voluntary contribution games, market games, and coordination games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C7.  相似文献   

12.
Egalitarianism and Efficiency in Repeated Symmetric Games   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
We analyze the symmetric equilibria of repeated symmetric games where there is a conflict of interests over equilibria—the battle-of-the-sexes or the hawk–dove game are key examples. If one restricts attention to symmetric equilibria, efficient equilibria must be egalitarian. For finitely repeated games, and generic discount factors, there is a unique outcome path which ensures efficiency within the class of symmetric equilibria. This is also true for the infinitely repeated games if the players are sufficiently impatient. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.  相似文献   

13.
An Evolutionary Interpretation of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
A convincing interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria describes them as steady states in a large population in which players use pure strategies but the population as a whole mimics a mixed strategy. I study the conditions under which an evolutionary, stochastic learning process converges to the appropriate distribution over pure strategies in the population. I find that not all mixed equilibria can be justified as the result of an evolutionary process even if the equilibrium is unique. For symmetric 2 × 2 and 3 × 3 games I give necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence, which are related to the concept of an ESS, and forn × ngames I give a sufficient condition.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C73, D83.  相似文献   

14.
We present a model for the α-beauty contest that explains common patterns in experimental data of one-shot and iterative games. The approach is based on two basic assumptions. First, players iteratively update their recent guesses. Second, players estimate intervals rather than exact numbers to cope with incomplete knowledge of other players' rationality. Under these assumptions we extend the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. [Camerer, C., Ho, T., Chong, J., 2003b. A cognitive hierarchy model of one-shot games. Quart. J. Econ. 119, 861–898]. The extended model is estimated on experimental data from a newspaper experiment.  相似文献   

15.
This paper compares local and global strategic interaction when players update using the (myopic) best-response rule. I show that randomizing the order in which players update their strategic choice suffices to achieve coordination on the risk-dominant strategy in symmetric 2 × 2 coordination games. The "persistant randomness" which is necessary to achieve similar coordination with global interaction is replaced under local interaction by spatial variation in the initial condition. An extension of the risk-dominance idea gives the same convergence result for K × K games with strategic complementarities. Similar results for K × K pure coordination games and potential games are also presented. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78.  相似文献   

16.
Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
This paper studies n-player games where players' beliefs about their opponents' behaviour are modelled as non-additive probabilities. The concept of an “equilibrium under uncertainty” which is introduced in this paper extends the equilibrium notion of Dow and Werlang (1994, J. Econom. Theory64, 305–324) to n-player games in strategic form. Existence of such an equilibrium is demonstrated under usual conditions. For low degrees of ambiguity, equilibria under uncertainty approximate Nash equilibria. At the other extreme, with a low degree of confidence, maximin equilibria appear. Finally, robustness against a lack of confidence may be viewed as a refinement for Nash equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81.  相似文献   

17.
ARichman gameis a combinatorial game in which, rather than alternating moves, the two players bid for the privilege of making the next move. The theory of such games is a hybrid between the classical theory of games (von Neumann, Morgenstern, …) and the combinatorial theory of games (Berlekamp, Conway, Guy, …). We expand upon our previous work by considering games with infinitely many positions as well as several variants including thePoorman variantin which the high bidder pays a third party (rather than the other player).Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C7.  相似文献   

18.
In general, there are examples of TU games where the core is stable but is not large. In this paper, we show that the extendability condition introduced by Kikuta and Shapley (1986, “Core Stability in n-Person Games,” Mimeo) is sufficient for the core to be stable as well as large, for TU games with five or fewer players. We provide a counter example when the number of players is six. We then introduce a stronger extendability condition and show that it is necessary and sufficient for the core to be large. Our proof makes use of a well-known result from the theory of convex sets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.  相似文献   

19.
We explore the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for nontransferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution is to establish that theconsistent fieldis intimately related to the concept ofsubgame perfectionfor finite horizon noncooperative bargaining games, as the horizon goes to infinity and the cost of delay goes to zero. We then show that in the general NTU case—unlike the transferable utility and pure bargaining cases—the finite horizon subgame perfect equilibria need not approach the consistent value.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, C72.  相似文献   

20.
We study the set of limit points of equilibrium payoffs in n-player repeated games, with bounded recall, when the memory capacities of all the players grow to infinity. Two main issues are explored: (i) whether differential information enables players to play correlatively, and (ii) the extent to which boundedly rational players can learn others′ behavior patterns and conceal their own. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: 026.  相似文献   

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