Trade Costs and the Open Macroeconomy

Trade costs are known to be a major obstacle to international economic integration. Following the approach of New Open Economy Macroeconomics, this paper explores the effects of international trade costs in a micro‐founded general equilibrium model that allows for different degrees of exchange rate pass‐through. Trade costs are shown to create an endogenous home bias in consumption and the model performs well in matching empirical trade shares for OECD countries. In addition, trade costs reduce cross‐country output and consumption correlations, and they magnify exchange rate volatility. Trade costs turn a monetary expansion into a beggar‐thy‐neighbor policy.     

Economic Determinants of Free Trade Agreements Revisited: Distinguishing Sources of Interdependence

One of the most notable international economic events since 1990 has been the enormous increase in the number of free trade agreements (FTAs). While Baier and Bergstrand were the first to show empirically the impact of a country‐pair's economic characteristics on the likelihood of the pair having an FTA, the literature has been extended to demonstrate the importance empirically of FTA “interdependence”—the effect of other FTAs on the probability of a pair having an FTA. In the context of the Baier–Bergstrand framework, this paper delves deeper into the sources of interdependence—an “own‐FTA” effect and a “cross‐FTA” effect. The authors argue that the own‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between two countries owing to either already having other FTAs) likely dwarfs the cross‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between the pair owing to other FTAs existing in the rest of the world, or ROW). Augmenting a parsimonious logit model with simple “multilateral FTA” and “ROW FTA” terms to differentiate the own and cross effects empirically, it is shown that the marginal impact on the probability of a country‐pair having an agreement of either country having one more FTA with a third country is 50 times that of one more FTA between another pair in ROW. The results suggest that “domino (own‐FTA) effects” have far exceeded “competitive liberalization (cross‐FTA) effects” in the proliferation of FTAs.     

PROFIT TAX AND FIRM MOBILITY IN A THREE‐COUNTRY MODEL

We construct a three‐country model that incorporates international relocation by imperfectly competitive firms and examine both the effects of each country's profit tax reduction on the consumption and welfare of all countries, and the incentive for the countries to decrease the profit tax. In such a model, both the terms of trade and international relocation of firms offer the key to understanding the impacts of one country's profit tax policy. In particular, we note that the relocation of firms from the other two countries is positively related to the wage incomes of the third country through a shift in labour demand, and the terms‐of‐trade improvement is not only positively related to the wage incomes, but also negatively related to profit incomes through a shift in world consumption demand. We show that (i) in a three‐country world economy, regardless of the reduction's source, the profit tax reduction of each country leads to relocation of firms away from foreign countries toward its own economy and deteriorates the terms of trade of its economy and (ii) this becomes a ‘beggar‐thy‐neighbour’ policy in the sense that it lowers the welfare of the other foreign countries.     

Trade,Wage Gaps,and Specific Human Capital Accumulation*

We develop a new framework for the analysis of the impact of trade liberalization on the wage structure and on welfare. Our model focuses on the decision of workers to accumulate firm‐specific skills, by “on‐the‐job” training, knowing that this means their future wages will have to be negotiated, and that the outcome of negotiation will depend on the profitability prospect of firms operating in a new trading environment. We show that trade liberalization may reduce the welfare of a developing country because of its adverse effect on skill accumulation. We also explore the effects of trade liberalization on the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers.     

Labor immobility and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in a monetary union

It is believed that a common monetary policy in a monetary union will have identical effects on different countries as long as these countries have identical fundamentals. We show that, when there is specialization in production, the terms of trade react to the shock. The transmission mechanism of a monetary shock has in this case an additional channel, the terms of trade. This is the case even if state contingent assets can be traded across countries. For a reasonable parametrization, the differential on the transmission across countries is quantitatively significant when compared with the effect on the union's aggregates. Monetary shocks create cycles with higher volatility in “poor” countries than in “richer” ones.     

International trade and “Catching up with the Joneses”: Are the consumption patterns convergent?

We use a dynamic international trade model to analyse the implications of international trade for agents’ preferences and economic growth. This model is based on the home market effect with external habit formation (“catching up with the Joneses”) and “learning by doing” in production. We demonstrate the following: the historical composition of consumption in countries determines industrialization after trade; the preferences of agents converge after trade, independent of the economic results; and the welfare effects of trade may be positive or negative depending on trading partner characteristics. In some scenarios, autarky is strictly preferred to trade. Thus, international trade does not necessarily imply greater welfare, as is the typical result in a static context under CES preferences.     

THE DISTRIBUTION OF MONEY BALANCES AND THE NONNEUTRALITY OF MONEY*

Recent monetary models with explicit microfoundations are made tractable by assuming that agents have access to centralized markets after one round of decentralized trade. Given quasi‐linear preferences, this makes the distribution of money degenerate—which keeps the models simple but precludes the discussion of distributional effects of monetary policy. We generalize these models by assuming two rounds of trade before agents can readjust their money holdings to study a range of new distributional effects analytically. We show that unexpected, symmetric lump‐sum money injections may increase short‐run output and welfare, whereas asymmetric injections may increase long‐run output and welfare.     

LACK‐OF‐RECALL AND CENTRALIZED MONETARY TRADE*

We introduce lack‐of‐recall of past transactions as an alternative assumption to anonymity in a model where trade is centralized. In environments where there is an intertemporal lack‐of‐double‐coincidence of wants problem and lack‐of‐commitment, lack‐of‐recall can give rise to monetary equilibria that dominate nonmonetary outcomes in terms of welfare.     

Public infrastructure and trade in a dynamic two‐country model

We develop a two‐country dynamic trade model with public infrastructure having an “unpaid‐factor”‐type positive externality on private sectors’ productivity. With welfare‐maximizing national governments making infrastructure investment, we show that a country with a smaller labor endowment, a lower depreciation rate of infrastructure, and/or a lower time preference rate will become an exporter of a good that is more dependent on infrastructure and will gain from trade, whereas its trading partner may lose from trade. We consider both the nonstrategic governments case and the case of strategic governments that recognize the effect on the terms of trade.     

Exchange Rates,Expectations, and Monetary Policy: a NOEM Perspective*

We use a dynamic general‐equilibrium optimizing two‐country model to analyze how the formation of exchange rate expectations shapes the effects of a monetary policy shock in an open economy. We also provide empirical evidence on how traders in foreign exchange markets form exchange rate expectations. Our model implies that the short‐run output effect of a permanent monetary policy shock diminishes if “technical traders” form the type of regressive exchange rate expectations we find in our empirical analysis. If the influence of technical traders is strong enough, a permanent expansionary monetary policy shock can result in a temporary decline of the output in the country in which it takes place. The output effect of a temporary monetary policy shock is magnified when technical traders form regressive exchange rate expectations.     

Guaranteed Manufactured without Child Labor: The Economics of Consumer Boycotts, Social Labeling and Trade Sanctions

Does labeling products “Child‐Labor Free” provide a market‐based solution to the pervasive employment of child labor? This paper explores the promise of social labeling in the context of its four oft‐noted objectives: child labor employment, consumer information, welfare, and trade linkages, when competition between the North and South is based both on comparative cost advantage, and the use of child labor as a hidden product attribute. We show that (i) social labeling benefits consumers and Southern producers, whereas children and Northern producers are worse off; (ii) trade sanctions on unlabeled products deteriorates Southern terms of trade, but leaves the incidence of child labor strictly unaffected; and (iii) a threat to sanction imports of unlabeled Southern products discourages the South from maintaining a credible social labeling program. We also explore the question of whether social labeling should be viewed as a transitory or a permanent institution in developing economies.     

The silent success of customs unions

Globally, 81 countries are now part of a customs union (CU), following the rapid proliferation of this type of trade agreement in past decades. Much of this growth has been driven by countries “upgrading” their links from a free trade agreement (FTA) to CU. At the same time, the rapid formation of new FTAs among countries that had no prior agreement in place has largely overshadowed this growth, making CUs the silent success of regional integration. Using the canonical regionalism model, augmented to allow for political bias towards firm interests, we investigate the endogenous choice of trade agreement. We show it is generally politically viable to move from FTA to CU, because such a move is rent‐creating; but for countries without a trade agreement in place, it may be optimal to form an FTA as a stepping stone to reduce the risk of political derailment. Importantly, forming a CU is consistent with member social welfare maximization: as long as trade with the rest of the world does not cease entirely, a CU leads to higher social welfare than either FTA or no agreement. These gains come at the expense of third‐country welfare. If past trends continue, one can expect more FTAs to be upgraded to CU with associated adverse consequences for outsiders.     

Estimating the effects of non‐discriminatory trade policies within structural gravity models

We propose a simple method to identify the effects of unilateral and non‐discriminatory trade policies on bilateral trade within a theoretically consistent empirical gravity model. Specifically, we argue that structural gravity estimations should be performed with data that include not only international trade flows but also intra‐national trade flows. The use of intra‐national sales allows identification of the effects of non‐discriminatory trade policies such as most favoured nation tariffs, even in the presence of exporter and importer fixed effects. A byproduct of our approach is that it can be used to recover estimates of the trade elasticity, a key parameter for quantitative trade models. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques in the case of most favoured nation tariffs and “time to export” as representative non‐discriminatory determinants of trade on the importer and on the exporter side, respectively. Our methods can be extended to quantify the impact on trade of any country‐specific characteristics as well as any non‐trade policies.     

MEGA‐EVENTS AND SECTORAL EMPLOYMENT: THE CASE OF THE 1996 OLYMPIC GAMES

Using the data of the 1996 Olympic Games, this paper analyzes the economic impact of a mega‐sporting event. Earlier studies are extended in several ways. First, monthly rather than quarterly data are employed. Second, the impact is analyzed for 16 different sectors. Third, we use a nonparametric approach to flexibly isolate employment effects. Hardly any evidence for a persistent shift in the aftermath of or the preparation for the Olympic Games is supported. We find significant positive employment effects exclusively during the Olympic Games. These short‐term effects are concentrated in the sectors of “retail trade,”“accommodation and food services,” and “arts, entertainment, and recreation.” (JEL H54, R12, L83)     

The Trade Effects of Indian Antidumping Actions

Antidumping (AD) has emerged as the most widespread policy impediment to trade in the last 25 years. One of the surprise proliferators of AD in the lesser developed world has been India, which has filed an outstanding number of 285 cases between 1992 and 2002. In this paper, I study empirically the effect of Indian AD cases on trade flows from other countries. I also look at the effect of AD cases on trade diversion from countries subject to or “named” in AD investigations to non‐subject or “non‐named” countries and conclude that Indian AD policy is effective. I use a unique dataset combining AD data from the World Trade Organization with trade data from Comtrade. The empirical model is estimated via the Arellano–Bond procedure.     

Common Ground Between Free‐Traders and Environmentalists

We use a North–South model with property right differences and resource dynamics to study the effects of trade on resource use and welfare. Autarky is likely to Pareto‐dominate free trade in the long run when the environment is quite fragile, and the result is reversed when the environment is quite resilient. Trade may cause an environmentally poor country to “drag down” its richer trading partner, when they degrade their stocks which would be preserved under autarky. It may enable the environmentally richer country to “pull up” its partner, when they preserve their stocks which would be degraded under autarky.     

Technology Transfer and Merger Activities with Trade and Tariffs

In order to better understand the effects of globalization on merger incentives this paper considers a set of commonly observed mergers whereby a restructured target (with improved managerial or technical capability) continues to supply the market. In contrast to the market‐concentrating merger literature it finds that trade barriers tend to encourage mergers, including potentially welfare‐reducing, tariff‐jumping mergers. Multilateral trade liberalization, however, encourages welfare‐improving mergers. Hence, and despite the skepticism of regulatory authorities towards the existence of cost synergies as a consequence of mergers, this paper suggests that in order to assess the impact of trade liberalization under the WTO on merger incentives, and consequently on prices, quantities, and welfare, accurate information on ex ante cost differences and the transferability of managerial and technical techniques is required.     

Market Integration,Choice of Technology,and Welfare

This paper develops an international trade model where firms in a duopoly may diversify their technologies for strategic reasons. The firms face the same set of technologies given by a tradeoff between marginal costs and fixed costs, but depending on trade costs firms may choose different technologies. Market integration may induce a technological restructuring where firms either diversify their technologies or switch to a homogeneous technology. In general, market integration improves welfare. However, a small decrease of trade costs which induces a switch from heterogeneous technologies to a homogeneous technology may locally reduce global welfare. The model also shows that productivity differences lead to intra‐industry firm heterogeneity in size and exports similar to the “new–new” trade models with monopolistic competition.     

Reciprocal Dumping with Product Differentiation*

This paper examines if international trade can reduce total welfare in an international oligopoly with differentiated goods. We show that intra‐industry trade, i.e. “reciprocal dumping,” can result in lower total surplus than autarky in a Cournot model for any degree of product differentiation. Moreover, trade can reduce welfare compared to autarky in a Bertrand model when the local markets are sufficiently competitive and products are sufficiently close substitutes. Otherwise it unambiguously increases welfare.     

Optimal fiscal policy in sunspot‐driven oligopolistic economies

Economies with oligopolistic markets are prone to inefficient sunspot fluctuations triggered by autonomous changes in firms equilibrium conjectures. A well‐designed taxation‐subsidization scheme can eliminate these fluctuations by coordinating firms in each sector on a single equilibrium, left unaffected. The optimal taxation scheme must select the number of active firms that makes the best trade‐off (in terms of consumer welfare) between the markup and the scale inefficiency distortions. Implementing such stabilization policy leads to significant welfare gains, attributable to an “efficient stabilization effect,” typically ignored in usual computations of the welfare costs of fluctuations.