电子商务环境下大学生群体价格歧视认知及可接受程度分析

经济学家庇古于1920年提出"价格歧视"这一经济现象,其实质是一种价格差异,通常指商品或服务的提供者在向不同的接受者提供相同等级、相同质量的商品或服务时,在接受者之间实行不同的销售价格或收费标准。价格歧视在现代市场经济的发展过程中愈发常见,许多企业将其应用于营销体系中。随着互联网科技的迅猛发展,网购成为众多消费者的首选,其中大学生消费群体在电商平台消费时涉及的价格歧视无处不在。本文在价格歧视理论及其文献综述的基础上,阐述电子商务平台价格歧视的应用情况,并通过问卷调查与分析探究在电子商务环境下,大学生消费群体对于价格歧视认知及可接受度,由此对政府、企业和大学生提出相关建议。     

价格歧视理论的应用分析

价格歧视现象在现代市场经济的发展过程中越来越常见,价格歧视是一个经济术语,无好坏之分。现代许多国家将价格歧视应用于营销市场中。本文从价格歧视的理论概述、价格歧视的现实应用及价格歧视的意义三方面对价格歧视进行论述。     

价格歧视理论的应用分析

价格歧视现象在现代市场经济的发展过程中越来越常见，价格歧视是一个经济术语，无好坏之分。现代许多国家将价格歧视应用于营销市场中。本文从价格歧视的理论概述、价格歧视的现实应用及价格歧视的意义三方面对价格歧视进行论述。     

网络营销中价格歧视的利与弊

在网络经济迅猛发展的今天，价格歧视被网络厂商作为现代化的营销手段加以利用。价格歧视是指厂商在销售同一产品的不同数量时，向相同或不同的消费者索取不同的价格．他不包括因运输费用的差别而导致的产品价格的不同，也不包括因品牌、质量、包装和售后服务的不同而产生的价格差别。价格歧视分为三种最基本的形式：（1）一级价格歧视：亦称为完全价格歧视，指卖者对每一单位的产品收取不同的价格．而且价格恰好等于买者的保留价格，此时卖者得到了全部的消费者剩余。     

价格歧视在营销决策中的运用

提到“歧视”,人们常常想起“性别歧视”、“种族歧视”、“地域歧视”等,这些都与不公正的待遇相联系。与这些“歧视”不同,本文所涉及的“价格歧视”被商家广泛频繁的运用,对于企业的营销和定价具有重大的指导意义。本文介绍了“价格歧视”的基本理论,并从营销决策上阐述了“价格歧视”理论的应用。     

高科技产品的营销策略：品牌认知与价格激励

高科技产品的技术信息含量高且更新换代快,消费者的高度关注,其营销策略要注重消费者学习,本文主要分析了高科技产品市场比一般产品市场更具有不完全竞争性,提出了高科技产品如何使消费者从品牌认知到吕牌忠诚的营销策略以及特殊的价格激励。     

价格歧视规制所面临的困境剖析

本文从理论上对价格歧视的概念、分类及其福利效果进行了详细的分析,并以电信业、电子商务和民航业为例考察了价格歧视在现实生活中的体现。最后,分别从价格歧视界定的困难、福利结果的不确定性、多维度的价格歧视以及法律法规的欠缺等四个方面深入剖析了价格歧视进行规制时所面临的困境并给出了相应的政策建议。     

基于产品的电子商务营销模式探析

在未来商业模式中,企业营销方式将转向网络营销,电子商务环境下的营销模式将逐步替代传统的营销模式,电子商务将贯穿于企业运营。因此,企业在选择电子商务营销模式时,必须基于产品,不同种类的产品须采用不同的营销模式,只有这样才能在电子商务环境下使其信息流、资金流、物流和商流实现整合。     

微信公众平台:新技术创新的价格歧视新领域

在现代商业活动中,价格歧视是企业经常运用的一种实现超额利润的手段。随着科技的发展,微信公众平台的推出引发了企业进行新一轮的基于新媒体基础上的价格歧视的尝试,这种新形式的价格歧视打破了传统价格歧视的固有模式,一定程度上降低了价格歧视的门槛。本文旨在从价格歧视的角度出发,分析企业为什么要投入时间、精力和费用开发和维护微信公众平台。     

论电子商务市场中的"价格歧视"

本文分析了电子商务市场上价格歧视的形式与内容 ,并运用信息经济学的方法分析了电子商务市场中价格歧视的实施障碍、形成原因及所造成的后果 ,最后提出了解决此问题的对策建议。     

Retail channel price discrimination

This paper examines price differentials of identical items across retail channels. Many consumer packaged goods are sold through both grocery and drug stores. Liquor is unique in that in much of the country there is a third retail channel of distribution, liquor stores. If consumers in each retail channel differ in their willingness to pay for certain items, then sellers can exploit those differences and charge different prices for the same items in each channel. We examine a unique data set of pooled cross sectional retail scanner data on wine to test whether sellers use retail channel to identify heterogeneous consumer market segments and engage in price discrimination. We begin by presenting a model of price discrimination by retail channel along with behavioural assumptions regarding shoppers in each channel. Next we examine sales by retail channel and find persistent price differentials for the same item across retail channel after controlling for sample selection bias and seasonality. Lastly, we estimate the price elasticity of demand correcting for endogeneity and find differences across channel consistent with the price differentials. The extent of price differential, however, differs significantly with respect to price point.     

论市场因素对保险产品定价的影响

基于精算技术的保费厘定实际上是用一种成本定价方法,未考虑市场因素对价格的影响。即单个投保人之间对保险产品价格变化的容忍程度、价格空间的大小变化对顾客需求的影响以及不同组群的潜在投保人的需求差别。分析市场因素对保险产品定价的影响,保险产品差别定价的策略是保险业产品定价之良策。而保险业只有精算技术与市场分析结合起来才能挖掘保险产品深层次的潜力。     

Why is Price Dispersion Higher Online than Offline? The Impact of Retailer Type and Shopping Risk on Price Dispersion

When physically similar products, of similar quality, are offered by retailers both online and offline, we often observe that the dispersion in prices of these products online is greater than the price dispersion offline. This observation runs counter to early theories that suggested price dispersion online would be smaller than that offline due to the ease of search and information availability online. This paper investigates and provides an explanation for this puzzling phenomenon by examining the impact of two important drivers of price dispersion: retailer type and consumers’ shopping risk. Retailer type refers to whether a retailer is a pure offline, pure online, or dual channel retailer. Shopping risk is defined as the product of consumers’ perceived risk of shopping and the transaction uncertainty related to shopping at different types of retailers.A game-theoretic approach is adopted to model consumers’ price search and product purchase, as well as price competition within and across retailer types in online and offline markets. Equilibrium pricing strategies are derived for different retailer types competing for different consumer segments with different levels of perceived shopping risk. The impact of retailer type and shopping risk on online versus offline price dispersion are quantified, and conditions when price dispersion is greater online than offline are identified.Results indicate that price dispersion is greater online when the number of pure online retailers is sufficiently large and is increasing in the number of pure online retailers. In addition, a reduction in online shopping risk may actually increase online price dispersion. Results further suggest that even without any online sales, dual channel retailers should maintain their online presence for the purpose of information dissemination, which justifies the importance for pure offline retailer to incorporate webrooming strategies, where consumers can search for prices online but purchase offline.     

Mixed pricing in online marketplaces

A rich theory literature predicts mixed strategies in posted prices due to standard price discrimination, search frictions, and various other rationales. While typically interpreted as implying occasional sales or price dispersion, online marketplaces enable a firm to truly use randomization as a tool in pricing, and so such behavior should be expected to arise in online settings. We investigate a case of mixed pricing across a large subset of products on a major e-commerce website. We first test for randomizing behavior, and then construct a model of price discrimination that would generate randomization as optimal behavior. We estimate the model and use it to assess pricing effects of a proposed merger in the industry.     

Expectations and Attitudes Toward Gender-Based Price Discrimination

This study explores consumer expectations and attitudes related to gender-based price discrimination. Although much research has focused on pay inequalities and gender diversity, considerably less attention has been focused on situations in which men and women are charged different prices based on gender. In two studies, expectations and attitudes toward gender-based price discrimination are examined. In Study 1, two scenarios related to prices at hair salon and dry cleaning services were manipulated to measure expectations and attitudes toward gender-based price discrimination. We found that the nature of the service results in expectations of price differences between men and women. We also found men expect gender-based pricing more than women. In Study 2, qualitative research was conducted to reveal the cognitions that men and women experience when exposed to gender-based price discrimination.     

On manufacturers complementing the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel

With the explosion of the Internet and the reach that it affords, many manufacturers have complemented their existing retail channels with an online channel, which allows them to sell directly to their consumers. Interestingly, there is a significant variation within product categories in manufacturer's use of the Internet as a direct distribution channel. The main objective of this study is to examine the strategic forces that may influence the manufacturer's decision to complement the retail channel with a direct online channel. In particular, we are interested in answering the following questions:

1. Why is it that in some markets only a few firms find it optimal to complement their retail channels with a direct Internet channel while other firms do not?
2. What strategic role (if any), does the direct Internet channel serve and how do market characteristics impact this role?

To address these issues we develop a model with a single strategic manufacturer serving a market through a single strategic retailer. In addition to the focal manufacturer's product the retailer carries products of competing manufacturers. Consumers in this market are one of two types. They are either brand loyal or store loyal. The retailer sets the retail price and the level of retail support, which impact the demand for the manufacturer's product. The retailer's decisions in turn depend on the wholesale price as well as the Internet price of the product if the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel. Our analysis reveals that the optimality of complementing the retail channel with an online channel and the role served by the latter depends critically upon the level of support that the retailer allocates to the manufacturer's product in the absence of the online channel. The level of support allocated by the retailer, in the absence of the online channel, depends upon the retail margins on the manufacturer's product relative to that on rival products in the product category. When the size of the brand loyal segment is small relative to the size of the store loyal segment then in the absence of the online channel, the manufacturer can lower wholesale price and enhance retail support, especially when the retail margins on the rival products are low. In contrast, when the size of the loyal segment is large and the retail margins on rival products are high the manufacturer will find it more profitable to charge a high wholesale price even if that induces the retailer to extend low levels of support. If the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel, some consumers who would have purchased from the retailer might prefer to purchase online. Our analysis reveals that when consumers' sensitivity to price differences across the competing channels exceeds a certain threshold it is not optimal for the manufacturer to complement the retail channel with an online channel. However, this price sensitivity threshold itself depends upon product/market characteristics, suggesting that manufacturers seeking to complement their retail channels with an online channel should look beyond the nature of threat the online channel poses to the retail channel in devising their optimal distribution strategies. When the retail margins on rival products are sufficiently small, complementing the retail channel with an online channel when optimal allows the manufacturer to price discriminate and enhance profits. In contrast when retail margins on rival products are sufficiently high, complementing the retail channel with an online channel serves to enhance retail support. We also identify market conditions under which profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer are greater with the online channel than that without it. This is particularly interesting since the online channel competes with the retail channel.     

个别化价格歧视的规制难题及其纾解——基于“禁止差别待遇”规则的分析

在互联网相关市场,商品定价模式由统一定价模式和群体化价格歧视模式逐渐转向个别化价格歧视模式,“禁止差别待遇”规则面临个别化价格歧视行为的挑战。首先,个别化价格歧视行为引发了价格歧视型共谋行为。“禁止差别待遇”规则应采用“信息交流”与“知悉规则”的双重标准审查此类特殊的共谋行为。其次,个别化价格歧视行为开始伪装为动态定价行为,“禁止差别待遇”规则应当引入“相当性”规则区分两类行为。最后,个别化价格歧视行为在损害部分消费者利益的同时增加了市场效率,相关经济分析标准难以判断个别化价格歧视行为正当性。“禁止差别待遇”规则应当在损害分析与效率分析的基础上引入正当性综合审查。     

Price and quality decisions in a vertically-differentiated supply chain with an “Online-to-Store” channel

Because of the prevalence of “Online-to-Store (OS)” channel, customers can purchase differentiated products online and pick up in-store. We develop a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to study the impact of an OS channel on quality levels, demands, prices, and profits of a manufacturer and a retailer in a supply chain. We assume that the retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader, and the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg follower. The manufacturer produces and sells two products with vertically-differentiated quality levels to the retailer who in turn sells the products to customers through a Store channel, an Online channel, or an OS channel. The retailer incurs a handing cost if the OS channel is available, and consumers bear a shipping cost and a transaction cost when the products are purchased from the Online and Store channels, respectively. We find that the manufacturer should reduce both products’ quality levels and wholesale prices, whereas the retailer can increase the selling prices for a relatively small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. When the products are available both online and in-store, however, the quality levels, wholesale prices and selling prices might increase for a small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. Compared to the case in which both products are available online only with the OS channel, adding the Store channel is always beneficial for both parties. The intuition behind these results hinges on the trade-off between the handling cost and the increased market demand for the retailer. Moreover, the quality levels, the wholesale prices of both products, and the selling price of the low-quality product would decrease, while the selling price of the high-quality product increases for a sufficiently low transaction cost and a not too small shipping cost.     

多渠道零售环境下消费者跨渠道购买行为研究

零售商不断拓展销售渠道,多渠道零售使消费者可从不同渠道获得类似服务与产品。消费者在渠道认知过程中,通过感性分析与理性选择,合理规避风险,实现跨渠道购买。购买动机、人口统计特征主观作用于消费者渠道选择,价格比较、情景、渠道特征、产品类型对消费者的跨渠道购买产生客观影响。消费者跨渠道购买要求零售商提供相互支撑的、协调的多渠道零售体系,并依产品类型与技术支持将资源合理分配至各类渠道。     

The Effect of Product Innovation,Promotion, and Price on Consumer Switching to Private Labels

The channel conflict that exists between retailers and manufacturers of branded products has dynamically shifted as large retailers have expanded their offerings of private label products. This study investigates the ability of consumer packaged goods companies to exert influence in the channel by testing which marketing initiatives implemented by manufacturer brands are more efficient in preventing consumer switching to private labels. We use a hazard model to simultaneously measure the effects due to product innovation, promotion, and price on consumer switching and how strong those effects are. We find that as expected product innovation, promotion, and price exert a negative effect on the consumer likelihood of switching to private labels. However, we find the strongest effect on promotion suggesting the importance of understanding how consumers perceive value in the national brands offer.