Spontaneous (non)emergence of property rights

The paper analyses preferences of private owners over the degree of property rights protection. It is shown that inequality in resource ownership and/or relative inefficiency of production technologies could make wealthier agents favour less than full protection of property rights. If such agents control the choice of a property rights regime, fully secured property rights will not emerge from the grassroots. This conclusion is consistent with the failure to create an efficient property rights system in Russia.     

Economic growth,financial crisis,and property rights: observer bias in perception-based measures

Recent years have seen an increasing number of empirical papers using subjective indicators in cross-country quantitative analyses of growth. We evaluate potential observer biases in the three most commonly employed subjective measures of property rights – taken from the Heritage Foundation, Fraser Institute, and World Economic Forum. Drawing on cross-national data for 156 countries during the years 2000 – 2010, we use Granger causality tests to assess whether exposure to recent information on economic performance introduces bias to coding of property rights scores. Further, we evaluate whether the Great Recession led observers to change property rights scores in advanced nations. We find consistent evidence that observers who provide subjective coding of property rights scores rated nations more positively when their economic performance was positive, and more negatively during the recent global financial crisis. Taken together, our findings suggest that coding of commonly employed property rights measures are subject to substantial observer bias.     

The Veil of Uncertainty Unveiled

A central assumption of constitutional economics is that in the process of constitutional decisionmaking the players' uncertainty about their post-constitutional positions (veil of uncertainty) serves the useful purpose of making unanimity and fairness at the constitutional level more rather than less probable. The paper argues that this assertion is false if the conventional assumption holds true that social contracts are threatened by a prisoners' dilemma incentive structure. By means of a simple two-person game-model it is shown that, if players are fully aware of all their partial interests, agreement on a Pareto-efficient rule will be the iterated dominance equilibrium of the game played at the constitutional level. A veil of uncertainty cannot do better. It may, however, induce disagreement or discrimination, if the prisoners' dilemma violates the cardinal property often assumed. This raises the question why the choice of rules which typically takes place in full knowledge of the players' post-constitutional positions poses so many problems although, from a theoretical point of view, unanimity seems so easy to achieve. Finally, it is examined, if there is any salutary role the veil of uncertainty is able to play in view of a post-constitutional prisoners' dilemma.     

Land,Gender, and Food Security

Since 2008, a surge in large-scale land acquisitions, or land grabs, has been taking place in low- and middle-income countries around the globe. This contribution examines the gendered effects of and responses to these deals, drawing on nine studies, which include conceptual framing essays that bring in debates about human rights, studies that draw on previous waves of land acquisitions globally, and case studies that examine the gendered dimensions of land dispossession and loss of common property. Three key insights emerge: the evolving gender and land tenure literature provides valuable information for understanding the likely effects of land deals; some of the land deal issues transcend gender-equity concerns and relate to broader problems of dispossession and loss of livelihoods; and huge gaps remain in our knowledge of gender and land rights that require urgent attention and systematic integration of gender analysis into mainstream research.     

COMMON PROPERTY AS AN INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABILITY

Relationships between the potential productivity of land and property rights generally are couched in terms of measures of central tendency or means. However, risk or variance as a measure of uncertainty also is critical in relating property rights and organizational arrangements developed within various property regimes. Meteorological and hydrological research results support the appropriateness of risk-spreading property regimes, especially in semi-arid and arid lands. Spatial diversification models indicate that common property regimes can be a rational response to environmental variability. Efforts by the public sector to privatize and fence grazing lands on the extensive margin may have limited appeal to pastoralists throughout the world .     

关于经典产权经济研究的综合评述与判断

文章基于经典产权制度的7大模型,对经典产权制度进行了全面的梳理与评述,无论是逐利动机模型、"公地悲剧"模型、交易成本模型、产权界定模型、微观产权模型、比较分析模型还是法经济分析模型,各有优劣,且它们之间并非结论一致。该现状反映了理论的中性与理论的非完美性。文章通过比较分析法,得出的结论是任何产权制度理论在阐释中国问题时都有局限性,故而建议变通使用经典产权制度理论。之所以对经典产权经济的相关研究进行综合评述,目的是为研究中国少数民族产权制度做好铺垫,尤其是现在产权经济研究的走向问题,当它似乎变得不再那么红极一时,它的理论适应性是否可以在中国少数民族推广,是否能够为中国少数民族产权经济发展指引方向。     

Law, Property, and Marital Dissolution

This paper challenges the view that legal rights are not important in affecting whether people divorce, but it puts as much emphasis on property rights (given, for example, by the law on alimony) as on dissolution rights. The paper sets out two stylised models of marriage and examines the consequences of fuller compensation for economic sacrifices made during marriage. If the dominant economic issue in a marriage is who undertakes household tasks then a law giving fuller compensation makes divorce more likely. If the dominant issue is child custody, divorce is less likely.     

国企人的理论假设与制度安排

国有企业改革的困境主要源于理论假设错误所导致的政府、市场和企业功能紊乱,从而在制度安排上混淆了产权、所有权和所有制的经济功能;特别是基于错误理论假设的刚性一元化意识形态阻碍了市场经济的正常运行。因此,改变理论假设前提,重构理论框架和理论体系;在制度安排上确立国有产权的各类交易主体及其所有权,转变政府职能、完善政策法规体系;在意识形态领域去除僵化的模式．这三大方面是国有企业改革取得成功的根本保证。     

Property rights and liability for deforestation under REDD+: Implications for ‘permanence’ in policy design

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is critical in efforts to mitigate the effects of anthropogenic climate change. Despite uncertainty about the exact form of a future, international REDD+ system, REDD+ carbon property rights would need to be created and allocated with liability assigned for the potential loss of climate benefits in the event of carbon reversal from deforestation. This commentary explores the links between forest property rights and liability, to different REDD+ policy options and their implications for permanence. Should national governments retain liability for permanence then project-level activities that have individually-assigned REDD+ carbon rights may have a higher risk of carbon reversal than policies where rights are assigned to the state. Knowledge of pre-existing forest rights is necessary for some policies implemented with government-assigned REDD+ rights in order to compensate for potential income losses from policy implementation.     

Environmental Degradation and Population Movements: The Role of Property Rights

This study examines the linkages between environmental degradation (viewed primarily as deforestation and land degradation) and the movement of population from one region to another within a developing country. The hypothesis postulated is that the link between population and environmental degradation is mediated by the nature of property rights in land. This hypothesis is examined with the help of two alternative methodologies. Firstly, a simultaneous equations model using data for the arid and semi-arid region of Western India illustrates that outmigration from the region is largely the consequence of push factors such as environmental degradation and decrease in common land. Alternatively, micro experiments in environmental protection and the creation of common property rights on open access land in the same region indicate that the association between migrational change, creation of common property rights and participation indices is high. It can be concluded that once property rights are well defined with the help of appropriate institutional arrangements, labour moves towards the creation of common assets and an improvement in the environment takes place. Out migration is prevented and higher levels of population are supported by the same resources. The authors wish to thank Ms. Seema Bathla and Dr. Suresh Sharma for assistance in documentation, data collection and analysis.     

数据要素市场培育：法律难题、域外经验与中国方案

数字经济时代,数据继土地、劳动力、资本、技术之后成为第五大生产要素。目前我国数据权属确定的法律制度不够完善,数据要素市场交易的法律制度尚未建立,数据要素市场监管的法律制度不够健全,这都制约了我国数据要素市场发展。为了培育数据要素市场,应以数据生产者与数据处理者为划分标准,建立“数据生产者（扩展权利)—数据处理者（有限产权)”的数据产权制度;以“降低制度成本—减少交易成本”的思路完善数据要素市场交易相关规则;以“事前预防与事后规制相结合”的方式完善数据要素市场监管法律制度。     

A model of the origins of basic property rights

This paper studies the origins of one of the most basic of property rights, namely, the right of an individual or an organization to the fruits of its labour. My objective is to address the questions of why, when and how this property right can emerge and be made secure. I develop a model of the strategic interaction between two players in the state-of-nature, which is an environment characterized by the absence of any laws and institutions (including property rights and the state). My analysis explores, in particular, the roles of the players' fighting and productive skills on the emergence and security (or otherwise) of this property right.     

策略互动与产权的界定-一个非完全信息动态博弈模型及其应用

该文构建了一个非完全信息动态博弈模型,对一个有限经济(ECONOMY)内部行为主体的一项基本权利(如产权)的界定与实施过程给出了一种解释.与以往一些博弈论专家在分析制度(尤其产权制度)及制度变迁不同的是,该文在博弈模型中通过非完全信息的假设,引入行为主体策略的差异性.该文给出的结论是:制度是不同的行为人与政府之间的博弈均衡.在文中我们使用的是一种混合均衡的概念--对称完美贝叶斯均衡.最后该文对相应的结论给予了一个现实的说明,并指出了模型可能的进一步发展方向.     

股金合作制和股份合作制的比较与选择--集体企业典型形式探索

与我国股份合作制企业相比,西方股金合作制企业的产权安排更为规范、稳定、可行,其弊端可以在保持劳动合作基本特征的前提下加以校正。股份合作制“瞬时效应”明显,根源在于资本权利与劳动权利在企业内部的冲突以及产权安排的不确定性。这一制度缺陷难以在坚持劳动合作为核心的前提下进行校正。在我国发展股金合作制企业具有理论和现实依据,但必须结合实际对其制度缺陷进行校正。股金合作制独特的产权制度和经济社会功能,更适合作为集体所有制企业的典型形式。     

A great wall of patents: What is behind China's recent patent explosion?

China's patent surge, documented in this paper, is seemingly paradoxical given the country's weak record of protecting intellectual property rights. Using a firm-level data set that spans the population of China's large and medium-size industrial enterprises, this paper explores the factors that account for China's rising patent activity. While the intensification of research and development in the Chinese economy tracks with patenting activity, it explains only a fraction of the patent explosion. The growth of foreign direct investment in China is prompting Chinese firms to file for more patent applications. Amendments to the patent law that favor patent holders and ownership reform that has clarified the assignment of property rights also emerge as significant sources of China's patent boom. These results are robust to alternative estimation strategies that account for over-dispersion in the patent counts data and firm heterogeneity.     

DIVISIONS OF LABOUR, SPECIALIZATION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF A SYSTEM OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

Abstract. This paper uses a model of endogenous theft and endogenous network division of labour to formalize some of the main principles of the economics of the state and to explore related issues concerning why new constitutional rules emerge and evolve. The model suggests that fiscal competition between states facilitates important circular effects, which propel improvements in economic welfare and promote economic growth. In particular, improvements in institutional efficiency expand the demand for transactions, which in turn increases the need for further third‐party protection of property rights. We illustrate our results using the growth of the state system in Western Europe.     

Calculation of Self-Interest and Constitutional Consensus: The Role of Ideology

Constitutional political economy's veil of uncertainty prevents citizens from identifying their specific interests under political rules and facilitates agreement on rules by moving all individuals to an average position. But the calculation of self-interest in such settings is not straight-forward; citizens require a model of how the economy works to predict the effect of rules on welfare. Political ideologies typically supply such models. Citizens subscribing to different ideological models anticipate differential treatment under a given constitutional rule, breaking down the ability of the veil of uncertainty to achieve consensus. Constitutional consensus is unlikely in the absence of ideological consensus.     

城市交通问题的产权分析

通过对多个城市的观察,发现《中华人民共和国道路交通安全法》的许多条款形同虚设,得不到切实的执行。本文根据产权理论对这一现象进行了分析,解释当前城市交通问题的主要成因即：车辆的增多、无法识别、十字路口和交通意识。产权的主要作用是帮助人们形成与他人交流的信息的预期,有了清晰界定的产权,就可以减少城市交通中人与人之间的不确定性,减小冲突的发生。为此,本文提出了解决城市交通问题的政策建议,即限制行车数量、增强非机动车辆的识别能力和规范十字路口标识,提高公民城市交通意识。通过减少交易成本,清晰的界定产权等手段规范城市交通,从而帮助行人建立稳定的预期,保证道路畅通。     

Property Rights,Public Enforcement,and Growth

We study the link between public enforcement of property rights, innovation investments, and economic growth in an endogenous growth framework with an expanding set of product varieties. We find that a government can assure positive equilibrium growth through public employment in the enforcement of property rights, if the economic environment is sufficiently favorable to growth and/or if public enforcement is sufficiently effective. However, in terms of welfare, an equilibrium path without property‐rights protection and growth might be preferable. In this case, the enforcement of property rights involves too much reallocation of labor from production and research towards the public sector.