Strategic environmental policy and the accumulation of knowledge

In dealing with a transnational pollutant-emitting duopoly welfare-maximising policy makers face two negative externalities: imperfect competition and unpriced emissions. Strategic environmental policy models show that these externalities involve a trade-off between reducing pollution and allowing for rent-seeking of the respective firm. This dilemma usually results in a suboptimal internalisation of the negative externality emerging from emissions. Indeed, the conventional model setup includes an R&D stage that enables the firms to mitigate regulation costs. But the typical one period configuration ignores that R&D expenditures create knowledge capital which is, due to its inherent cumulativeness, also effective in following periods. Our model analyses the established trade-off in a two period setting and therefore allows for an investigation of intertemporal knowledge accumulation. We find that the intertemporal effects provide an incentive for a policy maker to set a higher tax rate compared to a one-period setup which lessens the magnitude of the suboptimal internalisation of emissions. Under certain conditions even a tax rate above the Pigouvian level is possible in period 1.     

Does free trade promote environmental technology transfer?

We investigate how environmental and trade policies affect the transfer of environmental technology in a two-country model with global pollution. By comparing free trade and tariff policy with or without commitment, the following results are obtained. First, firms avoid the implementation of environmental tax by contracting technological transfer. Second, there is a case in which free trade is preferable to a tariff policy for both countries when there is no commitment to a tariff level. Third, free trade is not Pareto-preferred to a tariff policy when there is a commitment.     

Standards policy and international trade: Multilateralism versus regionalism

We develop a simple model of policy coordination on domestic standards and examine whether domestic standards policy can lead to regional and multilateral harmonization of standards under the principle of national treatment. This paper focuses on mandatory product and process standards affecting the characteristics of a final good that control negative consumption externalities (e.g., vehicle emissions control and safety standards, restrictions on the use of pesticides for agricultural goods, and safety standards for electrical products). Only the products that meet a country's national standards are allowed to circulate in that country's market. Raising standards reduces negative externalities caused by consumption of a traded good but increases firms’ costs. We use the core as the solution concept. A standards regime is considered to be in the core if it is not blocked by any coalition within countries. The main finding is that a multilateral agreement on standards that maximizes world welfare is only in the core if externalities are local or slightly transboundary. Otherwise, only a regional agreement on standards is in the core. As extensions, we consider many and asymmetric number of firms, asymmetry in market size, fixed costs for different standards, and a multilateral agreement on different standards.     

Environmental Policy, Intra-Industry Trade and Transfrontier Pollution

The paper discusses effects of domestic environmental policy on foreignemissions and on transboundary pollution. We use a Dixit-Stiglitz typemodel of monopolistic competition with an endogenous number of firms.Production generates environmental externalities which spill over to theother country. It is shown that environmental policy has an impact onmarket structure at home and abroad. These market structure effectsinduce changes in emissions abroad. In contrast to what has been derivedin earlier contributions, it turns out to be possible that tighterenvironmental standards at home lead to less emissions abroad. The paperderives these results and provides the economic intuition behind them.Finally, conditions for optimal environmental policies are derived.     

Technological districts localized spillovers and productivity growth. The Italian evidence on technological externalities in the core regions

Technological R&D externalities are the effects on the technological capacity of each firm stemming from the complementary and interrelated activities of R&D activities of other firms that operate both in the same industry and in other industries. R&D technological externalities are specially influential at the regional level. Regional proximity enhances the circulation of information, the opportunities for external learning; the scope for capitalizing on potential complementarities among the variety of firms and the different R&D activities being carried out by each firm, and the opportunity for technological networking. The empirical evidence on core regions in Italy in the 1980s confirms that regional clustering of complementary and interrelated R&D activities facilitated the emergence of technological districts. Firms located within technological districts benefited enormously from the R&D technological externalities spilling out from the complementary and interrelated R&D activities of other firms localized in the same area. Consequently, firms localized within technological districts had fast rates of introduction of technological innovations which, in turn, made it possible for total factor productivity levels to be raised with comparatively low levels of intra-muros R&D expenses.     

Politics with(out) Coase

Political markets may be curative of political externalities, yet they are often unviable due to the presence of bargaining externalities. In this paper, we study the extent to which the choice of voting dimensions may affect the viability of Coasian bargaining in a political context. The results suggest that bargaining in a multi-dimensional policy space, although desirable in an ideal world of zero-transaction costs, is almost unavoidably affected by bargaining externalities. Disaggregating the policy choices and voting in a one-dimensional policy space can reduce bargaining externalities and lead to median voter outcomes. Bargaining by a limited number of players in a median voter situation can achieve a social first-best. We show the equivalence between the outcomes of multiple independent voting in one-dimensional space and the hypothetical outcome of Coasian bargaining in a multi-dimensional policy space.     

节能减排政策对绿色技术进步的实证研究——来自中国电力行业的经验证据

"十一五"期间我国对电力行业实施了一系列节能减排政策措施。基于方向距离函数和ML指数,运用2000～2010年29个省份的面板数据,测度了电力行业的绿色技术进步。基于环境波特假说,运用非参数"Kruskal–Wallis"秩和方法实证检验了"十一五"节能减排政策对电力行业绿色技术的影响。结论证实,相对于"十五"期间,"十一五"期间严格的节能减排政策显著促进了电力行业的绿色技术进步。     

Productivity change and externalities: empirical evidence from Hungary

This paper contributes to the analysis of the impact of externalities on the host country’s total factor productivity by taking into account different dimensions of spillover effects. Namely, engagement in exporting and foreign ownership is generally perceived as being beneficial to individual firms and the economy as a whole. The approach used in the current research accounts for different internal as well as external factors that individual firms face and evaluates the effect on changes in productivity, technology as well as the efficiency of domestic firms. The empirical analysis focuses on Hungary. While the country leads the group of post-socialist countries in the amount of attracted foreign direct investments (FDI) the effect of this policy on the economy remains unclear. The research finds that different externalities play a different role in productivity, technological and efficiency change in different types of firms and sectors of the economy.     

Corrective Taxes under Oligopoly with Inter-Firm Externalities

Pollution externalities between polluters should be taken into account in the design of corrective taxes. When the externalities are substantial and/or the number of polluters is large, the effluent levies on these firms do not necessarily result in a deadweight loss. Consequently, the second-best tax exceeds the marginal social cost of pollution. A more general rule is that the tax rate should be greater than the marginal social cost of pollution if and only if a marginal increase in the tax rate results in opposite effects on the changes of equilibrium emission level and output.     

On the efficiency of environmental instruments in a spatial economy

This paper develops an efficiency criterion to evaluate environmental policy instruments in a spatial economy. We call an environmental policy regime at the regional level efficient if it guarantees not only an efficient distribution of emission permits within a region, but also an efficient locational pattern of mobile firms across the regions of a federation. Using marketable pollution rights or emission taxes, efficiency in this broad sense can only be achieved if revenues of regional environmental agencies are not transferred to regional firms. Direct controls neither support an efficient allocation of emission rights within a region nor locational efficiency of firms.     

Environmental taxation,information precision,and information sharing

We analyze how environmental taxes should be optimally levied in a sequential game in which regulators and firms face costs uncertainties. First, the regulator chooses the intensity of emissions taxes to reduce externalities. Then, facing common and private information with noisy signals, firms compete in the marketplace and choose outputs. We show that, under nonuniform quality of signals across firms, the regulator may calibrate differentiated tax policy. We also show that the social impact of more precise private signals hinges largely and fundamentally on the value of the ratio of the slopes of the marginal damage and the marginal consumer surplus. Finally, we investigate information sharing between polluters and its impacts on welfare. We stress that, when there are threats of severe environmental damages under deep uncertainties, collusion is welfare reducing and may jeopardize the regulatory process. Regulators need to set an appropriate precautionary policy. Numerical simulations illustrate the results that the model delivers.     

Technology, agglomeration, and regional competition for investment

Abstract.  Competition for firms by region has a long-standing history, and the academic literature has debated whether such competition is efficient. We develop a model that explores technology development by firms facing regional competition for their investment and examine the endogenous determination of region policy, firm technology, and agglomeration externalities. We find a new source of inefficiency – regional competition leads firms to inefficiently distort their development and selection of production technology to improve their standing in the regional competition for their investment. We show that these inefficient firm decisions on technology and location can also weaken agglomeration externalities.     

产业集中、集群式供应链组织衍续和技术创新——以"武汉·中国光谷"光电子产业为例

集群式供应链组织衍续(即产业集群在同一地域形成完整或近乎完整的供应链)不仅是产业集群升级的主要途径,也是产业集群及其企业技术创新的潜在机理。文章根据产业集群所表现出来的供应链组织衍续特点,来分析产业集中度(MAR外部性)、集群式供应链组织衍续(Jacobs外部性)与集群技术创新之间的内在联系,在此基础上提出相关的假设,并以“武汉.中国光谷”光电子产业为例,来实证产业集中度、集群式供应链组织续衍对产业集群及其企业创新行为的影响。     

Optimal policy for environmental goods trade in asymmetric oligopolistic eco-industries

In this paper, we examine the optimal structure of an environmental tax to pollution, a production subsidy to a domestic eco-industry, and an import tariff on environmental goods (EGs) in a two-country model where the home country imports EGs from the foreign country. Home and foreign firms that produce EGs engage in Cournot competition. We then assume that the number of the home local firms which produce EGs is constant, but that of the foreign firms is variable. Our main findings are as follows: (I) The optimal environmental tax level may be lower than the Pigouvian level even if the tax has a positive impact on the output of EGs produced by a domestic firm. (II) The optimal tariff level may be positive when the country implements the first best policy combination in a closed economy regarding the environmental tax and the subsidy. (III) The optimal subsidy level may be positive, and then the subsidy may be substitutive for the import tariff on EGs.     

Network effects, market structure and industry performance

This paper analyzes oligopolistic markets with network externalities. Exploiting a minimal complementarity structure on the model primitives that allows for pure network goods, we prove existence of non-trivial fulfilled-expectations equilibrium. We formalize the concept of industry viability, investigate its determinants, and show that it improves with more firms in the market and/or by technological progress. These results enlighten some well-known conclusions from case studies in the management strategy literature. We also characterize the effects of market structure on industry performance, which depart substantially from ordinary markets. The approach relies on lattice-theoretic methods, supplemented with basic insights from nonsmooth analysis.     

Admission standards,student effort,and the creation of skilled jobs

We consider the implications of expanding enrollment through lower standards in a model with human capital externalities and a market failure. Workers and firms make uncoordinated investment choices prior to random matching. Investment choices depend on the expected productivity of the counterpart in production. The setting generates a potential human capital externality as a more skilled labor force induces more skilled job openings. Exploiting the externality is complicated by a market failure which may cause some workers to earn a degree but not put forth the effort required to become highly skilled. We show that beyond a threshold, increased enrollment through low standards can be poor policy. Policies which increase returns to agents and firms in best matches can improve outcomes.     

Environmental protection without loss of international competitiveness

We develop a two‐country Cournot oligopoly model with product differentiation across countries and production‐generated pollution. The abatement of pollution by the firms in response to emission taxes is endogenous, and the number of firms can be fixed or there may be free entry and exit of firms in both countries. We propose particular unilateral and multilateral piecemeal policy reforms of emission taxes and production subsidies such that domestic industries will not suffer any loss of international competitiveness (defined in terms of either market share or profits), emission levels will be lower, and welfare could be higher in both countries.     

Adoption of Pollution Prevention Techniques: The Role of Management Systems and Regulatory Pressures

This paper investigates the extent to which firm level technological change that reduces unregulated emissions is driven by regulatory pressures, and firms’ technological and organizational capabilities. Using a treatment effects model with panel data for a sample of S&P 500 firms over the period 1994–1996, we find that organizational change in the form of Total Quality Environmental Management leads firms to adopt pollution prevention practices, after controlling for the effects of various regulatory pressures and firm-specific characteristics. We find that the threat of anticipated regulations and the presence of ‘complementary assets’ is important for creating the incentives and an internal capacity to undertake incremental adoption of pollution prevention techniques.     

Understanding the effectiveness of environmental offset policies

In the real world, taxes and cap-and-trade systems are rarely implemented in their pure form. In this paper, we examine a related approach that has been used widely in practice—which we refer to as an “offset.” The idea behind offsets is to encourage firms or entities that may not be a part of the main regulatory system to produce environmental improvements. These improvements can then be used to offset pollution reduction requirements for regulated entities. This paper analyzes how offsets are used in practice, and identifies key economic and political factors that help explain the use of offsets in certain situations. We find that offsets may often fail to take adequate account of environmental or ecosystem damages. We argue that the effectiveness of an offset policy depends on the political and institutional context in which it is developed.     

Large‐Scale Risks and Technological Change: What About Limited Liability?

We consider a firm under strict liability that must choose between two risky technologies, one being safer but costlier than the other one. The total potential level of damage increases with the level of activity. We show that, under limited liability, technological change is welfare‐improving and leads to full risk internalization when the firms are sufficiently capitalized. Nevertheless, the percentage of firms adopting the safer technology and full risk internalization is higher under unlimited liability than under limited liability. We show how an adequate tax policy increases this percentage. We also determine the characteristics of a second‐best tax policy.