The limitations of decentralized world redistribution: An optimal taxation approach

A centralized scheme of world redistribution that maximizes a border-neutral social welfare function, subject to the disincentive effects it would create, generates a drastic reduction in world consumption inequality, dropping the Gini coefficient from 0.69 to 0.25. In contrast, an optimal decentralized (i.e., with no cross-country transfers) redistribution has a miniscule effect on world income inequality. Thus, the traditional public finance concern about the excess burden of redistribution cannot explain why there is so little world redistribution.Actual foreign aid is vastly lower than the transfers under the simulated world income tax, suggesting that voluntary world transfers - subject to a free-rider problem - produces an outcome that is consistent with rich countries such as the United States either placing a much lower value on the welfare of foreigners, or else expecting that a very significant fraction of cross-border transfers is wasted. The product of the welfare weight and one minus the share of transfers that are wasted constitutes the implicit weight that the United States assigns to foreigners. We calculate that value to be as low as 1/2000 of the value put on the welfare of an American, suggesting that U.S. policy is consistent with social preferences that place essentially no value on the welfare of the citizens of the poorest countries, or that implicitly assumes that essentially all transfers are wasted.     

Revenue‐enhancing Trade Liberalization in a Differentiated Duopoly

Existing studies suggest that in developing countries, tax reforms that increase consumption taxes can compensate for shortfalls in revenue from a tariff reduction. However, these revenue‐enhancing tariff–tax reforms have a critical shortcoming—they generally reduce welfare under imperfect competition. This paper shows that tax reforms such as consumption tax reforms do not necessarily have to be implemented to make up for revenue shortfalls from tariff reductions under imperfect competition, because trade liberalization through tariff cuts leads to an increase in government revenue when domestic and imported goods have a high substitutability. This revenue‐enhancing effect of a tariff reduction occurs for a wider degree of product substitutability when initial tariff and consumption tax rates are high. More importantly, we show that even if initial tariff and consumption tax rates are sufficiently low, a tariff reduction still increases government revenue for a low degree of product differentiation under Bertrand competition.     

Getting help from abroad: The macroeconomics of foreign direct investment in infrastructure in low‐income countries

Infrastructure financing needs in most low‐income countries are substantial, but funding for such needs is only partly covered by national governments and aid donors. This paper introduces foreign direct investment (FDI) through public–private partnerships as a source of infrastructure financing in low‐income countries. A two‐sector open economy model is developed to assess the macroeconomic performance of FDI in infrastructure. With efficient foreign investment, an increase in revenue‐generating infrastructure investment boosts productivity and spurs private investment while stabilizing domestic prices. A direct comparison between infrastructure financed by domestic versus foreign investment shows that foreign investment creates higher output growth and welfare gains and is preferable to domestically sourced investment, irrespective of the underlying financing instrument the domestic economy is employing. FDI in non‐revenue‐generating infrastructure is also analyzed and discussed.     

Revenue-increasing and welfare-enhancing reform of taxes on exports

The loss of revenue from a reduction in export taxes has been a concern for trade policy reform in many developing countries. We discuss a strategy for selective reform of taxes on exports that enhances welfare and increases revenue. The strategy involves a reduction in the export tax on a given commodity with an offsetting increase in production tax to keep the producer price unchanged. This strategy is especially promising for exportables with a net subsidy on domestic consumption due to high export taxes and low consumption taxes.     

Capital and Consumption Tax Reforms in a Small Open Economy

The effects of a reform in capital and consumption taxes on private welfare and government tax revenue are examined for a small open, capital‐importing economy. A trade‐off between private welfare and tax revenue is encountered in maximizing social welfare. Nonetheless, lowering capital taxes and raising consumption taxes can increase both private welfare and tax revenue if the initial tax rates are not optimal. In addition, a tax reform by this fashion is a likely response to a rise in the foreign rate of return on capital.     

A TALE OF TAX POLICIES IN OPEN ECONOMIES

To evaluate fiscal policy reforms for Euro‐area countries, this article develops and calibrates a small open economy model. Debt reduction reforms require higher tax rates in the short term in exchange for lower rates in the long term as the debt‐servicing burden falls. Using the capital income tax to implement such a policy leads to welfare gains; the consumption tax, a very small welfare gain; and the labor income tax, a welfare loss. Holding fixed the long‐run debt–output ratio, offsetting a lower capital income tax with either a higher labor income or consumption tax generally yields welfare gains.     

Optimal income taxation and migration: a world welfare point of view

This paper considers a world in which a distortionary income tax must be employed to raise and redistribute revenue. The optimal taxation of emigrants relative to those left behind is examined under the objective of world social welfare maximization. When tastes for consumption and labor do not depend directly on residence, the optimal tax system induces individuals to reside where the marginal products of their chosen labor supplies are highest. This paper also proves the existence of an optimal tax system under which each individual resides where he pays the greatest tax. This result holds even when tastes are allowed to vary with residence in an interesting way.     

Migration,Foreign Aid and the Welfare State

Aspects related to the links between international migration, foreign aid and the welfare state are highlighted in this paper. Migration is modeled as a costly movement from an aid‐recipient developing country with low income and no welfare state, towards a rich donor, developed country with a well‐developed welfare state. Within this model, it is found, among other things, that the best response of the developed donor country is to increase aid as the co‐financing rate by the recipient country increases. When the immigration cost decreases, e.g. as a result of greater economic integration between the two countries, it is beneficial for the donor country to increase aid and the recipient country to increase the co‐financing rate.     

PROFIT TAX AND FIRM MOBILITY IN A THREE‐COUNTRY MODEL

We construct a three‐country model that incorporates international relocation by imperfectly competitive firms and examine both the effects of each country's profit tax reduction on the consumption and welfare of all countries, and the incentive for the countries to decrease the profit tax. In such a model, both the terms of trade and international relocation of firms offer the key to understanding the impacts of one country's profit tax policy. In particular, we note that the relocation of firms from the other two countries is positively related to the wage incomes of the third country through a shift in labour demand, and the terms‐of‐trade improvement is not only positively related to the wage incomes, but also negatively related to profit incomes through a shift in world consumption demand. We show that (i) in a three‐country world economy, regardless of the reduction's source, the profit tax reduction of each country leads to relocation of firms away from foreign countries toward its own economy and deteriorates the terms of trade of its economy and (ii) this becomes a ‘beggar‐thy‐neighbour’ policy in the sense that it lowers the welfare of the other foreign countries.     

The Foreign Trade and Sectoral Impact of Truck Road Pricing for Cross-Border Trade

Truck road pricing is on the brink of beingintroduced in a number of European countries.The experience gained from Switzerland, thefirst country worldwide to implement such adistant-dependent pricing scheme, has provedinvaluable. Nevertheless, significant questionsstill remain. The present paper attempts toprovide some clarity by analysing the welfareand sectoral impact resulting from theintroduction of truck road pricing with respectto foreign trade. It is shown that this impactcan be separated into four effects: the pureterms of trade effect, the tax revenue effect,the transit tax revenue effect and the resourcegain effect (resources set free by a reductionin transport activity). A CGE simulation ofeach of these effects identifies theirquantitative implications. Out of the foureffects the pure terms of trade effect turnsout to dominate at both the sectoral andaggregate level. It triggers a trade-inducedwelfare loss. The tax revenue effect, and lessso the transit revenue effect, mitigate thisloss. For a full road transport costinternalization a trade-induced welfare loss isquantified for Austria at 1.3%. Sensitivity ofthis and other aggregate variables is high withrespect to household reaction to transport taxrevenue refunding. The trade-induced welfareloss of variable size as explored in thisarticle counterbalances a fraction of thewelfare gain due to internalization.     

Can productive government spending be a source of equilibrium indeterminacy?

This paper presents an examination of the interaction between indeterminacy and productive government spending financed by taxes in a one-sector growth model. In the paper, we show that the possibility of indeterminacy is positively affected by dependence on income tax financing and is negatively affected by consumption tax financing. Under balanced budget rules, a key determinant for indeterminacy is a revenue source for providing public services (i.e. income tax financing) rather than the presence of productive government spending.     

Growth,revenue, and welfare effects of tariff and tax reform: Win–win–win strategies

We examine growth, revenue, and welfare effects of tariff and tax reform with a two-good, two-factor endogenous growth model. Learning-by-doing and intersectoral knowledge spillovers contribute to endogenous growth consistent with incomplete specialization. We obtain two main results. First, trade liberalization raises (or lowers) the growth rate if and only if the import sector is more effective-labor-intensive (or capital-intensive). Second, we can attain growth, revenue, and welfare gains by combining consumer–price–neutral tariff and tax reform for growth enhancement with an additional rise in the consumption tax on the less distorted good.     

The Welfare of Investment Deductibility Under a Flat Tax

This paper analyses the welfare effects of investment deductibility in a contest of endogenous growth generated by learning–by–doing and knowledge spillovers. We present a model where a set of revenue neutral fiscal policies, each characterized by different degrees of investment deductibility and different uniform tax rates on income, have been introduced. We show that, given the ratio of public expenditures to national product, partial investment deductibility turns out to be welfare enhancing when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is sufficiently small. Our result means that a pure consumption tax—although ensuring more saving and faster growth—is not always preferable to a revenue neutral tax system in which both consumption and investment are taxed.     

Tax competition with parasitic tax havens

We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries, and these countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenue from capital taxation to the havens. We demonstrate that the full or partial elimination of tax havens would improve welfare in non-haven countries. We also demonstrate that the smaller countries choose to become tax havens, and we show that the abolition of a sufficiently small number of the relatively large havens leaves all countries better off, including the remaining havens. We argue that these results extend to the case where there are also taxes on wage income that involve administrative and compliance costs.     

Why Do Poor democracies Collect a Lot of Tariff Revenue?

Governments in developing countries typically collect a significantly higher proportion of their revenue in the form of trade taxes, than their developed country counterparts. This paper provides a political–economic explanation for this phenomenon. A model of trade in vertically differentiated products is used in order to determine the preferences of the households among different ways of raising government revenue. It is shown that the majority of households in poor countries will consume low-quality, domestically produced varieties of differentiated products and would thus register a preference for the government to rely more on tariff rather than income tax revenue in order to finance its operations.     

Global capital markets,direct taxation and the redistribution of income

Standard fiscal theory suggests that taxation should be heaviest on the least mobile factors of production – for both efficiency and revenue reasons. A shift in tax burdens from capital to labour as economies become globally integrated is thus justified. This theoretical tradition (founded by Ramsay and continued by Mirrlees and Lucas) assumes by construction that profit taxes reduce investment and growth; and while sensitive to inter-generational equity, sidesteps the issue of income distribution within generations. In contrast, starting from Keynes’ critique of these assumptions and building on modern endogenous growth models, it can be shown that profit taxation is not necessarily injurious to productive investment. In practice, moreover, the effect of globalisation has not been to reduce tax rates on capital, but rather to erode the tax base itself (i.e. ‘tax evasion’). Improved information exchange between tax authorities, which is now being driven by fiscal insolvency in developed countries, would allow tax incidence to be shifted so as to improve income distribution within OECD countries. Such cooperation could also permit the replacement of the current discretionary system of fiscal transfers from rich to poor countries (‘development aid’) by equitable sharing of global capital tax revenue.     

Neoclassical Growth, Manufacturing Agglomeration, and Terms of Trade

This study reverses the prediction of geography and growth models that trade integration may cause income divergence. Moreover, a new dynamic welfare gain of trade openness is identified. These results are obtained from embedding a new economic geography model into a neoclassical growth model. Starting from symmetric countries, a country that accumulates more capital than the other increases its home market size, improves its terms of trade, and lowers its relative consumption price index, because trade costs drive a wedge in between relative producer and consumption price indices. Both effects in turn tend to increase its marginal revenue product of capital relative to the other country (divergence forces), while factor substitution diminishes its marginal revenue product of capital (convergence force). Reducing trade costs decreases the wedge and weakens the divergence forces, while the convergence force is unaffected. Hence, divergence is more likely with higher rather than lower trade costs.     

Carbon-reducing taxes and income inequality: general equilibrium evaluation of alternative energy taxation in Taiwan

Recently, several studies have been a detailed evaluation of the economic implications of energy taxation as a policy instrument to conserve energy and reduce carbon emissions. However, little attention has been devoted to inquiring about the economic implications of energy taxation in the newly industrialized countries (the so-called NICs). In this paper, we use a multisector, multihousehold computable general equilibrium model to assess the distributional effects of alternative energy taxation on the Taiwan economy. The counterfactual simulation technique is applied to investigate the income distribution implications of: (1) an increase in the import taxes of crude oil; and (2) an increase in the excise taxes of petroleum products. Our empirical results basing on Taiwan's data show that both energy taxes increase government revenue and the Gini coefficient, but reduce net value-added, private consumption, disposable income and equivalent variation. A raise in the Gini coefficient implies that there is a worsening in the distribution of income. The lowest income group suffers relatively large welfare and income loss, but the highest income group suffers a relatively small welfare and income loss. The distributional effects differ from household to household depending on the composition of their total consumption and the source of their factor income. Our findings reveal that the energy tax appears to be mildly regressive, there are broadly consistent with those cases of developed countries reported in previous studies.     

A Tax Package to Reduce the Marginal Rate of Income Tax and the Wage Demands of Trade Unions*

To reduce the level of tax evasion, a shift of taxation away from income tax and towards a consumption tax has been proposed in Australia. This paper shows that for such a shift to maintain revenue but not induce trade unions to raise their wage demands, it is necessary that the income tax threshold be increased. Numerical examples of desirable tax packages are given.     

Trade agreements, bargaining and economic growth

Rebelo’s two-sector endogenous growth model is embedded within a two-country international trade framework. The two countries bargain over a trade agreement that specifies: (i) the size of the foreign aid that the richer country gives to the poorer one; (ii) the terms of the international trade that takes place after the aid is given. Foreign aid is given not because of generosity, but because it improves the capital allocation across the world and thus raises total world production. This world production surplus enables the rich country to raise its equilibrium consumption and welfare beyond their no-aid levels. To ensure it, the rich country uses a trade agreement to condition the aid on favorable terms of trade.