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1.
FAN-CHIN KUNG 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2006,8(3):345-355
We study the formation of coalitions that provide public goods to members. Individuals are linked on a tree graph and those with similar preferences are connected on the tree. We present a well‐defined solution that selects envy‐free allocations from the core. 相似文献
2.
A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive-form bargaining game. We establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game. Our main results are concerned with the characterization of equilibriumcoalition structures. We develop an algorithm that generates (under certain conditions) an equilibrium coalition structure. Our characterization results are especially sharp forsymmetricpartition functions. In particular, we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our results to a Cournot oligopoly.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, C72, C78, D62. 相似文献
3.
The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
We consider the partitioning of a society into coalitions in purely hedonic settings, i.e., where each player's payoff is completely determined by the identity of other members of her coalition. We first discuss how hedonic and nonhedonic settings differ and some sufficient conditions for the existence of core stable coalition partitions in hedonic settings. We then focus on a weaker stability condition: individual stability, where no player can benefit from moving to another coalition while not hurting the members of that new coalition. We show that if coalitions can be ordered according to some characteristic over which players have single-peaked preferences, or where players have symmetric and additively separable preferences, then there exists an individually stable coalition partition. Examples show that without these conditions, individually stable coalition partitions may not exist. We also discuss some other stability concepts, and the incompatibility of stability with other normative properties. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, A14, D20. 相似文献
4.
ANNA BOGOMOLNAIA MICHEL LE BRETON ALEXEI SAVVATEEV SHLOMO WEBER 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2008,10(3):455-473
This paper examines a model of multijurisdiction formation where individuals' characteristics are uniformly distributed over a finite interval. Every jurisdiction locates a public facility and distributes its cost equally among the residents. We consider the notions of Nash and local Nash stability, and examine the existence and characterization of stable partitions. The main feature of this analysis is that, even under the uniform distribution, there are stable structures that exhibit a high degree of heterogeneity of jurisdictional sizes. 相似文献
5.
We study auctions with financial externalities, i.e., auctions in which losers care about how much the winner pays. In the
first-price auction, larger financial externalities result in a lower expected price; in the second-price auction, the effect
is ambiguous. Although the expected price in the second-price auction may increase if financial externalities increase, the
seller is not able to gain more revenue by guaranteeing the losers a fraction of the auction revenue. With a reserve price,
we find that both auctions may have pooling at the reserve price. This finding suggests that identical bids need not be a
signal of collusion, in contrast to what is sometimes argued in anti-trust cases.
We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Dutch National Science Foundation (NWO 510.010.501 and NWO-VICI 453.03.606).
For valuable discussions and comments, we would like to thank Eric van Damme, Jacob Goeree, Thomas Kittsteiner, Marta Kolodziejczyk,
seminar participants at Tilburg University, Humboldt University Berlin, and National University of Singapore, and audiences
at ESEM 2001 in Lausanne, and the FEEM 2002 conference in Milan on auctions and market design. The suggestions of an anonymous
referee of this Journal greatly improved the article. The usual disclaimer applies. 相似文献
6.
Melvyn G. Coles 《International Economic Review》1999,40(4):851-868
This article considers equilibrium decentralized trade when there is a marketplace where buyers and sellers meet costlessly. Since buyers have idiosyncratic match payoffs for each seller's good, some buyers, rather than trade with the current stock of sellers, wait for new sellers to enter the marketplace to obtain a good they like. A turnover externality exists where all traders are better off with higher entry rates of new traders. Furthermore, this turnover externality supports multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria. This provides new insights into similar results obtained in the random-matching literature. 相似文献
7.
We study coalition formation in "real time", a situation in which coalition formation is intertwined with the ongoing receipt of pay-offs. Agreements are assumed to be permanently binding: They can only be altered with the full consent of existing signatories. For characteristic function games we prove that equilibrium processes—whether or not these are history dependent—must converge to efficient absorbing states. For three-player games with externalities each player has enough veto power that a general efficiency result can be established. However, there exist four-player games in which all Markov equilibria are inefficient from every initial condition, despite the ability to write permanently binding agreements. 相似文献
8.
This paper shows that even untied aid is Pareto-improving if and only if the marginal propensity to consume the polluting good in the donor country is sufficiently larger than in the recipient country. 相似文献
9.
Revisiting Externalities 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Leonid Hurwicz 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》1999,1(2):225-245
For economies with one-sided externalities between firms, four types of results are presented and discussed: (i) the impossibility of decentralized finite-dimensional mechanisms guaranteeing Pareto optimality; (ii) the possibilities for Pigou taxes in situations where Arrovian markets cannot function; (iii) that mergers may be able to internalize weak externalities but not strong ones; and (iv) that parallelism of indifference curves (quasi-linear utilities, absence of income effects) is necessary, and not merely sufficient, for the validity of the Coase Invariance Theorem (asserting that alternative institutional arrangements do not change the level of externality). The paper builds on the seminal contributions of Starrett, Calsamiglia, Baumol, Bradford, Oates, Boyd, and Conley. 相似文献
10.
“交易外部性”:外部性的重新理解及系统整合 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
基于对外部性和交易本质的理解,当前生产外部性和消费外部性两分的观点有失偏颇。研究提出交易外部性概念,即产权交易过程中,交易一方或交易以外的行为主体的权利(束)或权利部分职能被交易另一方强制利用而未被定价或实现对等补偿的现象。据此,按照发生领域和作用主体的不同,外部性可以划分为生产外部性、消费外部性和交易外部性三类,其中,交易外部性进一步包含一类交易外部性、二类交易外部性和三类交易外部性。此处的二类交易外部性与史普博的内部性具有相同的本质内涵,即内部性实质是交易外部性范畴下的一个子分类。 相似文献
11.
The identification of aggregate human-capital externalities is still not fully understood. The existing ( Mincerian ) approach confounds positive externalities with wage changes due to a downward sloping demand curve for human capital. As a result, the Mincerian approach yields positive externalities even when wages equal marginal social products. We propose an approach that identifies human-capital externalities, whether or not aggregate demand for human capital slopes downward. Another advantage of our approach is that it does not require estimates of the individual return to human capital. Applications to U.S. cities and states between 1970 and 1990 yield no evidence of significant average-schooling externalities. 相似文献
12.
Xiangkang Yin 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2003,26(2):269-277
Pollution externalities between polluters should be taken into account in the design of corrective taxes. When the externalities are substantial and/or the number of polluters is large, the effluent levies on these firms do not necessarily result in a deadweight loss. Consequently, the second-best tax exceeds the marginal social cost of pollution. A more general rule is that the tax rate should be greater than the marginal social cost of pollution if and only if a marginal increase in the tax rate results in opposite effects on the changes of equilibrium emission level and output. 相似文献
13.
Denise Hazlett 《The Journal of economic education》2013,44(1):44-51
A graphical approach shows that in order for the tax revenue to increase, following a reduction in the marginal rate, the increase of aggregate supply must be greater the lower the price level elasticity of aggregate demand. 相似文献
14.
Road Transport Externalities 总被引:8,自引:1,他引:8
During the last decade much progress has been made in defining & measuring the external costs of transport. As the cost of tolling equipment falls, the set of realistic policy options to internalise these externalities will continue to grow. This will determine the research and policy agenda. We make three points. Firstly, empirical work is still necessary to better identify marginal external costs, including congestion, accident and environmental costs. Secondly, any assessment of policy options should treat externalities simultaneously. The use of pricing instruments and emissions standards are discussed within this framework. Thirdly, we emphasise the role of government. Designing the optimal road-pricing institutions requires consideration of horizontal and vertical tax competition, while double-dividend arguments are central to the question of securing public support. 相似文献
15.
We study a dynamic regulation model where firms’ actions contribute to a stock externality. The regulator and firms have asymmetric information about serially correlated abatement costs. With price-based policies such as taxes, or if firms trade quotas efficiently, the regulator learns about the evolution of both the stock and costs. This ability to learn about costs is important in determining the ranking of taxes and quotas, and in determining the value of a feedback rather than an open-loop policy. For a range of parameter values commonly used in global warming studies, taxes dominate quotas, regardless of whether the regulator uses an open-loop or a feedback policy, and regardless of the extent of cost correlation.Early versions of this paper were presented at the Fifth California Workshop on Environmental and Resource Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, May 5–6, 2000, and at the annual meeting of the Canadian Agricultural Economics Society, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada, June 1–3, 2000. We thank these conference participants, and two anonymous referees of this journal for their comments, without implicating them in any remaining errors. The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Asian Development Bank. 相似文献
16.
17.
Externalities and optimal taxation 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
This paper reexamines the optimal tax design problem (income and commodities) in the presence of externalities. The nature of the second–best, and the choice of the tax instruments, are motivated by the informational structure in the economy. The main results are: (i) environmental levies (linear or nonlinear) differ in formula from Pigouvian taxes by the expressions for the optimal tax on private goods; (ii) externalities do not affect commodity tax formulas (linear and nonlinear) for private goods; (iii) externalities do not affect the income tax structure if commodity taxes are nonlinear and affect it if commodity taxes are linear; and (iv) a general income tax plus strictly Pigouvian taxes are sufficient for efficient taxation if individuals of different types have identical marginal rates of substitution (at any given consumption bundle). 相似文献
18.
Kazuo NishimuraAlain Venditti 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,105(1):140-157
We consider a two-sector economy with positive intersectoral external effects and nonincreasing social returns. We show that if the discount factor ρ is close to 1 then local indeterminacy may be obtained with mild market imperfections. Moreover, with additional conditions, when ρ is made smaller the steady state becomes totally unstable and quasi-periodic cycles, along which equilibrium paths are indeterminate, may appear through a Hopf bifurcation. This will be proved even if the investment good is capital intensive at the private level while this condition guarantees local determinacy in the sector specific case. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, E32, O41. 相似文献
19.
Abstract. We combine the augmented Solow model with the Mincer equation to derive a specification that identifies an education externality within a production function framework. The previous empirical literature has not reached a consensus about the size of the education externality, which is given by the difference between the microeconomic and the macroeconomic return to education. Relative to our benchmark value that is based on a parameterization of the derived specification, we find that the estimated education externality is too large when the empirical model is not properly restricted, and appears to be absent when all control variables of the empirical model are properly accounted for. We note that the absence of an education externality is difficult to reconcile with observed levels of education subsidies for efficiency reasons. 相似文献
20.
Timing of Entry under Externalities 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Received August 23, 2000; revised version received May 14, 2001 相似文献