Inside the black box: What explains differences in the efficiencies of financial institutions?

Over the past several years, substantial research effort has gone into measuring the efficiency of financial institutions. Many studies have found that inefficiencies are quite large, on the order of 20% or more of total banking industry costs and about half of the industry's potential profits. There is no consensus on the sources of the differences in measured efficiency. this paper examines several possible sources, including differences in efficiency concept, measurement method, and a number of bank, market, and regulatory characteristics. We review the existing literature and provide new evidence using data on US banks over the period 1990–1995.     

How useful is the Marginal Expected Shortfall for the measurement of systemic exposure? A practical assessment

We explore the practical relevance from a supervisor’s perspective of a popular market-based indicator of the exposure of a financial institution to systemic risk, the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES). The MES of an institution can be defined as its expected equity loss when the market itself is in its left tail. We estimate the dynamic MES recently proposed by Brownlees and Engle (2012) for a panel of 68 large US banks over the last decade and a half. Running panel regressions of the MES on bank characteristics, we first find that the MES can be roughly rationalized in terms of standard balance-sheet indicators of bank financial soundness and systemic importance. We then ask whether the cross section of the MES can help to identify ex ante, i.e. before a crisis unfolds, which institutions are more likely to suffer the most severe losses ex post, i.e. once it has unfolded. Unfortunately, using the 2007–2009 crisis as a natural experiment, we find that some standard balance-sheet ratios are better able than the MES to predict large equity losses conditionally to a true crisis.     

What is being exchanged? Framing the logic of value creation in financial services

Financial service providers are facing a major paradigm shift. The understanding of what eventually constitutes customer value is being extended; economic value as the sole core of exchange is a far too limited perspective in contemporary competition. To address this emerging shift, the purpose of this study is to reframe the logic of value creation in financial services. As a result, a tentative framework for value creation logic in financial services is developed and discussed. On the basis of the framework, financial service providers should not limit their attention and resources to the exchange process, but identify innovative value-creating mechanisms through which they could contribute to the customer value actualization process. Our tentative framework (i) offers financial service providers guidance on which innovative value-creating mechanisms would enable them to participate in their customers’ value actualization process; (ii) shows how a product becomes a channel for a service, specifically a solution possessing value in the customer’s routine processes; (iii) illustrates that researchers and service providers should develop their understanding of customers beyond the traditional loan, insurance and/or investment product orientation.     

What is the role of legal systems in financial intermediation? Theory and evidence

We develop a theory’ and empirical test of how the legal system affects the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. The theory uses a double moral hazard framework to show how optimal contracts and investor actions depend on the quality of the legal system. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of European venture capital deals. The main results are that with better legal protection, investors give more non-contractible support and demand more downside protection. These predictions are supported by the empirical analysis. Using a new empirical approach of comparing two sets of fixed-effect regressions, we also find that the investor’s legal system is more important than that of the company in determining investor behavior.     

What is the Intrinsic Value of the Dow?

We model the time-series relation between price and intrinsic value as a cointegrated system, so that price and value are long-term convergent. In this framework, we compare the performance of alternative estimates of intrinsic value for the Dow 30 stocks. During 1963–1996, traditional market multiples (e.g., B/P, E/P, and D/P ratios) have little predictive power. However, a V/P ratio, where V is based on a residual income valuation model, has statistically reliable predictive power. Further analysis shows time-varying interest rates and analyst forecasts are important to the success of V. Alternative forecast horizons and risk premia are less important.     

Support for pension reforms: What is the role of financial literacy and pension knowledge?

Despite the relevance of the issue of pension system sustainability in most advanced economies, the factors associated with the opposition to pension reforms are still under-studied. In this paper, we investigate the correlation between financial, pension and institutional knowledge and support for pension reforms. Using an ad hoc module of the SHARE data for Italy, we find that financially literate and pension knowledgeable individuals are more willing to accept pension reforms. In particular, individuals with a basic level of pension knowledge recognize that population ageing, low economic growth, and low contributions by the young make the public pension system hardly sustainable.     

What provides the micro-foundation of monetary policies in the absence of mature economic institutions?

In the absence of mature economic institutions, what provides the micro-foundation of monetary policies? Taking corporate financing of China's firms as a representative example, first, our data suggest that financial access of firms becomes indeed squeezed as the monetary policies require. Then we confirm that government intervention leads firms' financial access to become difficult since the financial contraction policies. We also provide evidence that government intervention indeed promotes severity of access to finance. These evidences confirm that government intervention squeezes financial access after central government's financial contraction policies and that government intervention functions to support the implementation of monetary policies. Therefore, this paper shows that government intervention provides micro-foundation of the monetary policies in the absence of mature economic institutions.     

What is the risk of European sovereign debt defaults? Fiscal space,CDS spreads and market pricing of risk

We estimate the pricing of sovereign risk for fifty countries based on fiscal space (debt/tax; deficits/tax) and other economic fundamentals over 2005–10. We focus in particular on five countries in the South-West Eurozone Periphery, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Dynamic panel estimates show that fiscal space and other macroeconomic factors are statistically and economically important determinants of sovereign risk. However, risk-pricing of the Eurozone Periphery countries is not predicted accurately either in-sample or out-of-sample: unpredicted high spreads are evident during global crisis period, especially in 2010 when the sovereign debt crisis swept over the periphery area. We match the periphery group with five middle income countries outside Europe that were closest in terms of fiscal space during the European fiscal crisis. Eurozone Periphery default risk is priced much higher than the matched countries in 2010, even allowing for differences in fundamentals. One interpretation is that these economies switched to a “pessimistic” self-fulfilling expectational equilibrium. An alternative interpretation is that the market prices not on current but future fundamentals, expecting adjustment challenges in the Eurozone periphery to be more difficult for than the matched group of middle-income countries because of exchange rate and monetary constraints.     

The financial crisis: What is there to learn?

Many are currently studying the origins of the financial crisis in an attempt to answer two seemingly simple questions: why did it happen, and can another crisis be prevented? Those two questions have proved incredibly divisive. The majority opinion of The United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was submitted with two dissenting positions. Furthermore, The 2010 Economic Report of the United States President does not perfectly align with any opinion presented in that report. Few studies, however, provide proper consideration to the evolution of macroeconomic thought and lengthening of the business cycle preceding the current crisis.     

What do we know about the second moment of financial markets?

Recent research shows that the vast majority of scientific studies published in leading finance journals fails scientific replication (Hou, Xue, and Zhang, 2020; Harvey, Liu, and Zhu; 2016). This study argues that p-hacking, publication pressure and the selection bias from leading finance journals are perhaps not the underlying root cause for this issue. This study shows that standard methodologies often used in finance research are inevitably sample-specific due to the very nature of financial markets. While the consensus of earlier research postulates a rejection of the time-honored Levy hypothesis, the results of this study strongly indicate that the variance of variance does not exist in any of the financial key markets that are considered. An unexpected finding of this study is that the variance process governing the U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate market is generating more extreme events than the Bitcoin market. The results cast doubts on the validity of methodologies currently used in finance research.     

Did TARP reduce or increase systemic risk? The effects of government aid on financial system stability

Theory suggests that government aid to banks may either reduce or increase systemic risk. We are the first to address this issue empirically, analyzing the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Analysis suggests that TARP significantly reduced contributions to systemic risk, particularly for larger and safer banks, and those in better local economies. This occurred primarily through a capital cushion channel that reduced market leverage by increasing the value of common equity. Results are robust to endogeneity and selection bias checks. Findings yield policy conclusions about whether to aid banks, the best targets for future assistance, and short-term versus long-term effects.     

What is the Economic Cost of the Investment Home Bias?

Overinvesting domestically is well known as an investment home bias (IHB). We define an economic home bias (EHB), whereby the IHB measures the investment weights and the EHB measures the economic cost induced by the IHB. We may have a large IHB and a negligible EHB. With the increase in the average correlation between foreign markets from 0.4 for the decade ending in 1988 to about 0.9 for more recent decades, the U.S. EHB is becoming negligible despite the domestic investment of 77.5%. Since 2009, the correlations have decreased, indicating that the HB puzzle is emerging once again.     

On the risk situation of financial conglomerates: does diversification matter?

In general, conglomeration leads to diversification of risk (the diversification benefit) and a decrease in shareholder value (the conglomerate discount). Diversification benefits in financial conglomerates are typically derived without explicitly accounting for reduced shareholder value. However, a comprehensive analysis requires competitive conditions within the conglomerate, i.e., shareholders and debt holders should receive risk-adequate returns on their investment. In this paper, we contribute to the literature on this topic by comparing the diversification effect in conglomerates with and without accounting for altered shareholder value. We derive results for a holding company, a parent-subsidiary structure, and an integrated model. In addition, we consider different types of capital and risk transfer instruments in the parent-subsidiary model, including intragroup retrocession and guarantees. We conclude that under competitive conditions, diversification does not matter to the extent frequently emphasized in the literature. The analysis contributes to the ongoing discussion on group solvency regulation and enterprise risk management, which is of relevance to insurance groups and other financial conglomerates.     

Does multinationality matter? Implications of operational hedging for the exchange risk exposure

An important issue in global corporate risk management is whether the multinationality of a firm matters in terms of its effect on exchange risk exposure. In this paper, we examine the exchange risk exposure of US firms during 1983–2006, comparing multinational and non-multinational firms and focusing on the role of operational hedging. Since MNCs and non-multinationals differ in size and other characteristics, we construct matched samples of MNCs and non-multinationals based on the propensity score method. We find that the multinationality in fact matters for a firm’s exchange exposure but not in the way usually presumed – the exchange risk exposures are actually smaller and less significant for MNCs than non-multinationals. The results are robust with respect to different samples and model specifications. There is evidence that operational hedging decreases a firm’s exchange risk exposure and increases its stock returns. The effective deployment of operational risk management strategies provides one reason why MNCs may have insignificant exchange risk exposure estimates.     

Did the financial crisis affect the market valuation of large systemic U.S. banks?

We examine the impact of the financial crisis on the stock market valuation of large and systemic U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). Using the Bertsatos and Sakellaris (2016) model of fundamental valuation of bank equity, we provide evidence that the financial crisis has not altered investors’ attitudes towards bank characteristics. In particular, before, during, and after the crisis, investors in large and systemic U.S. BHCs seemed to penalize leverage, albeit temporarily. Both before and after the crisis, they reward size in the short run. This pattern is appearing only briefly during the crisis. We also show that bank opacity plays no role in market valuation either in the short run or in the long run. Last but not least, we find evidence that stress testing has been informative to the market and that those BHCs that failed at the post-crisis stress tests were not subsequently valued differently by the market.     

What’s the contingency? A proposal for bank contingent capital triggered by systemic risk

Contingent capital (coco) automatically recapitalizes the banking system during financial crises if the trigger mechanism is properly designed. We propose a dual trigger mechanism based on: (1) aggregate systemic risk in the banking system, measured using CATFIN, and (2) the individual bank’s contribution to overall systemic risk, measured using delta CoVaR. The dual trigger is highly correlated with system-wide insolvency risk and prices systemic risk. We set different triggers for banks, insurance companies and broker-dealers. Using the 99% cut-off, systemic coco issued by Lehman and Bear Stearns would have been triggered in November 2007, months prior to their actual demise.     

Can CoCo-bonds mitigate systemic risk?

After the 2008 financial crisis, the idea of contingent convertible (CoCo) capital was revived as a means to stabilize individual banks, and hence the entire banking system. The purpose of this paper is to empirically test, whether CoCo-bonds indeed improve the stability of the banking system and reduce systemic risk. Using the broadly applied SRISK metric, we obtain contradicting results, which are based on the accounting of the CoCo-bond as debt or equity. This observation is problematic, as CoCo-bonds generally increase the loss-absorbing capacity of a bank. We remedy this shortcoming by proposing an adjustment to the original SRISK formula. Using empirical tests, we show that the undue disparity has been solved by our adjustment, and that CoCo-bonds reduce systemic risk, irrespective of their accounting. Our results are robust to different parametrizations and accounting standards, as well as issuance effects.     

What is the net effect of financial liberalization on bank productivity? A decomposition analysis of bank total factor productivity growth

We employ a unique framework to quantify the net effect of financial liberalization on banks’ total factor productivity (TFP) growth through a decomposition analysis of two effects: a positive direct effect of financial liberalization on bank TFP growth; and a negative indirect effect operating through a higher propensity to systemic banking crisis. The empirical decomposition is based on a sample of 1530 banks operating in 88 countries over the period 1999–2011. We find that the net effect of financial liberalization on bank TFP growth is positive: the direct positive effect outweighs the negative one. An important policy implication flows from these findings.     

What is the effect of an additional dollar of IPO proceeds?

We examine the effect of IPO proceeds on post-IPO liquidity and market monitoring. To do so we exploit variation in the amount of proceeds raised that is unrelated to firm size and manager decisions using an instrumental variable approach. We find that marginal increases in IPO proceeds lead to large increases in liquidity, analyst coverage, and institutional ownership in the first two years a firm is public. Increases in IPO proceeds also lead to more frequent follow-on offerings and longer survival as a public firm. We find evidence that immediate shocks to ownership dispersion represent one plausible channel through which changes in IPO proceeds affect long-run liquidity and market monitoring. Overall, our findings support the theoretical liquidity and market quality benefits associated with reductions in ownership concentration.