Should bank capital regulation be risk sensitive?

We present a screening model of the risk sensitivity of bank capital regulation. A banker funds a project with uninsured deposits and costly capital. Capital resolves a moral hazard problem in the choice of the probability of default (PD). The project’s loss given default (LGD) is the banker’s private information. The regulator receives a noisy signal about the LGD and imposes a minimum capital requirement. We show that the optimal sensitivity of capital regulation is non-monotonic in the accuracy of risk assessment. If the signal is inaccurate, the regulator should use risk-insensitive capital requirements. Given sufficient accuracy, the regulator should separate types via risk-sensitive capital requirements, reducing the risk-sensitivity of bank capital as accuracy improves.     

How does competition affect bank systemic risk?

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks. We find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies that restrict competition. We also find that the negative effect of lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.     

What is the systemic risk exposure of financial institutions?

I compare the performance of three measures of institution-level systemic risk exposure — Exposure CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016), systemic expected shortfall (Acharya et al., 2016), and Granger causality (Billio et al., 2012). I modify Exposure CoVaR to allow for forecasting, and estimate the ability of each measure to forecast the performance of financial institutions during systemic crisis periods in 1998 (LTCM) and 2008 (Lehman Brothers). I find that Exposure CoVaR forecasts the within-crisis performance of financial institutions, and provides useful forecasts of future systemic risk exposures. Systemic expected shortfall and Granger causality do not forecast the performance of financial institutions reliably during crises. I also find, using cross-sectional regressions, that foreign equity exposure and securitization income determine systemic risk exposure during the 1998 and 2008 crises, respectively; financial institution size determines systemic risk exposure during both crisis periods; and executive compensation does not determine systemic risk exposure.     

What do a bank’s legal expenses reveal about its internal controls and operational risk?

Excessive (substantially above peer) litigation against a bank is indicative of operational risk because it often suggests failure to maintain a strong system of internal control. We examine the relation between bank performance and weak internal control using legal expense as a proxy. We find that legal expense is a strong determinant of loan losses and stock returns. Bank regulators should require reporting of legal expense on call reports to help identify institutions with weaknesses in internal control. Current reporting creates unnecessary information asymmetries because investors are not well informed about operational risk, leading to mispricing of bank securities.     

What makes a bank risky? Insights from the optimal capital structure of banks

Assessing the risk of bank failures is the paramount concern of bank regulation. This paper argues that in order to assess the default risk of a bank, it is important to consider its financing decisions as an endogenous dynamic process. We provide a continuous-time model, where banks choose the deposit volume in order to trade off the benefits of earning deposit premiums against the costs that occur at future capital structure adjustments. The bank’s asset value may suffer from shocks and follows a jump-diffusion process.     

Curbing systemic risk in the insurance sector: A mission impossible?

This paper addresses the issue of systemic risk in insurance and investigates how financial markets evaluate the introduction of a new regulation addressed to global systemically important insurers (G-SIIs). We analysed the stock price reactions and the evolution of the distance-to-default of a sample of 44 of the world's largest insurers to the publication of the first list of 9 G-SIIs and the release of information regarding their new capital requirements and other policy measures. The results of our event study suggest that, overall, investors doubt the effectiveness of the new regulatory framework in reducing systemic risk in the insurance sector and curbing the moral hazard implications of a “too systemic to fail” policy.     

Did capital infusions enhance bank recovery from the great recession?

This paper investigates the long-run recovery experience of US banks that received capital infusions under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), a part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Based on a dynamic recovery model, our results show that recovering CPP banks tended to be in better financial condition than other CPP banks. Long-run event study analyses of common stock prices reveal that, in the quarter after repayment of TARP funds, CPP banks experienced economically large and significant buy-and-hold wealth gains of 14%, equivalent to approximately $329 billion. We conclude that TARP was successful in fostering bank financial and stock price recovery.     

What’s the value of politically connected directors?

This study examines the stock price response to Document 18, a regulation released in China in 2013 requiring independent directors with political connections to resign from the boards of directors for publicly listed firms. We document a significant positive price response in the window surrounding the directive’s promulgation date. This response is also of important economic magnitude. Our findings suggest that on average, the market views the costs of hiring politically connected directors as outweighing the associated benefits. Consistent with this view, we document that politically connected directors often shirk their board duties, as evidenced by their poor rates of attendance at board meetings. Further investigations show that the value decreasing effect of politically connected directors is apparent mainly for firms in regulated industries and varies with earnings management practices. However, the market views politically connected directors favorably if firms have significant business transactions with the government.     

A multivariate analysis of the determinants of Moody’s bank financial strength ratings

In 1995 Moody’s Investors Services inaugurated a new rating service, bank financial strength ratings (BFSRs), that assesses the safety and soundness of banks in over 50 countries. Our study sets out to do some preliminary investigations of this new type of credit rating. We develop logistic regression models to help explain or predict BFSRs. Using bank-specific accounting and financial data we are able to correctly classify or predict BFSRs. These fundamental variables cover the dimensions of risk, loan provision ratios, and profitability. Of the three, loan provisions is the most important factor, followed by risk, and then profitability. Country risk ratings do not appear to be significant explanators of BFSRs. We also find that traditional debt ratings accurately classify BFSRs and this raises the question of whether BFSRs add incremental information. The paper also highlights future directions for our research. One such area is to examine how well BFSRs predict banking crises such as the credit problems currently affecting Asia and Latin America.     

What do bank acquirers want? Evidence from worldwide bank M&A targets

What drives bankers to create larger and larger, often multinational banking groups? In this paper we investigate whether the targets in cross-border bank M&As are materially different from those banks targeted in domestic M&A deals. The main message of this paper is that, with few exceptions, domestic and foreign investors target similar banks. In particular, and contrary to what one might expect, bank size does not have a different effect on the probability of being a domestic or a cross-border target, instead it has a positive and highly significant effect in both cases. We find that the main differences between national and international M&As are the characteristics of the countries where the banks operate.     

Capital requirements and bank behavior in the UK: Are there lessons for international capital standards?

The financial crisis prompted widespread interest in developing a better understanding of how capital regulation drives bank behavior. This paper uses a unique, comprehensive database of regulatory capital requirements on all UK banks to examine their effects on capital, lending and balance sheet management behavior. We find that capital requirements that include firm-specific, time-varying add-ons set by supervisors affect banks’ desired capital ratios and that resulting adjustments to capital and lending depend on the gap between actual and target ratios. We use these results to measure the effects of a capital regime that includes features similar to those embedded in the UK framework. Our results suggest that countercyclical capital requirements may be less effective in slowing credit activity when banks can readily satisfy them with lower-quality (lower-costing) capital elements versus higher-quality common equity. Given the size of the UK banking sector and the global nature of many of the largest institutions in the UK banking sector, the results have implications for the ongoing debate surrounding the design and calibration of international capital standards.     

Were internal capital markets affected by the ‘perfect’ pension storm?

We examine capital expenditures in multi-segment firms before and after the “perfect storm” that affected pension plans between 2000 and 2002, when bond yields and stock prices both fell precipitously. Our sample of firms went from having overfunded to underfunded pension plans as a result of the storm. We examine the segment-level relation between investment, Tobin's q, and cash flow both before and after the event. We find mixed evidence on the change in the relation between investment and q, which may be a result of measurement error in q. We find stronger evidence for the conclusion that after the pension storm, firms with underfunded pension plans directed more investment towards segments that produce higher cash flow.     

Did the U.S. Treasury’s capital purchase program (CPP) help bank lending and business activity?

The 2008 financial crisis led the U.S. Treasury to implement the capital purchase program (CPP) to revive commercial bank lending and hence stimulate business activity. Employing dynamic panel techniques and methodologies from the bank lending channel literature we find that after controlling for asset size, bank capital, and macroeconomic variables (real GDP growth rate and interest rate spreads), the impact of the CPP program is statistically significant only for money center banks. However, over our sample period from 2008Q3 to 2009Q4 we find a very modest impact on lending by only the largest banks. Overall, our results suggest that CPP’s business objective to boost loan growth and hence business activity during the crisis remained unfulfilled.     

Cross-border bank mergers: What lures the rare animal?

Although domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the financial services industry have increased steadily over the past two decades, international M&As were until recently relatively rare. Moreover, the share of cross-border mergers in the banking industry is low compared with other industries. This paper uses a novel dataset of over 3000 mergers that took place between 1985 and 2001 to analyze the determinants of international bank mergers. We test the extent to which information costs and regulations hold back merger activity. Our results suggest that information costs significantly impede cross-border bank mergers. Regulations also influence cross-border bank merger activity. Hence, policy makers can create environments that encourage cross-border activity, but information cost barriers must be overcome even in (legally) integrated markets.     

Measurement and prediction of systemic risk in China’s banking industry

This research uses a hybrid systemic risk indicator (rSYR) to measure the systemic financial risk of China’s banking industry from 2009 to 2019 and combines rSYR with sSYR (new standardized rSYR) to more accurately determine systemic important banks. We also forecast systemic risk in the next period, finding that large-scale banks (such as ICBC, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, and China Merchants Bank) have high systemic importance. After eliminating the impact of scale, we then pay attention to the possibility of systemic risk brought by some smaller banks (such as Huaxia Bank and Everbright Bank). Through the prediction of systemic risk in the next six months, we also find out that the possibility of systemic risk caused by possible capital shortage brought by Agricultural Bank of China, Ping An Bank, Bank of China and Everbright Bank is more obvious, which is worth paying greater attention.     

How attractive is central Eastern Europe for risk capital investors?

This paper addresses the attractiveness of Central Eastern European countries for risk capital investors by the construction of a tailored composite measure. Based on a survey among institutional investors, we define six key drivers that determine an emerging country's attractiveness for this type of investment. Using 42 socio-economic data series as proxies for these six key drivers, we benchmark the Central Eastern European countries with EU-15, Norway, and Switzerland and identify six tier groups of country attractiveness. We highlight socio-economic strengths and weaknesses of Central Eastern Europe and provide guidelines for policy improvements to attract more risk capital funding to spur innovation, entrepreneurship, employment, competitiveness and growth in the emerging region.     

What drives the systemic banking crises in advanced economies?

This paper examines the drivers of post-war “systemic” banking crises in advanced economies. Using binary response models and a balanced panel of data, we show that persistently large departures from the long-run trend in housing and stock markets best predict the crises. Similar deviations in credit markets do not add to the explanatory power of the model that combines housing and stock market dynamics. Indicators capturing financial market risk perception also have high explanatory power. These findings indicate that extrapolative forecasts and neglect of tail risk drive asset market boom-bust cycles and systemic banking crises. Cycles in credit markets are driven by cycles in real-estate and stock markets before the crises. Additionally, capital inflow bonanzas fuel the stock and credit booms that spark systemic crises.     

What role for social scientists in risk expertise?

When it comes to risks – health and environmental risks, like those linked to the use of nanotechnologies, pesticides, etc. – three main groups of actors are easily identified, brought together through boundary organisations such as environmental and sanitary risk agencies: the natural and technical scientists, who provide their expertise to assess risks (especially toxicologists, epidemiologists and microbiologists); the policy makers, who take decisions regarding risk management and risk regulation; the lay public, who are more and more involved in participatory frameworks. Sometimes three other groups of actors are added: the ‘economists’ who can for instance conduct cost–benefit assessments or multi-criteria analyses (especially ecological economists, public economists, political economists and social economists); the ‘philosophers’/‘ethicists’ who can use ethics to highlight moral choices and responsibilities in face of risks; and the ‘jurists’/‘legal experts’ who can justify authorisation or interdiction according to law. Inversely, there is a group of actors which is not clearly identified, that of social scientists, even though a considerable quantity of social science knowledge on risk has been produced. Why is there such a discrepancy? This article, based on a critical review of the literature, aims to make sense of the fuzziness surrounding the involvement of social scientists when it comes to risk expertise. The article shows that one reason for this puzzling situation is to be found in the gap between what social scientists often want to do when they are called in as risk experts and what natural scientists and public policy makers actually expect from them.     

How does owners’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk influence the capital structure of private companies?

This paper identifies the owner's exposure to idiosyncratic risk as an important determinant of the demand for loans and the capital structure of private companies. The analysis is based on a sample of small and medium-sized companies from the United States. The exposure to idiosyncratic risk is approximated by the share of personal net worth invested in one company (SNWI). Exposure to idiosyncratic risk increases the cost of equity capital, since higher equity returns are required as compensation. This therefore makes bank financing more attractive. We find that SNWI increases both the demand for new bank loans and leverage substantially.     

What is the net effect of financial liberalization on bank productivity? A decomposition analysis of bank total factor productivity growth

We employ a unique framework to quantify the net effect of financial liberalization on banks’ total factor productivity (TFP) growth through a decomposition analysis of two effects: a positive direct effect of financial liberalization on bank TFP growth; and a negative indirect effect operating through a higher propensity to systemic banking crisis. The empirical decomposition is based on a sample of 1530 banks operating in 88 countries over the period 1999–2011. We find that the net effect of financial liberalization on bank TFP growth is positive: the direct positive effect outweighs the negative one. An important policy implication flows from these findings.