Corporate debt and output pricing in developing countries: Industry-level evidence from Turkey

The present study is an application of capital structure theory to developing economies where markets are commonly imperfect. The industry-level data of Turkey is used as a benchmark case to investigate the effects of corporate debt on output pricing, which in return, might have critical implications for stabilization theory. The panel estimations on the major two-digit industries reveal two basic findings. First, short-term debt leads to an increase in output prices while long-term debt has the opposite effect, and short-term but not long-term debt has a cyclical influence on prices. Second, the inflationary effect short-term debt implies a lower capital gain and induces higher prices, while the effect long-term debt implies a higher capital gain and induces lower prices. Given the predominant share of short-term debt in most developing countries, these findings suggest an explanation for inflation inertia on the side of corporate sector.     

Global capital markets,housing prices,and partisan fiscal policies

In recent years, global imbalances have channeled the excess savings of surplus countries toward the real estate markets of deficit countries. By consequence, the deficit countries that attracted lots of foreign capital experienced large run‐ups in house prices, whereas most surplus countries that exported capital exhibited flat or slow house price growth. We first use new house price data and a novel instrumental variable design to show the causal relationship between housing prices and capital inflows, particularly through debt bonanzas. We then argue that international capital flows affect the fiscal policy preferences of both voters and political parties by way of their impact on housing prices. Where capital inflows are large and housing prices are rising, we expect voters to respond by demanding both lower taxes and less publicly‐provided social insurance because rising house prices allow homeowners to self‐insure against income loss. In contrast, declining house prices produce greater demands for social insurance, particularly among those most exposed to housing market risk. We present evidence from two cross‐national surveys that supports these claims, as well as a “before and after” analysis of the housing crash in Eastern Europe. We also show that the connection between house prices and social policy also manifests itself in government spending outcomes, mediated by partisan control.     

Stock prices and inflation hedged firms

As the Federal Reserve continues its near-zero rate policy, the threat of inflation remains a concern among both policymakers and businesses. This article uses over 30 years of accounting data and stock returns to examine how publicly traded firms respond to increasing inflation expectations. We first examine whether firms make balance sheet adjustments in response to expected inflation. We then examine whether these activities have a positive effect on stock prices. We find that firms increase inventory, increase capital expenditures and reduce long-term debt when there is an increased expectation of inflation. We then find that firms that increase inventory in this economic regime are rewarded in the market. Markets also reward firms that increase their cash positions and reduce long-term debt possibly suggesting investor flight to safety.     

Financial crises,debt overhang,and firm growth in transition economies

ABSTRACT

We examine the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the European debt crisis of 2011 on the relationship between capital structure, investments, and performance for Eastern European companies. While the existing literature documents how firms’ investments are sensitive to the availability of internal funds and to debt holdings, we further investigate whether this investment sensitivity also translates in different levels of performance, and document that capital structure indeed has both a direct and an indirect effect, mediated by the capital expenditure channel. We show that firms with higher financial flexibility experience higher investments and returns on capital. Over-levered firms instead suffer from a debt overhang condition, forcing them to curb investments, and consequently experiencing lower performance. Overall, we provide evidence on the importance of capital structure and financial flexibility on investments and performance, showing the real consequences of the debt overhang condition on firm value creation. Firms should therefore aim at maintaining adequate financial flexibility in order to be able to pursue future profitable investment opportunities, and avoid the under-investment problem arising from a debt overhang situation.     

我国上市公司资本结构的问题、成因及其优化——以我国三大行业上市公司为例

目前,我国上市公司的资本结构存在外源融资较多、内源融资较少,债务融资较少、股权融资较多,流动负债较多、长期负债较少等问题。我国资本市场发展不完善、公司治理结构不健全、公司利润分配不合理等是导致上述问题的主要原因。为了优化我国上市公司的资本结构,必须完善资本市场结构,完善公司治理结构,努力提高公司的盈利水平。     

The capital structure and investment of regulated firms under alternative regulatory regimes

This paper explains how regulated firms choose their capital structure and examines the effects of this choice on investment and on regulated prices. It is shown that in equilibrium, firms have an optimal debt level and that given this debt level, the regulated price is set high enough to ensure that firms never become financially distressed. The analysis of the equilibrium yields testable hypotheses concerning the effects of changes in cost parameters and in the regulatory climate on the equilibrium investment level, capital structure, and regulated price. The analysis also shows that a regulatory restriction on the ability of the firm to issue securities may have an adverse effect on investment and consequently may harm consumers.     

RETURNS TO DEBT AND EQUITY IN FARM PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS

While the capital structure irrelevance proposition is the point of departure in corporate finance, it is unknown if debt‐or‐equity decisions matter to farm producer organizations. To inform decisions of capital acquisition, a panel study is conducted to estimate the relationships of different types of debt (current, long‐term) and equity (allocated, unallocated) to the financial performance of 707 farm producer organizations in the United States during the 2005–2011 period. Using 3,120 observations, the panel analysis indicates net sales in period t is increased by $1.97, $9.59, and $4.01 with an addition of $1 in current debt, allocated equity, or unallocated equity in period t_‐1. Furthermore, the magnitude of the positive relationship of an additional dollar of allocated (unallocated) equity to net income is estimated at $0.32 ($0.14). We thus reject the notion managers and directors of farm producer organizations should decide to use debt or equity with a coin toss.     

Capital Structure Premium in Multinational SOEs: Evidence from China

We investigate the relationship among multinational operations, ownership and capital structure using data from China's A‐share listed companies. We find that, in general, multinational enterprises (MNEs) have lower leverages than domestic enterprises (DEs). More importantly, we document a capital structure premium in China's multinational state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). Since the state supports multinational SOEs that promote overseas national strategy, these multinational SOEs will have higher credit availability and therefore higher debt–equity ratios. This study sheds light on the Chinese government's impact on firm's creditability.     

Determinants of Leverage in Slovenian Blue-Chip Firms and Stock Performance Following Substantial Debt Increases

Hypotheses concerning capital structures are some of the most frequently tested in the financial literature. Authors usually discuss different incentives for the use of leverage. Their views can be broadly classified in two main groups. The proponents of the first argue that leverage increases the cash flow available to investors. With the use of debt a firm gains because it uses a cheaper component of capital and since it pays less tax thanks to advantageous debt tax shields. On the other hand, the proponents of the second group stress the importance of minimising transaction costs, and information asymmetry. They point to a pecking order of finance sources. In this article, I explain the most frequently stated drivers that provide incentives for the more extensive use of debt with a focus on an emerging market environment and test whether they are relevant to Slovenian blue-chip firms that emerged from the transition of the last decade.

The second part introduces the owners' point of view. I test whether raised debt levels in fact improve the long-term return to the stockholders of Slovenian firms. This should be expected because of the institution-led capital structure conservatism that firms practised in the past. Three methods are employed to test the relationship between increased levels of debt and long-term stock return. All of them offer a similar conclusion that the expected long-term performance of firms which significantly increased their leverage is no better than the long-term performance of firms that did not. The results are useful for other emerging capital markets in Europe where firms and investors faced similar circumstances tied to their socialist past and transition process.     

Liquidity and Liquidation

The manager of a firm that is selling an illiquid asset has discretion as to the sale price: if he chooses a high (low) selling price, early sale is unlikely (likely). If the manager has the option to default on the debt that is collateralized by the illiquid asset, the optimal selling price depends on whether the manager acts in the interests of owners or creditors. We model the former case. In equilibrium the owner will always offer the illiquid asset for sale at a strictly higher price than he paid, and will default if he fails to sell. As a result, upon successful sales the illiquid asset changes hands at successively higher prices. We also consider a generalization of the model which permits sellers to finance sales using either debt or preferred stock, or both. This allows derivation of an optimal capital structure. We are indebted to seminar participants at the University of California, Los Angeles; University of California, Santa Barbara; Utah State University; University of Miami; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. We have received helpful comments from Tom Cooley.     

Debt Concentration and Bargaining Power: Large Banks,Small Banks,and Secondary Market Prices

Commerical bank debts of developing countries are held by large international banks and smaller domestic banks. This paper investigates how debt concentration—the proportion of a country's debt held by large banks relative to small banks—affects the secondary market price for these loans. We find that countries with higher concentrations have higher secondary-market prices. We explain this empirical finding in a bargaining model that endogenizes the maximum penalty that banks can credibly impose on a recalcitrant debtor. We show that the banks' bargaining power increases with the degree of debt concentration, thus increasing repayment and secondary-market prices.     

Capital structure choice and ownership: evidence from electronics enterprises in China

Empirical studies on capital structure mostly focus on listed companies and also on countries other than China. In this paper, we employ a panel dataset for 4,716 large and medium-sized enterprises in the Chinese electronics industry during the period 2005–2007 in order to investigate the determinants of their capital structure choice. Using the debt ratio as the dependent variable, we find that firm size and potential growth have a positive effect on the debt ratio whereas profitability has a negative effect. We show that decisions on the debt ratio are based on mixed factors that the various theories suggest. The unlisted Chinese companies which are unable to access to the securities market are prone to acquire bank loans as sources for funds which provides room for the modification of pecking order theory based on listed companies. As to ownership structure, we find that those Chinese electronics enterprises with higher portions of foreign equity tend to have lower debt ratios.     

A role for preferred stock in the financing decision of a public utility

Summary We have shown that preferred stock has a unique role in the financing of public utility capital expenditures, particulary when returns allowed by regulatory commissions are perceived to be inadequate. From the firm's perspective there is no tax advantage for debt because the commission effectively passes the tax savings through the consumers. If allowed returns on common stock are inadequate and the firm has exhausted its perceived debt capacity, then preferred stock becomes the optimal financing instrument. The regulatory commissions compute the costs of debt and preferred stock so that companies can expect returns to cover payments on debt and preferred stock if the assets being financed are necessary and will be included in the rate base. During extremely bad years when revenues are much less than expected, the companies can delay or miss preferred stock dividends without running the risk of default. The data on new capital sources for the electric and gas utilities indicate that these companies made adjustments which are consistent with the implications of our model, but they did not follow the extreme policy of using only debt and preferred stock when market-to-book ratios for common stock were below one. Regulators have, on occasions, used capital structures for rate-making that differ from actual capital structures, and a utility might be penalized for using an extreme capital structure policy. The main emphasis of regulatory review of capital structure, however, has been on the debt component. One strategy would be to use a debt level that satisfies the regulatory commission and then adjust equity between preferred stock and common stock to maximize value for common stockholders.     

Temporary stabilization with capital controls

This paper studies both positive and normative aspects of quantity-based capital controls in a small open economy undergoing a temporary inflation stabilization plan. In the model, capital controls are implemented by choosing two policy variables: a ceiling on the private sector debt and a terminal date for removing controls; the date on which controls trigger and hence its duration are endogenously determined. Equilibrium dynamics are characterized for all feasible range of debt ceilings and durations. Temporary controls that end with the collapse of the stabilization plan are shown to mitigate consumption boom-bust cycles and dominate allocations under perfect capital mobility, thus providing a “second-best” rationale for employing them. For controls that are prolonged beyond the collapse of the stabilization plan, equilibria exist even when the debt ceiling is above the debt that accumulates under perfect capital mobility. Here, if the ceiling is sufficiently low, controls mitigate consumption cycles. Conversely, a sufficiently high ceiling amplifies consumption cycles. For prolonged controls, there is a critical value of debt ceiling below (above) which the welfare is higher (lower) relative to the perfect capital mobility case. Finally, for a given debt ceiling, prolonged controls rank lower in welfare than those that end with the stabilization plan. We would like to thank two anonymous referees and the editor whose suggestions have helped us improve the paper substantially. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Human capital investment with competitive labor search

We study human capital accumulation in the presence of labor search frictions. Given that unemployed workers can default on their education loans, skilled individuals with a larger debt burden prefer riskier but better paid careers than is socially desirable. A higher level of employment risk in turn depresses the skill premium and the incentives to invest in education. The equilibrium allocation is characterized by too low employment, underinvestment by the poor, and too little investment in skill-intensive technologies. A public education system funded by graduate taxes can restore efficiency, and it would also reduce wage inequality.     

Financing government investment and its implications for public capital: A small open economy perspective

Expenditure reductions played a key role in many small open economies during fiscal consolidation, with large declines in public investment. This led to a reduction in public capital stock and affected the competitiveness of these economies. After the sovereign debt crisis, the governments that consider increasing investment to replenish the public capital stock have limited fiscal space and have to avoid external imbalances. We show that using budget-neutral investment spending can generate long-term benefits of higher public capital stock while at the same time limiting negative consequences for the public finances and the trade balance. The best way of financing government investment, which preserves fiscal and trade balances, and increases welfare, is by reducing other government spending. The second-best is financing investment with value-added tax. Financing with debt worsens fiscal and trade balances, while using distortionary labour taxes reduces labour supply, increases wage costs and worsens the trade deficit in the short run.     

改善国有企业资产负债结构之对策

资产负债率过高是影响国有企业走出困境以及建立现代企业制度的重要因素。针对这种情况 ,十五届四中全会的《决策》就改善国有企业资产负债结构问题 ,提出一整套政策思路 :诸如增加银行核销呆坏账准备金、债权转股权、提高直接融资比重、减轻企业利息负担等。所有这些 ,必将对国有企业的改革与发展 ,产生深远的影响     

Debt markets and corporate debt structure in an emerging market: The South African example

This is a first attempt at gauging the effects of corporate public debt issuance on the debt structure, risk profile and valuation of firms in an emerging market. We find that financial services firms, along with government institutions, are important early supporters of an organized public debt market. Firms in this market use equity, public debt and private debt funds simultaneously as need be. Consistent with predictions of the corporate debt structure literature, public debt-issuing firms are larger, older, more profitable, and less informational opaque than non-public debt-issuing firms. Moreover, public debt-issuing firms experience significant reductions in both overall and systematic risks, and incur lower cost of capital following issuance than non-public debt issuers. These and other findings of the study suggest deepening national debt markets can be a fruitful financial market development exercise for emerging markets.     

Taxes,risk taking,and financial stability

After the global financial crisis, the use of taxes to enhance financial stability received new attention. This paper analyzes the corrective role of taxes in banking and compares two instruments, namely, an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), which mitigates the debt bias in corporate taxation, and a Pigovian tax on bank debt (bank levy). We emphasize financial stability gains driven by lower bank asset risk and develop a principal-agent model, in which risk taking depends on the bank's capital structure and, by extension, on the tax treatment of debt and equity. We find that (i) the ACE unambiguously reduces risk taking, (ii) bank levies reduce risk taking if they are independent of bank performance but may be counterproductive otherwise, and (iii) taxes are especially effective if regulatory capital requirements are constrained to low levels.     

How the Machinery of International Finance Runs with Sand in its Wheels

The dramatic swings in international capital movements in recent years have renewed interest in restrictions on capital flows. This paper provides a model of international asset flows and domestic equity price formation incorporating three restrictions on capital flows. A transaction tax introduces significant asymmetries in the reaction of asset prices to financial and real shocks but has no long-lived effects. Policies targeted to the level of net foreign debt by imposing a tax or outright controls do influence the steady-state levels of the real exchange rate and relative equity prices.