A characterization for the negative welfare effects of cost reduction in Cournot oligopoly

This paper characterizes the welfare effects of cost reductions in a Cournot model with linear costs. Under linear demand, a small reduction in a firm’s marginal cost reduces welfare if and only if its market share is less than 1/(2n+2), or equivalently, its marginal cost exceeds a critical level determined by the market. A large cost reduction by the firm increases welfare if and only if its magnitude is at least twice the difference between the current marginal cost and its critical value. The paper also extends the results to non-linear demand, but the characterizations become less tractable.     

The Dominant Firm Model Revisited

This paper extends the standard Forchheimer dominant firm model by making more explicit shifts in the fringe supply when the market price set the dominant firm deviate from its limit price. It demonstrated how, when a dominant firm engages in short-run profit maximization, the market price it sets in the long run will equal its limit price and that, in certain situations, increased production cost for fringe lead to an increase in the number of fringe firms in the long run.     

A note on dominant firm market share and economic performance

The hypothesis of a positive concentration-profits relationship has been one of the most thoroughly tested in economics. Market share has been used in a number of these studies as a measure of horizontal dominance by a firm in an industry. Although these studies have shown empirically that a positive relationship exists between market share and rates of return, little theoretical evidence for this relationship exists. The price leadership model can be used to show that a continuous, direct relationship exists between market share and competitive injury. From a simulation exercise based upon the price leadership model, a positive association is demonstrated between increasing market share of the dominant firm (or collusive leading firms) and increasing competitive injury (as evidenced by a greater divergence between the competitive versus price leadership price-output decisions). This exercise establishes market share as a fundamental structrual variable in describing the short run competitiveness within the industry. The results of this model imply that intra-industry cross section studies, utilizing a carefully defined price leader(s) and price followers dictomy, should yield better statistical fits. At the present stage of empirical testing, however, only the roughest approximations using rather arbitrary definitions of the price leader-follower dichotomy have been made.     

厂商市场份额的品牌经济模型及其现实解释

厂商的市场份额决定了其利润率,从而决定了厂商能否在残酷的竞争中生存、增长与发展。而在经济过剩的条件下,消费者的选择决定了厂商的市场份额,货币价格与品牌及品牌信用度决定的选择成本作为消费者选择和购买过程中的局限条件制约和影响着消费者的选择与购买。本文建立起引入品类需求强度系数、价格、选择成本的需求函数,并以此模型解释了厂商市场份额的决定是通过价格机制与品牌机制共同作用而实现的。在理论分析的基础上,对大量的现实进行了解释,在验证该模型的同时,对未来市场竞争及厂商市场份额做出了预测。同时,本文提出了提高厂商市场份额与定价权的＂品类需求强度—品牌信用度＂二维模型,并分别从开发具有较高品类需求强度的品类市场和提高品牌信用度的品牌建设方面给现实中的厂商提供了相应策略。     

Horizontal concentration and anticompetitive behavior in the central Canadian cement industry: testing arbitrage cost hypotheses

Consider a market with a small number of firms attempting to collude. If they successfully act as a dominant firm, they will raise price. This in turn will expand output by any fringe firms and thus reduce the market share of the colluding group. Thus, higher prices will decrease concentration over time. Here we test this hypothesis, using a modification of Spiller and Huang (1986) and data from the post-1974 Toronto cement market. The weight of the evidence indicates that market price has a negative effect on concentration, implying that the firms in this market act, with significant though limited, success as a cartel.     

Competitive advantage and performance: the impact of value creation and costliness of imitation

We create an industrial organization type model to relate resources to the spread between product market demand and marginal cost. We define competitive advantage as the cross‐sectional differential in this spread, and performance as the longitudinal differential between what a firm appropriates in the product market and what it paid in the factor market. With factor markets imposing different costs on the innovator and potential imitator(s), competitive advantage, performance, and high resource value do not necessarily coincide. Also, the interaction between resource value and the cost of imitation is complex and affected by the number of firms in the industry. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Entry,imperfect competition,and futures market for the input

We analyze firms' entry, production and hedging decisions under imperfect competition. We consider an oligopoly industry producing a homogeneous output in which risk-averse firms face an entry cost upon entering the industry, and then compete in Cournot with one another. Each firm faces uncertainty in the input cost when making production decision, and has access to the futures market to hedge the random cost. We provide two sets of results. First, under general assumptions about risk preferences, demand, and uncertainty, we characterize the unique equilibrium. In contrast to previous results in the literature (without entry), both production and output price depend on uncertainty and risk aversion. Specifically, when entry is endogenized and the futures price is not actuarially fair, access to the futures market does not lead to separation. Second, to study the effect of access to the futures market on entry and production, we restrict attention to constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences, a linear demand, and a normal distribution for the spot price. In general, the effect of access to the futures market on the number of firms and production is ambiguous.     

Predatory intent under uncertainty

Current analyses of predatory behavior neglect uncertainty. Its presence complicates a firm's evaluation of profits and risks associated with various pricing strategies. Using a price leadership model (with the supply of the competitive fringe not known in advance), we show that a risk averse dominant firm will price lower than the price which maximizes expected profits. Such behavior could be misconstrued as being predatory if marginal and average variable cost rules are used for establishing the proof of predation.     

Investment under Demand Uncertainty,Ex-Ante Pricing,and Oligopoly

This paper considers the capacity choice of duopolists who set price ex-ante under demand uncertainty with risk-neutrality. The duopolists compete for market shares on the basis of availability of supply, rather than by price competition. Collusive pricing coexists with Cournot–Nash capacity choice. A formal model is presented, where the market share of each firm may deviate from the certainty share due to rationing. With shares reflecting different costs, capacity utilisation for the lower cost firm is expected to be substantially lower. The implications for the price-cost margin and capacity formation are also explored.     

The maximum capture per unit cost location problem

This paper considers the problem of siting p new facilities of an entering firm to a competitive market so as to maximize the market share captured from competitors per unit cost. We first formulate the problem as a mixed 0-1 fractional programming model, in which we incorporate the fixed cost and transportation cost. The model can deal with the case where some demand nodes have two or more possible closest servers. We then re-formulate the problem as a 0-1 mixed integer linear program. We use a one-opt heuristic algorithm based on the Teitz-Bart method to obtain feasible solutions and compare them with the optimal solutions obtained by a branch-and-bound algorithm. We conduct computational experiments to evaluate the two algorithms. The results show that both algorithms can solve the model efficiently and the model is integer-friendly. We discuss other computational results and provide managerial insights.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity Industry

Using historical cost data, we simulate the California electricity market after deregulation as a static Cournot market with a competitive fringe. Our model indicates that, under the pre-deregulation structure of generation ownership, there is potential for significant market power in high demand hours, particularly in the fall and early winter months when hydroelectric output is at its lowest level relative to demand. The results also show that two of the most important factors in determining the extent and severity of market power are the level of available hydroelectric production and the elasticity of demand.     

An Asymmetric Oligopolist can Improve Welfare by Raising Price

We demonstrate that, in Bertrand/Cournot equilibrium, a firm with a relatively small market share may improve social welfare by raising its price. This could be because the price increase can mitigate an output-structure distortion: if there are two goods which have the same marginal cost, then, under some conditions, the good in higher demand (the efficient good) will have a higher markup rate than the other good (the inefficient good). This suggests that the output structure is distorted in favor of the inefficient good, since the higher markup rate of the efficient good should lead to a considerable increase in demand for the inefficient good.     

The Antitrust Implications of Capacity Reallocation by a Dominant Firm

When a firm acquires rival firms in one market, and moves their capacity to another market, should antitrust authorities be concerned? We address this question by studying a multi‐stage game. A dominant firm has the opportunity to acquire fringe firms that operate in the same market. Then, the dominant firm has the opportunity to move capacity from that market to a second market. The model is motivated by a series of acquisitions in the Specialized Mobile Radio industry aimed at establishing a new cellular carrier. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the dominant firm to acquire too little capacity relative to the social optimum. The results shed light on the Consent Decree negotiated in US v. Motorola Inc. and Nextel Communications Inc., 1994.     

The Effect of Government Advertising Policies on the Market Power of Cigarette Firms

We estimate market power among cigarette manufacturers over 1952–1984, a period of uniform pricing. We apply the Bresnahan approach; adjust it to the firm level; employ a dynamic model with habit persistence; and add an advertising equation, which helps identify the parameters, increase degrees of freedom, and constrain parameters so we can interpret our results at the firm level, despite the fact that the equations conform to what we might see in a market model. We consider effects of government interventions upon demand and market power and find, for instance, that the 1971 broadcast advertising ban decreased market power.     

Should competition authorities care about conglomerate mergers?

Mergers and acquisitions may change competition even when they do not affect market structure, a case known as conglomerate mergers. In this paper, we explore a wave of acquisitions of higher education institutions by educational groups in Brazil, which allows us to disentangle the effects of conglomerate mergers and of horizontal mergers on price, quantity, and quality indicators. Our findings show that multiunit organizations are able to increase some quality indicators. As for the effect on price and quantity, results are different. For conglomerate mergers, we estimated an increase in the number of freshmen and tuition fees, whereas for acquisitions that lead to horizontal concentration there is no increase in quantity, just in prices. Also these effects are larger the smaller the market share of the acquired HEI. On the whole, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that multiunit operations increase efficiency, but only conglomerate mergers tend to pass those gains on to consumers. Results also indicate that greater caution should be taken in market extension mergers when the acquired firm has a clear dominant position.     

On scale economies and exhaustible resource markets

This paper considers an exhaustible resource market where firms realize economies of scale in the production of the resource, and may augment reserves through exploration. With the non-convexities inherent in this model, the typical firm's optimal decisions are corner solutions. It either operates at full intensity or not at all. Firms with larger current reserves have a greater incentive to produce today; firms with smaller reserves will tend to hold their reserves for production at a later date. It follows that the market supply curve in any given period is a step function. As price rises, production increases discontinuously: at discrete intervals, the marginal firm will change from not producing today to producing all of its reserves. With such a supply curve, the market may or may not clear. Simulation of this model suggests: (i) the chance of market clearing in any period is near 1/2; (ii) such an industry is unlikely to exhibit a significant increase in concentration over time.     

Identifying Participants in a Price-fixing Conspiracy: Output & Market Share Tests Reexamined

If there is a cartel agreement among a subset of firms in an industry, it should be predicted that all firms in that industry will increase prices. Nevertheless, industry prices alone should not indicate that a particular firm is guilty of that conspiracy. According to the output test and its market share variant – proposed by Blair and Romano – if the output or the market share of the firm that claims to be innocent in the collusive activity rises in response to the price increase, that firm's claim should be accepted as true. Using a collusive variant of the dominant firm model, this paper shows that these are not robust tests to reveal either innocence or guilt, and characterizes cases where they may pardon a guilty firm (Type I error) or indict an innocent firm (Type II error). This paper also shows that a market share test can not be used to prove a dominant firm's intent for predatory pricing.     

Product Market Competition and Corporate Real Estate Investment under Demand Uncertainty

This article theoretically and empirically analyzes the interactions among corporate real estate investment, product market competition and firm risk. In our model, firms own strategic real estate or lease generic real estate. Our model predicts that strategic real estate ownership is positively correlated with industry concentration and negatively related to demand uncertainty. Also, firm risk is higher for firms with more strategic real estate operating in a more concentrated market. This prediction arises because smaller investments induce greater market competition, which effectively eliminates the right tail of the firm's profit distribution. We provide strong empirical support for our predictions. In particular, firm value is more volatile in less competitive markets for a given level of demand uncertainty.     

Doomed from the start: what is the value of selecting a future dominant design?

This study investigates how important it is for a firm to select what turns out to be a dominant design in a technology‐driven industry. Using the personal computer industry as a case study, this research shows that firms are not doomed when their entry design choices turn out to be ‘wrong.’ For early entrants, we found that switching to the dominant design is associated with increased chances of survival and market share. Contrary to our expectations, we found that even later entrants that switched to the dominant design also enjoyed higher survival rates and greater market position. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stackelberg Independence*

The standard model of sequential capacity choices is the Stackelberg quantity leadership model with linear demand. I show that under the standard assumptions, leaders’ actions are informative about market conditions and independent of leaders’ beliefs about the arrivals of followers. However, this Stackelberg independence property relies on all standard assumptions’ being satisfied. It fails to hold whenever the demand function is non-linear, marginal cost is not constant, goods are differentiated, firms are non-identical, or there are any externalities. I show that small deviations from the linear demand assumption may make the leaders’ choices completely uninformative.