Pricing and the psychology of consumption

Most executives know how pricing influences the demand for a product, but few of them realize how it affects the consumption of a product. In fact, most companies don't even believe they can have an effect on whether customers use products they have already paid for. In this article, the authors argue that the relationship between pricing and consumption lies at the core of customer strategy. The extent to which a customer uses a product during a certain time period often determines whether he or she will buy the product again. So pricing tactics that encourage people to use the products they've paid for help companies build long-term relationships with customers. The link between pricing and consumption is clear: People are more likely to consume a product when they are aware of its cost. But for many executives, the idea that they should draw consumers' attention to the price that was paid for a product or service is counterintuitive. Companies have long sought to mask the costs of their goods and services in order to boost sales. And rightly so--if a company fails to make the initial sale, it won't have to worry about consumption. So to promote sales, health club managers encourage members to get the payment out of the way early; HMOs encourage automatic payroll deductions; and cruise lines bundle small, specific costs into a single, all-inclusive fee. The problem is, by masking how much a buyer has spent on a given product, these pricing tactics decrease the likelihood that the buyer will actually use it. This article offers some new approaches to pricing--how and when to charge for goods and services--that may boost consumption.     

Asymmetric Information,Bank Lending,and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships

Customer relationships arise between banks and firms because, in the process of lending, a bank learns more than others about its own customers. This information asymmetry allows lenders to capture some of the rents generated by their older customers; competition thus drives banks to lend to new firms at interest rates which initially generate expected losses. As a result, the allocation of capital is shifted toward lower quality and inexperienced firms. This inefficiency is eliminated if complete contingent contracts are written or, when this is costly, if banks can make nonbinding commitments that, in equilibrium, are backed by reputation.     

基于贡献度分析和客户关系的商业银行贷款定价方法研究

随着我国银行业改革的深化和利率市场化进程的加快,为竞争到更大的市场份额,商业银行逐步意识到为各种产品定价的重要性.本文设计了一种基于贡献度分析的贷款定价方法,该方法专门针对大型优质客户,它从银行与客户的整体关系入手,计算出包括贷款在内的一系列产品价格组合,帮助银行确定出有竞争力的价格.本文认为,无论是贷款定价还是其他业务产品定价,定价的过程是银行对客户关系的全面衡量过程,因此,贷款定价实际上是在为整个客户关系定价;本文详细讨论了该定价方法的计算过程和适应条件,并对方法本身进行了较全面的评价.     

Interest rate indexation and the pricing of loan commitment contracts

The central question addressed in this paper is why most loan pricing agreements between banks and their commercial customers involve additive rather than multiplicative markups over the base lending rate. It is argued that banks generally prefer additive pricing because the real value of the premiums moves inversely with inflation. Therefore this pricing formula provides an automatic partial inflation hedge for banks. Most borrowers who hold long positions in nominal assets also prefer this formula for the same reason. However, some borrowers who hold net short positions in nominal assets prefer multiplicative pricing. Banks provide them with such a form of pricing in exchange for appropriate compensation. Supporting empirical evidence is provided.     

The Role of Trading Halts in Monitoring a Specialist Market

When a collection of specialists organize as an exchange, eachcan reap net private benefits at the expense of the exchangeby quoting a privately optimal pricing schedule. Coordinationmakes all specialists and customers better off, but requiresa system of monitoring and punishment that breaks down wheninformation asymmetries between the exchange and a specialistare high. The specialist may then seek a temporary trading haltto alleviate unjustified punishment, or the exchange may halttrading to prevent the quoting of damaging privately optimalpricing schedules. We test this theory on a sample of NYSE halts.As predicted, we find a significant increase in estimated informationasymmetry immediately preceding trading halts.     

Price smarter on the Net

Companies generally have set prices on the Internet in two ways. Many start-ups have offered untenably low prices in a rush to capture first-mover advantage. Many incumbents have simply charged the same prices on-line as they do off-line. Either way, companies are missing a big opportunity. The fundamental value of the Internet lies not in lowering prices or making them consistent but in optimizing them. After all, if it's easy for customers to compare prices on the Internet, it's also easy for companies to track customers' behavior and adjust prices accordingly. The Net lets companies optimize prices in three ways. First, it lets them set and announce prices with greater precision. Different prices can be tested easily, and customers' responses can be collected instantly. Companies can set the most profitable prices, and they can tap into previously hidden customer demand. Second, because it's so easy to change prices on the Internet, companies can adjust prices in response to even small fluctuations in market conditions, customer demand, or competitors' behavior. Third, companies can use the clickstream data and purchase histories that it collects through the Internet to segment customers quickly. Then it can offer segment-specific prices or promotions immediately. By taking full advantage of the unique possibilities afforded by the Internet to set prices with precision, adapt to changing circumstances quickly, and segment customers accurately, companies can get their pricing right. It's one of the ultimate drivers of e-business success.     

Managing price, gaining profit

The fastest and most effective way for a company to realize maximum profit is to get its pricing right. The right price can boost profit faster than increasing volume will; the wrong price can shrink it just as quickly. Yet many otherwise tough-minded managers miss out on significant profits because they shy away from pricing decisions for fear that they will alienate their customers. Worse, if management isn't controlling its pricing policies, there's a good chance that the company's clients are manipulating them to their own advantage. McKinsey & Company's Michael Marn and Robert Rosiello show managers how to gain control of the pricing puzzle and capture untapped profit potential by using two basic concepts: the pocket price waterfall and the pocket price band. The pocket price waterfall reveals how price erodes between a company's invoice figure and the actual amount paid by the customer--the transaction price. It tracks the volume purchase discounts, early payment bonuses, and frequent customer incentives that squeeze a company's profits. The pocket price band plots the range of pocket prices over which any given unit volume of a single product sells. Wide price bands are commonplace: some manufacturers' transaction prices for a given product range 60%; one fastener supplier's price band ranged up to 500%. Managers who study their pocket price waterfalls and bands can identify unnecessary discounting at the transaction level, low-performance accounts, and misplaced marketing efforts. The problems, once identified, are typically easy and inexpensive to remedy.     

With friends like these: the art of managing complementors

Intel and Microsoft neither buy from nor sell to each other directly, but they are undeniably in business together. They are probably the world's most widely known pair of complementors--companies that independently provide complementary products or services to mutual customers. Complementors increase the value of each other's offerings and the size of the total market. So it's not surprising that so many just assume that their interests are aligned. Nothing could be further from the truth. Discord can develop in many areas, such as pricing, technology, standards, and control of the market--both in terms of which company has the most influence over customers and which one gets the biggest slice of the pie. The issue of pricing perfectly captures this tension. Ideally, you'd like to price your goods high while your complementors price theirs low. Airlines, for instance, would be happy to see vacation lodgings go for a song, while destination resorts could raise rates and still fill their rooms if customers could fly there for free. The first step in managing relationships with complementors is to develop a deep understanding of their economics, their strategies and goals, their existing capabilities, their incentives for cooperation, and any potential areas of conflict. Then, to gain the upper hand, companies can use a variety of tools that fall into two main categories: hard power (inducements or coercion to get what you want) and soft power (persuasion through indirect means to get others to want what you want). The authors explain how to build both hard power and soft, illustrate the strengths and limits of each, and offer guidelines for choosing one over the other. Conflict among complementors is inevitable, but together, hard and soft power can help companies manage the dark side of complementor relationships and take full advantage of the opportunities that cooperation should create.     

Correlation and the pricing of risks

Given a pricing kernel we investigate the class of risks that are not priced by this kernel. Risks are random payoffs written on underlying uncertainties that may themselves either be random variables, processes, events or information filtrations. A risk is said to be not priced by a kernel if all derivatives on this risk always earn a zero excess return, or equivalently the derivatives may be priced without a change of measure. We say that such risks are not kernel priced. It is shown that reliance on direct correlation between the risk and the pricing kernel as an indicator for the kernel pricing of a risk can be misleading. Examples are given of risks that are uncorrelated with the pricing kernel but are kernel priced. These examples lead to new definitions for risks that are not kernel priced in correlation terms. Additionally we show that the pricing kernel itself viewed as a random variable is strongly negatively kernel priced implying in particular that all monotone increasing functions of the kernel receive a negative risk premium. Moreover the equivalence class of the kernel under increasing monotone transformations is unique in possessing this property.      

Competitive differential pricing

We analyze welfare under differential versus uniform pricing across oligopoly markets that differ in costs of service, and establish general demand conditions for differential pricing by symmetric firms to increase consumer surplus, profit, and total welfare. The analysis reveals why competitive differential pricing is generally beneficial—more than price discrimination—but not always, including why profit may fall, unlike for monopoly. The presence of more competitors tends to enlarge consumers' share of the gain from differential pricing, though profits often still rise. When firms have asymmetric costs, however, profit or consumer surplus can fall even with ‘simple’ linear demands.     

A reduced PDE method for European option pricing under multi-scale,multi-factor stochastic volatility

The number of tailor-made hybrid structured products has risen more prominently to fit each investor’s preferences and requirements as they become more diversified. The structured products entail synthetic derivatives such as combinations of bonds and/or stocks conditional on how they are backed up by underlying securities, stochastic volatility, stochastic interest rates or exchanges rates. The complexity of these multi-asset structures yields lots of difficulties of pricing the products. Because of the complexity, Monte-Carlo simulation is a possible choice to price them but it may not produce stable Greeks leading to a trouble in hedging against risks. In this light, it is desirable to use partial differential equations with relevant analytic and numerical techniques. Even if the partial differential equation method would generate stable security prices and Greeks for single asset options, however, it may result in the curse of dimensionality when pricing multi-asset derivatives. In this study, we make the best use of multi-scale nature of stochastic volatility to lift the curse of dimensionality for up to three asset cases. Also, we present a transformation formula by which the pricing group parameters required for the multi-asset options in illiquid market can be calculated from the underlying market parameters.     

Risk Management, Capital Budgeting, and Capital Structure Policy for Insurers and Reinsurers

This article builds on Froot and Stein in developing a framework for analyzing the risk allocation, capital budgeting, and capital structure decisions facing insurers and reinsurers. The model incorporates three key features: (i) value‐maximizing insurers and reinsurers face product‐market as well as capital‐market imperfections that give rise to well‐founded concerns with risk management and capital allocation; (ii) some, but not all, of the risks they face can be frictionlessly hedged in the capital market; and (iii) the distribution of their cash flows may be asymmetric, which alters the demand for underwriting and hedging. We show these features result in a three‐factor model that determines the optimal pricing and allocation of risk and capital structure of the firm. This approach allows us to integrate these features into: (i) the pricing of risky investment, underwriting, reinsurance, and hedging; and (ii) the allocation of risk across all of these opportunities, and the optimal amount of surplus capital held by the firm.     

The Profitability and Pricing of Major Customers

We examine the profitability and valuation of retail firms identified by suppliers as major customers, using major customer relationships to proxy for unrecorded organizational-capital intangibles. Major customers have higher operating profitability and profitability persistence, with the sources of the higher profitability consistent with purported advantages of supply chain arrangements. The pricing of major customers is consistent with the market recognizing the level and over-time properties of operating profitability. Together, these results suggest that investors understand the profitability effects of unrecorded organizational intangible assets and that financial statement analysis can be used to further examine the valuation effects of such intangibles.     

Effects of commitment on intentional loyalty at the person-to-person and person-to-firm levels

This study explores how customers’ affective commitment and calculative commitment to the personal adviser and bank, respectively, affect their intentional loyalty to the personal adviser and bank. Data were collected using a web survey of mass affluent customers of a major Swedish bank. Responses were measured and analysed using factor, correlation, and regression analyses. The results reveal that the person-to-person and person-to-firm loyalty categories are influenced by affective and calculative commitment to the personal advisor and by affective commitment to the bank, but not by calculative commitment to the bank. Moreover, there is a strong relationship between customer loyalty to the personal adviser and to the bank. It can be concluded that affective commitment has a stronger overall impact on customer loyalty than does calculative commitment, indicating the importance of creating affective ties with customers, and that personal advisers are central to bank – customer relationships. The importance of financial issues to mass affluent customers implies that both affective commitment and calculative commitment to the personal adviser are important in building customer loyalty to a bank or brand.     

Switching customers from branches to internet: A credit union's journey

This research paper reports how a credit union applied knowledge from the literature to solve a marketing problem. A credit union serves a unique group of customers who may be in the same profession, have the same employer, or simply in the same regional location. The marketing problem is how to switch bank customers from branches to internet for the main reason of reducing transaction costs. The research model comprises the independent factors of customer, transaction, application, and bank; and the dependent variables the number of internet banking transaction, perceived usefulness of internet banking, and willingness to use internet banking measuring different aspects of internet banking. We carried out an on-site survey in different branches of our subject credit union to capture the opinion of customers who rely solely on branches for banking transactions. To our knowledge, this study provides a pioneer internet banking survey in the context of credit unions. The survey results reveal different internet banking facilitators for customers with and without internet bank accounts. For customers with internet bank accounts, application security is the most important facilitator variable for them to continue its use in the future; while promises for continuous improvement can be a prohibitive variable. In order to encourage customers without internet bank accounts to adopt internet banking, the management should focus on strengthening the variables of bank diversified service, bank responsiveness, bank image, and extra online instruction and feedback for complicate internet transactions; and reducing the negative effect of web fun/entertainment. We also found that the variables of proficiency in using computers, application security, and bank image have opposite effects on customers with and without internet bank accounts.     

利差、美元指数与跨境资本流动

一般认为跨境资本流动由利差决定,政策制定也强调利差对资本流动的指示意义。但本文发现,中国跨境资本流动历史上主要是由套汇而非套息资本决定,且套汇的显著指标是多边美元指数(DXY)而非人民币兑美元双边汇率,我们把这一现象称之为“中国的跨境资本流动之谜”。我们提出,汇率影响大于利率且多边汇率影响大于双边汇率的原因在于人民币兑美元双边汇率历史上波动幅度较小,及时和充分反映中美基本面的分化还不够。美元指数是市场指标,能够预示人民币兑美元双边汇率的走势,进而驱动资本流动。进一步研究发现,由于中国经济的外溢效应,中美经济基本面的分化不仅决定中美利差,还在很大程度上驱动美欧、美日经济基本面的分化,进而略有时滞地驱动美元指数。因此,中美利差在统计意义上是美元指数的同步甚至略微领先的指标,从这个意义上讲,政策制定仍要关注利差。随着人民币汇率弹性增强,中美利差和美元指数对中国跨境资本流动的解释力都会边际减弱。     

Differential pricing when costs differ: a welfare analysis

This article analyzes the welfare effects of monopoly differential pricing in the important, but largely neglected, case where costs of service differ across consumer groups. Cost‐based differential pricing is shown to increase total welfare and consumer welfare relative to uniform pricing for broad classes of demand functions, even when total output falls or the output allocation between consumers worsens. We discuss why cost‐based differential pricing tends to be more beneficial for consumers than its demand‐based counterpart, third‐degree price discrimination. We also provide sufficient conditions for welfare‐improving differential pricing when costs and demands differ across consumer groups.     

Cream Skimming: Innovations in Insurance Risk Classification and Adverse Selection

We demonstrate how innovations in insurance risk classification can lead to adverse selection, or cream skimming, against insurers that are slow to adopt such pricing innovations. Using a model in which insurers with insufficient pricing data cannot differentiate between low‐ and high‐risk policyholders and therefore charge both the same premium, we show how innovative insurers develop new risk classification data to identify overcharged low‐risk policyholders and attract them from rival insurers with reduced prices. Less innovative insurers thus insure a growing percentage of high‐risk customers, resulting in adverse selection attributable to their informational disadvantage. Next, we examine two cases in which “Big Data” innovations in risk classification led to concerns about cream skimming among U.S. auto insurers. First, we track the rapid adoption of credit‐based insurance scores as pricing variables in personal auto insurance markets. Second, we examine the growing popularity of usage‐based insurance programs like telematics, plans in which insurers use data on policyholders’ actual driving behavior to set prices that attract low‐risk customers. Issues associated with the execution of such pricing strategies are discussed. In both cases, we document how rival insurers quickly adopt successful innovations to reduce their exposure to adverse selection.     

M&A needn't be a loser's game

Three out of four acquisitions fail; they destroy wealth for the buyer's shareholders, who end up worse off than they would have been had the deal not been done. But it doesn't have to be that way, argue the authors. In evaluating acquisitions, companies must look beyond the lure of profits the income statement promises and examine the balance sheet, where the company keeps track of capital. It's ignoring the balance sheet that causes so many acquisitions to destroy shareholders' wealth. Unfortunately, most executives focus only on sales and profits going up, never realizing that they've put in motion a plan to destroy their company's true profitability--its return on invested capital. M&A, like other aspects of running a company, works best when seen as a way to create shareholder value through customers. Some deals are sought to help create better value propositions for the business or to better execute current strategies--or to block competitors from doing these things. But most deals are about customers and should start with an analysis of customer profitability. Some customers are deliciously profitable; others are dismal money losers. The better an acquirer understands the profitability of its own customers, the better positioned it will be to perform such analyses on other companies. In this article, the authors show that customer profitability varies far more dramatically than most managers suspect. They also describe how to measure the profitability of customers. By understanding the economics of customer profitability, companies can avoid making deals that hurt their shareholders, they can identify surprising deals that do create wealth, and they can salvage deals that would otherwise be losers.     

隐性杠杆约束、流动性风险和投资者情绪

本文以2003—2019年间开放式主动管理型的股票型和偏股型基金为样本,以持仓占比为权重估算基金投组中A股的总市场风险暴露,检验结果表明,该序列上升反映了基金面临的隐性杠杆约束收紧,刻画了市场的弱流动性。内在逻辑在于,流动性收紧时,投资者难以通过融资直接增加杠杆,更倾向于重仓持有高市场风险头寸的股票而间接实现杠杆。本文发现隐性杠杆约束所刻画的风险在股票或基金收益截面上的无条件定价基本失效,而条件定价则依赖于低市场情绪与弱流动性。分解基金持股的敞口,进一步发现,因中小盘基金在流动性收紧时具有更强的流动性偏好,其持股的市场风险头寸能够更敏锐地捕捉到弱流动性风险。