On a clear day you might see an environmental Kuznets curve

We shed some new light on the Environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) and show how it can be viewed as a particular form of equilibrium relationship, where technology and preference parameters determine the shape of the curve. In contrast to most of the literature on the EKC, we estimate a theoretically consistent model on long-run data (Swedish sulfur emission, covering the period 1900–2002). Furthermore, we test and date structural change. The model suggests four regimes, 1900–1918, 1919–1933, 1934–1967 and 1968–2002, generating four rather different patterns for pollution over time. The policy-conclusions are consonant with Pearce’s general view about the EKC: there is no theoretical presumption that it has an inverted U shape, nor should any country try to “grow out of the environmental problems” without analyzing the benefits and costs of so doing.     

Disclosure Strategies for Pollution Control

Disclosure strategies, which involve public and/or private attempts to increase the availability of information on pollution, form the basis for what some have called the third wave in pollution control policy (after legal regulation – the first wave – and market-based instruments – the second wave). While these strategies have become common in natural resource settings (forest certification and organic farming, for example), they are less familiar in a pollution control context. Yet the number of applications in that context is now growing in both OECD and developing countries. This survey will review what we know and don’t know about the use of disclosure strategies to control pollution and conclude with the author's sense of where further research would be particularly helpful.     

Consumption,wealth and business cycles in Germany

This paper studies the long-run relationship between consumption, asset wealth and income—the consumption–wealth ratio—based on German data from 1980 to 2003. We find that departures from this long-run relationship mainly predict adjustments in income. The German consumption–wealth ratio also contains considerable forecasting power for a range of business cycle indicators, including the unemployment rate. This finding is in contrast to earlier studies for some of the Anglo-Saxon economies that have shown that the consumption–wealth ratio reverts to its long-run mean mainly through subsequent adjustments in asset prices. While the German consumption wealth ratio contains little information about future changes in German asset prices, we report that the U.S. consumption–wealth ratio has considerable forecasting power for the German stock market. One explanation of these findings is that in Germany—due to structural differences in the financial and pension systems—the share of publicly traded equity in aggregate household wealth is much smaller than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. We discuss the implications of our results for the measurement of a potential wealth effect on consumption. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the position of the Deutsche Bundesbank. We gratefully acknowledge comments and suggestions from an anonymous referee as well as from Heinz Herrmann, Helmut Lütkepohl, the editor, Baldev Raj, Burkhard Raunig, Monika Schnitzer, Harald Uhlig and Christian Upper. We also benefitted from comments by seminar participants at the ECB, the Deutsche Bundesbank, the CESifo Macro, Money and International Finance Area Conference 2005, the EEA 2005 annual congress and at the 2005 IAEA Meetings. Last but not least, we would like to thank Mark Weth for very useful information concerning the construction of the financial wealth data. Hoffmann’s work on this paper is also part of the project The International Allocation of Risk funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in the framework of SFB 475. Responsibility for any remaining errors and shortcomings is entirely our own.     

Do cost efficiency gap and foreign competitors matter concerning optimal privatization policy at the free entry market?

In this paper, we demonstrate that in contrast to the case with exogenous number of foreign private firms, partial privatization is always the best policy for the public firm in long-run equilibrium, which casts doubt on the robust result in Matsumura and Kanda (J Econ 84(1):27–48, 2005) who argued that welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is always optimal in mixed markets. Critical cost gap determines that long-run degree of privatization is larger than the short-run one. In particular, regarding the scenario wherein one public firm competes with domestic private firms and foreign private firms, equilibrium price is lower than marginal cost of public firm instead of being equivalent to marginal cost of the public firm, and that public firm’s outputs, profit, and social welfare is the smallest in the concerned mixed oligopoly models.     

Environmental Quality,Public Debt and Economic Development

This article analyzes the consequences on capital accumulation and environmental quality of environmental policies financed by public debt. A public sector of pollution abatement is financed by a tax or by public debt. We show that if the initial capital stock is high enough, the economy monotonically converges to a long-run steady state. On the contrary, when the initial capital stock is low, the economy is relegated to an environmental poverty trap. We also explore the implications of public policies on the trap and on the long-run stable steady state. In particular, we find that government should decrease debt and increase pollution abatement to promote capital accumulation and environmental quality at the stable long-run steady state. Finally, a welfare analysis shows that there exists a level of public debt that allows a long run steady state to be optimal.     

Dynamic analysis of British demand for tourism abroad

This paper investigates how preference endogeneity, in the form of habit persistence, can affect short-run and long-run tourism expenditure decisions. The proposed model is applied to British quarterly data over the period 1979–91 and the empirical results suggest that preference endogeneity appears to have an important effect. This has policy implications for countries competing for British tourist arrivals. The differences between the short-run and long-run price and budget elasticities which are implied by habit persistence are also investigated.     

Does Environmental Policy Necessarily Discourage Growth?

This paper analyzes the long-run impact of an environmental policy on economic growth. A growth model with vertical innovation is modified by including intermediate goods as a source of pollution. Taxation on pollution reduces profits of intermediate firms as well as final outputs. However, it increases their mark-ups and alleviates profit losses. In this setting, profit losses are offset by the general equilibrium effect; thus, the tax enhances R&Ds which drive economic growth while it reduces pollution. If the government provides an R&D subsidy, the growth rate will be accelerated.     

Optimal Control of Pollution Accumulation with Long-Run Average Welfare

This paper considers the problem of pollution accumulation in order to maximize the long-run average welfare functional in environmental economics. We approach the problem by solving the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in the classical sense, via the viscosity solution method. The optimal policy is shown to exist in a feedback from, and the maximum value is also obtained independently of the initial level of pollution. An equilibrium of the optimal stock of pollution is discussed.     

A common trends model of UK core inflation

In this paper the long-run trend in RPI inflation (core inflation) for the UK over the 1961–1997 period is estimated within the framework of a multivariate common trends model which extends the bivariate VAR approach of Quah and Vahey (1995). In this context core inflation is directly linked to money and wage growth and interpreted as the long-run forecast of inflation from a small-scale, cointegrated macroeconomic system. First version received: September 1999/Final version received: October 2001 RID="*" ID="*"  We thank two anonymous referees for many helpful comments and suggestions. Work on this paper was partially conducted when C. Morana was at Heriot-Watt University.     

Environment,Directed Technical Change and Economic Policy

We study the effects of an economic policy in an endogenous growth general equilibrium framework where production of consumption goods requires two resource inputs: a polluting non-renewable resource and a non-polluting labour resource. The use of the former contributes to the accumulation of pollution in the atmosphere, which affects welfare. There is a specific research sector associated with each of those resources. We provide a full welfare analysis, and we describe the equilibrium paths in a decentralized economy. We go on to study the effects of three associated economic policy tools: a tax on the polluting resource, and two research subsidies. We show that the optimal environmental policy has two main effects; it delays the extraction of the resource and with it the level of polluting emissions and it reallocates research efforts, decreasing the amount put into “grey” research to the benefit of “green” research. We also show that the environmental policy is grey-biased in the short-term, and green-biased in the long-term. Finally, we compute the optimal values for these tools.      

Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly

This paper examines a differential game model of international pollution control in which polluting oligopolists compete in a third country market. Two alternative policy instruments (emission taxes and command-and-control regulations) are considered. A tougher emission policy in the home country enhances the foreign firm’s competitiveness because of the static “rent-shifting” effect. The foreign country also enjoys a future improvement of the global environmental quality by “free riding” on the home country’s emission reduction effort. Because of these strategic effects, the levels of environmental policy determined in the noncooperative policy game are distorted away from the socially optimal level. Moreover, the emission tax game produces a more distortionary outcome than that in the command-and-control game; it generates more pollution and lower welfare.      

An Empirical Examination of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis for India: Towards a Green Leontief Paradox?

Using input–output analysis, we examine whether India can be regarded as a pollution haven. We calculate the extra CO₂, SO₂ and NO _x emissions induced by 1 billion rupees of additional exports. This is compared with the reduction of Indian pollution caused by an import increase of equal size. In contrast to what the pollution haven hypothesis states for developing countries, we find that India considerably gains from extra trade. Comparing 1996/1997 with 1991/1992, the gains have only increased, indicating that India has moved␣further away from being a pollution haven. The outcome is robust to changes in the underlying assumptions.      

Reaching for the stars: the appointment of celebrities to corporate boards

For a sample of over 700 celebrity appointments to corporate boards of directors over the period 1985–2006, we find positive excess market returns at the time of their announcement. The 1-, 2-, and 3-year long-run performance of the appointing firms provide corroborating evidence of the value of these appointments. We conclude that the appointment of celebrities as directors increase a firm’s visibility in a fashion consistent with Merton’s (J Finance 42:483–510, 1987) investor recognition hypothesis.     

Environmental Protection and Urban Unemployment: Environmental Policy Reform in a Polluted Dualistic Economy

This paper explores sufficient conditions for the welfare‐improving environmental policy reform in the Harris–Todaro economy. A rise in the pollution tax rate in the urban manufacturing has spillover effects on the two labor market distortions: the less‐than‐optimal manufacturing employment and the urban unemployment. If both are weakened the welfare improves. Otherwise, we need to develop an alternative sufficient condition. It is shown that there exists a range of welfare‐improving pollution tax rates, and that it corresponds to the lower values of tax rate. This range may shrink by the wage subsidy policy and the technological change toward less pollution‐intensive techniques.     

The Production of Eco-Labels

Eco-labeling is a market-based technique for conveying information about consumers’ demands for environmental protection. Most criticisms of eco-labeling have concentrated on demand-side issues – the potential for firms or countries to use eco-labels to manipulate market power – and the difficulty of creating credible labels. In this paper, we argue that fundamental problems also arise on the production side. Specifically, we argue that both increasing returns to scale and complexities in production imply that it will be possible to market only a small percentage of environmental attributes through the use of eco-labels. We present evidence for our hypotheses from a detailed survey of 100 randomly-selected consumer products.      

Working time, employment, and work sharing: Evidence from Sweden

We study three questions which are important for work sharing to increase employment. First, is there a negative long-run relation between working time and employment? Second, are hours per worker exogenous with respect to wages and employment? Third, can policy makers influence actual hours per worker? We formulate a theoretical model for employment, hours per worker, production, and real wages. A VAR model with cointegrating constraints is estimated by maximum likelihood using Swedish private sector data 1970:1–1990:4. We find (i) no long-run relation between hours per worker and employment, (ii) that hours per worker are endogenous with respect to the estimation of long-run parameters, and (iii) that legislated working time and hours per worker are related to each other in the long run. First version received: September 1997/final version accepted: June 1999     

International production chains and the pollution offshoring hypothesis: An empirical investigation

Most analyses of the impact of heterogeneous environmental policy stringency on the location of industrial firms have considered the relocation of entire activities – the well-known pollution haven hypothesis. Yet international enterprises may decide to only offshore a subset of their production chain – the so-called pollution offshoring hypothesis (POH). We introduce a simple empirical approach to test the POH combining a comprehensive industrial mergers and acquisitions dataset, a measure of sectoral linkages based on input-output tables and an index score of environmental policy stringency. Our results confirm the impact of relative environmental policy stringency on firms’ decisions to engage in cross-country M&As. Our findings also indicate that environmental taxation have a stronger impact on international investment decisions than standards-based policies. Further, we find that transactions involving a target firm operating in a sector upstream of the acquirer are more sensitive to environmental policy stringency, especially when that sector is highly pollution-intensive. This empirical evidence is consistent with the pollution offshoring hypothesis.     

Strategic Environmental Policy under Free Trade with Transboundary Pollution

We analyze the effects of trade liberalization on environmental policies in a strategic setting when there is transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom in environmental taxes, which makes both countries worse off. This is not due to the terms of trade motive, but rather the incentive, in a strategic setting, to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution. With command and control policies (emission quotas), countries are unable to influence foreign emissions by strategic choice of domestic policy; hence, there is no race to the bottom. However, with internationally tradable quotas, unless pollution is a pure global public bad, there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy. Under free trade, internationally nontradable quotas result in the lowest pollution level and strictly welfare‐dominate taxes. The ordering of internationally tradable quotas and pollution taxes depends, among other things, on the degree of international pollution spillovers.     

The demand for money in Austria

In this paper, the demand for real money M1, M2, and M3 is estimated for Austria over the time period 1965–96. The modelling takes place within the framework of a small vector autoregression. To estimate the demand for money, two-equation error-correction models are constructed, which contain the short-run dynamics and the long-run economic equilibrium. It is found that a stable money demand exists for all monetary aggregates. The long-run equilibrium of M1, after accounting for a structural break in 1979, can be characterised as a classical type of money demand, with no interest rate effects and an elasticity of one for real GDP. In the case of M2 and M3, we find a unit coefficient on income and a significantly negative influence of a long-term interest rate. The statistical properties of the estimated short-run money demand equations – considering in-sample and out-of-sample tests – are generally very good. First version received: October 1996/Final version received: April 2000     

Double Irreversibility and Environmental Policy Timing

The timing of environmental policy typically takes place within a framework in which uncertainty over the future impact of pollution and two different kinds of irreversibilities interact. The first kind of irreversibility concerns the sunk cost of environmental degradation; the second is related to the sunk cost of environmental policy. Clearly, the two irreversibilities pull in opposite directions: policy irreversibility leads to more pollution and a less/later policy, while environmental irreversibility generates less pollution and a more/sooner policy. Using a real option approach and an infinite time horizon model, this paper considers both irreversibilities simultaneously. The model first is developed by paying particular attention to the option values related to pollution and policy adoption. The environmental policy we consider consists in increasing the natural assimilation rate. Solving the model in closed form then provides solutions for both the optimal pollution level and the optimal environmental policy timing. Finally, we provide a numerical example with the purpose of appraising which irreversibility has the prevailing effect and what is the overall impact of both irreversibilities on pollution and policy timing.