Resolving Impasses in e-Negotiation: Does e-Mediation Work?

In this article we evaluate the performance of an e-mediation system, referred to as VienNA, in an e-negotiation environment. A set of hypotheses drawn from the mediation and e-mediation literatures are explored. Bargaining processes, outcomes, and perceptions are compared for bargainers that have access to the VienNA system with those that do not have access during negotiation. Supporting several of the hypotheses, bargainers with access to the system were more flexible during the process, showed more concession reciprocation, sent more messages dealing with relationships and related sources of conflict, and were more satisfied with both the process and outcome. Early use of the system produced more flexible bargaining and better outcomes than later use, a finding that supports research on mediation in international conflicts. More balanced agreements occurred when bargainers consulted a form of advice known as fairness norms. Implications of these results for theory and practice are discussed along with suggestions for further research.     

“I am Disgusted by Your Proposal”: The Effects of a Strategic Flinch in Negotiations

To flinch in negotiations refers to verbal or physical displays of shock, disgust, or disbelief made in response to an opening offer. We investigated the impact of advising negotiators to strategically flinch in distributive bargaining. In experiment 1, negotiators who flinched claimed significantly more value than negotiators who did not flinch. Targets of a flinch, however, viewed the negotiation relationship less positively than negotiators in a control condition. Yet, flinching appeared to have no effect on the target negotiators’ perceptions of how well they did. In experiment 2, the notion that a subtle flinch might still facilitate value claiming but without imperilling the bargaining relationship was supported. Implications for negotiation theory and practice, and directions for future research, are discussed.     

Power imbalance and the pattern of exchange in dyadic negotiation

We investigate how a key structural aspect of negotiation—power—combines with aspiration level to affect the interaction pattern of negotiators. Conflicting research findings have revealed that in most cases negotiators with anequal balance of power reach agreements of higher joint gain than negotiators with an unequal power balance, but in some instances the opposite result has been found. We suggest that it is important to consider the interaction between the negotiators to explain these varying findings. We propose that when unequal power negotiators are able to reach agreements of high joint gain it is due to the efforts of the low power party. In addition, we argue that the low power player will be most likely to drive the search for a solution of high joint gain when he or she also has high aspirations. We tested these proposals in a market negotiation with integrative potential. To examine the pattern of negotiation, all offers and counter-offers were written. The results indicated that overall, equal power dyads achieved higher joint outcomes than unequal power dyads. Under unequal power, the hypothesis that higher joint outcomes would be obtained when the low power player had high aspirations received partial support. In addition, support was found for the hypothesis that in unequal power dyads low power players would be responsible for driving solutions of higher joint gain.     

Negotiators’ Effectiveness with Mixed Agendas: An Empirical Exploration of Tasks,Decisions and Performance Criteria

This article analyzes the performance of 1,060 individuals in dyadic, mixed-agenda negotiations in order to further understanding of individual negotiators’ effectiveness and test the applicability of common negotiation advice. To evaluate performance, both established and new measures were employed. In general, individuals were not effective, although there was wide variation that included highly effective negotiators. In striking contrast to previous research, high-performing individuals’ achievements were not significantly related to maximum joint value creation or to maximum logrolling. Most of the variation in benchmarked (best-practices) effectiveness and in partner-compared effectiveness was explained by individuals’ decisions on three types of agenda items: pure conflict, reverse priorities, and no-conflict. Each had a significant effect (with one exception), but decisions on pure conflict influenced individual effectiveness much more than decisions on either of the other two. Additional results include the extent to which negotiators tended to compromise, logroll, agree on common values, and modify their decisions across items within an item type. Among other implications, these findings argue for richer, more nuanced treatment of individual effectiveness and for advice that is attentive to the structural features of particular negotiations.     

Social Embeddedness in Electronic Negotiations

This study contributes to electronic negotiation research by analyzing the role of social embeddedness of actors in a controlled laboratory experiment. In particular, we analyze the effect of prior negotiator relationship in different conflict levels in web-based negotiations. We hypothesize that with increasing intensity of conflicts, negotiators who have a personal relationship use more value creating strategies compared to anonymous negotiators. As a consequence, we also hypothesize to find fewer impasses in electronic negotiations involving subjects who are socially embedded. Our results confirm that, in fact, in severe conflicts socially embedded actors reach significantly more agreements than subjects of the control group while such an effect is not found in weak conflict situations. These findings are related to more yielding between embedded actors but not to more value creating behavior. From these results, we can conclude that socially embedded negotiators better manage to reach agreements in difficult situations. Furthermore, an institutionalized pre-negotiation phase which allows negotiators to establish a personal relationship can counteract the threat of impasses.     

Social Motives and Trust: Implications for Joint Gains in Negotiations

This study examined the role of trust via contingency model in a multi-issue multi-party negotiation setting and how it relates to outcomes. Results of a laboratory experiment with 288 undergraduate students confirmed both a main effect of Social Value Orientations (SVO), such that cooperative negotiators achieved higher joint gains than pro-self negotiators, and a main effect of Motivational Orientations (MO), such that pro-social negotiators attained higher joint gains than egoistic-oriented negotiators. Furthermore, the predicted interaction effect between SVO and MO, such that negotiators with a pro-self SVO attained higher joint gains in a pro-social, in contrast to an egoistic MO, condition was confirmed. This effect was fully mediated by trust. The dimension of trust that explained the SVO and MO interaction was that of concern for fellow negotiators as rated by oneself, as well as by an objective third-party observer. Implications for the strategic use of social motives and trust on effective information exchange and negotiated outcomes are discussed.     

Negotiators' Communication, Perception of Their Counterparts, and Performance in Dyadic E-negotiations

The aim of this study was to improve our understanding of negotiation strategies, behaviors, and outcomes, and the relationships between these factors based on data collected from questionnaires, actual behavior during the negotiation process implemented using e-negotiation system, and the negotiation outcomes. This study clustered the negotiators based on either the negotiators' own strategies or their thoughts about those of their partners. This resulted in a division into cooperative and noncooperative clusters. We found that the negotiators whose own strategies are less cooperative tend to submit more offers but fewer messages. However, these people consIDer that they have less control over the negotiation process compared with those who adopt a more cooperative strategy, who make fewer offers but send more messages. Those in the cooperative cluster consistently feel friendlier about the negotiation and more satisfied with the outcome and their performance. Further, there is a correlation not only between self-strategies and the thoughts about partners' strategies, but also between strategies and final agreements. Finally, the proportion of negotiations reaching agreement is larger for the cooperative cluster than for the noncooperative cluster.     

The effect of communication medium on negotiation performance

Concepts of media efficiency and media richness are employed to describe the impact of communication media on two key aspects of negotiation behavior—reducing uncertainty about the task, and managing equivocality about negotiator's bargaining orientation. A controlled experiment was conducted to examine how the use of either audio or text forms of verbal communication, and the presence or absence of visual communication, impacts negotiation performance in a bilateral monopoly task. Each member of a pair of negotiators received private instructions either to maximize joint profit (a cooperative bargaining orientation) or to maximize individual profit (an individualistic bargaining orientation). Negotiation performance was measured via the total amount of relative cooperativeness of verbal communication and joint profit. In the audio mode as opposed to the text mode, the total amount of verbal communication and joint profit was increased. In the presence of visual communication the relative cooperativeness and joint profit of pairs of individualistic negotiators was less than that of cooperative negotiators. In the absence of visual communication the relative cooperativeness and joint profit of pairs of individualistic negotiators was no less than that of cooperative negotiators. In sum the findings suggest that uncertainty regarding the logical structure of the task was reduced primarily via verbal communciation, while equivocality regarding the bargaining orientation of the other negotiator was reduced primarily via visual communication. The implications for group decision and negotiation research and practice are explored.     

A prototype NSS based on problem structure and suggestions toward more comprehensive negogiation support

Seeking an effective approach to supporting negotiation through the use of computer technology, we have constructed a prototype negotiation support system based on the concept of problem structure. Problem structure refers to the characteristics of the feasible settlement space and efficient frontiers as defined by the joint utility distribution of negotiators' utilities. Problem structure is recognized as playing a major role in negotiation processes and outcomes. The cognitive complexity and inherent uncertainty of typical negotiations make it difficult for negotiators to effectively visualize and “navigate” the settlement space defined by the problem structure. As a result, negotiators often resort to suboptimizing heuristics which produce inefficient and/or unsatisfying outcomes. It follows that a promising approach to negotiation support is to exploit the computational speed and graphics capabilities of computer technology to make problem structure and its implications more accessible. Thus, our prototype is designed to allow negotiators to hypothesize problem structure and to explore and manipulate the resulting settlement space quickly and easily. Preliminary experimentation has demonstrated the value of this approach and has suggested areas for extended, comprehensive support. A negotiation process formalism, Cognitive Action Theory, neural network technology, and computer simulation are well-suited to providing more comprehensive support, and we suggest an architecture for delivery through NSS.     

Positive affect and decision frame in negotiation

This study examined decision frame (“gain” vs. “loss”) and negotiator affect (positive vs. control) in a simulated bilateral negotiation where negotiators dealt with a programmed opponent and made offers and counteroffers on three issues that differed in value. Direct comparisons between the gain and loss frame conditions, in the control-affect condition, revealed a replication of the standard frame effect: a loss frame produced fewer concessions than a gain frame. However, an interaction effect indicated that the frame effect reversed in the positive affect condition: under positive affect, a loss frame produced greater concessions than a gain frame. In addition, the data indicated a replication of earlier work showing that positive affect can lead to more integrative agreements in negotiation. The results suggest that positive affect can influence location of a reference point in evaluating prospective outcomes; one implication is that prospect theory can be useful for understanding the effects of affect in bilateral negotiation.     

I Expected More from You: The Influence of Close Relationships and Perspective Taking on Negotiation Offers

Three experimental studies show that interpersonal relationships influence the expectations of negotiators at the negotiation table. That is, negotiators expect more generous negotiation offers from close others (Study 1), and when expectations are not met, negative emotions arise, resulting in negative economic and relational outcomes (Study 2). Finally, a boundary condition for the effect of interpersonal relationships on negotiation expectations is shown: perspective taking leads the parties to expect less from friends than from acquaintances (Study 3). The findings suggest that perspective taking helps negotiators reach agreement in relationships. The article concludes with implications for practice and future research directions.     

Mediation with Incomplete Information: Approaches to Suggest Potential Agreements

In bilateral Negotiation Analysis, the literature often considers the case of complete information. In this context, since the negotiators know the value functions of both parties, it is not difficult to calculate the Pareto efficient solutions for the negotiation. Thus rational negotiators can reach agreement on this frontier. However, these approaches are not applied in practice when complete information is not available. The research question of our work is “It is possible to help negotiators achieving an efficient solution in the absence of complete information regarding the different parameters of the model?”. We propose to derive incomplete information about the preferences of negotiators from the statements they make and the offers they exchange during the negotiation process. We present and discuss three approaches that use this information in order to help a mediator proposing a better solution than the compromise the negotiators have reached or are close to reach.     

Negotiation and design: Supporting resource allocation decisions through analytical mediation

The common element of all negotiations is change. Design is the key to directing and managing change, and resource allocation is the most critical component of design. Negotiations about change are, therefore, fundamentally, negotiations about design and resource allocation. Negotiations vary along a continuum, from those in which negotiators have consonant interests (share objectives) to discordant ones (disagree about appropriate objectives). The joint distribution of all possible payoffs defines thestructure of the negotiation problem—the opportunities the problem affords and constraints it imposes on negotiators. The analytical mediation approach supports the activities of an impartial, neutral third party who attempts to assist the disputants to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. It makes use of different types of techniques to support negotiations, depending on their location along the negotiation continuum. Two case studies involving analytical mediation are reported. One case study involves a budgeting exercise, in which the negotiators' interests were essentially consonant. The second case study involves a labor-management contract problem, in which the negotiators' interests were highly discordant.     

The effects of reciprocation wariness on negotiation behavior and outcomes

This study examined the influence of reciprocation wariness, a general fear of exploitation in interpersonal relationships, on negotiators’ motivational orientation, direct information sharing and negotiation outcomes. We predicted that low-wary negotiators are more likely to be prosocial and to engage in direct information sharing, and low-wary negotiators will perceive their opponents more positively after the negotiation. We asked 150 graduate students of business administration to formed 75 dyads to participate in a simulated business negotiation, each taking the role of a buyer or a seller. The results showed that reciprocation wariness had a significant effect on negotiators’ motivational orientation and the amount of information sharing. Negotiating dyads with low–low reciprocation wariness got higher joint gains than those with high–high reciprocation wariness, and information sharing fully mediated the relationship. After the negotiation, low-wary negotiators evaluated the other party more positively and were more willing to interact with their opponents in the future. Contributions and limitations are discussed.     

The effects of argument preparation and timing of first offer on negotiators' cognitions and performance

We investigate how argument preparation (self-only, self/counter) and the timing of the first offer (immediate, delayed) combine to affect negotiation performance. Subjects participated in a dyadic negotiation concerning the out-of-court settlement of a lawsuit. Subjects prepared by generating a list of arguments in support of their case (self-only), or by generating a list of arguments in support of their caseaccompanied by a list of counterarguments that they might expect from their opponent (self/counter). In the Immediate Offer condition, subjects began the negotiation with an exchange of written settlement offers. In the Delayed Offer condition, subjects began the negotiation with a discussion of the qualitative negotiation issues. It was proposed that negotiators who prepared both their own and counterarguments would be more flexible and that this effect would be increased by delaying the first offer. The results indicate that the effects of these variables are more complex than originally proposed, and reveal significant interactions with the negotiator's role in the conflict.The first author was supported by the IBM Faculty Research Fund at the Graduate School of Business, the University of Chicago.     

Cultural Perspective Taking in Cross-Cultural Negotiation

This study introduces the construct cultural perspective taking in negotiation, the active consideration of the other party’s culturally-normative negotiation behaviors prior to negotiation, and compares the effect of cultural perspective taking (CPT) versus alternative-focused perspective taking (PT) in cross-cultural negotiations. 160 undergraduate students of North American and East Asian ethnicity in the United States and Canada participated in a simulated cross-cultural buyer-seller negotiation in a laboratory study. Participants were randomly assigned to CPT or PT condition. Results show that negotiators who engaged in CPT claimed more value than those who engaged in PT. And when both East Asian and North American negotiators engaged in CPT, East Asian negotiators claimed more value. CPT had no effect on value creation. This study highlights that learning about the other culture before a cross-cultural encounter benefits value claiming, but not necessarily value creation.     

Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations

We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in — the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction — for the viability of multilateral cooperation when countries are linked by international trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, while in some cases negotiation tie-in has either no effect or can make multilateral cooperation more viable, in others a formal tie-in constraint can make an otherwise viable joint multilateral agreement unstable.     

Comparing the Israel–Palestinian Dispute to Australian Family Mediation

‘For decades the Israel–Palestinian conflict has been characterized as intractable, inextricable, and the root cause of suffering and misery for many of the people who live in the Middle East region’. Whilst it would be unwise to expect that the solution to this problem can be provided by negotiation support systems, we believe such systems can provide useful advice and allow disputants to more adequately understand their goals and support them to perform the trade-offs necessary to arrive at acceptable solutions. Given our research on interested based negotiation support systems to provide family mediation advice, we pose the question about the ability of such systems to provide useful advice about the Israel–Palestinian dispute. We examine the differences between family mediation and international conflict resolution and reflect upon whether results from the former can provide useful advice in the latter. After identifying the issues in dispute and each of the disputant’s goals, the data is fed into the Asset Divider system. The system allows users to engage in testing the potential outcome of their dispute given their beliefs and goals. The system hence outlines to users the consequences of insisting upon their stances. The outcome proposed by the system given trial data, is similar to the successful Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt, where Israel gave up territory for recognition and security.     

The Hidden Persuader: The Role of the Advisor in Negotiations and Group Decision Making—Perspectives from the European Union

Theoretical models of negotiation and group decision making often overlook or at least do not fully account for the important role played by persons who advise negotiators and participants in group decision making. Sight unseen, advisors are often “hidden persuaders,” important but unrecognized sources of influence on the negotiation dynamic. This article explores the roles and methods of advisors in the negotiation process, drawing on survey research conducted in 2013 among approximately seventy advisors at the European Union Council of Ministers. Defining advice as “\(\ldots \)a communication from one person (the advisor) to another (the client) for the purpose of helping that second person determine a course of action for solving a particular problem\(\ldots \)”, the author considers the nature of advice and the range of relationships that may exist between advisors and their clients. He argues that advising is much more than the mere transmittal of information from advisor to negotiator and that for advice to be effective a relationship must exist between the two parties. The author identifies three models of the advisor–negotiator relationship. Model I is the advisor as director, wherein the advisor tends to take control of the negotiating process, directing the negotiator in actions that the negotiator should take to achieve success at the negotiation. Model II is the advisor as servant in which the advisor merely responds to the demands of the client for help and guidance in the negotiation. Model III is the advisor as partner, wherein advisor and negotiator jointly manage the advising process and together take co-ownership of the problem to be solved. The author then explores the factors that lead advisors and negotiators to adopt each of these three models, the various advising styles that advisors adopt, and the differing effects on the negotiation process that these elements may have, drawing on historical examples as well as survey data from the EU Council of Ministers. He concludes by offering advice about advising to three important professional groups—scholars, negotiators, and advisors—on ways to carry out their respective functions more effectively.     

The ethical profile of global marketing negotiators

As international trade and business opportunities grow globally, insight into trading partners’ strategies is essential. One of the major strategies that impact trading partners’ relationships is negotiation strategy employed by each partner. These strategies assume even greater importance when these strategies have ethical content. This study examines the effects of marketing executives’ preferred ethical ideologies (relativism and idealism), opportunism and Machiavellianism on their perceived appropriateness of unethical negotiation tactics. Utilizing a sample of 995 marketing executives from six countries, cluster analysis and multivariate analysis of variance revealed two types of marketing negotiators: principled and corrupt negotiators. Corrupt negotiators tend to be more Machiavellian, more relativist, more opportunistic and less idealistic than their principled counterparts. Principled negotiators tend to perceive unethical negotiation tactics less favorably than their corrupt counterparts. Implications of these results for practitioners and directions for future research are discussed.