Mortgage Lending, Race, and Model Specification

This study examines the role of race in home mortgage lending by investigating the sensitivity of race estimates to variations in model specification. I compare parameter estimates based on a statistical model utilized by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, using a subset of the data that corresponds to FDIC-supervised institutions, with estimates obtained from several alternative variations specified to reflect information obtained from reviews of the mortgage loan application files. Estimates of the race effect are shown to be highly sensitive to the assumptions that underlie the model; minor modifications in model specification are sufficient to eliminate the race effect. The empirical results suggest that the statistical models used to evaluate the impact of race in mortgage lending may not provide reliable information about lending bias.     

Bank audit practices and loan loss provisioning

I empirically examine the evolution of loan loss accounting across banks that differ categorically by external auditing practice. Using a partial adjustment model, and a sample of 75,505 observations on affiliated banks, 1995–2009, I find evidence of convergence across audit categories in target ratios of provisions for loan losses to nonaccrual loans. This is consistent with a standardized method of accounting for “impaired” loans. I observe less convergence, on the other hand, in target ratios of provisions for loan losses to loans, which appears to accommodate a role for managerial discretion.     

Simultaneity bias in mortgage lending: A test of simultaneous equations models on bank-specific data

This study uses simultaneous equations models and single-equation models to test for simultaneity bias in mortgage refinance data compiled by a regional bank. The purpose of the study is to assess the claim that single-equation models of the lending decision produce biased and inconsistent parameter estimates of endogenous mortgage terms. Bank-specific data are analyzed to avoid bias resulting from uncontrolled policy, training, or underwriting differences across banks. Importantly, the data contain all variables the regional bank identified as important factors in explaining its loan disposition results. After controlling for applicants' debt, income, credit history, and requested loan term, I find that the race coefficient in single-equation models is biased upward, while the loan-to-value ratio coefficient is biased downward, although both biases are insignificant. Overall, the results suggest that simultaneous equations models are preferable to single-equation models in tests for discrimination, and can be used to determine the extent of race coefficient and loan-to-value ratio coefficient bias in single-equation models.     

Capital regulation,heterogeneous monitoring costs,and aggregate loan quality

This paper develops a banking-sector framework with heterogeneous loan monitoring costs. Banks are exposed to the moral hazard behavior of borrowers and endogenously choose whether to monitor their loans to eliminate this exposure. After analyzing an unregulated banking system, we examine several cases in which regulatory capital requirements bind the notional loan supplies of various subsets of banks. To gauge the impact of capital requirements, we define loan ‘quality’ in terms of either the ratio of monitored to total loans or the ratio of monitoring banks to total bank population. Under the assumption of a specific cross-sectional distribution of banks, our simulations show that the imposition of binding capital requirements on a previously unregulated banking system unambiguously increases the market loan rate and reduces aggregate lending, but has an ambiguous effect on loan ‘quality’. Nevertheless, once capital requirements are in place, the simulations indicate that regulators can contribute to higher overall loan ‘quality’ by toughening capital requirements.     

Uncertainty and debt covenants

I examine the use of financial covenants when contracting for debt under uncertainty. Uncertainty, in the context of this study, is a lack of information about future economic events and their consequences for the borrower’s creditworthiness. I examine the implications of ex ante uncertainty that is resolved by information received following loan initiation but prior to maturity. I argue that financial covenants, by transferring control rights ex post, provide a trigger for creditor-initiated renegotiation when the borrower is revealed to be of low credit quality. Using a large sample of private loans, I predict and find that financial covenant intensity is associated with greater uncertainty. I also revisit the agency-based explanation for covenant use and find that this uncertainty explanation is robust to various controls for agency conflicts.     

How legal and institutional environments shape the private debt renegotiation process?

I investigate how legal and institutional conditions around loan origination influence a private debt renegotiation process. Using a large sample of 15,000 loans on the European credit market, I apply a sequential logit model to consider the renegotiation likelihood, the conditional probability of multiple renegotiation rounds or multiple amended terms, and the renegotiation outcomes conditional on specific loan amendments. I find that legal systems with stronger protection of creditors control rights have a positive influence on renegotiation likelihood and favorable outcomes on amendments to amount or maturity. Stronger legal protection reduces renegotiation likelihood when creditors face potential strategic default by shareholders. The legal and institutional environment has a significant effect on how the initial design of the financial contract impacts the renegotiation process.     

Loan Loss Provisions, Earnings Management and Capital Management under IFRS: The Case of EU Commercial Banks

Prior research has shown that loan loss provisions are primarily used as a tool for earnings management and capital management by listed banks. Effective 2005 all listed companies in the European Union (EU) are required to comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Adherence to IFRS, it is claimed, should enhance transparency of reporting practices relative to local General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The overall objective of this paper is to examine the impact of the implementation of IFRS on the use of loan loss provisions (LLPs) to manage earnings and capital. We use a sample of 91 EU listed commercial banks covering a period of 10 years (before and after implementation of IFRS). Since early adopters may have different incentives and motivations relative to those who adopt mandatorily, we dichotomize our sample into early and late adopters. Overall, we find that earnings management (using loan loss provisions) for both early and late adopters while significant over the estimation window is significantly reduced after implementation of IFRS. We also find that, for risky banks, earnings management behavior is more pronounced when compared to the less risky banks, but is significantly reduced in the post IFRS period. Capital management behavior by bank managers is not significant in both pre and post IFRS regimes. Overall, we conclude that the implementation of IFRS in the EU appears to have improved earnings quality by mitigating the tendency of bank managers of listed commercial banks to engage in earnings management using loan loss provisions.     

Short-term safety or long-term failure? Empirical evidence of the impact of securitization on bank risk

Based on a sample of U.S. commercial banks from 2002 to 2012, this paper shows that bank loan securitization has a significant and positive impact on both Z-scores and the likelihood of bank failure, indicating a short-term risk reduction and a long-term risk increase effect. We also find disparate impacts between mortgage and non-mortgage securitization. Loan sale activities are found to have a similar impact to securitization.     

Coincident correlations of growth and cash flow in banking

Prior empirical research indicates that loan growth in the banking industry is positively related to cash flow. I offer an alternative methodology that is better able to capture the effect of cash flow on loan growth while controlling for the potentially coincident effect of loan growth on cash flow. Using a sample of 171,389 observations on banks, 1986–2007, I find that causality runs more consistently from growth to cash flow than from cash flow to growth. This extends prior empirical research by Houston and James (1998) and Campello (2002) on cash flow sensitivities in the banking industry.     

The certification value of private debt renegotiation and the design of financial contracts: Empirical evidence from Europe

By using a sample of bank loan renegotiations by European firms, I show that the renegotiation of financial contracts bears a certification value, while deeply changing the contractual features of the loan over time, to the benefit of shareholders. I find that amendments to financial covenants and to loan amounts increase the cumulative abnormal returns of a borrowing firm by 10–15%. Early and less frequent renegotiations of bilateral loans with short maturities also imply a positive stock market reaction. Amendments signaling the early accrual of new and positive information allow increasing firm value.     

How Unsecured Credit Policies Influence Mortgage and Unsecured Loan Defaults

Before the global financial crisis, the proportion of households defaulting on the mortgage while remaining current on the unsecured loan was almost the same as the proportion of households current on the mortgage but defaulting on the unsecured loan. After the crisis, the former ratio became higher than the latter. By using a heterogeneous agent model with the mortgage and the unsecured loan, I examine how the order of defaults changed before and after the crisis. I then analyze the impacts of unsecured credit policies on households' mortgage and unsecured loan defaults. My quantitative exercise shows that both default rates can decrease as the cost for unsecured loan defaults increases.     

Pathways After Default: What Happens to Distressed Mortgage Borrowers and Their Homes?

We use a detailed dataset of seriously delinquent mortgages to examine the dynamic process of mortgage default—from initial delinquency and default to final resolution of the loan and disposition of the property. We estimate a two-stage competing risk hazard model to assess the factors associated with post-default outcomes, including whether a borrower receives a legal notice of foreclosure. In particular, we focus on a borrower’s ability to avoid a foreclosure auction by getting a modification, by refinancing the loan, or by selling the property. We find that the outcomes of the foreclosure process are significantly related to: loan characteristics including the borrower’s credit history, current loan-to-value and the presence of a junior lien; the borrower’s post-default payment behavior, including the borrower’s participation in foreclosure counseling; neighborhood characteristics such as foreclosure rates, recent house price depreciation and median income; and the borrower’s race and ethnicity.     

Stock returns and investors' mood: Good day sunshine or spurious correlation?

This paper critically evaluates the significant weather effect on stock return reported in two seminal studies of investors' mood on stock market. It is found that their research design of maximizing statistical power by pooling as many data points as possible is statistically flawed, with a consequence that the test is severely biased against the null hypothesis of no effect. Coupled with small effect size estimates and test statistics inflated by massive sample sizes, this strongly suggests spurious statistical significance as an outcome of Type I error. The alternatives to the p-value criterion for statistical significance soundly support the null hypothesis of no weather effect. As an application, the effect of daily sunspot numbers on stock return is examined. Under the same research design as that of a seminal study, the number of sunspots is found to be highly statistically significant although its economic impact on stock return is negligible.     

Ability of accounting and audit quality variables to predict bank failure during the financial crisis

We examine the ability of selected accounting and audit quality variables measured in a period prior to the financial crisis (i.e., the four quarters of 2006), to predict banks that subsequently failed during the financial crisis. We employ two sets of samples from the US: a troubled banks sample that includes banks that failed in or after 2007 as well as banks classified as being troubled based on profitability, loan quality, and balance sheet position in 2007, and a full sample that includes all banks with available required data. Using the troubled banks sample, we identify six reliable predictors of bank failure: auditor type, auditor industry specialization, Tier 1 capital ratio, proportion of securitized loans, growth in loans, and loan mix. For the larger full sample of banks, we identify the following ten predictors of bank failure: auditor type, Tier 1 capital ratio, proportion of securitized loans, nonperforming loans, loan loss provisions, growth in commercial loans, growth in real estate loans, growth in overall loans, loan mix, and whether the bank is a public bank.     

Screening, Bidding, and the Loan Market Tightness

Bank loans are more available and cheaper for new and small businesses inthe U.S. in concentrated banking areas than in competitive banking areas. Weexplain this anomaly by analyzing banks' decisions to screen projects andtheir competition in loan provisions. It is shown that, by exacerbating thewinner's curse, an increase in the number of banks can reduce banks'screening probability by so much that the number of banks that activelycompete in loan provisions falls and the expected loan rate rises. This isthe case when the screening cost is low, which induces all active bidders tobe informed. The opposite outcome occurs when the screening cost is high, inwhich case there are sufficiently many uninformed banks in bidding toattenuate the winner's curse. We also examine the social optimum     

Investing for the Long Run when Returns Are Predictable

We examine how the evidence of predictability in asset returns affects optimal portfolio choice for investors with long horizons. Particular attention is paid to estimation risk, or uncertainty about the true values of model parameters. We find that even after incorporating parameter uncertainty, there is enough predictability in returns to make investors allocate substantially more to stocks, the longer their horizon. Moreover, the weak statistical significance of the evidence for predictability makes it important to take estimation risk into account; a long-horizon investor who ignores it may overallocate to stocks by a sizeable amount.     

Corporate legal structure and bank loan spread

This study examines how a firm's corporate legal structure may affect its borrowing costs. Corporate legal structure refers to the legal fragmentation of a firm into multiple, separately incorporated entities. This fragmentation is bound to be a factor when lenders determine the pricing of debt and design of contract terms because they can enter into legally enforceable agreements only with specific legal entities. Using a sample of private loans to parent companies in the United States, I find that a more complex corporate legal structure is associated with higher loan spread. The findings are robust to several firm and loan characteristics and are incremental to the effects of other forms of organizational structure, namely business and geographic diversification. Subsequent evidence suggests that the effect of a corporate legal structure on borrowing costs is, at least partly, explained by recovery risk.     

Cross-selling,switching costs and imperfect competition in British banks

This paper attempts to evaluate the competitiveness of British banking in the presence of cross-selling and switching costs during 1993–2008. It presents estimates of a model of banking behaviour that encompasses switching costs as well as cross-selling of loans and off-balance sheet transactions. The evidence from panel estimation of the model indicates that the consumer faced high switching costs in the loan market in the latter part of the sample period, as a result of weaker competitiveness in the loan market. Additionally, the weaker competitiveness in the loan market appears to facilitate the cross-selling behaviour of British banks, which helps explain the rapid growth of non-interest income during the last two decades.     

The leverage effect and the basket-index put spread

Benchmark models that exogenously specify equity dynamics cannot explain the large spread in prices between put options written on individual banks and options written on the bank index during the financial crisis. However, theory requires that asset dynamics be specified exogenously and that endogenously determined equity dynamics exhibit a “leverage effect” that increases put prices by fattening the left tail of the distribution. The leverage effect is larger for puts on individual stocks than for puts on the index, thus increasing the basket-index spread. Time-series and cross-sectional variation in the leverage effect explains option prices well.     

Discrimination in Lending: Theory and Evidence

Using a general equilibrium model of credit market discrimination, I find that both taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination have similar predictions for the intergroup differences in loan terms. The commonly held view has been that if taste-based discrimination exists, loans approved to minority borrowers will have higher expected profitability than those to majorities with comparable credit background. I show that the validity of this profitability view depends crucially on how expected loan profitability is measured. I also show that taste-based discrimination must exist if loans to minority borrowers have higher expected rates of return or lower expected rates of default loss than those to majorities with the same exogenous characteristics observed by lender at the time of loan originations. My analysis suggests that the valid method to test for taste-based discrimination should be reduced-form regressions. Empirically, I fail to find supporting evidence for the existence of taste-based discrimination.