A remark on rational expectation equilibria with incomplete markets and real assets

In this note, I established the existence, for a generic set of endowments, of a fully revealing rational expectation equilibrium (REE) in an economy characterized by incomplete markets and real assets.     

Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information

The assumption of asymmetric and incomplete information in a standard New Keynesian model creates strong incentives for monetary policy transparency. We assume that the central bank has better information about its objectives than the private sector, and that the private sector has better information about shocks than the central bank. Transparency has the potential to trigger a virtuous circle in which all agents find it easier to make inferences and the economy is better stabilised. Our analysis improves upon existing work by endogenising the volatility of both output and inflation. Improved transparency most likely manifests itself in falling output volatility.     

Determination of general equilibrium with incomplete markets and default penalties

This paper is concerned with the existence and computation of general equilibrium with incomplete asset markets and default. Due to the incompleteness of asset markets, the excess demand functions are typically not continuous at prices and delivery rates for which the assets have redundant nominal deliveries. This discontinuity results in a serious problem for the existence and computation of general equilibrium. We show that this problem can be resolved by replacing the nominal delivery matrix with a constant-rank one and restricting the macro variables in a subset of the domains. With this approach, the economies with incomplete markets and default penalties can be analyzed with differentiable homotopy techniques, and thus in the same framework as standard general equilibrium models. As a by-product, the existence of equilibrium is ensured for generic economies. Several computational examples demonstrate the effectiveness of the algorithm and show some quantitative features of equilibria in the model with default penalties.     

Adaptive learning and distributional dynamics in an incomplete markets model

Recent research shows that several DSGE models provide a closer fit to the data under adaptive learning. This paper extends this research by introducing adaptive learning in the model of Krusell and Smith (1998) with uninsurable idiosyncratic risks and aggregate uncertainty. A first contribution of this paper establishes that the equilibrium of this framework is stable under least-squares learning. The second contribution consists of showing that bounded rationality enhances the ability of this model to match the distribution of income in the US. Learning increases significantly the Gini coefficients because of the opposite effects on consumption of the capital-rich and of the capital-poor agent. The third contribution is an empirical exercise that shows that learning can account for increases in the income Gini coefficient of up to 25% in a period of 28 years. Overall, these findings suggest that adaptive learning has important distributional repercussions in this class of models.     

Robust efficiency in mixed economies with asymmetric information

In this paper, we study robustly efficient allocations in a pure exchange economy. Answering a question of Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García (2008), we present an extension of their main result to an asymmetric information mixed economy whose commodity space is an ordered separable Banach space having an interior point in its positive cone.     

Blocking efficiency in an economy with asymmetric information

In this paper, we study a pure exchange atomless economy with asymmetric information and having an ordered Banach space with an interior point in its positive cone as the commodity space. An extension of the main theorem in Vind (1972) to the private core without free disposal is established. As a particular case of this result, a solution to a problem mentioned in Pesce (2010) is derived.     

The relation between sunspot effects and multiplicity in incomplete markets models with numeraire assets

This paper considers the necessity and sufficiency of multiple certainty equilibria for sunspot effects, and shows that neither implication is valid. This claim is made for models with incomplete markets and numeraire assets. First, I prove that a multiplicity of certainty equilibria is neither necessary nor sufficient for sunspot effects by way of two counter-examples. Second, I verify over an entire subset of economies that equilibrium with sunspot effects can never be characterized as a randomization over multiple certainty equilibria.     

Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information

We prove an existence theorem for pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Tullock contests where the information endowment of each contender is described by a countable partition.     

Game contingent claims in complete and incomplete markets

A game contingent claim is a contract which enables both the buyer and the seller to terminate it before maturity. For complete markets Kifer [Finance and Stochastics 4 (2000) 443–463] shows a connection to a (zero-sum) Dynkin game whose value is the unique no-arbitrage price of the claim. But, for incomplete markets one needs a more general approach. We interpret the contract as a generalized non-zero-sum stopping game. For the complete case this leads to the same results as in Kifer [Finance and Stochastics 4 (2000) 443–463]. For the general case we show the existence of an equilibrium point under the condition that both the seller and the buyer have an exponential utility function. For other utility functions such a point need not exist in the context of incomplete markets.     

Corporate risk management and asymmetric information

We discuss the effect of information on corporate risk management decisions when the information is asymmetric between the insider and the market. We suggest an explanation for previous contradiction between existing theories and empirical findings, which state that fewer small firms choose to hedge. We consider two different scenarios of information revelation to the market, and find hedging cost is not the main reason preventing firms from hedging. Rather asymmetric information plays the decisive role in a firm's risk management policy. One of the empirical implications we find is that cash flows with high variances may discourage firms from hedging even when they face high financial distress costs.     

Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets

I present a strategic model of a bilateral oligopoly with asymmetric information to examine (i) the validity of the conjecture of price-taking behavior in such markets as the number of agents becomes large and (ii) the effect of the rate that individual information precision decreases with increased number of agents on convergence to price-taking and efficiency. I show that with downstream competition, increasing the number of sellers may make all participants price-takers in the limit, but increasing the number of buyers may not. When the total precision of information in the market is high, price-taking and full social efficiency is achieved in the limit with large numbers of buyers and sellers. However, if the total precision of information in the market is poor, price-taking conjecture may fail and large inefficiencies, including full inefficiency, can occur in the limiting outcome. The rate of decrease of individual information precision with increased number of agents determines the rate of convergence to efficiency, and the convergence is slower than that predicted by single-unit auction models in the literature. I also demonstrate that when the number of sellers or both the number of buyers and the sellers go to infinity, price-taking and information aggregation tend to go together. When the number of buyers goes to infinity, however, information can get aggregated when the agents do not become price-takers in the limit. Albeit, in the latter case, the aggregated information is masked by the noise in the sellers’ signals and the cost variability.     

Alliances and negotiations: an incomplete information example

We study a bargaining game between an individual and an ‘alliance’ in the sense of Manzini and Mariotti (J Econ Theory 121:128–41, 2005), in which the opponent of the alliance is incompletely informed about the relative strengths of its members. The best equilibrium outcome for the alliance under a unanimity rule is not attainable with a non-unanimity rule. However, unlike in the complete information model, less than optimal outcomes and delays may occur with positive probability even under unanimity, depending on the prior beliefs and the preferences of the agents. We are grateful to a careful referee for comments. We wish to thank Clara Ponsati for useful comments.     

COVID-19 and asymmetric volatility spillovers across global stock markets

In this study, I improve the assessment of asymmetry in volatility spillovers, and define six asymmetric spillover indexes. Employing Diebold-Yilmaz spillover index, network analysis, and my developed asymmetric spillover index, this study investigates the time-varying volatility spillovers and asymmetry in spillovers across stock markets of the U.S., Japan, Germany, the U.K., France, Italy, Canada, China, India, and Brazil based on high-frequency data from June 1, 2009, to August 28, 2020. I find that the global markets are well connected, and volatility spillovers across global stock markets are time-varying, crisis-sensitive, and asymmetric. Developed markets are the main risk transmitters, and emerging markets are the main risk receivers. Downside risk dominates financial contagion effects, and a great deal of downside risk spilled over from stock markets of risk transmitters into the global markets. Moreover, during the coronavirus recession, the total degree of volatility spillover is staying at an extremely high level, and emerging markets are the main risk receivers in the 2020 stock markets crash.     

Credit risk and asymmetric information: A simplified approach

We present a simple model for risky, corporate debt. Debtholders and equityholders have incomplete information about the financial state of the debt issuing company. Information is incomplete because it is delayed for all agents, and it is asymmetrically distributed between debtholders and equityholders. We solve for the equityholders' optimal default policy and for the credit spreads required by debtholders. Delayed information accelerates the equityholders' optimal decision to default. Interestingly, this effect is small, implying only a small impact on credit spreads. Asymmetric information, however, has a major impact on credit spreads. Our model predicts high credit spreads for short-term debt, as observed empirically in credit markets.     

Insider trading,overconfidence, and private information flow

In this study, we investigate a dynamic model wherein an overconfident and a risk-neutral informed trader optimally exploit their long-lived private information regarding the value of an asset. We find that when the degree of overconfidence becomes larger, or the intensity of private information flow becomes larger relative to the initial private signal, the market becomes more stable. Additionally, we find that the greater the intensity of private information flow relative to the initial private signal, the more evident the patient transaction and the slower the information is incorporated in the price.     

Large but finite games with asymmetric information

Carmona considered an increasing sequence of finite games in each of which players are characterized by payoff functions that are restricted to vary within a uniformly equicontinuous set and choose their strategies from a common compact metric strategy set. Then Carmona proved that each finite game in an upper tail of such a sequence admits an approximate Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.     

Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information

We study the relationship between the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations and the ex-post core of exchange economies with asymmetric information.     

Takings of development rights with asymmetric information and an endogenous probability of an externality

A game-theoretic model is used to analyze the interaction between the landowner and the government. In the benchmark model, efficiency can be reached when compensation is tied to the private value of developed land, which is contrary to much of the takings literature. Further, the level of compensation needed to create an efficient outcome with no over-development is derived. Next, two cases are considered: asymmetric information and an endogenous probability of an externality. First, the presence of the positive externality is revealed only to the landowner before the decision to develop early. In this case, if the landowner does not receive the full market compensation, then he or she has an incentive to eliminate the externality. In the second case, the model includes an endogenous probability of a positive externality occurring that depends on investment in conservation. For an efficient outcome to occur, the landowner should be compensated by the full amount of the positive externality. This compensation scheme aligns the incentives of the owner with society.     

信息不对称下保险信用缺失分析及防范

当前，保险信用缺失已成为制约保险市场进一步发展的瓶颈。文中从投保人、保险人的逆向选择及道德风险三个方面阐述了保险信用缺失的原因，同时提出了健全我国保险信用体系的对策。