Consumers’ implicit attitudes toward corporate social responsibility and corporate abilities: Examining the influence of bank governance using the implicit association test

In studying corporate association valence for two dimensions: corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate abilities (CA), this paper aims to investigate how corporate governance may contribute to brand equity. Using an experimental design, this research measures implicit consumers attitudes with two implicit association tests (IAT) to assess the potential moderating effect of banks governance. In study 1, we manipulated solidarity vs. non-solidarity concept (major meaning associated with CSR) by mobilizing 116 respondents. In study 2, we manipulated performance vs. non-performance concept (major meaning associated with CA) by mobilizing 96 respondents. Results reveal that the CSR association is more positive for member-owned banks than for investor-owned banks. Conversely, the CA association is more positive for investor-owned banks than for member-owned banks. These results emphasize the role of governance in building brand equity through its impact on the valence of the brand associations.     

SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION AND PRIORITY STRATEGIES IN DANISH ORGANIZATIONS

There has been little discussion on how to prioritize and implement SCM strategies within organizations. This paper presents a decision tool to identify prioritized strategies for improving SCM implementation and validates its use in a study amongst SCM managers of 100 Danish organizations.     

Gender and ethnic diversity on boards and corporate information environment

Prior studies argue that demographic diversity on a firm's board impacts its information environment, yet there is limited empirical evidence regarding the relation between board diversity and corporate opacity. We extend this line of research by examining whether gender and ethnic diversity of directors impacts corporate opacity. Using a Herfindahl Index based on directors' gender and ethnicities to measure board diversity, and an opacity index based on analyst following, analyst forecast error, bid–ask spread, and share turnover to measure corporate opacity, we find that board diversity is negatively associated with corporate opacity. Our results are robust to alternative measures of board diversity and the various tests we employ to address potential endogeneity concerns.     

浅析企业税收风险的成因与防范

目前,企业讨论最多的是财务风险、审计风险等,忽视了税收风险对企业影响。但随着经济的迅猛发展和交易的复杂多变性以及税收征纳过程中许多不确定因素的逐渐增多,税收风险也日益引起了人们的注意。税收风险按主体分为：企业（纳税主体）税收风险和税务部门（征税主体）税收风险。本文主要在分析产生企业税收风险原因的基础上,浅析其防范的措施,以便减弱税收风险对企业的负面影响。     

Ownership structure and earnings management in emerging markets—An institutionalized agency perspective

Previous earnings management research has largely focused on firm-level governance mechanisms in single countries or on macro-level variables in multiple countries. Building on this research, we incorporate firm ownership predictors along with national institutional dimensions to explore why firm decision makers in emerging markets vary in their earnings management behavior. Our theoretical framework integrates agency and institutional theories proposing that firm-level ownership mechanisms do not function in isolation, but are reinforced or attenuated by elements of the institutional governance environment. The multilevel empirical analysis of 1200 firms in 24 emerging markets indicates that controlling ownership is positively related to earnings management. We find that the level of minority shareholder protection in a country weakens this positive relationship. We also find that regulatory quality strengthens the negative relationship between institutional ownership and earnings management activity. It is hoped that awareness of how firm ownership structures interact with national-level institutions in affecting firm-level behavior will help managers and investors develop skills and practices to better cope with business norms in emerging economies.     

萨班斯法案与我国上市公司治理结构研究

为了保护投资者的利益,美国于2002年颁布了萨班斯法案。该法案要求加强对在美国上市公司的监管,完善上市公司的内部控制机制,但其高昂的实施成本也引起了人们对该法案作用的争议。尽管如此,萨班斯法案对我国上市公司治理方面仍具有借鉴意义。本文通过对萨班斯法案的分析,探讨我国证券市场应如何借鉴该法案来完善我国上市公司内部治理机制和外部治理环境,从而实现我国证券市场快速、健康而有序的发展,以保护国内广大投资者的利益。     

The role of corporate governance in FDI decisions: Evidence from Taiwan

There has been a considerable literature on the determinants of why firms undertake foreign direct investment (FDI), but very little on whether firms with different governance characteristics are more or less likely to venture overseas. For example, are family-controlled firms more predisposed to FDI than firms, with similar attributes, but different forms of ownership? Does the presence of institutional shareholders suggest a greater propensity to invest abroad? Does the composition of the Board of Directors have an impact? Most extant studies of corporate governance focus on the impact of governance factors on firm performance. However, these performance outcomes are a function of the strategic decisions made by the firms, which suggests it might be useful to consider the relationship between corporate governance factors and particular strategic decisions. One example is the decision to undertake foreign direct investment. The two main strands of IB literature on the determinants of FDI have little or nothing to say about how corporate governance factors might affect the FDI decision. Both internalisation theory and the resource-based view see FDI primarily as a means by which firms can appropriate rents in overseas markets from the exploitation of their idiosyncratic resources and capabilities. This paper extends this literature by investigating the effects of governance factors on the decision to undertake FDI. In particular, we want to assess the impact upon the FDI decision of (a) the extent of family control, (b) the presence of domestic and foreign institutional shareholders, and (c) the composition of the Board of Directors. We investigate these effects using a sample of 228 publicly listed firms in Taiwan, and our results clearly indicate that family control and share ownership by domestic financial institutions in Taiwanese firms are associated with the decision to undertake FDI. We also find that corporate governance impacts in different ways with regard to Taiwanese FDI in China in comparison to Taiwanese FDI in the rest of the world.     

试析商业银行的特殊性及其对法人治理的影响

完善法人治理结构是银行改革的核心,但目前对商业银行法人治理的研究基本上只是简单套用企业法人治理理论,并没有充分考虑商业银行与一般企业的差异。本文着重研究了商业银行在经营目标、经营地位、资本结构、经营风险、存款保险、信息透明度和政府管制等方面的特殊性及其对法人治理的影响,希望能为构建具有商业银行自身特色的法人治理理论体系奠定基础。     

Can minority state ownership influence firm value? Universal and contingency views of its governance effects

Drawing on the literature of corporate governance and privatization, this study explores the elusive roles of a specific owner identity, namely, state ownership in its minority. With a sample of 68 Taiwanese companies with 5 to 49% state ownership during 1999-2003, the study examines the value-shaping effects of minority state ownership (MSO) and, furthermore, seeks to establish a contingency perspective suggesting that the internal and external contexts may moderate the influence of MSO on firm value. Using first-order autoregressive models to mitigate the problems of endogeneity, the study shows that the governance effect of MSO associates not only in a curvilinear relationship with firm value but also strengthened by corporate ownership ties and market competition. The non-monotonic performance effect and the context-dependent nature of MSO yield significant implications for government investments in the private sector.     

Strategic fit, contractual, and procedural governance in alliances

This paper focuses on the simultaneous mediating and moderating effects of different governance mechanisms on the relationship between conditions for alliance formation and outcome. Alliance governance takes two distinct forms: contractual integration and procedural coordination. While contracts may help set the legal parameters of the alliance agreement, it is day-to-day coordination of activities and processes that determine the effectiveness of such contracts. The proposed framework explains how knowledge outcome of collaborative relationships may be determined by the match of partner motives, influenced by the mix of contractual and procedural governance. A series of testable propositions helps answer the following question. Do combinations of contractual and procedural governance mechanisms, given specific strategic fit, explain knowledge performance differentials?     

Foreign listings, corporate governance, and equity valuations

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign listing on equity valuations and relates it to an improvement in corporate governance. It documents abnormal returns around the announcement to list foreign shares on the London Stock Exchange. These are partially explained by a reduction of agency costs that is consistent with the enhanced monitoring and investor protection that prevail in a superior information and legal environment. The results are consistent with predictions derived from theoretical models of agency costs and illustrate an interesting implication of more open global equity markets.     

Cash holdings and corporate governance in family-controlled firms

This study examines the association between corporate governance and cash policy within family-controlled firms. Family businesses are complex, because, in addition to dealing with common business requirements and opportunities, they must consider the needs and desires of the family owners. The results of this study show that the impact of corporate governance, with its separation of control rights and cash flow rights, director-ownership-in-pledge ratio and proportion of independent directors on cash policy, differs between family-controlled and nonfamily-controlled firms. Separation of seat control rights and cash flow rights, as well as chair duality, significantly affects the cash policy within different levels of cash holdings in firms.     

Do founders matter? A study of executive compensation,governance structure and firm performance

This study compares founder-CEOs and professional CEOs in newly public firms in terms of executive compensation, governance structure, and firm performance. The paper applies a series of decomposition methods to separate founders' extrinsic characteristics from their intrinsic endowments. The paper finds that founder CEOs tend to earn smaller incentive compensation and smaller total compensation than professional CEOs. Founder-managed firms are associated with higher financial performance and are more likely to survive than professional managed firms. Firms with founder-CEOs are associated with even higher financial performance when the position of CEO and chairperson of the board is combined.     

How does regulatory monitoring of cause marketing affect firm behavior and donations to charity?

Cause marketing (CM) typically involves for-profit firms donating part of their sales revenue to a charity, with the hope that this will increase their revenue. We argue that it is important for a regulator to monitor firms’ CM activities, and to assess how differences in the enforcement of CM laws impact the CM practice by firms. Our analytical model uses a Stackelberg leader–follower game that endogenizes the regulator’s decision to enforce CM. The firm then decides whether to truthfully declare or overstate the amount it contributes to charity (and if overstate: by how much). We find the following results in equilibrium under different conditions: (i) CM campaigns are a win–win–win situation – they increase profit for the firm while being truthful, generate larger donations for the charity, and generate a cause marketing surplus for the regulator, resulting in doing well while doing good, (ii) the best response of the firm is to be strategic, even when the regulator is strict with monitoring, (iii) the regulator itself decides not to monitor CM, even though it knows that this results in untruthful behavior by firms. When we endogenize the extent of overstatement, we find that the firm tends to be strategic by overstating donation percentage, whether the regulator is strict or not. As the proportion of unsophisticated consumers (who believe a firm’s claims, whether truthful or not) increases, the donation proportion decreases in general, and the overstatement level increases when the regulator is lenient and decreases when the regulator is strict. In equilibrium, the regulator is strict if the market size is large, and lenient otherwise. A survey with consumers supports key modeling assumptions regarding consumers' lack of knowledge of CM laws.     

现代商业银行公司治理下风险管理的国际比较及对中国的启示

现代西方商业银行根据不同利益主体权利和责任结构的不同主要分为两种比较典型的公司治理模式:以美、英为代表的市场主导型的模式和以德、日为代表的出资者主导型的模式。分析这两种公司治理模式下现代西方商业银行风险管理的特点,在借鉴的基础上提出了完善我国商业银行公司治理下风险管理的构想和建议。