Fiscal Stimulus and Endogenous Firm Entry in a Monopolistic Competition Macroeconomic Model

This paper sets up a monopolistic competition model featuring the returns to production specialization. Some novel results are derived from the analysis. First, the effect of a fiscal stimulus on consumption may be positive or negative, depending crucially upon whether the production function is characterized by increasing or decreasing returns to production specialization. Second, following a fiscal expansion, increasing returns to specialization lead to a positive linkage between real wages and aggregate output, while decreasing returns to specialization result in a negative relationship between real wages and aggregate output. Third, a fiscal expansion may raise social welfare, provided that the degree of increasing returns to production specialization is sufficiently large.     

Exhaustible Resources, Monopolistic Competition, and Endogenous Growth

One of the central analytical findings of the growth literature is that continuous growth is possible even in an economy with exhaustible resources. Based on this result, this paper addresses the question of whether different equilibrium trajectories which lead to a balanced growth path are possible within an endogenous growth model with incomplete competition. Although the Solow-Stiglitz condition is violated due to a monopolistic sector, we nevertheless demonstrate that steady growth in per capita consumption is possible under the condition that the rate of entry of new monopolists exceeds that of the average monopolist's decline in output. As a necessary but not sufficient condition for indeterminacies in a growing economy, this paper demonstrates that the partial production elasticity of capital must be smaller than that of the exhaustible resource.     

Pattern of Trade and Economic Development in a Model of Monopolistic Competition

The paper introduces differences in production and transaction conditions between countries into a model of monopolistic competition. It applies inframarginal analysis to show that, as transaction conditions are improved, the general equilibrium may jump discontinuously across different patterns of trade and economic development. A country may export a good in which it has exogenous comparative disadvantage if its endogenous comparative advantage dominates this disadvantage. Countries will choose a trade and development pattern to utilize their net exogenous and endogenous comparative advantages in production as well as in transactions.     

International Commodity Taxation under Monopolistic Competition

We analyze non‐cooperative commodity taxation in a two‐country trade model characterized by monopolistic competition and international firm and capital mobility. In this setting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through the relocation of mobile firms and through changes in the rents accruing to capital owners. With consumption‐based taxation, these fiscal externalities exactly offset each other and the non‐cooperative tax equilibrium is Pareto efficient. With production‐based taxation, however, there are additional externalities on the foreign tax base and the foreign price level that lead non‐cooperative tax rates to exceed their Pareto efficient levels.     

Noncooperative Equilibrium and Chamberlinian Monopolistic Competition

This paper addresses the existence of equilibrium for a nonatomic Bertrand game in a Chamberlinian environment. We reformulate O. Hart′s model (Rev. Econ. Stud. 52, 1985, 529–546) as a nonatomic game and show that under dispersion of tastes and continuity of the tastes density, there exists a pure-strategies ε-equilibrium where prices exceed marginal cost. Unlike Hart′s model there is no need to impose uniformity (or even independence) on the distribution of the m-tuple of differential commodities that consumers care about. Moreover, demand curves are allowed to vary across firms and in equilibrium firms may earn profits. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: B21, D43, L13.     

Public Good Provision Under Monopolistic Competition

This paper presents a model of voluntary private provision of public good under monopolistic competition following Pecorino. Consumers prefer product varieties and a public good. Marginal utility of income depends inversely upon the aggregate consumption of private goods in this model. As population size increases, aggregate consumption of private goods goes up and marginal utility of income falls. This explains the positive relationship between population size and public good provision. Any technological changes in the production of private goods are shown to be neutral to the aggregate provision of public good. These results are in contrast to Pecorino.     

Environmental Policy in Open Economies and Monopolistic Competition

This paper analyses the implications of international trade for non-cooperative environmental policy in the case of local production externalities. A particular focus is on the potential effects of regulations on the variety of goods and the resulting international spillover caused by trade. A tougher domestic standard negatively affects the utility of the households abroad, since such a policy reduces their variety of imports (due to fewer domestic product inventions) or their consumption of each imported brand (due to higher import prices). Ignoring the negative spillover, non-cooperative governments implement inefficiently strict standards in equilibrium. In contrast to this clear-cut inefficiency result, the impact of international trade on the state of the environment is ambiguous.     

Monopolistic Competition and Different Wage Setting Systems

In this paper, we present a disequilibrium unemployment model without labor market frictions and monopolistic competition in the goods market within an infinite horizon model of growth. We consider different wage setting systems and compare wages, the unemployment rate, and income per capita in the long‐run at firm, sector, and national (centralized) levels. The aim of this paper is to determine under which conditions, the inverted‐U hypothesis between unemployment and the degree of centralization of wage bargaining, reported by Calmfors and Driffill [Economic Policy, 6, 14–61, 1988], is confirmed. Our analysis shows that a high degree of market power normally produces the inverted‐U shape for unemployment. Moreover, we also illustrate that this inverted‐U shape can be reversed when the ability of trade unions to internalize the provision of social services is great enough at sector level.     

垄断竞争、中间产品与城市规模

从分工经济与城市规模之间关系的角度,运用Dixit-Stiglitz模型框架下经济活动的规模收益递增原理,在城市内部最终产品生产企业利润最大化的条件下,系统讨论了投入的中间产品种类数与城市人口规模之间的关系、中间产品之间的替代性对城市均衡人口规模的反馈作用,以及城市内部中间产品专业化水平和互补经济程度之间的关系。在此基础上,利用广东省城市增长的部分数据进行了实证分析。认为:经济活动的集聚形成了城市;在城市体积增长和城市系统随产业的专业化与多样化发展而演进的过程中,城市规模经济的实现除了依赖生产要素流动外,最终产品生产企业对中间产品投入的需求也具有不可忽视的作用。     

中国经济波动——基于新凯恩斯主义垄断竞争模型的分析

本文运用新凯恩斯主义垄断竞争模型来研究中国经济波动问题。模型校准的结果表明,就暂时冲击而言,消费偏好冲击、投资边际效率冲击、技术冲击、名义货币供给增长冲击和政府支出冲击都能产生明显的暂时经济波动;就冲击的持久性而言,只有消费偏好冲击和技术冲击的持久性对经济波动变化具有较明显的影响。但技术冲击对产出波动的影响不如RBC类模型那样大,而持久的正向消费偏好冲击对稳定经济增长非常重要。     

Capital Inflow in the Presence of Endogenous Labour Supply and Monopolistic Competition

This paper examines the impact of capital mobility within the context of a simple general equilibrium model where the supply of labour is endogenous and the producer services sector is subject to monopolistic competition. It is shown that the presence of monopolistic competition influences the size of all comparative static results. The paper also shows that the size of the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption of the final good plays a crucial role in determining the impact of changes in the supply of capital on utility-maximising labour supply and welfare. Specifically, it is shown that capital mobility has no impact on optimal labour supply if the elasticity of substitution is equal to unity. The impact of a small capital inflow on welfare can be negative if the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently larger than unity.     

Monopolistic Competition, Increasing Returns and International Coordination of Entry Policy

This paper presents a new model of monopolistic competition in which firms produce differentiated products under decreasing costs. This model is used to confirm and illustrate the limitations of the excess entry hypothesis, well known in the literature on industrial organization. The validity of the theorem is limited in the sense that it fails to hold in the present model if the properly defined degree of love for variety is sufficiently large. The model is extended to allow for intraindustry trade and to examine the conditions for gains (or losses) from trade in a two-country framework. It is shown how the degree of love for variety affects them. The significance and nature of international coordination of competition policy in the present setting is considered. The degree of love for variety is again shown to be of crucial importance in the characterization of the optimal policy coordination.     

Transfers in a North-South Growth Model

The possibility of immiserizing growth is explored in a non-Neoclassical North-South model having formal similarities to Goodwin's growth-cycle model. Because of the the 'engine-of-growth' property of the Northern economy, a redistribution in favour of the South is beneficial to that region only in the short run but will harm both regions in the long run.     

Comparison Utility in a Growth Model

We examine the dynamics of two endogenous-growth modelsin which agents have comparison utility. In the inward-lookingeconomy, individuals care about how their current consumptioncompares with their own past consumption. In the outward-lookingeconomy, they care about how their own consumption compares withother peoples consumption. In response to a negative shock tocapital, saving and growth will temporarily fall in both of themodels that we consider but will remain constant in a model withstandard preferences. The decline will be smaller in the outward-than in the inward-looking case, but utility will be lower inthe former case because of a negative externality.     

我国经济"低成本竞争"模式形成的背景和特征

本文分析了现阶段我国工业化进程中的特殊条件和“要素组合优势”，指出我国一些年来的增长模式是以“低成本竞争”为显著特征的，讨论了与这一模式相关的“国内消费和对外贸易导向”、“主导产业驱动”、“劳动力和其他资源跨部门流动”、“成熟技术的引入和扩散”、“市场的外延扩张”等重要因素，并分析了体制变迁对这一模式多方面的影响。     

公平竞争与投资增长

公平竞争的经营环境是经济持续增长的必要条件,而现阶段影响我国企业公平竞争的两个重要问题是官员清廉度与政府规制繁冗。本文使用我国地级市2013年1月至2015年8月的月度数据,实证分析了消除这两种障碍对地级市固定资产投资增长的影响,并得出建立公平的市场环境需要提高清廉度并减少政府规制的结论。具体来说,我们发现在政府管理制度化程度较差的地区,官员清廉度越高则固定资产投资增长越快;而在政府管理制度化水平高的地区,官员清廉度则对该市的固定资产投资增长没有显著的影响。这些结果表明,官员清廉度不高和地方政府管理制度化的缺失是阻碍我国地级市固定资产投资增长的重要因素,而提高清廉度并同时提高政府管理制度化水平有利于投资的稳定增长。     

Growth, Competition and Welfare

The impact of competition on growth and welfare is analysed by developing a model in which the number of firms, profit margins and innovation rates are endogenous. Different regimes of oligopolistic competition are distinguished. The tougher the price competition, the lower the profit margins for a given rate of concentration. This reduces the number of firms and product variety in a free entry equilibrium. Consequently, tougher competition implies larger firm size and higher rates of innovation since new technologies can be applied in a larger market. Oligopolistic pricing leads to underinvestment in firm-specific knowledge, even if inter-firm knowledge spillovers are neglected.