Schumpeterian Growth Without Scale Effects

We incorporate population growth into the model of trustified capitalism, with vertical and horizontal product differentiation, developed by Thompson and Waldo (1994) and generate endogenous long-run Schumpeterian growth without scale effects. Our model extends the analysis of Young (1998) and overturns some key policy and welfare implications of his model. The transitional dynamics of the model can account for the presence of scale effects in preindustrial and early industrial eras.     

Schumpeterian Growth with Gradual Product Obsolescence

The model in this article captures several important aspects of the real world: gradual obsolescence of goods in the form of gradually declining net profit derived from each product until it is phased out, expanding variety of goods over time, and both dynamic and static internal increasing returns to scale of production. To eliminate the scale effect, Jones's specification that gives rise to a semiendogenous rate of innovation is adopted. The most interesting finding of the article is that, when the research duplication effect is small (large) relative to the intertemporal knowledge spillover effect in R and D, the decentralized market delivers insufficient (excessive) obsolescence and allocates too little (much) labor to R and D, while a small subsidy (tax) to innovation is welfare-improving. All these results hold because the positive knowledge spillover externality overwhelms (is overwhelmed by) the negative research duplication externality.     

产权、代理成本和代理效率

本文选择政府管制较少、竞争较为充分的电子电器行业作为研究对象,考察了产权制度与代理成本和代理效率的关系,得到以下结论:(1)在代理成本上,国有产权企业普遍高于混和产权企业,混和产权企业高于个人产权企业;在代理成本差异上,混和产权企业与个人产权企业的差异小于与国有产权企业的差异。(2)长期投资率和职工人数与代理成本呈显著正相关关系,而长期投资率、财务杠杆比率、职工人数等与代理效率呈显著负相关关系。(3)企业规模越大,不同产权的代理成本差异越小;反之代理成本差异越大。(4)随着市场竞争程度的提高,各类产权企业的代理成本都呈现下降趋势,其代理效率呈现提高趋势。我们研究的启示是国有企业改革的突破口应考虑如何降低其代理成本,解决的措施之一是产权改革,尤其是产权多元化的改革,其次是完善对投资和负债及冗员的监督和控制机制,以促进代理成本的降低和代理效率的提高。     

企业内部控制:台谋及其防范对策研究

文章在假设内部控制制度外部设计框架合理有效的前提下(在我国由财政部企业内部控制标准委员会制定),从我国企业组织内履行或者根据企业特点对内部控制度规范进行适应性改造设计角度出发,着重研究委托人(董事长、经理和总会计师)与监管者(内部审计)之间、代理人(内部控制各项业务或职务执行者)之间、以及代理人与员工之间三层组织内的合谋问题,通过分析模型给出具有价值的防范对策.     

Gradual Product Replacement,Intangible-Asset Prices and Schumpeterian Growth

The paper develops a general-equilibrium model of scale-invariant Schumpeterian (R&D-based) growth. New higher-quality products are discovered through stochastic and sequential R&D races in each industry. The market share of an R&D race winner increases gradually and is governed by an exponential deterministic process. The introduction of gradual (as opposed to instantaneous) product replacement sheds more light on the effects of the rate of technology diffusion on long-run growth and on long-run dynamics of intangible asset prices. An economy with faster product diffusion rates experiences higher long-run innovation rates, faster transitional growth, and is populated by younger firms. As the typical firm becomes older, the earnings yield (i.e., the inverse of the price earnings (P/E) ratio) increases and expected earnings growth declines. Younger firms have lower earnings, lower market shares, but higher P/E ratios and higher expected earnings growth associated with their higher potential market growth.An electronic version of the paper is available at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/dinopoulos/research.html.     

Schumpeterian Entrepreneurs Meet Engel's Law: The Impact of Inequality on Innovation-Driven Growth

This article analyzes the impactof inequality on growth when consumers have hierarchic preferencesand technical progress is driven by innovations. With hierarchicpreferences, the poor consume predominantly basic goods, whereasthe rich consume also luxury goods. Inequality has an impacton growth because it affects the level and the dynamics of aninnovator's demand. It is shown that redistribution from veryrich to very poor consumers can be beneficial for growth. Ingeneral, the growth effect depends on the nature of redistribution.Due to a demand externality from R&D activities, multipleequilibria are possible.     

效率工资、股权特征与代理成本

本文研究表明,第一种效率工资对代理成本下降具有显著影响,第二、三种效率工资对代理成本下降没有影响。究其原因,与经济特征效率工资、治理机制效率工资、第三种效率工资对代理成本的影响不同有关。从股权特征来看,国有股东、负债融资增加代理成本,而大股东持股比例增加则降低代理成本。从股权特征与效率工资交互作用来看,经济特征效率工资、第一种效率工资与股权特征的监管水平在一定条件下存在替代关系。此外,效率工资和股权特征对公司绩效影响与对代理成本的影响总体一致,但也存在一些差异。     

投资者保护、代理成本与公司绩效

本文基于一个构造的各地区2001—2004年的投资者保护指标,研究了该指标与公司绩效的关系。我们的研究发现:投资者保护水平与公司绩效正相关;国有控股上市公司的投资者保护水平与公司绩效的关系更显著。我们还发现,投资者保护水平能减弱控股股东的控制权和公司绩效的关系,降低控股股东对上市公司的资金占用,并减少上市公司对外部审计的需求。     

信息披露、代理成本与公司治理

本文采用2004-2008年沪深两市A股上市公司数据,运用面板数据固定效应模型和Logistic回归模型,分项和综合考察了公司治理对信息披露质量和代理成本的影响。结果显示:信息披露质量与股权集中度、第一大股东持股比例、高管持股比例、公司控制权、公司所有权显著正相关,与股东人数显著负相关,与最终控制人属性无显著关联;代理成本与股权集中度、第一大股东持股比例、高管持股比例、公司控制权、所有权显著负相关,与股东人数、最终控制人属性无显著关联。     

Entry and Schumpeterian profits

A large empirical literature has documented differences in Schumpeterian profits, both among firms in single industries and between firms in different industries. Theorists have proposed various institutional and strategic factors to account for such differences but have had relatively little to say about the manner in which technology affects entry and profits. In this paper I present a model in which persistent intraindustry differences in firm profitability arise as the outcomes of learning and imitation, and interindustry differences in the persistence of above normal profits arise solely from production being more technologically complex in some industries than in others.     

International Trade, Technology Transfer, Growth, and Welfare in a Schumpeterian Model of Endogenous Growth

This paper provides a simple analysis of the role of international technology transfer in the determination of the long-run pattern of trade, growth, and welfare in a two-country world within an endogenous growth framework. It is shown how the possibility and form of technology transfer impinge upon the long-run pattern of trade and therefore long-run growth rates and welfare. The most interesting finding of this paper is that, under certain conditions, there is a case in which restricted trade is growth- and welfare-enhancing compared with free trade.     

控制权转移、企业绩效与代理成本

我们采用独立样本T检验和非参数检验来考察控制权转移前后企业绩效、代理成本的变化。结果显示,企业绩效下降、代理成本增加对控制权转移有重大影响;控制权转移以后,这些问题能够得到显著改善。但这种改善不可持续,两三年后,绩效、代理成本有复原的迹象。另外,不同转移方式、转移对象转移后,绩效、代理成本的变化趋势也有差别。     

The observational implications of Schumpeterian growth theory

This paper obtains and discusses alternative testable implications of the Schumpeterian theory of creative destruction for economic growth.     

双重委托代理视角的内部控制

股权集中导致了小股东和控股股东间、控股股东与管理层间的双重委托代理问题的存在。作为内部控制思想渊源的委托代理关系的改变必然对内部控制理论的创新和发展提出要求，由中层会计核算系统和业务执行系统向高层决策系统渗透。与此相适应，内部控制需要从财务报告导向向价值创造导向转型。     

Schumpeterian incumbents and industry evolution

This essay explores the role of established firms in the evolution of innovative industries. Both direct and indirect contributions are discussed. Besides innovation in their own industries, established firms are often among the pioneering entrants into related markets. They enable spin-off entrepreneurship and provide exit options for startups through acquisition. Furthermore, established firms help shape and directly support public research activities. The multiple roles of established firms, their interaction with new entrants in the innovation process, and the dynamics on industry evolution in an increasingly globalized world are not sufficiently well understood.     

The Cost of Diversity: Endogenous Property Rights and Growth

Well-specified property rightsenhance economic performance but vary considerably across countries.The failure of numerous nation-states to adopt growth-enhancinginstitutions is paradoxical. This paper examines the role ofethnic and linguistic diversity in retarding the developmentof growth-enhancing property rights and in-turn economic growth.The data show that property rights are attenuated in more diversepolities and economic growth is correspondingly lower.     

The Relationship Between Saving and Credit from a Schumpeterian Perspective

After 1995, the United States experienced housing and mortgage booms, fuelled by increased lending from less regulated institutions, such as hedge funds. At the micro level, the housing boom may have left families with more wealth, but the mortgage boom may have increased their financial vulnerability. Using the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances, we consider both wealth creation and a select number of financial vulnerability measures of homeowners. The data indicate that the housing boom was not only associated with larger house values, but also moderated wealth gains and substantially greater financial vulnerability of homeowners. Both trends were more pronounced among middleincome and Hispanic families, who saw larger wealth gains, but also greater increases in financial vulnerability than their counterparts. Given the breadth of the spread in homeowners’ financial vulnerability alongside sharply higher house prices, our results support the link between more deregulated financial markets and rising financial instability.     

Technological Regimes and Schumpeterian Patterns of Innovation

This paper proposes that the specific pattern of innovative activities in an industry can be explained as the outcome of different technological (learning) regimes . A technological regime is defined by the particular combination of technological opportunities, appropriability of innovations, cumulativeness of technical advances and properties of the knowledge base. Building upon the distinction between Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II industries, this paper provides empirical estimates of the relationships between indicators of the Schumpeterian patterns of innovation (concentration of innovative activities, stability in the hierarchy of innovators and importance of new innovators) and indicators of the variables defining technological regimes.     

房屋经纪职能:来自交易成本的解释

本以交易成本理论为依据,通过比较“有经纪人参与”和“无经纪人参与”时交易成本形态的变化,导出了有经纪人参与时房屋买卖双方交易成本的节约模型,笔认为：房屋经纪职能能降低房屋交易成本,交易成本的节约值便是经纪人的“产品”,该结论与消费需求理论的分析结果相一致。     

Agency Cost of Debt and Credit Market Imperfections: A Bargaining Approach

This paper studies the effect of credit market imperfections, measured by the relative bargaining power of banks, on the agency costs of debt finance. The threshold of obtaining loan finance is shown to be independent of the relative bargaining power of the financier. However, lower relative bargaining power of banks leads to lower lending rates and investment return distributions with lower, but less risky returns. Thus, our analysis does not support the view, presented in a large existing literature, that there would be a trade‐off between reduced credit market imperfections and higher agency costs of debt finance.